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Problem 
 There is a disagreement between three theological models (sacramental, 
functional, and ontological) of interpretation about Christ’s priesthood. One clear aspect 
of this disagreement is the existence of different views on the relationship between 
sacrifice and heavenly mediation in the priesthood of Christ. These conflicting views 
reveal that Christian theology does not have a consensus about the nature of the priestly 
work of the ascended Christ, including the conception of how Christ mediates salvation 
through his priesthood. This problematic situation raises the question whether there is a 





The present study hermeneutically deconstructs these models of Christ’s 
priesthood to articulate a constructive proposal of an alternative model as a suggestion for 
the resolution of the conflict of interpretations regarding this doctrine. This 
deconstruction seeks to uncover the logic of each interpretation of Christ’s priesthood 
from the perspective of the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality or ontological 
presuppositions assumed in that interpretation. Such perspective indicates how these 
presuppositions inform and impact an interpretation or theory about the priesthood of 
Christ. This deconstruction involves three steps in this dissertation: (1) a systematic 
outline of the interpretations of Christ’s priesthood; (2) a description of the understanding 
of the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality assumed in each interpretation depicted 
in the first step and an indication of the implications for the doctrine of Christ’s 
priesthood; and (3) a transition to the construction of an alternative model derived from 
an interaction with Hebrews, including its pointers to the interpretation of macro-
hermeneutical principles of reality, and the implications for the doctrine of Christ’s 
priesthood. 
Results 
With regard to the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality in the sacramental, 
functional, and ontological models, the research shows that divinity is a reality defined by 
non-sequentiality (understood as, or at least logically close to, a timeless-spaceless 
being), the humanity of Christ is a spatio-temporal instrument of the divine non-
sequential reality, and heaven is understood as, or logically close to, a timeless-spaceless 
environment. When the sacramental, functional, and ontological interpretations of the 
 
 
priesthood of Christ are read from the perspective of these macro-hermeneutical 
principles of reality, the results below are generated. 
In the sacramental model, the priesthood of Christ refers to a Christological 
picture that is soteriologically concrete in spatio-temporal instruments that convey and 
actualize the timeless-spaceless reality of the new creation in human beings.  
In the functional model, the priesthood of Christ is described in a Christological 
language that involves sequentiality of functions (earthly cross and heavenly 
intercession), but it is soteriologically concrete in spatio-temporal instruments that 
convey/actualize the timeless-spaceless reality of the new creation in human beings. 
In the ontological model, the priesthood of Christ portrays a Christology that 
reveals, by means of spatio-temporal instruments, in our spatio-temporal world the 
soteriological reality of new creation that is already concrete in God. 
However, on the basis of a systematic reading of Christ’s priesthood in the epistle 
to the Hebrews, the research suggests an alternative view, namely, the historical model. 
This reading finds pointers to a different interpretation of macro-hermeneutical principles 
of reality, where the divine reality, the humanity of Christ, and heaven are spatio-
temporal realities. In contrast to the other models, as they hold a distinct interpretation of 
macro-hermeneutical principles, the historical model strongly emphasizes a heavenly 
priesthood and intentionally interprets Christ’s priesthood as spatio-temporal. This means 
that Christ performs a sequential official activity in heaven, in which God is involved in 
the soteriological process of forgiving and transforming human beings. 
Conclusions 
The main contention of this study is that the historical model constitutes a viable 
 
 
alternative that points to a way out of the conflicting systematic interpretations of the 
doctrine of Christ’s priesthood. This conclusion is unpacked in the following arguments.  
First, the basic problem of the sacramental model lies on the interpretation of the 
macro-hermeneutical principles of reality, as it conceptualizes the divine reality and 
realm in terms of timelessness-spacelessness. By assuming a spatio-temporal view of 
divine reality, the historical model necessarily (in terms of internal consistency) outlines 
a different conception of the priesthood of Christ in comparison with the sacramental 
model.  
Second, in contrast to the internal coherence of the sacramental model, the chief 
weakness of the functional model is the lack of consistency between its notion of the 
priesthood of Christ and its interpretation or assumptions regarding the macro-
hermeneutical principles of reality. While the picture of Christ’s priesthood in this model 
seems to imply a spatio-temporal view of reality, its interpretation of the principles of 
reality is aligned with a timeless-spaceless perspective of divine reality. In this way, the 
important idea of sequential actions and events in the functional model is obscured by a 
timeless-spaceless understanding of divine reality. With this situation in mind, the 
historical model stipulates that a consistent understanding of Christ’s priesthood 
characterized by sequential actions and events requires an interpretation of the macro-
hermeneutical principles of reality that presupposes spatio-temporality in the notion of 
divine reality. 
Third, the major problem of the ontological model is that it did not modify in a 
substantial way the timeless-spaceless view of reality assumed by the sacramental and 
functional models. While this model is more internally coherent than the functional 
 
 
model, the interpretation of Christ’s priesthood in the ontological model does not seem 
consistent with the picture of this priesthood in Hebrews, according to the interpretation 
of the historical model.  
Fourth, the consistency of the historical model is basically described by a focus on 
an official heavenly priesthood in Hebrews that implies, for instance, a real appearance 
before God and a real activity of intercession in the heavenly sanctuary that is supported 
by a spatio-temporal view of divine realm and reality. These activities allow an actual 
sequential interaction between what takes place on earth (e.g., human prayer) and what 
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Background of the Problem 
As a central aspect of Christian soteriology, Christ’s priesthood (CP) is 
foundational for a proper understanding of His work.1 Based on the fact that the book of 
“Hebrews contains the only detailed Christology of the High Priest in the New 
Testament,”2 Oscar Cullmann argues in his classic New Testament Christology that 
“Hebrews’ development of the High Priest concept offers a full Christology” that 
“includes all the three fundamental aspects of Jesus’ work”:3 (1) “his once-for-all earthly 
                                                
1 Donald Hagner points out the biblical connection between Christology and soteriology, 
particularly in Christ’s priesthood. “Christology in Hebrews, as throughout the New Testament, consists in 
the identity of Jesus bound together with what he does. Very simply, it is because of who Christ is that he 
can do what he does. The unique emphases of the christology of Hebrews can be best appreciated by 
examining this connection between the person and work of Christ.” Donald A. Hagner, “The Son of God as 
Unique High Priest: The Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews,” in Contours of Christology in the New 
Testament, ed. Richard N. Longenecker (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), 248. 
2 Oscar Cullmann, The Christology of the New Testament, trans. Shirley C. Guthrie and Charles A. 
M. Hall (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1959), 104. George Ladd claims that the priesthood of Christ is “the 
central theme in the Christology of Hebrews.” George Eldon Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament, rev. 
ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1993), 625. For further information about the centrality of Christ’s 
priesthood in the Epistle to the Hebrews, see Hagner, “The Son of God as Unique High Priest,” 247-266; 
Albert Vanhoye, Our Priest Is Christ: The Doctrine of the Epistle to the Hebrews (Rome: Pontifical 
Biblical Institute, 1977); Joy D. Tetley, “The Priesthood of Christ as the Controlling Theme of the Epistle 
to the Hebrews,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Durham, UK, 2008).  
3 Cullmann, The Christology of the New Testament, 103. Cullmann recognizes that “this concept 
does not especially take into account the work of the pre-existent Christ. But, besides the bold reference in 
1.10 to Christ as the Creator of earth and heaven,” he highlights that the book of Hebrews “especially 
emphasizes another Christological title, ‘Son of God’ which refers precisely to Jesus’ pre-existence.” Ibid. 
For further information about the connection between the Christological concepts of Son of God and High 




work”;4 (2) “his present work as the exalted Lord”;5 and (3) “his future work as the one 
coming again.”6 However, Cullmann notes that this third aspect “is only mentioned and 
not fully developed.”7  
Overall, the most systematic treatments of the doctrine of the priesthood of Christ 
tend to focus on the two first aspects pointed by Cullmann, which roughly correspond 
respectively to the notions of atonement and mediation. Among the different views of 
Christ’s priesthood in Christian theology,8 three main theological models9 may be 
distinguished.10 In fact, one of the chief dissimilarities between them is the way in which 
they integrate the atoning sacrifice of Christ and His heavenly mediation. Broadly 
speaking, the first model sacramentally identifies Christ’s sacrifice with His mediation 
                                                
4 Cullmann, The Christology of the New Testament, 103-104. This aspect is mainly related to the 
once-for-all sacrifice of Christ on the cross (Heb 7:27; 10:10).  
5 Ibid., 104. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. Cullmann affirms that this aspect is mentioned in Heb 9:28 and represents “the 
eschatological side” of Christ’s priesthood, pointing to “the ‘second’ coming of Jesus.” Ibid., 103. 
8 For useful information about patristic interpretations of the concept of Christ as priest and 
mediator, especially in the context of the book of Hebrews, see Gerald O’Collins and Michael Keenan 
Jones, Jesus Our Priest: A Christian Approach to the Priesthood of Christ (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 69-104; Michael Keenan Jones, Toward a Christology of Christ the High Priest 
(Rome: Gregorian University Press, 2006), 63-126; Jon M. Robertson, Christ as Mediator: A Study of the 
Theologies of Eusebius of Caesarea, Marcellus of Ancrya, and Athanasius of Alexandria (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Rowan A. Greer, The Captain of Our Salvation: A Study in the 
Patristic Exegesis of Hebrews (Tübingen: Mohr, 1973).  
9 In the present study, “the concept of ‘model’ refers to the specific way in which a theological 
doctrine is articulated in its essential features.” It means that models are “ideal, simplified, and schematic, 
accounts of a much more complex reality.” Fernando Luis Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration: 
Searching for the Cognitive Foundation of Christian Theology in a Postmodern World (Lanham, MD; 
Oxford: University Press of America, 2001), 76.   
10 As far as the doctrine of Christ’s priesthood is concerned, the present study could not find a 
significant taxonomy of the different interpretations of this doctrine in Christian theology from a systematic 
perspective. It means that the classification and labels provided below represent an attempt to systematize 




(sacramental priesthood); while the second affirms that Christ’s sacrifice and His 
heavenly mediation are connected, but they are distinct and sequential activities 
(functional11 priesthood); and the third model argues that His sacrifice and mediation are 
ontologically merged in Christ’s own being (ontological priesthood). 
More specifically, the model labeled in this study as sacramental priesthood is 
particularly defended by traditional Catholic theology. For Thomas Aquinas, the 
sacraments administered by the church are derived and flow from Christ’s priesthood.12 
In this sense, Gerald O’Collins highlights that, as the eternal high priest, “the risen Christ 
exercises his saving mission as primary” and invisible “minister of all the sacraments.”13 
According to that perspective, the priesthood of Christ is principally connected with the 
idea of sacrifice in the sacrament of the eucharist.14 Aquinas assumes that Christ’s 
sacrifice essentially means the achievement of His priestly work,15 and His sacramental 
sacrifice16 takes place in the eucharist by virtue of the alleged reality of 
                                                
11 The term functional, in this context, conveys the idea that Christ performs specific and distinct 
priestly functions.  
12 ST 3.63.3. 
13 JOP, 212. Elsewhere Collins declares that “the eternal High Priest incessantly acts as the 
primary, invisible minister in the preaching and sacramental life of the Church.” Ibid., 267. 
14 According to Aquinas, the eucharist is the most important of the seven sacraments because of 
two main reasons: (1) it contains Christ substantially, the source of grace, whereas the other sacraments are 
merely instruments of Christ’s grace; (2) the eucharist is the end and consummation of all the other 
sacraments. ST 3.65.3; 3.63.6. 
15 Aquinas presumes that “the priesthood of Christ was made manifest most of all in His passion 
and death.” ST 3.22.5. All English quotations of ST are taken from Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 
trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 5 vols., The Master Christian Library Ver. 5.0 [CD Rom] 
(Albany, OR: AGES Software, 1997). 
16 The sacramental sacrifice is not different from the sacrifice on the cross. ST 3.22.3.2. In regard 
to the relationship between the sacrifice on the cross and the sacramental sacrifice in the eucharist (the 
sacrifice of the mass), Ludwig Ott explains that the latter is a “relative sacrifice,” and “it is essentially 





transubstantiation.17 In this way, Christ’s mediation is sacramentally identified with the 
eucharistic sacrifice,18 because such mediation occurs in the sense that humans receive 
the fruits of Christ’s priestly sacrifice through the eucharistic elements.19 
On the other hand, the model named functional priesthood is mainly related to 
classical Protestant theology, as expounded by figures such as Martin Luther and John 
Calvin.20 In contrast to the sacramental model, the functional priesthood rejects the idea 
of sacramental sacrifice in the church and its connection with Christ’s mediation of 
                                                
Sacrifice of the Mass draws its whole power from the Sacrifice of the Cross, whose fruits applies to 
individual men.” Furthermore, they are different only in “the nature and mode of the offering . . . [whereas] 
on the Cross the sacrificial gift was offered in a bloody manner by a real separation of the body and blood 
(immolatio realis), in the Holy Mass it is offered in an unbloody manner by a mystical separation of the 
body and blood (immolatio mystica).” Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma (Rockford, IL: Tan 
Books, 1974), 407-408. As O’Collins and Jones indicate, eucharist is a sacramental, not a historical 
sacrifice. JOP, 290. 
17 ST 3.75.4. The Council of Trent (1551) defined transubstantiation as follows: “By the 
consecration of the bread and of the wine, a conversion is made of the whole substance of the bread into the 
substance of the body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of His 
blood.” The Council of Trent: The Canons and Decrees of the Sacred and Ecumenical Council of Trent, ed. 
J. Waterworth (London: Dolman, 1848), 77. For further information about the concept of 
transubstantiation, see Engelbert Gutwenger, “Transubstantiation,” Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise 
Sacramentum Mundi, ed. Karl Rahner (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 1751-1755; Joseph Pohle, “The Real 
Presence of Christ in the Eucharist,” The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 5 (New York: Robert Aplleton, 
1909), http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05573a.htm (accessed 30 December, 2016); Stephen L. Brock, 
“St. Thomas and the Eucharistic Conversion,” The Thomist 65, no. 4 (2001): 529-565; Joseph Pohle and 
Arthur Preuss, The Sacraments: A Dogmatic Treatise, 4 vols. (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder, 1917), 2:25. 
18 According to Ott, in the “sacrifice of the mass, Christ’s sacrifice on the cross is made present, its 
memory is celebrated, and its saving power is applied.” Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, 407. 
19 ST 3.79.1; 3.22.6. In short, the “eucharist provides a sacramental means of entry into the 
offering and fruits of Christ’s priestly sacrifice.” JOP, 108. 
20 The discussion about the priesthood of Christ has been particularly fruitful in Calvinist circles. 
See Efion E Evans, “The Puritan Concept of Divine Intercession,” in Puritan Papers, Volume Two: 1960-
1962, ed. J.I. Packer (Phillipsburg, NJ; Kingsburg, CA: Presbyterian and Reformed; The den Dulk 
Christian Foundation, 2001), 187-205; Howard Griffith, “High Priest in Heaven: The Intercession of the 
Exalted Christ in Reformed Theology; Analysis and Critique,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Westminster 
Theological Seminary, 2004); Graham Redding, Prayer and the Priesthood of Christ in the Reformed 
Tradition (Edinburgh; New York: T&T Clark, 2005); Arthur J. Tait, The Heavenly Session of Our Lord: An 
Introduction to the History of the Doctrine (London: R. Scott, 1912). Overall, these studies highlight the 




salvific grace.21 Rather, the Reformers emphatically affirm that Christ’s death on the 
cross is the once-for-all sacrifice, which means that this sacrifice is full, perfect, and 
sufficient, and therefore is not to be repeated in any form.22 Based on this unique sacrifice 
Christ performs His subsequent work as mediator before the Father in heaven. In this 
context, the priesthood of Christ encompasses two inseparable but distinct and sequential 
functions or aspects, namely, the earthly sacrifice and the heavenly intercession.23   
 Finally, the model identified as ontological priesthood is basically adopted by 
some strands of modern theology, as in the case of Karl Barth and Thomas Torrance. 
Unlike the previous model, this position emphasizes that Christ’s salvific mediation is not 
related to something that He does, but to something that He has in His being. To put 
differently, the priestly mediation of Christ is understood ontologically, not in terms of 
functions or activities performed in heaven. 24 Because Barth and Torrance maintain that 
                                                
21 Luther affirms that Christ did not ordain the sacrament of the eucharist in terms of sacrifice, 
since the sacrifice was once performed by the true high priest on the cross. LW, 13:313 (Commentary on 
Psalm 110, 1535). See also ibid., 36:36-40 (The Babylonian Captivity of the Church). According to Paul 
Althaus, the idea of sacrifice in the community of the church is understood in the light of the concept of the 
priesthood of all believers. “For Luther, Christ’s priesthood and the Christian’s priesthood belong together, 
as reconciling faith in Christ and the community of saints together constitute the nature of the church. In the 
final analysis, the Christian’s priestly sacrifice is nothing else than Christ’s own sacrifice. For the life of 
Christians is Christ’s life. All sacrifice through which the community exists is an offering with and in 
Christ in that one sacrifice which took place once but is yet everywhere present, which cannot be repeated 
but lives on in the reality of the community.” Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. R. C. 
Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), 315. For Calvin’s statements against the idea of sacrifice of the 
mass, see ICR 2.15.6; 4.18.  
22 See ICR 4.18.3; LW, 13:320. 
23 See ICR 4.6.2; LW, 13:315, 320-321. 
24 Barth criticizes any “distinction between the restoration of fellowship between God and man 
accomplished once and for all in Jesus Christ” (sacrifice) “and the ‘continual’ mediation of it” (heavenly 
mediation). CD IV/1, 285. All quotations of CD are taken from Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. 
Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, 14 vols. (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2010). According to Torrance, “looked 
at from the side of God, the whole work of salvation is accomplished in the Son.” Thomas F. Torrance, 
Atonement: The Person and Work of Christ (Milton Keynes, UK; Colorado Springs, CO; Downers Grove, 





incarnation and sacrifice took place in the being of Christ, the atonement is a complete 
and ontological reality in Him.25 Thus, the complete salvific reality that is already present 
in Christ’s being needs to be revealed to believers. 
Statement of the Problem 
There is an evident disagreement between the three theological models mentioned 
above (sacramental, functional, and ontological) concerning Christ’s priesthood. One 
clear aspect of this disagreement is the existence of different views on the relationship 
between sacrifice and heavenly mediation in the priesthood of Christ. These conflicting 
views reveal that Christian theology does not have a consensus about the nature of the 
priestly work of the ascended Christ, including the conception of how Christ mediates 
salvation through his priesthood. This problematic situation raises the question whether 
there is a way to resolve this conflict of interpretations. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this dissertation is to deconstruct hermeneutically26 conflicting 
                                                
needs to be interpreted according to His timeless being, which means that all His earthly experience is 
present in His being. “He not only did represent us, He does represent us. He not only did bear the sin of 
the world, He does bear it. He not only has reconciled the world with God, but as the One who has done 
this, He is its eternal Reconciler, active and at work once and for all. He not only went the way from Jordan 
to Golgotha, but He still goes it, again and again.” CD IV/1, 313.  
25 In Torrance’s words, “the judgement of the judge” took place “within his own person.” 
Torrance, Atonement, 124. In this sense, Barth mentions that “Jesus Christ is the atonement.” CD IV/1, 34. 
For Kevin Vanhoozer, this view implies that “the efficacy of the atoning act is internal, not external, to 
God’s own being.” Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “Atonement,” in Mapping Modern Theology: A Thematic and 
Historical Introduction, ed. Kelly M. Kapic and Bruce L. McCormack (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2012), 24. 
26 For a proper explanation of the concept of hermeneutical deconstruction or adopted in this 
study, see Conceptual Framework below. For a detailed description of the application of this deconstruction 




models of Christ’s priesthood in order to articulate a constructive proposal of an 
alternative model as a suggestion for the resolution of the conflict of interpretations 
regarding this doctrine. 
Justification 
Many scholars have argued that by assuming a Greek notion of being Christian 
theology has traditionally interpreted the doctrine of God guided by non-biblical 
presuppositions,27 particularly, from a timeless perspective.28 If “theological 
hermeneutics recognizes that our doctrine of God affects the way we interpret the 
Scriptures,”29 and if Christian “doctrine reflects the nature of God,”30 the concept of a 
                                                
27 See Anthony C. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), 
39-40; Jean-Luc Marion, God without Being: Hors-Texte, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1995); Stanley J. Grenz, The Named God and the Question of Being: A Trinitarian Theo-
Ontology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 15-89. 
28 See Fernando Luis Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as 
Primordial Presuppositions, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series 10 (Berrien 
Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1987); Fernando Luis Canale, Basic Elements of Christian 
Theology: Scripture Replacing Tradition (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Lithothec, 2005); 
Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker, 2000), 17; Clark H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness, Didsbury 
Lectures (Carlisle, UK; Grand Rapids, MI: Paternoster Press; Baker Academic, 2001), 7. Many scholars 
have discussed the relationship between God and time, from different standpoints. See William Lane Craig, 
Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s Relationship to Time (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001); Garrett J. 
DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, Ashgate Philosophy of Religion Series (Aldershot, UK; Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate, 2004); Gregory E. Ganssle, ed., God and Time: Four Views (Cumbria, UK: Paternoster, 
2001); Gregory E. Ganssle and David M. Woodruff, eds., God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, Cornell 
Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 1998); Paul Helm, 
Eternal God: A Study of God without Time (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); William J. 
Hill, Search for the Absent God: Tradition and Modernity in Religious Understanding (New York: 
Crossroad, 1992); Eunsoo Kim, Time, Eternity, and the Trinity: A Trinitarian Analogical Understanding of 
Time and Eternity (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2010); Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity, Cornell Studies 
in the Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); John J. O’Donnell, Trinity and 
Temporality: The Christian Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology and the Theology of Hope, 
Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Alan G. Padgett, 
God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); Nelson Pike, God and 
Timelessness, Studies in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1970).  





timeless God in Christian theology should affect the understanding of the doctrine of 
Christ’s priesthood. Recently, scholars have debated the impact of the timeless notion of 
God on Christology.31 Even though this discussion may reveal significant implications 
for the priestly work of Christ, the debate is mainly focused on the earthly ministry of the 
incarnate Christ and does not address the condition of the ascended Christ and his 
heavenly work as a priest. In this sense, this dissertation may reveal if the timeless 
presupposition plays a role in the understanding of Christ’s priesthood in Christian 
theology. 
Furthermore, some theologians have concluded that there is a scarcity of attentive 
theological reflection upon the connection between Christ’s priesthood and soteriology,32 
                                                
Leicester, England: InterVarsity; Apollos, 2002), 10. 
30 Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine, 63. 
31 See Brian Leftow, “A Timeless God Incarnate,” in The Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary 
Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God, ed. Daniel Kendall, Stephen T. Davis, and Gerald 
O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 273-299; Thomas D. Senor, “Incarnation, 
Timelessness, and Leibniz’s Law Problems,” in God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature, ed. Gregory 
E. Ganssle and David M. Woodruff (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 220-235; Thomas 
D. Senor, “Incarnation and Timelessness,” Faith and Philosophy 7, no. 2 (1990): 149-164; Douglas K. 
Blount, “On the Incarnation of a Timeless God,” in God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature, ed. 
Gregory E. Ganssle and David M. Woodruff (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 236-
248; Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity,” The Journal of Philosophy 78, no. 8 (1981): 451-
453; Pike, God and Timelessness, 172-173; Paul Helm, “Divine Timeless Eternity,” in God and Time: Four 
Views, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle (Cumbria, UK: Paternoster, 2001), 33, 54-55; Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
“Unqualified Divine Temporality,” in God and Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle (Cumbria, UK: 
Paternoster, 2001), 209-210; DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 232-234; Gerald O’Collins, 
Christology: A Biblical, Historical, and Systematic Study of Jesus, 2 ed. (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
Univesity Press, 2009), 249. 
32 See Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1976), 401; Jones, 
Toward a Christology of Christ the High Priest, 10; O’Collins and Jones, Jesus Our Priest, v. As Jones 
indicates, even though “notable theologians and biblical scholars of the twentieth century have presented 
their own various studies of Christ, . . . rarely do they approach Christ through the prism of his priesthood. 
Salvation, redemption, and mediation are constant themes running through Christology but there is often a 
hesitation, a moment’s reluctance to call him a priest, or if the title is mentioned at all, it often seems to be 





including in evangelical circles.33 In this context, the present study may uncover 
hermeneutical reasons why systematic theologians in general have not properly 
developed the role of the priesthood of Christ in soteriology, particularly if the timeless 
presupposition does play a role in their understanding of Christ’s priestly work. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The present study is restricted to three existing models34 of Christ’s priesthood, 
which are identified as sacramental priesthood, functional priesthood, and ontological 
priesthood. The analysis of these models will be essentially limited to specific 
representatives. The selection of representatives is based on two criteria: (1) significance 
of the representative for Christian theology, particularly in the area of systematic 
theology; (2) the representative provides an explicit, detailed, and systematic description 
of the priesthood of Christ. Therefore, the criteria derive primarily from the perspective 
of systematic theology (structure of ideas), and not from the standpoint of historical 
theology (development of ideas). On this basis, the following representatives have been 
selected for each model: (1) Sacramental priesthood—Thomas Aquinas and Gerald 
O’Collins;35 (2) Functional priesthood—Martin Luther and John Calvin;36 (3) 
                                                
33 Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 401-402. 
34 David Tracy defends the importance of using models in theology. “A widely accepted dictum in 
contemporary theology is the need to develop certain basic models or types for understanding the specific 
task of the contemporary theologian.” David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in 
Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 22. For a specific definition of the concept of 
models in the present study, see footnote 9 above.  
35 Aquinas is arguably the most important systematic theologian in classical Roman Catholic 
tradition. He also provides the most systematic description of the priesthood of Christ in this tradition. In 
this same tradition, O’Collins is the most important systematician who provides a systematic portrayal of 
this doctrine in the twentieth-first century. Writing from the perspective of Vatican II, O’Collins implies 




Ontological priesthood—Karl Barth and Thomas Torrance.37 
After the hermeneutical deconstruction of these three models, in the interaction 
with Scripture for the articulation of an alternative model, the scriptural corpus will be 
delimited to the Epistle to the Hebrews as the focus of the study. Because of the 
systematic focus of the research, this dissertation will not engage in the analysis of the 
way the representatives of the sacramental, functional, and ontological models interpret 
Hebrews for their conceptualization of Christ’s priesthood. Rather, the research will 
privilege sources in which the representatives present more systematic expositions, and 
note their references to Hebrews when they are conceptually important to inform specific 
points of the model. 
Furthermore, at the outset, the study does not provide an exact definition of the 
concept and scope of Christ’s priestly work. The present research will use the definitions 
indicated by the models as the starting point for the reflection on the concept and scope of 
Christ’s priesthood. 
Conceptual Framework 
A significant notion for the development of this hermeneutical analysis is the 
concept of theological deconstruction. The explanation of this concept in the present 
section reveals the basic assumptions of this dissertation, which include the notions of 
Hellenization of Christian doctrine, onto-theo-logy and theo-onto-logy, macro-
hermeneutical principles, time and timelessness. All these notions are employed from a 
                                                
36 Luther and Calvin are the most significant names in classical Protestantism. 
37 Barth and Torrance are the most important theologians in modern Protestantism who discuss the 





Two points are important for an adequate understanding of the concept of 
theological deconstruction, namely, the need and nature of this deconstruction. By using 
the term onto-theo-logy scholars have indicated that Greek ontology has traditionally 
been the metaphysical ground of Christian theology.38 This has been caused by the 
Hellenization of Christian doctrine. Studies on the historical development of doctrine in 
Christian theology indicate an assimilation of Greek metaphysical conceptions in the 
explanation of biblical material, promoted chiefly by “the expansion of Christianity into a 
Hellenistic milieu in the first centuries of its history.”39 As Gunton indicates, in the 
context of the idea of Hellenization of theology, the historical development of Christian 
doctrines is generally interpreted in three ways: (1) the presence of Greek elements in 
Christian doctrines represented a clear distortion of the original faith (Adolf von 
Harnack); (2) the use of Greek categories in the development of doctrine basically 
unfolded “what was already implicit in the original faith” (J. H. Newman); and (3) the 
development of Christian doctrine involved an ambivalent rejection and assimilation of 
Hellenism (Jaroslav Pelikan).40 My perspective on Hellenization in this dissertation 
                                                
38 See Martin Heidegger, “The onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics,” in Identity and 
Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Iain D. Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology: 
Technology and the Politics of Education (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 7-
43; Marion, God Without Being, 35-38; Grenz, The Named God and the Question of Being, 15-130; Canale, 
A Criticism of Theological Reason, 19-284; Brian D. Ingraffia, Postmodern Theory and Biblical Theology: 
Vanquishing God’s Shadow (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 119.  
39 Alister E. McGrath, The Genesis of Doctrine: A Study in the Foundations of Doctrinal Criticism 
(Oxford, UK; Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990), 4. 
40 Colin E. Gunton, “Historical and Systematic Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Christian Doctrine, ed. Colin E. Gunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 5. Pelikan 
highlights that “the accusation” of Hellenization “recurred in the attacks of the Reformers on medieval 





follows this third option of ambivalent rejection and assimilation.41 
However, the problem of assimilation is not a simple one, since it has taken place 
at the level of hermeneutics. As Alister McGrath points out, in the context of “the 
expansion of Christianity into a Hellenistic milieu in the first century, . . . the move from 
the repetition or reiteration of scripture to doctrinal exposition through an already existing 
language [Greek] and conceptual framework [Hellenism], inevitably carried with it the 
demand for an engagement with the view, or range of views, of reality already associated 
with that language and conceptual framework.”42 As a result, “the data of scripture and 
the Christian tradition were thus interpreted in the light of presuppositions, within a 
hermeneutical framework, alien to their sources.”43 Therefore, McGrath emphasizes that 
the problem of Hellenization is essentially hermeneutical, as Christian doctrine tends to 
be interpreted through presuppositions of a Greek view of reality. 
The problem of Hellenization calls for a deconstruction of the ontotheological 
                                                
a widely circulated explanation of the development of early Christian doctrine. Taken as it stands, 
‘hellenization’ is too simplistic and unqualified a term for the process that issued in orthodox Christian 
doctrine. Nevertheless, it is true that in its language and sometimes in its ideas orthodox Christian doctrine 
still bears the marks of its struggle to understand and overcome pagan thought, so that what later 
generations of the church (including those generations that were themselves ignorant of antiquity) inherited 
in the dogma of the church included more than a little of Greek philosophy as well.” Taking the example of 
the early apologists “as the interpreters of the church to the Gentile world,” Pelikan argues that “their 
attitude toward ancient culture is contradictory.” Jaroslav Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition 
(100-600), The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1971), 45 (italics mine). 
41 As McGrath points out, “we fail to do justice to the pressures confronting early-Christian 
thinkers if we represent them as simply incorporating pre-existing philosophical or civil views of the divine 
attributes.” Similar to the experience of the early-Christian thinkers, “there is a temptation for every 
generation of theologians to bring a cluster of inherited metaphysical commitments as self-evident, 
requiring no further justification, to the task of theology. McGrath, The Genesis of Doctrine, 5. 
42 Ibid., 4. 




structure of Christian theology44 and a replacement of onto-theo-logy by theo-onto-logy.45 
The type of deconstruction adopted in this study intends to prepare the way for an 
alternative theological construction46 that interacts with the Scripture as the ground for 
Christian theology. Considering that the main problem of Helenization for Christian 
doctrine is hermeneutical, the deconstruction of ontotheology also needs to be 
hermeneutical. Furthermore, the “principles that guide theological interpretation and 
construction”47 are found at the hermeneutical level. In other words, from a 
hermeneutical standpoint it is possible to observe and evaluate how theological models 
have been structured. Studies on hermeneutics indicate two helpful concepts for the 
understanding of the cognitive process involved in the construction of a theological 
model by a theologian: (1) the fusion of horizons and (2) the spiral movement of 
induction and deduction. Christian theologians usually construct theological models 
based on their reading and interpretation of Scriptures, and this process of interpreting 
                                                
44 See David R. Griffin, “Reconstructive Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern 
Theology, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 102; 
Fernando Luis Canale, “Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?,” AUSS 44, no. 1 (2006): 95-130; Ingraffia, 
Postmodern Theory and Biblical Theology, 167-224. 
45 See Grenz, The Named God and the Question of Being, 90-373; Canale, A Criticism of 
Theological Reason, 285-387. The term theo-onto-logy suggests an ontology defined by God’s self-
disclosure in Scripture. 
46 According to Griffin, there are two types of postmodern deconstruction: 
deconstructive/eliminative and constructive/revisionary. The former attempts to overcome the modern 
worldview through the deconstruction or elimination of the ingredients necessary for a worldview, and is 
mainly associated to Derrida’s work. Conversely, the latter aims to deconstruct the modern worldview “not 
by eliminating the possibility of worldview as such, but by constructing a postmodern worldview through a 
revision of modern premises and traditional concepts.” David R. Griffin, “Introduction to Suny Series in 
Constructive Postmodern Thought,” in Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy: Peirce, James, 
Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne, ed. David Ray Griffin (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1993), viii. Therefore, the theological deconstruction to be used in the present study assumes a constructive 
perspective. 
47 Fernando Luis Canale, “Evolution, Theology, and Method: Part 3 Evolution and Adventist 




biblical data is characterized by a fusion of horizons, which refers to the horizon of the 
text and the horizon of the interpreter. This fusion “does not allow the interpreter to speak 
of an original meaning of the work without acknowledging that, in understanding it, the 
interpreter’s own meaning enters in as well.”48 To put it differently, hermeneutics is not 
only about texts that are read, but also about the mind of the reader, because 
interpretation “takes place when [these] two sets of horizons are brought into relation to 
each other.”49  
The horizon of the interpreter encompasses the pre-understanding that he or she 
brings to the text, which is defined as “the initial application of a tentative working 
assumption to set the understanding going and on its journey toward a fuller appreciation 
of all that this might entail.”50 As the “understanding begins to move and to grow, we 
may discover that certain aspects of our preliminary understanding need to be corrected 
while other aspects seem to be proving their value.”51 Therefore, the relationship between 
the horizon of the text and the pre-understanding of the reader is not a matter of warfare 
involving “nonnegotiable fixed presuppositions.”52 Rather, “preliminary understanding 
and responsible journeys into fuller understanding leave room for renegotiation, 
reshaping, and correction in the light of subsequent wrestling with the parts and the 
                                                
48 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall 
(London; New York: Continuum, 2004), 578. In the context of biblical interpretation, Karl Barth indicates 
that “exegesis is always a combination of taking and giving, of reading out and reading in.” CD I/1, 106. 
49 Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical 
Description (Carlisle, UK; Grands Rapids, MI: Paternoster; Eerdmans, 1993), 103. 







The process of understanding, described by the reshaping of presuppositions 
through the interactions between the parts and the whole, is properly explained by Grant 
Osborne in terms of a spiral movement of induction and deduction.54 In the process of 
construction of theological models, theologians spirally move using inductive and 
deductive reasoning. Inductively, they move from observations of specific texts in 
Scripture (the parts) to the composition of broad theories or concepts (the whole). 
Deductively, they apply “hermeneutical principles and previously formed theological 
decisions [the whole] to the text itself [the parts].”55 In other words, the inductive 
movement recognizes the horizon of the text, and the deductive movement acknowledges 
the horizon of the interpreter. Ideally, the theologian needs to work constantly in this 
spiral movement “to refine the model on the basis of an increased understanding of the 
data.”  56 In this ideal situation, the horizon of the interpreter is gradually shaped by the 
horizon of the text, that is, the pre-understanding and presuppositions of the theologian 
are progressively informed by the biblical data. However, considering that theology is a 
fallible “process of human reflection upon the revelation of God,”57 in practice the spiral 
                                                
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Similarly, Bernard Lonergan argues that the process of understanding is “a self-correcting 
process of learning that spirals into the meaning of the whole by using each new part to fill out and qualify 
and correct the understanding reached in reading the earlier parts.” Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in 
Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 159. 
55 Grant R. Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical 
Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1991), 298. 
56 Ibid. 





theological movement tends to stop. In this sense, the work of theological deconstruction 
is always necessary to keep Christian theology moving in a growing understanding of 
God’s revelation in Scripture.58 
Even though Osborne correctly highlights that the presuppositions that 
theologians bring for the construction of a theological model or system need to be shaped 
by the biblical data, he seems to discuss these presuppositions basically at the level of the 
influence of theological traditions.59 Although this is a legitimate discussion, it is not able 
to properly grasp the philosophical influence of onto-theology (mentioned above) that 
stands behind and inform those theological traditions. As Millard Erickson points out, 
“our interpretation of the Bible is affected by our philosophical presuppositions.”60 These 
presuppositions are at the level of the macro-hermeneutical principles, which guide 
theologians in the interpretation of biblical texts and in the construction of theological 
models and systems.  
There are three levels of hermeneutical principles according to the nature of 
                                                
Investigations 13 (New York Seabury, 1975), 61. 
58 While affirming that theology is a “fallible human work,” Barth emphasizes the “human task of 
criticizing and revising its speech about God.” In fact, he thinks that the existence of theology is justified 
by its task of humbly guiding the talk of the church about God. CD I/1, 3-4.  
59 “We do not simply move from the Bible to theological assertions, and those assertions are not 
automatic reproductions of biblical truths. Rather, all decisions are filtered through a network of tradition 
and preunderstanding, which itself exerts tremendous influence upon our interpretations and choices.  To 
this extent each decision we make is provisional and we must establish a continual dialogue between 
tradition and biblical text in the spiral upward to truth.” The understanding of presuppositions in terms of 
theological tradition is also evident when he emphasizes the need of a conscious reconstruction of our pre-
understanding: “If we desire an honest re-examination of the issue, we must define carefully where we and 
our tradition stand on the doctrine before beginning the study. . . . Unless these are brought to the surface 
they will dominate and skew the research, for it is natural to want the evidence to corroborate rather than 
challenge our presuppositions.” Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral, 308, 315 (italics mine). 
60 Millard J. Erickson, Truth or Consequences: The Promise and Perils of Postmodernism 




theological interpretation: micro-hermeneutics (biblical/textual principles of 
interpretation), meso-hermeneutics (theological/doctrinal principles of interpretation), 
and macro-hermeneutics (the most inclusive ontological, epistemological, and 
articulation principles of interpretation).61 This distinction on the levels of hermeneutical 
principles means that the influence of theological traditions, as Osborne’s emphasizes, 
occurs at the level of meso-hermeneutics, while the influence of philosophical 
presuppositions behind the theological traditions, as Erickson highlights, takes place at 
the level of macro-hermeneutics.    
 One of the main presuppositions at the macro-hermeneutical level is the principle 
of reality (ontology), which includes the interpretation of the reality of God, human 
beings, and the world.62 Basically, the principle of reality permeates the understanding of 
any theological issue. According to Fernando Canale, the notions of time or timelessness 
function as primordial presuppositions that condition the macro-hermeneutical 
principles.63 Under the influence of Greek ontology on Christian theology, God and 
heavenly realities have been conceived timelessly, which affects the macro-hermeneutical 
principles of reality (interpretations about the reality of God, humans, and the world) and, 
                                                
61 Canale, “Evolution, Theology, and Method: Part 3,” 21. 
62 Ibid., 10. Christoph Schwobel stresses the need for constructing an ontology based on these 
three principles of reality (God, humans, and the world), more specifically, taking into account “the 
interactions of God with particular human beings in a world of particular characteristics.” In this way, the 
biblical “descriptions of the interaction between God, human beings, and the world” needs to be taken 
“seriously in an ontological sense.” In other words, “who God is, how God and what God is, becomes clear 
from the relationships he establishes, maintains, and restores with his creatures. And consequently, who, 
how, and what a human being is become clear from the way God relates to human beings and invites them 
to relate to their God, to one another, and to their world. A relational view of reality is therefore an exercise 
in descriptive biblical metaphysics which hopes to avoid the risks of subjecting the biblical witnesses to a 
prior metaphysical scheme.” Christoph Schwobel, “Recovering Human Dignity,” in God and Human 




thus, distorts the interpretation of the biblical doctrines.64 Canale explains that the notion 
of timelessness refers to “the absence of time and space” and he specifies a minimal 
definition of a timeless reality by focusing on the concept of non-sequentiality, where 
there is no experience of “the flow from past to present and future,”65 that is, there is no 
before and/or after. Conversely, time is minimally defined as sequentiality, implying 
“past-present-future flow,”66 before and after. Furthermore, time is not conceived as “a 
thing” or a “container,” but it “co-appears with things,” being “relative to reality.”67 From 
this standpoint, God’s temporality is infinite and analogical, meaning that it is His own 
nature that determines His experience of temporality, and not a previous definition of 
time as thing that dictates God experience with time.68 It should be noted that this 
perspective on time and timelessness, particularly this idea of God’s temporality, is not 
necessarily identical to the affirmation of divine temporality in the scholarly literature on 
                                                
63 Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason.  
64 Canale summarizes this historical process in the following way: “First, the most universal and 
all-inclusive of all hermeneutical principles is the concept of Being. Second, Parmenides originated the 
classical tradition that interprets Being from a timeless horizon. Third, when Plato and Aristotle decided to 
build their ontologies from the timeless horizon suggested by Parmenides, Western philosophy fixed the 
macro-hermeneutical direction from which classical and modern philosophies and theologies would be 
constructed. Fourth, classical Christian theology sealed its intellectual destiny when Justin Martyr 
(implicitly) and Origen and Augustine (explicitly) interpreted God and human nature as nontemporal and 
nonhistorical from within the Platonic ontological tradition.” Canale, “Deconstructing Evangelical 
Theology?” 115. 
65 Fernando Luis Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology: A Hermeneutical Study 
of the Revelation and Inspiration of the Bible (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Lithothec, 2005), 
93. 
66 Ibid., 251. 
67 Ibid., 250-252. Canale points out that “time can be of limited or unlimited duration depending 
on which reality it is describing. A limited being will experience time as of limited duration; a limitless 
being will experience time as endless. Out understanding of time must be relative to whatever reality in 
which it coappears.” Ibid., 252. 





The idea that the study of God’s nature in Scripture is necessary for the 
understanding of His temporality constitutes the basis for the development of a theo-
ontology. Indeed, Erickson seems to provide a general perspective for this type of 
development, as he affirms the necessity of using “the Bible to formulate our 
presuppositions, thus avoiding the problem of distortion from external presuppositions.”70 
Erickson proposes a construction of philosophical presuppositions (macro-hermeneutical 
principles) through a spiral process of biblical study:  
Since the Bible is to supply our philosophical conceptions, but our discerning of those 
within the Bible is itself affected by our antecedent philosophy . . . a series of 
incremental changes will be necessary. We should seek to discern whether the Bible 
gives us a metaphysic, then check against it our own conceptions, correcting them to 
fit, then repeating the exegesis, again matching the results to our philosophy, and 
continuing in this process.71 
In summary, the theological deconstruction to be developed in this study is an 
analysis of the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality upon which theological models 
have been constructed. The final goal of this deconstruction is to observe whether these 
hermeneutical principles are informed by the Hellenization of doctrine. If the answer is 
positive, the deconstruction prepares the way for an alternative model to be articulated 
from an interaction with Scripture. My next step is to show how this conceptual 
framework is methodologically applied to the study of the doctrine of Christ’s priesthood. 
                                                
69 References to the literature on this topic are indicated in foonotes 28 and 31 above. 






The deconstruction of conflicting interpretations about the doctrine of the 
priesthood of Christ72 in the present study constitutes an attempt to uncover the logic of 
each interpretation of Christ’s priesthood from the perspective of the macro-
hermeneutical principles of reality or ontological presuppositions assumed in that 
interpretation.73 This perspective reveals how these presuppositions inform and impact an 
interpretation or theory about the priesthood of Christ. 
This deconstruction involves three steps in this dissertation: (1) a systematic 
outline of the interpretations of Christ’s priesthood; (2) a description of the understanding 
of the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality assumed in each interpretation depicted 
in the first step and an indication of the implications for the doctrine of Christ’s 
priesthood; and (3) a transition to the construction of an alternative model derived from 
an interaction with Hebrews, including its pointers to the interpretation of macro-
hermeneutical principles of reality, and the implications for the doctrine of Christ’s 
priesthood.  
In the first step, the interpretations to be outlined correspond to three models. As 
mentioned above, they are labeled sacramental, functional, and ontological models. The 
                                                
72 For examples of similar use of deconstruction in the hermeneutical study of doctrines, 
particularly on the doctrines of God, revelation and inspiration, creation, and the nearness of the second 
coming of Christ, see Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology; Canale, Back to Revelation-
Inspiration; Marcos Blanco, “Atemporalidad, Omnisciencia Y Providence Divinas: Podemos Adelantar La 
Segunda Venida?” DavarLogos 2, no. 2 (2003): 153-165. For an example of this use of deconstruction in 
the hermeneutical study of exegetical methodology, see Klaus Popa, “Method, Data and Hermeneutical 
Presuppositions: A Limited Analysis of the Relation between Method, Data and Hermeneutical 
Presuppositions in Rhetorical Criticism, Rhetorical Critical School, Narrative Criticism and Text 
Linguistics” (MA thesis, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 2007). 
73 Henceforth, the terms ‘macro-hermeneutical principles of reality’ and ‘ontological 




focus on models of interpretation instead of on the ideas of individual interpreters reveals 
three important interest of the present research: (1) the interest on an interpretive 
paradigm of Christ’s priesthood; (2) the use of models as a heuristic tool for the 
conceptualization of this priesthood; and (3) the preparation for the second step, leading 
to the study of macro-hermeneutical principles of reality that undergird the models. First, 
even though individual interpreters provide the concepts for the description of the model, 
my main interest is not on their individual ideas but on how the reading of two 
theologians in the model reveal a broad paradigm for the interpretation of Christ’s 
priesthood that is even able to accommodate specific differences between these 
theologians. Second, since I will describe a model of interpretation and not merely a 
theologian, I will not follow the sequence of arguments that one theologian offers for his 
understanding of the priesthood of Christ. Rather, the sequence and organization of the 
description of the models will be guided by formal components of Christ’s priesthood 
that should be present in any interpretation of the reality of this priesthood. As it will be 
explained in the introduction of the second chapter, the four components selected derive 
from a preliminary phenomenological reading of Hebrews: need, agent, actions, and goal. 
The use of these components intentionally privileges the hermeneutical focus on 
systematic interpretation of an issue, and not merely on what one author thinks, since a 
common formal structure of a topic provides a better condition for comparing different 
ways of interpreting or understanding the priesthood of Christ. In this way, the use of 
these formal components facilitates a systematic conceptualization about Christ’s 
priesthood in which the description and comparison of models function as a heuristic tool 




study of models will help us think about conceptual possibilities regarding the doctrine of 
Christ’s priesthood. Third, the description of the interpretation of each component in the 
different models selected in this study prepares the way for the study of macro-
hermeneutical principles of reality that undergird the models, providing the necessary 
information about the interpretation of the doctrine for the analysis of the ontological 
presuppositions that inform or modify that interpretation, which is the next step to be 
undertaken in this dissertation. 
In the second step of the dissertation, I will uncover the interpretation of the 
macro-hermeneutical principles of reality assumed in each model. As it will be explained 
in the introduction of the third chapter, similar to the phenomenological reading of the 
previous step, the formal macro-hermeneutical principles of reality derive from a 
preliminary phenomenological reading of Hebrews: divinity, humanity, and cosmology. 
In this way, I will describe the interpretation of each principle existent in the three 
models, and then delineate their implications for the logic of the interpretation of Christ’s 
priesthood in each model. The comparison of the conflicting interpretations in the models 
will justify the articulation of an alternative model.  
While the first and second steps operate in the internal conceptualization and 
coherence of each model, the third step provides an alternative model (namely, the 
historical model) derived from an interaction with Hebrews (the main biblical book that 
deals with this priesthood, where we find the grounding data from which all models 
construct their interpretations about the priesthood of Christ),74 to be compared with the 
                                                
74 In his discussion about high priestly Christology, Johnsson points out that “Hebrews is unique 





models described in the previous steps. This alternative model is a constructive proposal 
suggested as a way out of the conflicting interpretations of Christ’s priesthood in the 
existing models. The same formal components and principles used in the previous steps 
are used in the third step. To provide the material interpretation each compoment and 
each principle I read Hebrews phenomenologically.75 In this way, I attempt to find out 
whether the description of Christ’s priesthood in the book of Hebrews seems to imply a 
structure of the reality of His priesthood and point to ontological presuppositions 
necessary for a proper understanding of the biblical thinking about this reality.76 
                                                
Romans 8:34 or 1 John 2:2, or allusive imagery as in Revelation, chapters 1, 4, and 5. In Hebrews, 
however, Jesus as high priest is a dominant idea, and the book works it out in great detail.” William G. 
Johnsson, “Hebrews: An Overview,” in Issues in the Book of Hebrews, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver 
Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, 1989), 21. 
75 Canale indicates three essential features of a phenomenological reading of the Bible: (1) It 
“applies a scientific, philosophical, theological, and doctrinal epoché [which means suspension of 
judgment]. In other words, as the text is analyzed in search of its meaning, every prior existent theory is 
‘suspended’ or ‘bracketed out.’ Yet epoché is not ignorance of those theories. Phenomenological epoché 
can be applied in its fullness only when all the involved theories are properly understood, otherwise they 
will not be suspended but rather ignored or, worse, applied unconsciously.” (2) It “works and is grounded 
on the ‘things themselves,’ which in our particular case are the meaning of the text itself as it is.” (3) It 
“presents its results not by ‘constructing,’ ‘building up,’ or ‘proving’ its assertions and statements, but 
rather by ‘describing’ or ‘showing’ what has been heard or seen while the exegete catches at least some 
glimpses of what is being thought in the text.” Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 296-297. See his 
phenomenological reading of Exod 3:14-15 on pages 321-348. Considering the three levels of 
hermeneutical principles mentioned on pages 15-16 (micro-hermeneutics, meso-hermeneutics, and macro-
hermeneutics), the application of the epoché in this study occurs mainly at the level of macro-hermeneutics, 
which means that the there is no intentional suspension of presuppositions at the level of the textual or 
linguistic principles of interpretation of the Bible (micro-hermeneutics). Moreover, I intend to suspend the 
presuppositions at the level of macro-hermeneutics as much as possible, but I also recognize the necessity 
of further studies giving continuity to the movement of the hermeneutical spiral, since our pre-
understanding (or presuppositions) needs to be increasingly shaped by the biblical text. 
76 This endeavor is similar to McCormack’s stipulation that the biblical text implies an ontology 
that is able to explain how what is mentioned in the biblical narrative actually takes place. See Bruce L. 
McCormack, “‘With Loud Cries and Tears’: The Humanity of the Son in the Epistle to the Hebrews,” in 
The Epistle to the Hebrews and Christian Theology, ed. Richard Bauckham, Daniel R. Driver, Trevor A. 
Hart, and Nathan MacDonald (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 55, 59, 66. Several scholars have 
discussed the significance of the study of ontology in the Bible. Langdom Gilkey argues that “biblical 
theology must take cosmology and ontology more seriously,” because Christian theology “desperately” 
needs “a biblical ontology that will put intelligible and credible meanings into our analogical categories of 
divine deeds and of divine self-manifestation through events.” B. Gilkey Langdon, “Cosmology, Ontology, 





At this point, I need to clarify what is methodologically called deconstruction in 
this dissertation, since the two first steps also involve a great deal of systematic 
construction. For instance, in these steps I provide the formal structure (from my reading 
of Hebrews) to be interpreted by the models, which means that I formally describe the 
models differently from the way the representatives of each model explain the priesthood 
of Christ. In other words, I put concepts together in a way that the representatives did not 
do, as I delineate the logic of the model as an interpretive paradigm. However, the use of 
the term deconstruction is justified by the fact that I am not merely constructing a theory 
or interpretation, but uncovering a logic implied in the data provided by the 
representatives of the models (in the case of the sacramental, functional, and ontological 
models). In the process of uncovering a logic from the data, I need to think about it, draw 
conceptual connections, implications, and eventually provide a systematic organization of 
ideas that will probably state more than what is simply said in the data, but that attempts 
to be faithful to the logic implied by the data. 
                                                
Hanson questions, “Why should biblical theology shy away from questions of ontology when Israelite 
religion assumes an historical ontology that sets it apart from the mythopoeic worldviews of surrounding 
cultures?” Paul D. Hanson, “A New Challenge to Biblical Theology,” Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion 67, no. 2 (1999): 449.  In the same vein, Douglas Hall firmly believes in a biblical ontology: “the 
question is not whether biblical theology will or will not discuss ontology but what ontology it assumes. 
There is, I believe, a biblical ontology—or, better stated, an ontology that is native to the tradition of 
Jerusalem. . . . Christian thinkers throughout the ages have been extremely negligent in delineating the 
conception of being or ontology that belongs to the tradition of Jerusalem. . . . That tradition, however, did 
not approach the question of being or reality explicitly—that is, as a direct subject of detached or specific 
inquiry. Jerusalem (as contemporary Jewish theologian-philosophers like Martin Buber and Abraham 
Heschel have shown) did and does have a theory of reality, but it is implicit and indirect—and above all it 
is not abstract, which is the reason why it could not be treated in an isolated way.” Douglas John Hall, 
Professing the Faith: Christian Theology in a North American Context (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 302. 
Canale seems to agree with Hall: even though “we do not find in Scripture a technically developed 
ontology . . . Scripture includes specific and detailed interpretations about the beings of God, humans, the 
world, and the whole.” Therefore, through these significant interpretations it is possible to “use biblical 





With this clarification in mind, I can now indicate that the first, second, and third 
steps depicted above correspond respectively to chapters two, three, and four. The fifth 
chapter will provide a brief comparison of the models described in this dissertation. 









A DESCRIPTION OF THEOLOGICAL MODELS OF 
CHRIST’S PRIESTHOOD 
Introduction 
The first step of the hermeneutical study of Christ’s priesthood, as proposed in the 
present dissertation, is the description of models of this priesthood in systematic 
theology. In the previous chapter, I indicated that the three theological views of the 
priesthood of Christ to be initially explored in this research would be labeled as 
sacramental, functional, and ontological models. Therefore, this second chapter intends to 
describe these three theological models of Christ’s priesthood. Overall, the purpose of 
this description is to gain a general overview of the discussion from a systematic 
perspective, and also prepare the ground for the study of the macro-hermeneutical 
presuppositions that undergird each model, which is the task of the next chapter. 
In order to facilitate the description and comparison of these models, it is 
necessary to outline the general structure of Christ’s priesthood (formal level of 
description) that each model interprets in a concrete way (material level of description). I 
will use this structure as the pattern to describe and compare each model.1 Once I define 
this general structure, I will be able to describe each theological model of the priesthood 
                                                
1 A similar strategy used to study theological models of the doctrine of revelation-inspiration is 




of Christ by showing how each model interprets (material aspect) each element of the 
structure (formal aspect). 
I recognize that a careless description of the general structure of Christ’s 
priesthood at this point may jeopardize the further steps and conclusions of the present 
research, especially if categories alien to the materials to be studied are introduced in the 
process. To avoid this danger as much as possible, I attempt to proceed with caution on 
this point regarding (1) the selection of its source and (2) the definition of its nature. With 
regard to the selection of the source, Christian theology has no basis for an explicit 
doctrine of the priesthood of Christ without the NT book of Hebrews.2 Hence, any 
reflection on this priesthood needs to start with Hebrews.3 In the context of the present 
research, this assumption is confirmed by the fact that the models to be described below 
generally draw their reflections primarily from the book of Hebrews. Second, the formal 
structure of Christ’s priesthood suggested in this study is essentially an outline of the 
basic components involved in the general concept of this priesthood, which must be 
present in any possible interpretation of this issue.4 Thus, the present attempt to delineate 
                                                
2 This statement takes into account that Hebrews is the only book in Scripture that explicitly refers 
to Jesus Christ as a priest (ἱερεὺς—Heb 5:6; 7:11, 15, 17, 21; 8:4; 10:21) or high-priest (ἀρχιερεὺς—Heb 
2:17; 3:1; 4:14-15; 5:5, 10; 6:20; 7:26; 8:1, 3; 9:11). While different theological schools of thought in 
Christianity may dispute the principle of Sola Scriptura, and even offer distinct definitions of this principle, 
it is my understanding that no one of these schools will consciously advance a Christian doctrine that has 
no legitimate basis in Scripture. I am not arguing that any doctrine advanced by these schools is necessarily 
biblical. Rather, I am affirming that these schools normally want to be consistent with Scripture in their 
doctrines. 
3 I agree with Gerald O’Collins that, whereas the book of Hebrews is the main source of 
information about Christ’s priesthood in the Bible, the background of the OT and the NT needs to be 
considered for a proper understanding of His priesthood. See JOP, 1, 240. It is in this sense that I suggest 
that Hebrews is the starting point for a theology of the priesthood of Christ. 
4 The formal structure of Christ’s priesthood that I suggest in this study may be proved limited and 
perhaps provisional. While the suggested structure provides an initial framework necessary to start this 





the implied structure of Christ’s priesthood from the picture of this priesthood in 
Hebrews is regarded as a minimal formal description that is going to be used as a 
conceptual tool to organize the material description of the theological models.  
With these considerations in mind, it is possible to affirm that Christ’s priesthood 
can be formally described in terms of (1) an agent who performs specific (2) 
functions/actions that are (3) needed to deal with a situation in order to (4) accomplish a 
particular goal.5 Arguably, this formal description may potentially outline the general 
structure of any type of priesthood,6 and seems to be consistent with the picture of the 
                                                
understanding that is generated in the progression of the study. More specifically, if the present study 
shows that all the models have given serious thought to each component of the structure suggested here, 
this structure will be confirmed. If this does not happen, then the suggested structure should be modified or 
replaced. 
5 By using this minimal formal description to initiate the study of the doctrine of the priesthood of 
Christ, I assume that the focus of studies in systematic theology goes beyond a mere summary of the 
biblical teaching on a particular topic, as Wayne Grudem seems to define the task of systematic theology. 
See Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Leicester, England; Grand 
Rapids, MI: InterVarsity; Zondervan, 1994), 21, 23. Rather, my assumption is that the focus of systematic 
theology is on the conceptualization of the realities, pictures, or notions described or implied in the biblical 
text. The understanding of systematic theology in terms of conceptualization of reality is affirmed by 
Fernando Luis Canale, “Is There Room for Systematics in Adventism?” Journal of the Adventist 
Theological Society 12, no. 2 (2001): 121-122; John Webster, Introduction to The Oxford Handbook of 
Systematic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1; Wolfhart Pannenberg, An Introduction to 
Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), 18; Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ, new ed. 
(London; New York: T&T Clark, 2011), 9. In this sense, the minimal formal description that I suggest is an 
attempt to initiate a conceptualization of the priesthood of Christ. 
6 This potential formal openness to other types of priesthood is particularly important because the 
book of Hebrews compares Christ’s priesthood with both the Aaronic priesthood (Heb 5:1-5; 7:11, 13, 23-
24, 27-28; 8:3-4; 9:6-7, 11-14, 23-25; 10:11-12) and Melchizedek’s priesthood (Heb 5:6, 10; 6:20; 7:1-3, 
11, 15, 17, 21). Dealing with the priestly cult in the Hebrew Bible, Philip Jenson utilizes four categories 
(spatial, personal, ritual, and temporal dimensions) to provide a systematic description of the priestly cult. 
Jenson believes that his categories, which in my view are elaborated from a perspective of the realities 
involved in the cult, constitute a more suitable framework for the understanding of the priestly cult than an 
organization “by word, formula or theme.” Also, he clearly distinguishes his approach from a historical, 
literary, and redactional research. Philip Peter Jenson, Graded Holiness: A Key to the Priestly Conception 
of the World, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series, vol. 106 (Sheffield, England: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 32-34. Similarly, Frank Gorman adopts the categories of space, time, and 
status in order to explore the conceptual framework of the priestly cult. He argues that his research 
contrasts with the majority of studies on this topic, which are “primarily text-oriented” as they emphasize 
more “the analysis of texts than ritual.” For him, “there have been very few attempts to analyze and 





priesthood of Christ in the book of Hebrews.7 In this way, the material description of the 
                                                
texts.” Frank H. Gorman Jr., The Ideology of Ritual: Space, Time, and Status in the Priestly Theology, 
Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series, vol. 91 (Sheffield, England: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1990), 7. My general formal structure of the priesthood of Christ, which may serve 
systematic studies of other types of priesthood, is close to the approach adopted by Jenson and Gorman in 
their study of the priestly cult, in the sense that this structure attempts to work with categories that describe 
the priesthood as a reality (need, agent, actions, and goal) in order to better understand its conceptual 
framework. As far as I know, the majority of biblical studies on priesthood are more concerned with textual 
and historical aspects, rather than a systematic conceptualization of priesthood. For examples of these types 
of studies, see Gary A. Anderson and Saul M. Olyan, Priesthood and Cult in Ancient Israel, Journal for the 
Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991); 
Joseph L. Angel, Otherworldly and Eschatological Priesthood in the Dead Sea Scrolls, Studies on the 
Texts of the Desert of Judah (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010); Joseph Blenkinsopp, Sage, Priest, Prophet: 
Religious and Intellectual Leadership in Ancient Israel, Library of Ancient Israel (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1995); Aelred Cody, A History of the Old Testament Priesthood (Rome: 
Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1969); Martha Himmelfarb, A Kingdom of Priests: Ancestry and Merit in 
Ancient Judaism, Jewish Culture and Contexts (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); 
Mark Leuchter, Levites and Priests in History and Tradition, Ancient Israel and Its Literature (Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2011); Deborah W. Rooke, Zadok’s Heirs: The Role and Development of the 
High Priesthood in Ancient Israel, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012); James C. VanderKam, From Joshua to Caiaphas: High Priests after the Exile (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2004). Comparative studies and biblical theologies on the priesthood attempt to provide a 
more systematic account of this theme. See, for instance, E. O. James, The Nature and Function of 
Priesthood: A Comparative and Anthropological Study (London: Thames and Hudson, 1955); Leopold 
Sabourin, Priesthood: A Comparative Study (Leinden: Brill, 1973); Albert Vanhoye, Old Testament Priests 
and the New Priest: According to the New Testament, trans. J. Bernard Orchard, Studies in Scripture 
(Petersham, MA: St. Bede’s Publications, 1986); Richard D. Nelson, Raising up a Faithful Priest: 
Community and Priesthood in Biblical Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993). 
However, in my opinion, they are not able to provide a systematic conceptual framework of the priesthood, 
as Jenson and Gorman do with the theme of the priestly cult, because these comparative studies and biblical 
theologies tend to organize the description of the priesthood in topics of discussion (sometimes 
emphasizing the functions of a priest), instead of working with categories that describe its reality. It seems 
to me that Schenck’s treatment of the cosmology and the eschatology of Hebrews would have the potential 
to develop the framework that I propose here, as he attempts to explore Hebrews from the perspective of 
time and space, if his focus on time and space were not merely rhetorical, but ontological. As he indicates, 
his study provides “a systematic picture of Hebrews’ narrative and rhetorical worlds.” Kenneth L. Schenck, 
Cosmology and Eschatology in Hebrews: The Setting of the Sacrifice, ed. John M. Court, Society for New 
Testament Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 183. 
7 Even though the formal description suggested here should not include at this point a precise 
definition of its categories (agent, actions, need, goal), as this definition constitutes the material description 
of each model, I briefly indicate how these broad categories can be generally found in the exposition of the 
priesthood of Christ in the book of Hebrews: (1) Agent—the incarnate Christ (2:17), who is the ascended 
Son of God (4:14; 7:28); (2) Actions—offering of sacrifice (7:27; 8:3; 9:14, 26-27; 10:12), continual 
intercession (7:25), ministry in the heavenly sanctuary (8:2, 5; 9:11, 24), mediation of a better/new 
covenant (8:6; 9:15); (3) Need—human sins (2:17; 9:7, 26, 28; 10:2, 4, 11-12; 13:11) and weaknesses 
(4:15; 5:2); (3) Goal—human perfection (7:11; 10:1, 14) and sanctification (9:13; 10:10, 14; 13:11), access 
to God (4:15; 7:25; 10:19), eternal salvation (5:9; 7:25; 9:15, 28). I have intentionally provided a loose, 
perfunctory, and non-comprehensive characterization of these formal categories because this 
characterization will receive a more precise and in depth interpretation in the material description of the 





theological models of Christ’s priesthood selected for this study (sacramental, functional, 
ontological) is organized on the basis of the following components dictated by the formal 
structure of Christ’s priesthood indicated above: (1) Need, (2) Agent, (3) Actions, and (4) 
Goal.8 The first model to be described is the sacramental model. 
The Sacramental Model 
The model outlined below is labeled sacramental because a crucial conception in 
the understanding of Christ’s priesthood in this model is that Christ’s priestly mediation 
is performed through spatio-temporal instruments that convey divine (spaceless-timeless) 
realities to human beings. According to this label, the emphasis of this model seems to be 
on the medium of the priesthood. I will unpack this conception in my treatment of the 
sacramental model both here in this chapter and in the next chapter. The representatives 
selected for this model are the medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas9 (1225-1274) and 
                                                
from the book of Hebrews, which means that they are not arbitrary. Likewise, as indicated in my comment 
on the previous footnote regarding studies that attempt to systematize the priesthood, scholars who analyze 
the priesthood of Christ in the book of Hebrews tend to be more interested in textual and historical aspects. 
Therefore, they usually do not work with categories that systematically describe Christ’s priesthood as a 
reality, as I do in the present study. See, for example, Eric F. Mason, ‘You Are a Priest Forever’: Second 
Temple Jewish Messianism and the Priestly Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews, Studies on the Texts 
of the Desert of Judah (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008); R. J. McKelvey, Pioneer and Priest: Jesus Christ in 
the Epistle to the Hebrews (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2013); Nelson, Raising up a Faithful 
Priest, 141-154; Sabourin, Priesthood, 178-211; Jerome Smith, A Priest Forever: A Study of Typology and 
Eschatology in Hebrews (London; Sydney: Sheed & Ward, 1969), 66-136; Vanhoye; Vanhoye, Old 
Testament Priests and the New Priest, 61-235; Albert Vanhoye, A Different Priest: The Letter to the 
Hebrews, Series Rhetorica Semitica (Miami, FL: Convivium Press, 2011); John M. Scholer, Proleptic 
Priests: Priesthood in the Epistle to the Hebrews, Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement 
Series, vol. 49 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991), 82-90.  
8 I have changed the order between need and agent indicated in the previous paragraph and in the 
previous footnote. The reason for placing the need as the first component is that it provides the explanatory 
context for the agent performing actions. 
9 ST III, q. 22 is the most detailed description of Christ’s priesthood in Aquinas. Concisely, q. 22 
defines Christ as the mediator (article 1), discusses the notions of sacrifice (article 2), the effects (articles 3 
and 4) and the eternity (article 5) of His priesthood, and compare it with other priesthoods (article 6). 





the modern Jesuit theologian Gerald O’Collins10 (1931-). I will explore the way they 
interpret each aspect or component of the formal structure of Christ’s priesthood.  
The Need for Christ’s Priesthood  
The need for the priesthood of Christ in the sacramental model is explained by a 
distance between God and human beings that requires a priestly mediation. This distance 
is partially related to an original limitation of creatures (ontological distance), but is 
mostly associated with sin (moral distance). The ideas of ontological and moral distance 
are better understood in the context of a teleological movement of creation toward God, 
which implies an evolutionary dynamics in creation. 
In the framework of this teleological movement, the idea of ontological distance 
is not a problem that appeared in creation, but an intended characteristic of original 
creation. From an anthropological perspective, Aquinas highlights that before sin “man 
was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined, 
                                                
exemplary cause. Emil Justus Scheller, Das Priestertum Christi Im Anschluss an Den Hl. Thomas Von 
Aquin: Vom Mysterium Des Mittlers in Seinem Opfer Und Unsere Anteilnahme (Paderborn: Schöningh, 
1934), 213, 215. For a comprehensive study of the priesthood of Christ in Aquinas, see ibid., 180-282. 
Even though Scheller’s book is arguably the best study of this subject, other useful works could be 
mentioned: Jean-Pierre Torrell, Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas, Thomistic Ressourcement 
Series (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 127-163; Matthew Levering, Christ and 
the Catholic Priesthood: Ecclesial Hierarchy and the Pattern of the Trinity (Mundelein, IL: Hillenbrand, 
2010), 86-119; Matthew Levering, “Christ the Priest: An Exploration of Summa Theologiae III, Question 
22,” The Thomist 71, no. 3 (2007): 379-417; Jones, Toward a Christology of Christ the High Priest, 126-
158; Thomas Marschler, “Das Hohepriestertum Jesu Christi Nach Dem Hl. Thomas Von Aquin,” Doctor 
Angelicus 3 (2003): 143-163; Denis Chardonnens, “Eternité Du Sacerdoce Du Christ Et Effet 
Eschatologique De L’eucharistie,” Revue Thomiste 107, no. 1 (1999): 159-180; Martin Morard, “Sacerdoce 
Du Christ Et Sacerdoce Des Chrétiens Dans Le Commentaire Des Psaumes De Saint Thomas d’Aquin,” 
Revue Thomiste 107, no. 1 (1999): 119-142; D. Mastroserio, “La Natura Del Sacerdocio Di Cristo Nel 
Pensiero Dei Tomisti,” Sapienza 16 (1963): 337-372; Gérard Remy, “Sacerdoce Et Médiation Chez Saint 
Thomas,” Revue Thomiste 99, no. 1 (1999): 101-118. 




which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence.”11 Hence, human beings are destined 
to a better condition than the initial condition of their creation, which suggests that perfect 
human beings in original creation are incomplete. From a cosmological perspective, 
O’Collins adopts a unified view of creation and redemption in which the latter is not a 
mere restoration of the former, but a continuation of it.12 If redemption is a continuation 
of creation (not a restoration), the implication is that original creation needs to be 
improved. Therefore, both the anthropological and the cosmological perspectives assume 
an intended incompleteness in original creation that justifies a teleological movement of 
creation toward God as the key to completeness or wholeness. 
In this context, sin is a problem that appears in creation and negatively 
accentuates the ontological distance between God and human beings. As a deliberate 
disobedience of God’s will,13 the sin of the first human beings resulted in “the loss of 
                                                
11 ST I, q. 94, a. 1, ad 1. Aquinas claims that Adam “was midway between our knowledge in the 
present” sinful “state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God through His Essence.” 
ST I, q. 94, a. 1. In contrast to human knowledge after sin, “the first man was not impeded by exterior things 
from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects.” Ibid. O’Collins also contrasts human 
beings in the perfect creation with their future destiny, as he compares their natural condition with their 
supernatural destiny: “The order of grace has existed right from the beginning, in that God has freely called 
all men and women to the supernatural destiny of eternal life.” CDT, 3 ed. (2013), s.v. “nature.” 
12 For the Jesuit theologian, “creation and redemption as two distinguishable but interconnected 
moments in God’s one saving plan for all humanity and the whole cosmos.” Thus, redemption is not “a 
mere restoration of the order of creation,” but a “continuity in the newness, above all through the one plan 
of God and the one figure of the creative Word who is also the Redeemer.” Gerald O’Collins, Jesus Our 
Redeemer: A Christian Approach to Salvation (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 35. 
O’Collins wants to follow Ireneaus’ “unified vision of creation and redemption.” Ibid., 37. 
13 According to Aquinas, “two things concur in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its 
inordinateness, which consists in departing from God’s law.” ST IIa, q. 72, a 1. Similarly, O’Collins defines 
sin as “any thought, word, or deed that deliberately disobeys God’s will and in some way rejects the divine 
goodness and love.” CDT, 3 ed. (2013), s.v. “sin.” For O’Collins’ and Aquinas’ discussions on sin, see 
respectively Jesus Our Redeemer, 43-62 and ST IIa, q. 71-89; Thomas Aquinas, On Evil, trans. Richard J. 




grace and wounding of nature”14 (original sin) in humanity. From an anthropological 
standpoint, as Aquinas points out, this means a disorder of the soul that promotes 
attention to material or sensible things. The loss of divine grace (original justice), which 
ordered human nature in a way that “the body was subjected to the soul” and “the soul 
remained subject to God,”15 caused a disorder (wounding of nature) in which the lower 
parts of human nature are not subject to the higher anymore.16 Considering that the lower 
parts focus on material things while the higher focus on intellectual/spiritual realities, the 
disorder of the soul means that human beings are actually “distracted by and occupied 
                                                
14 CDT, 3 ed. (2013), s.v. “original sin.” For Aquinas, “original sin denotes the privation of 
original justice” and “the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul.” ST 2a, q. 82, a. 1, ad 1. 
Commenting on original justice, O’Collins indicates that “the graced state of the first human beings before 
they fell into sin” was “interpreted for centuries as a historical period of time.” However, he avoids this 
historical interpretation by suggesting that “this original righteousness is better understood to be a way of 
speaking of our goodness as created and sanctified by God (Gen 1:26-31).” CDT, 3 ed. (2013), s.v. 
“original justice.” The Jesuit theologian argues that Adam’s story has been traditionally understood as “an 
initial period of perfection in creation and an original innocence that ended with a ‘one-point’ event, the fall 
of Adam and Eve into sin.” Yet, this “story need not be interpreted as necessarily entailing the first human 
couple (monogenism) spoiling a state of primordial happiness by one spectacular sin. It could also apply to 
a number of original human beings (polygenism), who, right from the start of their existence, through sin 
drifted away from what God intended for them.” O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 51-52. 
15 ST IIa, q. 81, a. 5, ad 2. Roughly speaking, Aquinas stipulates that the good of human nature 
was originally threefold: (1) “the powers of the soul,” (2) “inclination to virtue,” and (3) “the gift of 
original justice.” Sin entirely destroyed the third aspect and diminished the second, but did not impact the 
first. ST IIa, q. 85, a. 1. As a divine gift to human nature (ST IIa, q. 83, a. 2, ad 2), original justice provided 
order to the powers of the soul, in the sense that “the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the 
soul, while reason itself was perfected by God, and was subject to Him.” Because sin destroyed the gift of 
original justice, the powers of the soul, although intact, lost “their proper order, whereby they are naturally 
directed to virtue.” ST IIa, q. 85, a. 3. 
16 ST I, q. 94, a. 1. The distinction between lower and higher is evident in Aquinas’ statement that 
“the irascible and concupiscible powers” are supposed to obey “the higher part, in which are the intellect or 
reason, and the will.” ST I, q. 81, a. 3. The disorder effected by original sin impacts “the lower parts of the 
soul” and “the body itself.” ST IIa, q. 81, a. 3, ad 1. In Aquinas, “the soul’s parts are its various capacities 
or powers.” Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa 
Theologiae 1a, 75-89 (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 145. In his 
classification of the powers of the soul according to its operations, Aquinas indicates that the more the 




with sensible things,”17 and thereby not subject to God,18 who is an intellectual/spiritual 
being. Therefore, the basic problem of sin is that, by focusing only on inferior material 
things, human beings do not follow the order of things that leads them to 
intellectual/spiritual realities (teleology).19 This same point about sin being a disorder that 
impedes the teleological movement toward God is implied in the cosmological 
perspective of sin, as emphasized by O’Collins. Both human beings and the world are 
under the bondage and corruption of evil, which hinders the communion between human 
beings and God. Furthermore, sinful humans are self-alienated from God.20 In this 
situation, they cannot reach the goal of their existence (teleology), namely, communion 
with God.21 
                                                
17 ST I, q. 94, a. 1. 
18 ST IIa, q. 82, a. 1, ad 1; IIa, q. 82, a. 2. For Aquinas, “inordinate movements of the sensitive 
appetite cannot help occurring since the lower appetite is not subject to reason, so likewise, since man’s 
reason is not entirely subject to God.” ST IIa, q. 109, a. 8. The medieval theologian explains that “the whole 
order of original justice consists in man’s will being subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was 
in the will, whose function it is to move all the other parts to the end, . . . so that the will being turned away 
from God, all the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the privation of original justice, 
whereby the will was made subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder 
of the soul’s powers, is a kind of material element in respect of original sin.” ST IIa, q. 82, a. 3. 
19 This idea is vividly portrayed in Aquinas’ definition of “mortal sin,” where “the soul is so 
disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, viz. God.” ST IIa, q. 72, a. 5. He maintains that there is 
an “order of ends” in which “man must be directed to the last end by the motion of the first mover.” ST IIa, 
q. 109, a. 6. Indeed, “all movements, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the simple First Mover, 
Who is God . . . this motion is according to the plan of His providence.” ST IIa, q. 109, a. 1. 
20 O’Collins provides a threefold definition of sin: bondage, corruption, and self-alienation. The 
bondage of the power of the devil and death destroys humanity and the world, and hinders the communion 
between human beings and God. This bondage refers to the human “drive to possessions, success, and 
power” (idolatry), “compulsions and addictions” (“inner demons”), and “various economic, social, and 
political forces” (“organized evil . . . embedded in the structures of society”). With regard to corruption, 
“sin degrades and defiles human beings and corrupts their environment.” O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 
58-60. This corruption refers to the “breakdowns in relations with God, our neighbour, and the created 
world,” and shows that “the moral order, damaged by sin, needs to be reordered and purified.” JOP 263. 
Finally, sin is “self-alienation or estrangement from God and others,” which clearly entails an attitude of 
distance from God. O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 60. 





As a disorder that distances human beings from God, hindering their teleological 
movement toward Him, sin needs to be addressed by the mediatorial priesthood of 
Christ.22 However, two main questions arise from this understanding of the need for 
Christ’s priesthood: (1) Is the priesthood necessary only to eliminate the hindering of the 
teleological movement, or does it actually produce that movement? (2) Does the 
mediatorial priesthood deal only with human beings, promoting their movement toward 
God, or does it also deal with God? The first question assumes the following logic: If 
Christ’s priesthood addresses the sin problem (moral distance), His priesthood is not 
needed for the teleological movement itself (ontological distance), since this movement 
per se is unrelated to sin. Consequently, full communion with God would be achieved 
through the teleological movement, and not through the priesthood of Christ. This 
provoking logic may be answered by the anthropological and cosmological perspectives 
of the sacramental model. From an anthropological perspective, divine grace was always 
necessary for the teleological movement of perfect (without sin) human beings.23 
However, in terms of grace, human nature is impacted by sin on two grounds, namely, it 
                                                
being and final goal of all.” O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 28. For him, creation has a teleology. In his 
words, “creation has only one history, which finds in God its source and goal.” Ibid. 
22 Both O’Collins and Aquinas maintain that the effects of sin are eliminated by Christ’s 
priesthood. Considering that the Jesuit theologian defines sin basically as bondage, corruption, and self-
alienation (see footnote 20 above), the priesthood of Christ effects redemption by delivering from the 
bondage of evil, purifying from the defilement or corruption of sin, and annulling the human estrangement 
from God. JOP, 262. In this way, teleologically speaking, the mediation of Christ “ensures that the divine 
project for humankind and the world reaches its goal.” O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 62. For Aquinas, 
the effects of sin are essentially the stain of sin and the debt of punishment (see ST IIa, q. 87, a. 6; q. 109, a. 
7) and these effects are eliminated by the priesthood of Christ (see ST III, q. 22, a. 3).  
23 Aquinas points out that perfect human nature needed “a gratuitous strength superadded to 




has a greater need of grace24 and a different way of receiving it. On this second ground, 
the attention to material things in the sinful condition requires that grace (spiritual reality) 
be mediated through material instruments.25 As I will explain later, this type of mediation 
is a central feature of Christ’s priesthood in the sacramental model, which means that His 
priesthood is necessary for the human reception of grace needed for both the ontological 
and moral distance. Furthermore, according to a cosmological perspective, a unified view 
of creation and redemption is based on the belief that Christ is the mediator of both 
creation and redemption,26 which means that His priesthood is a continuation of the 
mediation in creation.27 This conception appears to imply that Christ’s mediation in 
creation was related to the ontological distance, while the priesthood adds to His 
                                                
24 Sinful human beings need grace not only for the ontological distance, but also for the moral 
disunity. For Aquinas, perfect human nature needed grace for one reason (see footnote above), while 
corrupt human nature needs it for two reasons: “in order to be healed” and “to carry out” meritorious 
“works of supernatural virtue.” ST IIa, q. 109, a. 2. Therefore, the corrupt nature adds one more reason for 
grace, namely, healing from sin. See the idea of grace healing the soul in q. 109, a. 9; q. 111, a. 3. A. N. 
Williams argues that, in contrast to the Augustinian notion that grace is needed only in the human fallen 
state, Aquinas emphasizes that grace is always necessary for creatures to attain their end, even without the 
fall. Actually, “the fall only adds another dimension to an ever-present need.” A. N. Williams, The Ground 
of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 79, 84. 
25 This notion is evident in Aquinas’ comparison between the human reception of grace before and 
after sin. Before sin, human beings did not need sacraments to receive grace, because they could obtain it 
“in a spiritual and invisible manner.” Thus, there was no need of “sensible signs” (sacraments). ST III, q. 
61, a. 2, ad 1. Conversely, after sin, human beings “subjected” themselves by their “affections to corporeal 
things.” Thus, God has provided human beings “with a spiritual medicine” (grace) “by means of certain 
corporeal signs” (sacraments), “for if man were offered spiritual things without a veil, his mind being taken 
up with the material world would be unable to apply itself to them.” ST III, q. 61, a. 1. 
26 O’Collins assumes a “coupling of redemption and creation with the mediation of Christ.” This 
means that “creation and the story of salvation were united in the Son of God from all eternity.” In other 
words, “the NT brings together the order of redemption and that of creation by understanding creation, and 
not merely redemption, to have occurred through the mediation of the Son of God.” O’Collins, Jesus Our 
Redeemer, 33-35. 
27 O’Collins indicates that “mediation is a broader category than priesthood. All priests are 
mediators, but not all mediators are priests.” JOP, 120. For explicit statements that Christ’s priesthood is a 
mediation, see ibid., 80, 265, 269. The point here is that the priesthood of Christ is part, actually a new 
phase, of the His broad work of mediation (creation-redemption). This point will be further elaborated 




mediation the dealing with the moral distance (sin). What seems clear from these 
anthropological and cosmological explanations is that the priesthood of Christ relates to 
the ontological distance as an instrument of grace. 
The second question inquires if Christ’s mediatorial priesthood is one-sided, 
working exclusively with sinful human beings and their movement toward God, or two-
sided, which includes also a work before God. Apparently, the sacramental model can 
accommodate both perspectives. In a two-sided mediation, as it can be seen in Aquinas, 
the priesthood of Christ cleanses human beings from sin and satisfies/appeases God with 
regard to their sin.28 Conversely, in a one-sided mediation, as defended by O’Collins, 
Christ’s priesthood addresses only human beings. God is not supposed to be 
satisfied/appeased.29 In the next chapter, I will analyze from a macro-hermeneutical 
                                                
28 His priesthood cleanses/expiates the stain of sin by grace, turning the human heart to God, and 
satisfies God (divine aspect), removing the human debt of punishment. ST III, q. 22, a. 3. The divine 
satisfaction is accomplished inasmuch as Christ’s passion “takes away sin by which men became God’s 
enemies” and constitutes a “sacrifice to appease [placetur] God.” ST III, q. 49, a. 4. Original Latin terms 
indicated in brackets for Aquinas’ works were taken from http://www.dhspriory.org/thomas (accessed 29 
December 2016), a website from the Dominican House of Studies. 
29 O’Collins rejects any notion of God’s wrath and propitiation. He argues that reconciliation is not 
about reestablishing “friendly relations between personal agents but as Christ making ‘all things’ conform 
to the divine plan.” O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 14. There is no human debt of punishment or divine 
satisfaction. In fact, the Jesuit theologian criticizes the penal substitutionary view of atonement, which in 
his understanding was promoted by Aquinas, claiming that this view portrays an angry God appeased by 
the punishment of an innocent person. JOP, 256. For further information, see ibid., 105-119. Strongly 
disagreeing with O’Collins, Nieuwenhoves argues that Aquinas did not contribute to penal substitution and 
propitiation of divine anger. Rather, he points out that “Aquinas, like Anselm, understands satisfaction in 
terms of purification and penance,” which “excludes” the notion of “punishment.” Rik Van Nieuwenhove, 
“‘Bearing the Marks of Christ’s Passion’: Aquinas’ Soteriology,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. 
Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 
289-290. Levering’s comments on the priesthood of Christ in Aquinas also affirm a satisfaction without the 
notion of penal substitution. See Levering, Christ and the Catholic Priesthood, 112-115. For other studies 
on atonement in Aquinas, see Eleonore Stump, Aquinas, Arguments of the Philosophers (London; New 
York: Routledge, 2003), 427-454; Adam J. Johnson, “A Fuller Account: The Role of ‘Fittingness’ in 
Thomas Aquinas’ Development of the Doctrine of the Atonement,” International Journal of Systematic 
Theology 12, no. 3 (2010): 302-318; Brandon Peterson, “Paving the Way? Penalty and Atonement in 




standpoint whether the sacramental model really allows the accommodation of both two-
sided and one-sided types of mediation.  
In summary, the solution for the sin problem requires the mediatorial priesthood 
of Christ. More specifically, sin causes a disorder that distances human beings from God 
by hindering their teleological movement toward Him. Christ’s priesthood is intended to 
solve the hindering/sin problem, and deals instrumentally with the ontological distance 
implied by the teleological movement. Also, the solution provided by His priesthood for 
the sin problem may demand a two-sided (involving God and human beings) or a one-
sided (only human beings) mediation. In the third chapter I will analyze the viability of 
these two types of mediation in the sacramental model. For now, I will describe the next 
component of the priesthood of Christ, namely, the agent. 
The Agent of the Priesthood  
The agent of the priesthood or the priest in the sacramental model is obviously 
identified as Christ. The key feature of the agent in this model is His human nature, 
which indicates that the incarnation is necessary for Him to be a priest.30 In fact, this 
model holds that Christ’s priesthood started with His incarnation. 31 This conception has 
                                                
30 Aquinas points out that “Christ was a priest, not as God, but as man, yet one and the same was 
both priest and God.” ST III, q. 22, a. 3, ad 1. Similarly, O’Collins defines Christ’s priesthood in terms of 
His humanity by stating that Christ’s incarnation is the association of “divine sonship and a human 
priesthood.” JOP, 49. Hence, for the Jesuit theologian, Christ’s “humanity was essential to his priesthood.” 
JOP, 242. He indicates that this idea can be found in Chrysostom, Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Newman, 
and Torrance. Ibid., 242. For additional historical information regarding the priesthood of Christ, from the 
church fathers to Vatican II, see ibid., 68-236.  
31 According to O’Collins, Christ became a high priest “when he took the human condition.” JOP, 
241. Referring to the Council of Ephesus (AD 431), Aquinas maintains that the priesthood of Christ started 
in the incarnation: Christ became high priest when He became man. ST III, q. 22, a. 3, ad 1. For helpful 
studies on Aquinas’ Christology, see Eleonore Stump, “Aquinas’ Metaphysics of the Incarnation,” in The 





implications for the scope of Christ’s priesthood and the nature of His mediation. In 
terms of scope, this priesthood includes everything that Christ is and does since His 
incarnation. As O’Collins emphasizes, the priesthood of Christ encompasses His entire 
human life, including His public ministry (teachings and miracles).32 
With regard to the nature of His priestly mediation, Christ’s humanity mediates 
the divine presence in creation (cosmological perspective) and divine grace to human 
beings (anthropological perspective). In both cases, Christ’s human nature mediates 
divine salvation in the sense that His corporeality provides a contact of the divine with 
the physical world and material human beings. According to the cosmological 
perspective expounded by O’Collins, the incarnation “brought a new stage in” Christ’s 
“revealing and saving presence. This event put” Him “in a material solidarity with all 
human beings and their world.”33 This means that the incarnation inaugurates a new 
                                                
Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O'Collins (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 197-218; 
Joseph Wawrykow, “Hypostatic Union,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove 
and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 222-251; Édouard-Henri 
Wéber, Le Christ Selon Saint Thomas d’Aquin, Jésus Et Jésus-Christ (Paris: Desclée, 1988); Thomas G. 
Weinandy, “Aquinas: God Is Man: The Marvel of the Incarnation,” in Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical 
Introduction, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel A. Keating, and John Yocum (London; New York: T&T 
Clark International, 2004), 67-89; Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 297-319; Michael Gorman, “Incarnation,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, 
ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 428-435. 
32 The Jesuit theologian affirms that, in Hebrews (5:7; 7:26; 10:5-7), Christ’s priesthood comprises 
His entire human life. JOP, 242. This means that although Christ’s “death, resurrection, and glorification” 
are decisive priestly moments, Christ’s life and public ministry are not “a mere prelude to the real exercise 
of His priesthood.” Ibid. He points out that Origen and Luther viewed Christ’s public ministry as a priestly 
ministry. Ibid., 244. 
33 O’Collins, Christology, 345; italics mine. The Jesuit theologian understands “soteriology as the 
multiform ways . . . in which Christ’s presence (or God’s unique, foundational presence in /to Christ) 
mediated and mediates itself to human beings and their world, so as to communicate revelation and 
redemption.” Ibid., 344. Reflecting on John 4, he argues that, as “the new priestly Mediator between God 
and human beings,” Christ “is the new place of the divine presence.” JOP, 25. Hence, O’Collins associates 
Christ’s priesthood with His mediation of the divine presence. Indeed, the presence of Christ, conceived in 
terms of the universal scope of His mediation, is part of the “primary interpretative key” of O’Collins’ 




phase of His mediation in creation-redemption,34 a phase characterized by material 
mediation, as Christ enters “into a kind of physical contact with the material universe” by 
means of His human body.35 Through this physical contact, the “personal presence in the 
world of the Son of God” initiates a process of transformation/divinization of the “whole 
human race and the whole created order.”36 This mediation of Christ through His 
physicality is an intended part of His whole creative-salvific mediation. More 
specifically, “the creation of the world and humankind provided the possibility for the 
Son of God to assume a human nature.”37 The intentionality of the existence of this 
material/human nature of Christ in a material creation is observed in the idea that 
salvation is “effected through a very long process of creation, incarnation, and final 
consummation.”38 On the basis of the premise that Christ’s priesthood initiated in His 
incarnation, in the cosmological perspective, His priesthood corresponds to the intended 
human phase of Christ’s creative-salvific mediation, which provides a material mediation 
of the divine presence for the transformation of creation.  
                                                
34 This statement is based on three lines of evidence in O’Collins: (1) he understands mediation as 
a broad category that may include priesthood (“mediation is a broader category than priesthood. All priests 
are mediators, but not all mediators are priests.” JOP, 120); (2) he affirms a large scope of Christ’s 
mediation as including creation and redemption (Christ is “mediator of creation and redemption.” 
O’Collins, Christology, 317); (3) he maintains that Christ’s priestly mediation initiates with His incarnation 
(this point is emphasized at the beginning of the discussion of the Agent of the Priesthood above). These 
lines of evidence imply that Christ’s priesthood is the human phase of His mediation. 
35 O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 85. He maintains that “our bodies insert us into the material 
world. We become part of the cosmos and the cosmos part of us . . . our life is constituted by a dynamic 
process of constant circulation between our bodies and our material environment.” Ibid., 84. 
36 Ibid., 85. O’Collins argues that the incarnation initiates the process of “conformation of all 
things to the plan of God,” as Christ united Himself “with the whole created world.” Ibid., 15. 
37 Ibid., 35. 
38 Ibid., 28. O’Collins assumes that “creation is there ‘for the sake of redemption,’” since “the 
mystery of love that was creation reached its climax at redemption, with both creation and redemption 




In the anthropological perspective elaborated by Aquinas, the association of 
Christ’s priestly mediation and His humanity assumes that the latter is the mean between 
God (one extreme) and sinful human beings (the other extreme).39 As a mean, Christ’s 
humanity is the material instrument by which salvific divine activities are performed.40 In 
fact, this instrumental mediation of Christ’s humanity is appropriate to the sinful 
condition of human beings. In agreement with what was mentioned above in the 
discussion of the need for Christ’s priesthood, “on deserting God” sinful human beings 
“had stooped to corporeal things,” which made “necessary that God should take flesh, 
and by corporeal things should afford” humanity “the remedy of salvation.”41 In this way, 
the humanity of Christ is a material instrument that channels a divine strength or force 
(grace) to the souls of concrete human beings.42 Assuming that the human locus of grace 
                                                
39 For Aquinas, “as man,” Christ “is distant both from God, by nature, and from man by dignity of 
both grace and glory. Again, it belongs to Him, as man, to unite men to God.” ST III, q. 26, a. 2; italics 
mine. Hence, the man Christ as priest is a mean that unites the extremes. In his words, “the office of a 
mediator is to join together and unite those between whom he mediates,” the “extremes are united in the 
mean [medio].” ST III, q. 26, a. 1. A mean is distant from both extremes, but it unites them “by 
communicating to one that which belongs to the other.” ST III, q. 26, a. 2. As a mean between God and 
human beings, “Christ had beatitude in common with God” and “mortality in common with men,” so that 
He could die to reconcile human beings with God and also confer beatitude on humankind. ST III, q. 26, a. 
1, ad 2. According to Scheller, the notions that the extremes are united in the mediator/mean and that the 
extremes are different from the mediator/mean are derived from Aristotelian metaphysics. Scheller, Das 
Priestertum Christi im Anschluss an den hl. Thomas von Aquin, 261. 
40 Aquinas affirms that “the humanity of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead.” ST III, q. 7, a. 
1, ad 3. In Latin, “humanitas Christi est instrumentum divinitatis.” This is not “an inanimate instrument, 
which nowise acts, but is merely acted upon; but an instrument animated by a rational soul, which is so 
acted upon as to act.” Ibid. 
41 ST III, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1. 
42 For the purpose of this discussion, Aquinas believes that grace is a superadded strength (ST IIa, 
q. 109, a. 5) or “higher force” (ST IIa, q. 109, a. 2) given by God to heal the corrupted human nature and to 
carry out meritorious works of supernatural virtue. The medieval theologian explains that divine grace can 
be defined in two ways, namely, as “the movement of the soul” (God moves the human soul “to know or 
will or do something”), and as “habitual gift” that “is infused by God into the soul.” ST IIa, q. 110, a. 2. The 
discussion of the reasons why the corrupt human nature needs grace (grace as superadded strength and 
higher force) refers to grace as habitual gift. See ST IIa, q. 109, a. 2, ad 1. For helpful information on 





is the soul,43 the humanity of Christ “receives the greatest outpouring” of divine grace in 
His soul, because His human nature is closely united to the divine nature (hypostatical 
union).44 Whereas Christ as God is the source of grace, Christ as man gives it 
“instrumentally,” “inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead.”45 
According to this view, the mediatorial instrumentality of Christ’s humanity in relation to 
His divinity is analogous to the instrumentality of the human body in relation to the 
soul.46 This correspondence between Christ’s humanity (instrument) and divinity, and the 
human body (instrument) and soul indicates the following logical sequence: Christ’s 
divinity, His humanity, human body, and human soul. More specifically, Christ’s divinity 
is the source of grace, which is instrumentally bestowed through His humanity on 
concrete human beings, who receive this grace “secondarily and instrumentally” through 
their bodies and, then, divine grace reaches their souls.47 In this anthropological view, 
                                                
“Grace,” 192-221. 
43 ST III, q. 7, a. 11.  
44 ST III, q. 7, a. 9. This statement connects the twofold grace that is in Christ: (1) “the grace of 
union,” as His humanity is “personally united to the Son of God;” and (2) the “habitual grace” which is “in 
the soul of Christ.” ST III, q. 7, a. 11. For Aquinas, in Christ, “the grace of union precedes, in thought,” not 
in time, “habitual grace.” ST III, q. 7, a. 13. The medieval theologian believes that the reason why Christ, 
being divine, needed an habitual grace created in His soul is the acknowledgment of His genuine humanity: 
“because it is necessary to admit a human operation, distinct from the Divine operation, . . . it was 
necessary for Him to have habitual grace, whereby this operation might be perfect in Him.” ST III, q. 7, a. 
1, ad 2. For further justifications of habitual grace in Christ, see ST III, q. 7, a. 1. 
45 ST III, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1. 
46 “Inasmuch as the soul is its motor, the body serves the soul instrumentally. Therefore . . . the 
manhood of Christ had the power of ‘influence,’ inasmuch as it is united to the Word of God.” ST III, q. 8, 
a. 2. Aquinas argues that the humanity of Christ cleanses (ST III, q. 31, a. 1; q. 14, a. 4, ad 1) and perfects 
(ST III, q. 1, a. 6; q. 2, a. 11) human nature, brings human beings to the end of beatitude (the vision of God) 
(ST III, q. 9, a. 2), and bestows upon humankind the full participation of the divinity (ST III, q. 1, a. 2). 
47 As an instrument of the soul, the body receives grace “secondarily and instrumentally.” ST III, 




Christ as priest is “the head of all” and “the fount of all grace,”48 which implies that He 
bestows through His humanity the grace that overflows in Him on others.49 This is a key 
aspect of His mediation as priest.50 
In summary, Christ’s humanity is His central feature as priest (the agent of the 
priesthood), meaning that the incarnation is not only necessary but also the starting point 
of His priesthood. In terms of scope, this implies that Christ’s priesthood encompasses 
His entire human life, including His public ministry. With regard to the nature of His 
mediation as priest, Christ’s human nature mediates divine salvation as His corporeality 
provides a contact of the divine with the physical world and material human beings. From 
a cosmological standpoint, Christ’s priesthood corresponds to an intended human phase 
of His whole creative-salvific mediation, which provides a material mediation of the 
divine presence for the transformation of creation. According to an anthropological 
perspective, Christ’s divinity bestows grace through the material instrumentality of His 
humanity upon concrete human beings, who receive this grace in their soul through the 
material instrumentality of their bodies.  
                                                
48 ST III, q. 22, a. 1, ad 3. In his explanation of the grace of Christ, Aquinas explores “the grace of 
Christ as an individual man” and “the grace of Christ as He is the head of the church.” ST III, q. 7 and q. 8, 
respectively. In these sections, “the end of grace is the union of the rational creature with God” (q. 7, a. 12; 
see also q. 7, a. 1, ad 1) 
49 ST III, q. 7, a. 5. In the list of reasons for calling Christ the head of the church, all the arguments 
center on the idea of grace: (1) “on account of” Christ’s “nearness to God His grace is the highest and first, 
though not in time, since all have received grace on account of His grace”; (2) “He had perfection as 
regards the fulness of all graces”; (3) “He has the power of bestowing grace on all the members of the 
Church.” ST III, q. 8, a. 1. 
50 “For Christ, as man, is the ‘Mediator of God and men,’ as is written, 1 Timothy 2:5; and hence it 
behooved Him to have grace which would overflow upon others, according to John 1:16.” ST III, q. 7, a. 1. 
The medieval theologian points out that whereas the sin of Adam, the head of humanity in Creation, is 
transmitted by fleshly generation, “the merit of Christ, who has been appointed by God to be the head of all 
men in regard to grace, extends to all His members” (ST III, q. 19, a. 4, ad 1) through “spiritual 




The Actions of the Priest  
In the sacramental model, the actions of Christ the priest are under a broad 
concept of sacrifice,51 which is conceived as invisible/internal (a personal disposition) 
and visible/external (a concrete offering). In the context of Christ’s priesthood, the 
invisible sacrifice encompasses His entire life and the visible sacrifice is defined by the 
shedding of His blood on the cross, which is followed by the consummation of His 
sacrifice. This consummation seems to combine visible and invisible aspects of sacrifice, 
as it includes Christ’s heavenly intercession and the sacrament of the eucharist. 
Therefore, the actions of Christ in His priesthood can be generally classified in the 
following way: (1) His invisible/internal sacrifice, (2) His visible bloody sacrifice, and 
(3) His consummation of the sacrifice. In the discussion below, I will clarify how these 
types of priestly actions are understood in the sacramental model. 
The notion of Christ’s invisible sacrifice assumes a distinction of invisible and 
visible sacrifice. The former is an internal disposition or self-offering to God,52 while the 
latter is an external expression or “a sacrament, that is a sacred sign, of the invisible 
                                                
51 Scheller argues that, for Aquinas, while the concept of a mediator priest refers to the person of 
Christ, the notion of a sacrificial priest concerns the office or work of Christ. Scheller, Das Priestertum 
Christi im Anschluss an den hl. Thomas von Aquin, 218. For helpful studies on the work of Christ and 
salvation in Aquinas, see Bernard Catão, Salut Et Rédemption Chez Saint S. Thomas d’Aquin: L’acte 
Sauveur Du Christ (Paris: Aubier, 1965); Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 320-344; Matthew 
Levering, Christ’s Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation According to Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002); Romanus Cessario, “Aquinas on Christian Salvation,” in 
Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel A. Keating, and John 
Yocum (London; New York: T&T Clark International, 2004), 117-137; Nieuwenhove, “‘Bearing the Marks 
of Christ’s Passion’,” 436-447; Rick Van Nieuwenhove, “The Saving Work of Christ,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 277-302. 
52 Aquinas stipulates that “whatever is offered to God in order to raise man’s spirit to Him, may be 




sacrifice.”53 In other words, sacrifice is an internal disposition accompanied by an 
external aspect.54 As O’Collins points out, “whatever Christ did by way of external 
sacrifice symbolized and expressed his interior self-giving to the Father.”55 Reflecting on 
Christ’s priesthood, Aquinas highlights His offering of the sacrifice (visible sacrifice) and 
the devotion with which He endured the passion (invisible sacrifice).56 The conception of 
invisible and visible sacrifice implies that Christ’s visible offering of the sacrifice was a 
sacrament or a materialization of His invisible devotion. In his emphasis on the invisible 
sacrifice, the medieval theologian claims that “Christ obtained a result from His passion, 
not as by virtue of the sacrifice [visible], which is offered by way of satisfaction, but by 
the very devotion [invisible] with which out of charity He humbly endured the passion.”57 
Thus, sacrifice is primarily invisible (spiritual) and understood as a self-offering or 
devotion. For O’Collins, Christ’s sacrifice must be viewed in terms of love and self-
giving and, therefore, it refers not only to His death on the cross but also to His entire 
                                                
53 Ibid. In this explanation, Aquinas quotes Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 5).    
54 O’Collins argues that this conception is largely based on the following notions: (1) in the OT, 
“external rituals were worthless without . . . the corresponding interior dispositions, and . . . compassionate 
behavior” (see e.g., Pss 40:6-8; 51:17-19; Hos 6:6; Mic 6:6-8); (2) in the NT, Paul employs “the 
terminology of sacrifice in both a cultic (e.g., 1 Cor. 5:7) and a non-cultic way” (e.g., Rom 12:1); (3) for 
Augustine, “the external sacrificial gift must symbolize the inner, invisible sacrifice”; (4) “Aquinas 
endorsed a broad, non-cultic account of sacrifice . . . and a more cultic reading of sacrifice.” JOP, 253-254. 
55 Ibid., 256. For O’Collins, this can be seen in the fact that Christ “had come to do God’s will 
(Heb. 10:7, 9).” Ibid. According to Aquinas, “the outward sacrifice” that someone “offers is a sign of the 
inner sacrifice whereby he offers himself to God.” ST III, q. 82, a. 4. 
56 ST III, q. 22, a. 4, ad 2.  
57 Ibid. The “passion was most acceptable to God, as coming from charity.” ST III, q. 48, a. 3. 
Matthew Levering comments that, for Aquinas, “the fundamental ‘offering’” of Christ’s “human life . . . is 
the active offering that he makes spiritually out of love, not the more ‘passive’ submission of his flesh to 




life.58 Christ’s life is a sacrifice of self-giving to God and others. In this perspective, 
Christ’s teaching, miracles, and the last supper are priestly actions.59 For the Jesuit 
theologian, the latter is the climax of Christ’s internal sacrifice (His life of service for 
others), as He committed Himself to a self-sacrificing death in the last supper.60 
The premise that sacrifice is an invisible self-offering accompanied by a visible 
expression or sacrament has implications for Christ’s visible sacrifice on the cross. One 
implication drawn by O’Collins is that sacrifice, as a self-offering, is a gift to God,61 not a 
punishment. This means that it is not true that Christ “bore ‘the sins of the world’ and 
was . . . under divine judgment ‘as the object of the anger of God’” on the cross.62 Thus, 
                                                
58 Regarding the first idea, the Jesuit theologian agrees with Aquinas that the death of Christ was a 
sacrifice only because He suffered ‘out of love.’” JOP, 257. In the second idea, Christ’s “whole life was a 
continual free gift of himself (or sacrifice) to God and others.” Hence, it is a “mistake to limit Christ’s 
sacrificial performance to his death and exaltation.” Ibid., 256. In Hebrews, a “priestly self-offering 
characterized his entire human existence (10:5-7).” Ibid., 50. 
59 This broad notion of sacrifice is compatible to O’Collins’ broad notion of Christ’s priesthood. 
Both sacrifice and priesthood encompass His entire life. In this sense, Christ’s public teaching and 
preaching as part of His priesthood which is supported, in O’Collins’ view, by the teaching function of the 
priests in the OT and by Paul’s understanding of his preaching work as a priestly or liturgical ministry 
(Rom 15:16). Ibid., 244. The Jesuit theologian stipulates that Christ’ healings and the Last Supper were 
significant priestly activities of His public ministry. His argument is that Christ’s proclamation and 
teaching were inseparable from His healings in the Gospels, and that “during his ministry and at its end, 
Jesus nourishes people in a ‘double’ and priestly way,” namely, through His teachings and in the institution 
of the eucharist. JOP, 244-245. O’Collins quotes the document “Decree on the Ministry and Life of 
Priests” (Presbyterorum Ordinis 18) of the Second Vatican Council: “‘Christians draw nourishment 
through the Word of God from the double table of holy Scripture and the Eucharist.’” Following this view, 
he claims that Jesus fed the people “with his teaching and shared his presence with them by joining them 
for meals.” Actually, “what he does in feeding people on both occasions” (the feeding of five thousand in 
Mark 6:30-44 and of four thousand hungry people in Mark 8:1-10) “foreshadows the Last Supper and the 
institution of the Eucharist.” Hence, “during his ministry and at its end, Jesus nourishes people in a 
‘double’ and priestly way.” Ibid. 
60 “at the Last Supper, when instituting the Eucharist as a sacrificial meal, Jesus committed 
himself through a cultic, priestly act to his self-sacrificing death.” Ibid., 250. See also ibid., 261. Regarding 
“Christ’s priestly self-offering at the Last Supper,” the Jesuit theologian stipulates that “the Last Supper 
integrated into his mission a final act of service.” Ibid., 261, 258. 
61 Ibid., 256. 
62 O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 147. See ibid., 152. Commenting on Lev 16, O’Collins points 





the cross is about Christ giving His life to God, and not about Him receiving human sins 
and then suffering the punishment of the divine wrath. A second and more significant 
implication is that the crucifixion constitutes a visible expression or sacrament that 
accompanies an invisible self-offering (the essence of the sacrifice). Following this 
perspective, the crucifixion is the visible expression of Christ’s commitment in the last 
supper (invisible sacrifice). In this sense, the Jesuit theologian declares that “Christ’s 
priestly self-offering at the Last Supper was consummated in the sacrifice of Calvary.”63 
For Aquinas, as the crucifixion is related to Christ’s corporeality,64 the experience of the 
cross was an instrument used by God. In his words, “inasmuch as Christ’s flesh, wherein 
He endured the Passion, is the instrument of the Godhead, so that His sufferings and 
actions operate with Divine power for expelling sin.”65 This notion of expelling sin or 
purification seems to interpret the crucifixion in terms of the sacrament of penance.66 
                                                
quite incompatible with the nature of sin as a breakdown in a personal relationship with God.” Actually, 
“Hebrews was to use the imagery of Yom Kippur to express the meaning of redemption, but emphasized 
that Christ, having died once and for all for our sins, expiated them and so made the whole ceremony of 
Yom Kippur superfluous (Heb. 9: 1–10: 18).” Ibid., 152.  
63 JOP, 261. O’Collins argues that the last supper and the crucifixion are “defining moments in the 
narrative of Christ’s priesthood.” Ibid., 241. 
64 The passion belongs to Christ “in respect of His human nature.” ST III, q. 64, a. 3. 
65 ST III, q. 49, a. 1. “Christ’s Passion, although corporeal, has yet a spiritual effect from the 
Godhead united.” Ibid. Aquinas acknowledges that the passion of Christ is “the cause of justification” as 
“an instrument,” and “not as the principal cause.” Ibid. The following quotations confirm this perspective 
of the passion: “Christ’s actions and sufferings operate instrumentally in virtue of His Godhead for the 
salvation of men.” q. 48, a. 6; “Although Christ did not suffer as God, nevertheless His flesh is the 
instrument of the Godhead; and hence it is that His Passion has a kind of Divine Power of casting out sin.” 
q. 49, a. 1, ad 1; “Although Christ’s Passion is corporeal, still it derives a kind of spiritual energy [virtutem] 
from the Godhead, to which the flesh is united as an instrument: and according to this power Christ’s 
Passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sins.” q. 49, a. 1, ad 2. 
66 In his discussion of the saving work of Christ in Aquinas, Van Nieuwenhove emphasizes that 
the medieval theologian connects “the satisfaction Christ makes on the Cross” with “the sacrament of 
penance.” Nieuwenhove, “The Saving Work of Christ,” 439. See also Davies, The Thought of Thomas 





Furthermore, from a broader perspective, considering that sin is a disorder in which 
material things distract human beings,67 the crucifixion or Christ’s human suffering is a 
decisive material instrument used by God to bring their attention to spiritual realities.68 
As a visible sacrifice, the crucifixion, besides its connection with penance, functions as a 
sacrament69 in two senses: (1) as a sign or visible expression of Christ’s devotion to God 
                                                
elements of the sacrament of penance is satisfaction (the paying of the penalty owed). See SCG IV.72.4. 
For Nieuwenhove, it is the element of satisfaction that makes the crucifixion a penitential act. Other 
important aspects of the sacrament of penance higlighted by Aquinas that appear to be related to Christ’s 
crucifixtion are: penance is a “sacramental remedy by which sins are washed away” (SCG IV.72.1), and 
this spiritual cure proceeds both “from something internal and from something external” (SCG IV.72.3), 
which seems to include both an invisible and visible sacrifice. All English quotations of SCG are taken 
from Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed. Joseph Kenny, trans. James F. Anderson Anton C. 
Pegis, Vernon J. Bourke, and Charles J. O’Neil (New York: Hanover House, 1955–1957), available at 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm (accessed 29 December 2016), a website from the 
Dominican House of Studies. 
67 See section above about the need for Christ’s priesthood. 
68 For the medieval theologian, Christ’s passion or crucifixion was not necessary to earn salvific 
merits, but to secure the effects of the merits that He already had. “From the beginning of His conception 
Christ merited our eternal salvation; but on our side there were some obstacles, whereby we were hindered 
from securing the effect of His preceding merits: consequently, in order to remove such hindrances, ‘it was 
necessary for Christ to suffer.’” ST III, q. 48, a. 1, ad 2. See also ad 3. To put it more sharply, the 
crucifixion was necessary to remove the hindrances of human beings so that Christ’s preceding merits 
could have a salvific effect in human beings. The crucifixion “has a special effect” (q. 48, a. 1, ad 3) on 
human beings, not necessarily more merit for their salvation. Overall, Aquinas seems to spell out the effect 
of removing human hindrances in the following way: through Christ’s passion human beings (1) know 
“how much God loves” them and are “thereby stirred to love Him in return”; (2) are “all the more bound to 
refrain from sin”; (3) are motivated to charity, by which “we procure pardon of our sins”; (4) have “an 
example of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the other virtues . . . which are requisite for man’s 
salvation.” ST III, q. 46, a. 3; q. 49, a. 1. These impacts of Christ’s passion on human beings are consistent 
with the idea highlighted above that sinful human beings “stooped to corporeal things” and God had to 
inhabit flesh in order to save them through corporeal things (q. 1, a. 3, ad 1). On the basis of this idea, the 
hindrances of human beings seem to be related to their sole attention to corporeal things, which makes 
them unable to appreciate and receive divine (immaterial) salvation. Therefore, Christ’s crucifixion, as a 
corporeal reality, removes the hindrances of human beings by bringing their attention and desire for divine 
and spiritual realities, which are described in the three points above. 
69 In fact, Aquinas uses the language of sacrament in reference to the cross. “Death on the cross 
was also appropriate as a sacrament. Christ wished to make clear by His death that we ought so to die in 
our carnal life that our spirit might be raised to higher things.” Thomas Aquinas, Compendium of Theology 
1.228. Quotation taken from the translation by Cyril Vollert (St. Louis & London: B. Herder Book, 1947), 
available at http://www.dhspriory.org/thomas/english/Compendium.htm (accessed 30 December 2016), a 
website from the Dominican House of Studies. According to Nieuwenhove, “by adopting the notion of the 
humanity of Christ as the instrument of his divinity Aquinas can argue that every aspect of Christ’s life, 





(invisible sacrifice) and (2) as a material instrument of divine salvific action that brings 
human attention to spiritual realities, which are communicated to human beings in the 
consummation of the sacrifice.70 
In the consummation of Christ’s sacrifice, human beings concretely receive the 
effect of the divine salvific action.71 Because Christ ascended to heaven, this 
consummation encompasses the heavenly and earthly realms.72 His heavenly intercession 
has its counterpart particularly in the earthly eucharist. In heaven, Christ’s intercession 
                                                
Christ,” 438. 
70 As a divine salvific action, Christ’s passion is “a kind of universal cause of the forgiveness of 
sins” that “needs to be applied to each individual for the cleansing of personal sins” through the 
“sacraments.” ST III, q. 49, a. 1, ad 4. See also ad 3. This idea of universal cause and personal application 
assumes that Christ is the head and humans beings in the church are members of the body. See q. 49, a. 1. 
71 Aquinas distinguishes the visible bloody sacrifice from its consummation by using the Latin 
words oblation and consummatio. For him, the priestly office consists of two parts: (1) “the offering 
[oblatio] of the sacrifice” and (2) “the consummation [consummatio] of the sacrifice.” In the second part, 
“those for whom the sacrifice is offered . . . obtain the end of the sacrifice.” ST III, q. 22, a. 5. According to 
this perspective, the bloody “offering [oblatio] made by Christ” was prefigured by the animal sacrifices of 
the levitical priesthood, while the consummation or the “partaking [participatio] thereof” was 
foreshadowed by the non-bloody offering of bread and wine in Melchizedek’s priesthood. ST III, q. 22, a. 
6, ad 2. The levitical priesthood foreshadowed “the shedding of blood,” whereas in the priesthood of 
Melchizedek there “was no blood-shedding.” Ibid. “In the New Law the true sacrifice of Christ is presented 
to the faithful under the form of bread and wine.” ST III, q. 22, a. 6, ad 2. Aquinas associates Christ’s 
priesthood with Melchizedek by quoting especially Heb 7 (see q. 31, a. 8) and Ps 109:4 (see q. 63, a. 5). 
For Melchizedek’s offering of bread and wine, he quotes Gen 14:18 (see q. 61, a. 3, ad 3). O’Collins 
employs the language of consummation of Christ’s sacrifice assuming that “through the Spirit the heavenly 
consummation of Christ’s sacrifice continues for all eternity.” JOP, 266. See also ibid., 271. 
72 In his remarks about the “consummation of Christ’s sacrifice,” Aquinas connects the heavenly 
aspect of this consummation with Christ’s ascension to heaven. In his words, such consummation “was 
foreshadowed in this, that the high-priest of the Old Law, once a year, entered into the Holy of Holies with 
the blood of a he-goat and a calf, as laid down, Leviticus 16:11, and yet he offered up the he-goat and calf 
not within the Holy of Holies, but without. In like manner Christ entered into the Holy of Holies—that is, 
into heaven—and prepared the way for us, that we might enter by the virtue of His blood, which He shed 
for us on earth.” ST III, q. 22, a. 5. Commenting on this statement in an editorial note, Colman E. O’Neill 
argues that “Thomas is concerned to exclude the idea of a heavenly sacrifice in the sense of a visible 
offering of a victim. However, the interior element of Calvary . . . does remain. . . . Such a permanence in 
heaven of the interior sacrifice of Christ, in union with his mystical body, is precisely the consummation of 
Calvary. The Mass gives sacramental expression, during the time of the earthly Church, to this interior 
sacrifice of all those who belong to Christ.” Thomas Aquinas and Colman E. O’Neill, The One Mediator 
(3a.15-26): Latin Text, English Translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices and Glossary, Summa 




before God means that He offers Himself to the Father through the Spirit (O’Collins),73 
and that He presents His humanity to the Father (Aquinas).74 In accordance to the idea of 
invisible sacrifice, the notion of intercessory self-offering is conceived as an eternal 
sacrifice in heaven.75 Arguably, the basic difference between O’Collins and Aquinas on 
the concept of heavenly intercession refers to the propitiation of the Father. For the 
medieval theologian, the presentation of Christ’s humanity aims at causing the Father to 
have mercy on human beings,76 whereas the Jesuit theologian does not mention the 
Father’s mercy in this context. For O’Collins, Christ’s heavenly mediation is part of His 
work of bringing to completion the fulfillment of the divine promises,77 which takes place 
as blessings to the world,78 and does not refer to a propitiation of divine wrath.79 
                                                
73 “The priesthood of Christ continues forever, since he eternally intercedes for the world and 
blesses the world, offers himself through the Holy Spirit to the Father.” JOP, 265. This conclusion is based 
on the picture of the Lamb who was slain facing the presence of God forever in the heavenly liturgy in 
Revelation, and on the notion of the Spirit offering the sacrifice of Christ to the Father in Heb 9:14. See 
ibid., 265-266. O’Collins emphasizes that “at all stages (incarnation, ministry, death, and risen glory) the 
priesthood of Christ is essentially Trinitarian.” Ibid., 270. 
74 As the OT high-priest “entered the holy place [sanctuarium] to stand before God for the people, 
so also Christ entered heaven ‘to make intercession [ad interpellandum] for us.’” For Aquinas, “the very 
showing [repraesentatio] of Himself in the human nature which He took with Him to heaven is a pleading 
[interpellatio] for us so that for the very reason that God so exalted human nature in Christ, He may take 
pity [misereatur] on them for whom the Son of God took human nature.” ST III, q. 57, a. 6. 
75 For O’Collins, “the heavenly consummation of Christ’s sacrifice continues for all eternity.”JOP, 
266. The Jesuit theologian does not firmly differentiate the categories of sacrifice and intercession, as the 
former may include the latter. “Sacrifice can include other such features as adoration, praise, thanksgiving, 
and intercession.” O’Collins, Christology, 304; italics mine. The identification of heavenly intercession and 
sacrifice is clearly perceived in the following statement, “Eternally interceding now for those still to be 
brought to completion through the fulfilment of the divine promises, Christ the High Priest presents forever 
on their behalf to the Father his sacrificial self-offering.” JOP, 262; italics mine. 
76 See footnote 74 above. 
77 See O’Collins’ concept of Christ’s eternal intercession in footnote 75 above. 
78 Ibid., 265. 




The consummation of Christ’s sacrifice in heaven finds its counterpart on earth 
through the Holy Spirit, who makes the benefits of the sacrifice available to human 
beings. The Jesuit theologian affirms that Christ, the ascended priest, “continues to pour 
out the Holy Spirit upon the Church and the world,” and this means that “the Spirit 
universalizes the priestly work of Jesus.”80 Through the Spirit, the main locus of Christ’s 
priestly activity on earth is the church, where He is the “primary minister” of all 
“preaching and sacramental life.”81 According to Aquinas, “the whole rite of the 
Christian religion is derived from Christ’s priesthood,”82 which implies that He acts 
through the sacraments of the church to apply the power of His sacrifice to human 
beings.83 Just as Christ’s humanity was a material instrument of His divinity for the 
                                                
80 Ibid., 265-266. For O’Collins, the sending of the Spirit by the ascended Christ constitutes an 
aspect of His cosmic presence. See O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 226. In fact the Jesuit theologian 
seems to believe that, through the work of the Holy Spirit in the world, Christ mediates the redemption of 
all” as He “sows the seeds of truth in the minds of every human being.” O’Collins, Christology, 325. 
Overall, O’Collins claims that “witnessing, giving new life, teaching the truth, and commissioning on the 
part of the Spirit are ongoing activities that involve a constant sending by the eternal High Priest.” JOP, 
266. O’Collins adds, “Luke can move from cases of faithful guidance by the risen and ascended Lord (Acts 
9:10-16; 18:9-10; 22:17-21) to cases of guidance by the Holy Spirit (Acts 8:29; 10:19; 16:6), without 
distinguishing clearly between them. He reports at least once guidance by ‘the Spirit of Jesus’ (Acts 16:7), 
in parallelism with ‘the Holy Spirit’ (Acts 16:6).” Ibid., 268.  
81 JOP, 265. Using the language of Vatican II (Lumens Gentium 8), O’Collins affirms that the 
church is the “visible organization” used by Christ to communicate “grace and truth” to human beings. 
O’Collins, Christology, 329. In this way, he considers that “the fullness of the means of salvation are to be 
found in the Church.” Ibid., 331. 
82 ST III, q. 63, a. 3. As Liam Walsh highlights, the medieval theologian identifies the activity of 
Christ as priest with the liturgical activity of the church. See Liam G. Walsh, “Liturgy in the Theology of 
St. Thomas,” The Thomist 38, no. 3 (1974): 571. 
83 O’Collins affirms that Christ “ministers really, if under signs, in the whole sacramental system 
of the Church and beyond.” O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 200-201. According to Aquinas, the salvific 
“power [virtus] of the Passion is applied to the living through the sacraments which make us like unto 
Christ’s Passion.” ST III, q. 52, a. 1, ad 2. Aquinas affirms that there are seven sacraments: baptism, 
confirmation, eucharist, penance, extreme unction, order (ordination), and matrimony. See ST III, q. 65, a. 
1. For helpful studies on sacraments in Aquinas, see Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 345-376; 
Dominic Holz, “Sacraments,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 448-457; Liam G. Walsh, “Sacraments,” in The 





visible sacrifice on the cross, the sacraments are material instruments of the 
consummation of the sacrifice performed on earth by the ascended Christ.84 In fact, 
Christ as priest does not act only by means of the instrumentality of material objects 
(sacraments in general) but also through concrete human beings, the ordained priests of 
the church (the sacrament of holy orders),85 who act in Christ’s person in the 
                                                
University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 326-364; John P. Yocum, “Sacraments in Aquinas,” in Aquinas on 
Doctrine: A Critical Introduction, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel A. Keating, and John Yocum (London; 
New York: T&T Clark International, 2004), 159-181. 
84 Aquinas points out that “as in the person of Christ the humanity causes our salvation by grace, 
the Divine power being the principal agent, so likewise in the sacraments of the New Law, which are 
derived from Christ, grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and principally by the power of the 
Holy Ghost working in the sacraments.” ST IIa, q. 112, a. 1, ad 2. John Yocum formulates a Christological 
understanding of the sacraments in Aquinas: Christ, “the Word incarnate, in whom the Word of God is 
united to sensible flesh, and this union of word and sensible element is paralleled in the composition of the 
sacraments.” Additionally, “the human being who is sanctified is also a composition of body and soul; and 
the sacraments are adapted to that condition, since the sacrament touches the body through the sensible 
element, and touches the soul through faith in the words.” Yocum, “Sacraments in Aquinas,” 166, 172. 
85 Aquinas explains that the two effects of the sacraments on human beings are grace and a 
character. See ST III, q. 62 and 63. The idea of the sacramental production of character, a “spiritual seal” 
given for a specific purpose (ST III, q. 63, a. 1, ad 1), is understood Christologically: “the character of 
Christ, to Whose character the faithful are likened [configurantur] by reason of the sacramental characters, 
which are nothing else than certain participations of Christ’s Priesthood, flowing [derivatae] from Christ 
Himself.” ST III, q. 63, a. 3. On the basis of Heb 1:3, Aquinas speaks of Christ having the character (figure, 
substance) of the Father. See ST III, q. 63, a. 1, ad 2. The character has two characteristics in human beings, 
it is eternal and instrumental. Because the priesthood of Christ is eternal, the “sanctification wrought by His 
Priesthood is perpetual,” and therefore the character is an indelible mark imprinted in the soul. This 
perpetuity is not a result from the perfection of the human person (the instrument), “but from the perfection 
of Christ’s priesthood” (the principal agent)—from the principal agent “the character flows like an 
instrumental power [instrumentalis virtus].” ST III, q. 63, a. 5. Considering that the purpose of a character 
is to receive or bestow divine gifts (ST III, q. 63, a. 3; see also q. 63, a. 2), there are two types of 
participation in the priesthood of Christ. While the sacraments of baptism and confirmation “confer the 
power to receive the other sacraments of the church” (receptive power), the sacrament of order confers the 
power to bestow sacraments on others (active power). ST III, q. 63, a. 6; see also q. 63, a. 2. Thus, believers 
participate in the priesthood of Christ by receiving the character as a receptive power through baptism (see 
ST III, q. 63, a. 5, ad 2), whereas priests receive the character as an active power by means of ordination 
(see ST III, q. 63, a. 6), which means that priests participate in Christ’s priesthood as a special (active) kind 
of instrument. See ST III, q. 63, a. 2. Aquinas argues that a priest or “minister is of the nature of an 
instrument, since the action of both is applied to something extrinsic, while the interior effect is produced 
through the power of the principal agent, which is God.” ST III, q. 64, a. 1. Similarly, O’Collins stipulates 
that the unique priesthood of Christ is “participated in, albeit differently, by all the baptized and by 
ordained ministers.” JOP, 271. All the baptized share in the priesthood of Christ as they (1) offer “priestly 
sacrifices of praise and good works,” (2) “express their priestly identity at the celebration of the Eucharist,” 
(3) “become the means through which Christ blesses and sanctifies others,” (4) offer themselves in the Holy 





administration of the sacraments.86 Both sacramental objects and priests have the 
instrumental power to confer grace, as Christ’s humanity does. Aquinas argues that the 
humanity of Christ is “a united instrument” due to the incarnation, while the sacraments 
and priests are “a separate instrument,” and the grace conferred by the priest and the 
sacraments comes from “Christ’s Godhead through His humanity.”87 In accordance to the 
discussion above on the agent of the priesthood, this instrumental notion suggests the 
following logical sequence for the communication of grace from God to human beings: 
(1) Christ’s divinity (principal agent), (2) Christ’s humanity (united instrument), (3) 
ordained priests (separate instrument), (4) sacraments (separate instrument), (5) human 
body (the instrument of the soul), (6) human soul (the essence of a human being). The 
best example of this instrumental dynamics is the eucharist, which is the climax of the 
                                                
(5) face afflictions and trials in the life of faith. Ibid., 273-279. However, through ordination, priests “share 
in a special way in the priesthood of Christ” (ibid., 281) and by acting “in the person of the invisible 
Christ” they “intercede for others as His visible representatives” (ibid., 286). The Jesuit theologian points 
out that Jesus “called and ‘established’ some of his disciples as priestly ministers who would share in a 
special way in his priesthood for the service of his community and the world.” Even though He did that 
“during his ministry” and also “after his resurrection,” the “defining moment in their being initiated into a 
priestly office” was the last supper. Ibid., 279-280.  
86 ST III, q. 22, a. 4. “The priests of the New Law” are “called mediators” insofar “as they are the 
ministers of the true Mediator by administering, in His stead, the saving sacraments to men.” ST III, q. 26, 
a. 1. For Aquinas, “Christ is the Head of all who pertain to the Church in every place and time and state; 
but all other men are called heads with reference to certain special places, as bishops of their Churches. Or 
with reference to a determined time as the Pope is the head of the whole Church.” ST III, q. 8, a. 6. 
Likewise, O’Collins subscribes to the idea that the priests of the church are “visible signs of the invisible 
but dynamically present priesthood of Christ—sacraments of Christ.” JOP, 286. 
87 ST III, q. 62, a. 5. While this text refers only to the sacraments, q. 64, a. 3 discusses the same 
concept applying it both to the sacraments and to the ministers. According to Aquinas, because the 
humanity of Christ “is an instrument united to the Godhead in unity of Person, it has a certain headship and 
efficiency in regard to extrinsic instruments, which are the ministers of the Church and the sacraments.” To 
put it differently, “Christ produces the inward sacramental effect, both as God and as man, but not in the 
same way.” ST III, q. 64, a. 3. As God He works as the principal agent, while as man He works 
instrumentally, since God, and not man, is the principal agent “because God alone can enter the soul 
wherein the sacramental effect takes place.” ST III, q. 64, a. 1. Yocum argues that, according to this 
perspective, the sacraments “are an extension of the effects of the incarnation. In the sacraments, God 





priestly act of the ascended Christ.88 In the eucharist, Christ, the invisible priest, acts 
through the instrumentality of the visible priest,89 and is particularly present through the 
instrumentality of the eucharistic elements (bread and wine), which are changed into His 
actual body and blood.90 Because of the presence of Christ’s real body and blood, the 
                                                
conformity to Christ.” Yocum, “Sacraments in Aquinas,” 172. 
88 Considering that the sacraments, and actually all the liturgy of the church, are priestly acts of 
Christ (they derive from His priesthood), the eucharist is the climax of the priestly acts of the ascended 
Christ on earth because it is the apex of the sacraments and the liturgy of the church. For O’Collins, the 
eucharist is the center of the church’s mediation of grace through preaching and sacraments. O’Collins, 
Christology, 332. According to Aquinas, the eucharist is the “greatest of all the sacraments.” ST III, q. 65, 
a. 3. In his study of the eucharist in Aquinas, Levering highlights that “the Eucharist is the supreme act of 
Christ’s priesthood: Christ as priest enables believers to share in his sacrifice, that is, to share in himself.” 
Matthew Levering, “Aquinas on the Liturgy of the Eucharist,” in Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical 
Introduction, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel A. Keating, and John Yocum (London; New York: T & T 
Clark International, 2004), 191. For helpful studies on the eucharist in Aquinas, see ibid., 183-197; Brock, 
“St. Thomas and the Eucharistic Conversion,” 529-565; Catherine Pickstock, “Thomas Aquinas and the 
Quest for the Eucharist,” Modern Theology 15, no. 2 (1999): 159-180. 
89 O’Collins indicates that “in the celebration of the Eucharist ordained priests are visible signs of 
the invisible Christ, Priest and Victim or Offerer and Offering.” JOP, 289. For Aquinas, as the 
“intermediary between God and the people” who performs the priestly work of delivering “consecrated 
gifts to the people,” the minister or priest is the appointed agent to effect “the consecration of Christ’s 
body” in the eucharist, and he does that “as in the person of Christ.” ST III, q. 82, a. 3. Also, the sacrament 
of order is particularly “ordained to the consecration of the Eucharist.” ST III, q. 65, a. 3.  
90 Aquinas calls this change transubstantiation, a change of substance. Through the words of 
consecration pronounced by the priest, “the whole substance of the bread is changed into the whole 
substance of Christ’s body, and the whole substance of the wine into the whole substance of Christ’s 
blood.” ST III, q. 75, a. 4. On the other hand, “the accidents of the bread and wine remain after the 
consecration.” q. 75, a. 5. For further details about this concept, according to Aquinas, see q. 75-77. Based 
on the concept of transubstantiation, the medieval theologian stipulates that the eucharist is the “greatest of 
all the sacraments,” especially because “it contains Christ Himself substantially,” while “the other 
sacraments contain a certain instrumental power which is a share of Christ’s power.” ST III, q. 65, a. 3. 
O’Collins points out that “in its Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy of 1963, the Second Vatican Council 
did not use the term ‘transubstantiation’ and listed various ways through which Christ is vitally present in 
liturgical celebrations. This presence comes to its highpoint with the consecrated bread and wine upon the 
altar and his encounter with Christians in sacramental communion.” Gerald O’Collins, Catholicism: A Very 
Short Introduction, Very Short Introductions (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 77. The 
Jesuit theologian follows this conception, affirming four modes of Christ’s presence in the eucharist 
according to Vatican II (see Sacrosanctum Concilium 7): “(1) ‘in the person of his minister’; (2) ‘in the 
Eucharistic species’; (3) ‘in his word since it is he himself who speaks when the holy scriptures are read’; 
and (4) in the assembled faithful praying and singing together.” JOP, 200. Even though he does not employ 
the term transubstantiation, O’Collins believes in the presence of Christ in the eucharistic elements, 
meaning that they are changed into His body and blood. “With the eucharistic invocation . . . and the words 
of institution, the Spirit descends upon the gifts to change them and bring about the intense and real 





eucharist is regarded a sacrifice that represents His passion and communicates its effects 
to the participants,91 allowing them to partake of the eternal effects of the sacrifice from 
Christ Himself. Hence, as the consummation of Christ’s sacrifice, the eucharist is a 
sacrifice and a sacrament (an instrument that conveys the benefits of the sacrifice).92 
Overall, O’Collins suggests a correspondence between “the permanent sacrifice in heaven 
with the Eucharistic sacrifice on earth,”93 which implies that the continuous “offering of 
the eucharist” expresses “visibly the permanent priesthood of Christ that was expressed 
invisibly in his interceding constantly for all at the right hand of the Father.”94 
                                                
changed “into the body and blood of Christ for the spiritual profit of those who receive them.” O’Collins, 
Jesus Our Redeemer, 203. 
91 ST III, q. 79, a. 1. See also q. 83, a. 1. Aquinas states that the eucharist “benefits recipients by 
way both of sacrament and of sacrifice, because it is offered for all who partake of it.” ST III, q. 79, a. 7. 
For the medieval theologian, “the sacrifice offered every day in the Church is not distinct from that which 
Christ Himself offered, but is a commemoration thereof.” ST III, q. 22, a. 3, ad 2. O’Collins offers the 
following arguments for the eucharist as a sacrificial meal: (1) “the Last Supper integrated into” Christ’s 
“mission a final act of service”; (2) “by the time of Jesus the festival of the Passover had long been given a 
sacrificial significance,” which means that “to claim that Jesus (and his companions at the Last Supper) did 
something sacrificial would not have appeared strange talk in first-century Judaism”; (3) “through the 
words and gestures of the ‘institution narrative’ (Mark 14:22-4 parr.; 1 Cor. 11:23-5), Jesus offered a 
covenant sacrifice—a cultic, priestly act that he wished to be continued as a central practice in the 
community which he had gathered”; (4) “in the discourse on the Bread of Life, John’s Gospel provides its 
own precious commentary on what Jesus’ institution of the Eucharist intended.” JOP, 258-260. 
92 These two meanings of the eucharist are indicated by Aquinas in the following way: the 
eucharist “is both a sacrifice and a sacrament. It has the nature of a sacrifice inasmuch as it is offered up; 
and it has the nature of a sacrament inasmuch as it is received. And therefore it has the effect of a 
sacrament in the recipient, and the effect of a sacrifice in the offerer.” ST III, q. 79, a. 5. 
93 JOP, 199. On this point, O’Collins seems to agree with Jean-Jacques Olier (1608-1657) from 
the French School of spirituality. See ibid., 265-266. 
94 Ibid., 66. O’Collins emphasizes that, “by connecting the bread and wine offered by Melchizedek 
with the eternal priesthood of Christ, Cyprian and others supported the permanent, even daily, celebration 
of the Eucharist.” Furthermore, they promoted “that those who presided at the Eucharist shared in the one 
high priesthood of Christ that Hebrews presented.” Ibid. The Jesuit theologian also highlights that 
Augustine initiated the notion of “Christ’s permanent, (invisible) priestly activity . . . in the daily 
[sacramental] life of the Church.” This “priestly activity moves beyond what Paul (Rom. 8:34) and 
Hebrews (7:25; 9:24) say about the High Priest’s permanent intercession at the right hand of God on behalf 
of human beings. One might interpret Augustine’s view of Christ’s active presence in the administration of 
all the sacraments as developing and applying what Hebrews said about human beings ‘approaching God’ 





In summary, Christ’s priestly actions are understood in terms of sacrifice, which 
is an invisible devotion or self-offering (primary) accompanied by a visible expression or 
sacrament (secondary). Since Christ’s entire life is a self-offering to God, all His life is a 
sacrifice and, thus, all His actions are priestly actions. The sacramental model emphasizes 
two events as highly significant visible expressions of Christ’s self-offering to God. The 
crucifixion is the climactic materialization of His earthly decisive devotion in the last 
supper, and the eucharist is the visible earthly expression of His invisible heavenly self-
offering (intercession) before the Father. In fact, both the crucifixion and the eucharist 
function as sacraments, not only as signs or visible expressions of Christ’s self-offering, 
but also as material instruments of divine salvific action on earth that reaches concrete 
human beings. Through Christ’s human suffering, human beings turn their attention to 
spiritual realities that are communicated to them especially in the eucharist, by means of 
concrete priests and eucharistic elements. Indeed, if crucifixion and eucharist function as 
sacraments of Christ’s self-offering, the eucharist is not a repetition of the sacrifice on the 
cross, because both of them are expressions of His invisible sacrifice. Concisely, Christ’s 
priestly action is an internal disposition that takes the form of visible actions, by means of 
material instruments, in order to reach concrete human beings. 
The Goal of the Priesthood  
Generally speaking, the goal of Christ’s priesthood in the sacramental model is to 
lead human beings to God, who is the goal of all creation. In the description of this goal, I 
will clarify two important aspects of His priesthood: (1) how this goal is attained through 
                                                




Christ’s priesthood, and (2) how the attainment of this goal is compatible with the idea 
that His priesthood is eternal. In fact, the description of the previous components of 
Christ’s priesthood (need, agent, actions) already pointed to the goal of His priesthood. I 
have emphasized above that there is an ontological and moral distance between human 
beings and God (the need), implying that Christ’s priestly mediation is meant to provide 
ontological and moral union. This union is understood in terms of participation.95 
Actually, all creation participates in God since its beginning, in the sense that He is the 
source of its being and existence.96 However, creatures do not participate in God only as 
their source, but also as their goal.97 In other words, the participation existing in creation 
implies a teleological higher participation.98 Aquinas emphasizes that this teleological 
participation requires divine grace, because human beings need “to receive in addition 
                                                
95 In his study of deification in Aquinas, Williams points out that union and participation are 
interchangeable terms in the discussion of theosis. Williams, The Ground of Union, 52. 
96 According to O’Collins, “we cannot participate in the material universe, without participating in 
God, the inmost ground of all being.” O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 256. Aquinas highlights that “all 
beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation.” Thus, “all things which are 
diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First 
Being, Who possesses being most perfectly.” ST I, q. 44, a. 1. Commenting on Aquinas, Williams argues 
that “participation in divine life occurs initially not as the sanctifying work . . . but in order for the creature 
to exist at all,” which means that the participation implied in creation provides “the base for all other 
varieties or degrees of participation in divine being.” Williams, The Ground of Union, 66. 
97 O’Collins highlights that God is the “source and goal” of all creation. This means that “human 
existence is a lifelong pilgrimage towards God.” O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 28. Similarly, Aquinas 
affirms that God “is the last end of all.” ST IIa.62.2. According to O’Neill, “the master-concept of the 
Summa” is that God “is the goal of man’s life in life everlasting, God as he is the point to which all our 
universe is tending, whether unconsciously and in obedience to a law of development written into its being, 
or consciously and in freedom.” Aquinas and O’Neill, The One Mediator, xxi. 
98 An important example of this concept of the image of God (imago Dei) in human beings. 
Aquinas’ statement that “likeness is a kind of unity” (ST I, q. 93, a. 9) indicates that humans participate in 
God by creation. On the other hand, the teleological participation is highlighted by O’Collins when he 
points out that “final redemption will complete the being made in the image and likeness of God.” 




something supernatural to direct” them “to a supernatural end.”99 This divine aid includes 
the infusion of supernatural/theological virtues by God and implies a kind of participation 
in the divine nature.100 In this context, grace means God’s self-communication, which 
lifts human beings to a higher participation in Him.101 The final goal of the teleological 
participation is the beatific vision of God experienced by human beings in heaven,102 
which requires God’s union with the human intellect.103 All this description of the 
                                                
99 ST IIa, q. 62, a. 3. 
100 Aquinas calls these virtues “theological virtues” (charity, faith, and hope). They “surpass the 
nature of man” (ST IIa, q. 62, a. 1, ad 1), “are infused in us by God,” and “direct us aright to God.” This 
reception of God’s powerful aid is considered “a kind of participation of the Godhead” (2 Pet 1:4). ST IIa, 
q. 62, a. 1. 
101 O’Collins affirms that “all divine giving is self-giving.” O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 197. 
Hence, grace is the “the self-communication of God” meant for “the deification of human life (2 Pet 1:4),” 
lifting “to a new and undeserved level the relationship of creature to creator, thereby transforming human 
nature . . . and anticipating the future life of heaven.” CDT, 3 ed. (2013), s.v. “grace.” According to 
Aquinas, “faith, hope, and charity,” the theological virtues, “are superhuman virtues: for they are virtues of 
man as sharing in the grace of God.” ST IIa, q. 58, a. 3, ad 3. The medieval theologian explains that “the 
gift of grace surpasses every capability of created nature, since it is nothing short of a partaking of the 
Divine Nature.” q. 112, a. 1. Commenting on Aquinas, Williams claims that grace is “not an entity distinct 
from God or an effect of God’s working in us but the fact of God’s indwelling, the name given to the 
sustenance that is God’s own being.” He adds, “although Thomas does not equate grace and God, he does 
not use the term grace as to distinguish it from divine being itself, shared with creatures.” Williams, The 
Ground of Union, 84. Similarly, Rudi te Velde argues that “grace, according to Thomas, is the free gift of 
God himself to man by which man becomes united with God in knowledge and love. It is through the gift 
of grace that man achieves his ultimate perfection which consists in the vision of God.” Rudi te Velde, 
“Deelgenoot Van De Goddelijke Natuur”: Genade En Participatie Bij Thomas Van Aquino,” Tijdschrift 
voor Filosofie 55, no. 4 (1993): 632. 
102 O’Collins explains the “beatific vision” as the “immediate and fulfilling vision of God in 
heaven that will constitute the core of eternal happiness for the redeemed.” CDT, 3 ed. (2013), s.v. “beatific 
vision.” For him, 2 Pet 1:3-4 offers a “striking picture of grace as sharing in the very being or nature of 
God,” and encourages “the notion of the ultimate happiness of the redeemed as seeing God ‘face to face.’” 
O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 197. Aquinas claims that, in heaven, “glorified eyes will see God” (ST I, q. 
12, a. 3, ad 2). In other words, “the blessed see the essence of God” (q. 12, a. 1), enjoying “Him as the 
ultimate fulfilment of desire” (q. 12, a. 7, ad 1). The medieval theologian believes that God can only be 
seen by human beings in the next life because in the present life their soul “has its being in corporeal 
matter” (human corporeal body), “hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter.” Therefore, 
“God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life.” 
q. 12, a. 11. Based on this assumption, Aquinas concludes that “when Jacob says, ‘I have seen God face to 
face,’ this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God.” q. 12, a. 11, ad 1. 
103 According to Aquinas, “those who see the divine essence see what they see in God . . . by the 





ontological union of human beings with God is related to Christ’s priesthood. 
Considering that “the ultimate goal of salvation” is “a totally fulfilling union with God 
through Christ,”104 the divine gifts that make human beings participants of the divine 
nature are bestowed on them through Christ the priest.105 Through His priestly mediation 
in heaven, “the blessed enjoy the vision of God.”106  
As mentioned before, the priesthood of Christ brings about a moral union between 
human beings and God. By addressing the sin/moral problem His priesthood can 
ultimately generate the ontological union with God,107 as sin hinders the teleological 
movement of human beings toward God.108 O’Collins highlights that “sin stops us from 
responding to God’s call and receiving the divine gifts”109 that lift human beings to a 
                                                
see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect, as an object made 
intelligible to it.” q. 12, a. 4. This union is conceived as “some kind of participated likeness of Him who is 
the first intellect”. q. 12, a. 2. Furthermore, he explains this conception by indicating that “divine grace” is 
“added” to “raise up” or supernaturally increase the human “intellectual powers.” q. 12, a. 5. In his study of 
Aquinas, Velde attempts to answer the following question, “How can man (as a finite intellect) be 
understood to attain his ultimate perfection of seeing God’s infinite essence, if this vision is only connatural 
to an infinite intellect?” His answer implies that divine grace does not “perfect man in relation to his human 
nature.” Rather the human act of seeing God is related “to the divine nature as participated in him by 
grace.” Therefore, it is only “by receiving a participated likeness of God” that “the human intellect (and 
will)” is “capable of an act with respect to God himself.” Velde, “Deelgenoot Van De Goddelijke Natuur,” 
632-633. 
104 O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 47. 
105 Aquinas argues that a priest is “a mediator between God and the people” in the sense that the 
priest “bestows Divine things on the people.” He emphasizes that Heb 5:1 depicts the priestly work as 
offering gifts. His conclusion is that “this is most befitting to Christ. For through Him are gifts bestowed on 
men, according to 2 Peter 1:4.” ST III, q. 22, a. 1. 
106 JOP, 265. 
107 Commenting on Aquinas, O’Neill points out that, “through his human service to the Father,” 
Christ “restores to the created image of God that inner dynamism which bears all creation towards its 
fulfillment in God.” Aquinas and O’Neill, The One Mediator, xxii. 
108 See the section on the need for Christ’s priesthood above. 




higher participation in the divine nature. Aquinas argues that the human sinful condition 
requires that these divine gifts be mediated through material instruments.110 First, this 
condition explains the priestly mediatorial role of Christ’s material human nature (the 
agent). Actually, the medieval theologian assumes that the incarnation was the most 
fitting way of healing human beings, highlighting that it enkindles the theological virtues 
(faith, hope, and charity) in them, and emphasizes that the humanity of Christ bestows on 
them a participation in God.111 Second, the human fallen condition indicates why His 
priestly action (essentially a self-offering) takes a visible form by means of material 
instruments (His suffering humanity on the cross,112 and His activity through ordained 
priests and the sacraments).113 Interestingly, the notion of Christ’s sacrifice as an invisible 
self-offering out of charity114 is clarified by the idea that this is the most excellent of the 
theological virtues,115 and therefore the most important virtue for participation in God.116 
Accordingly, what the material instruments of Christ’s priestly action really mediate is a 
                                                
110 See the section on the need for Christ’s priesthood above. 
111 This statement describes in large measure the reasons that Aquinas presents for Christ’s 
incarnation in ST III, q. 1, a. 2. 
112 In his remarks on believers’ “devotion by considering Christ’s passion,” Aquinas stipulates that 
“such is the weakness of the human mind that it needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge, but also 
to the love of Divine things by means of certain sensible objects known to us. Chief among these is the 
humanity of Christ,” which is the main “incentive to devotion.” ST IIb, q. 82, a. 3, ad 2. 
113 See section above about the actions of Christ’s priesthood. 
114 See section above about the actions of Christ’s priesthood. 
115 ST IIb, q. 23, a. 6. 
116 In his study of Aquinas, Williams argues that charity is “the most deifying” virtue. Williams, 
The Ground of Union, 159. The medieval theologian maintains that “charity attains God, it unites us to 




participation in the divine nature.117 The notion of participation seems even to qualify the 
instruments for this mediation.118 Indeed, the eucharist offers a clear example of 
participation in the divine nature: as human beings partake of this sacrament through their 
bodies, they actually receive in their souls the divine Christ (idea of union, participation), 
who in His humanity is instrumentally present in the eucharistic elements.119 
Overall, the idea that Christ’s priesthood is basically a material mediation for a 
participation in the divine nature highlights the moral and ontological union promoted by 
His priesthood. While the material mediation of divine grace is required by the sin/moral 
problem (Aquinas), a higher participation in the divine nature constitutes the ontological 
goal of creation. Nevertheless, this conception raises the following question regarding the 
eternity of Christ’s priesthood, which is assumed in the sacramental model: Why is His 
priesthood eternal if the material mediation is required by the human fallen condition? Is 
the priesthood really necessary for the saved in heaven? A key point in this discussion is 
the priestly mediatorial role of Christ in the beatific vision of God. In the sacramental 
model, the blessed in heaven enjoy the vision of God through Christ’s eternal priesthood. 
                                                
117 O’Collins points out that the sacraments have a “special role” in the life of grace, which is “the 
deification of human life (2 Pet 1:4).” CDT, 3 ed. (2013), s.v. “grace.” Aquinas indicates that the 
sacraments cause grace, which “is nothing else than a participated likeness of the Divine Nature.” ST III, q. 
62, a. 1. In his study of deification in Aquinas, Williams claims that the sacraments are the “way in which 
the grace of the hypostatic union is communicated, to the end of a wider union of humanity with God.” 
Williams, The Ground of Union, 92. 
118 According to Aquinas, “the nearer any recipient is to an inflowing cause, the more does it 
partake of its influence.” ST III, q. 7, a. 1. In the case of the humanity of Christ, it participates in His divine 
nature. See q. 9, a. 2, ad 1; q. 16, a. 5, ad 3; q. 59, a. 4, ad 3. Moreover, the ordained priests participate in 
Christ’s priesthood. See footnote 85 above. 
119 Aquinas assumes that “we communicate with Christ through” the eucharist, “because we 
partake of His flesh and Godhead . . . through it.” ST III, q. 73, a. 4. Moreover, through this sacrament 
human beings “may stand perfect . . . by union with God.” q. 79, a. 1, ad 1. Commenting on Aquinas, 




Aquinas and O’Collins interpret the eternity of this priesthood with specific emphases, 
namely, eternity in terms of its eternal effects120 (Aquinas) and in terms of His eternal 
humanity121 (O’Collins). In the first emphasis, the vision of God is an eternal effect of the 
priesthood. The saved/blessed enjoy this vision in heaven as an eternal result of the 
benefits they received on earth through Christ’s priestly material mediation. This material 
mediation is not necessary anymore because human beings return to their original 
condition before sin, in which the participation in the divine nature does not need to be 
mediated by material instruments.122 According to the second emphasis, the vision of 
God is mediated through Christ’s eternal glorified humanity. This emphasis implies an 
eternal need of some kind of (glorified) material mediation. This perspective is aligned 
with the conception that the material mediation of Christ does not bring human beings to 
                                                
120 “Although Christ’s passion and death are not to be repeated, yet the virtue of that Victim” 
(sacrifice) “endures for ever.” q. 22, a. 5, ad 2. This virtue or effect is understood by Aquinas as the end or 
consummation of Christ’s sacrifice. Following this perspective, he argues that “the Saints who will be in 
heaven will not need any further expiation by the priesthood of Christ, but having [been] expiated, they will 
need consummation through Christ Himself, on Whom their glory depends.” q. 22, a. 5, ad 1. Commenting 
Aquinas, Levering highlights, “because of what it achieves, Christ’s priesthood endures forever,” meaning 
that “it endures in its end or goal.” More specifically, “when the goal is achieved, the action that brought 
about the goal is not lost, but instead shares in its completion or consummation.” Hence, “eternal life 
belongs to Christ’s priestly action as its goal, and in this sense Christ’s priesthood endures everlastingly. 
Eternally, the consummation enjoyed by the saints in heaven depends upon Jesus Christ.” Levering, “Christ 
the Priest,” 394-395. 
121 In his remarks on the “ultimate destiny” of all human beings, O’Collins claims that they will 
share through Christ “in the divine life forever. In his glorified humanity he will remain the means by 
which the blessed know the Trinity and enjoy the fullness of salvation.” O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 
225. The Jesuit theologian adds, “In his glorified humanity Christ will remain eternally the Agent . . . 
through whom human beings will . . . enjoy divine life forever.” JOP, 269.  
122 This conclusion is based on Aquinas’ view that before sin, human beings did not need material 
instruments (sacraments) to receive grace. Rather, they could obtain it “in a spiritual and invisible manner.” 
There was no need of “sensible signs” (sacraments). ST III, q. 61, a. 2, ad 1. In contrast to this conclusion, 
Paul O’Callaghan argues, based on some remarks about Aquinas, that “it is reasonable to suppose that the 
instrumental action of the humanity of Christ is in some way involved in the reception and maintenance of 
the perpetual vision of God.” Paul O’Callaghan, Christ Our Hope: An Introduction to Eschatology 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 186. Even though I grant that this position 





a supposed original condition.123 Rather, this mediation is an intended characteristic of 
the participation of finite creatures in the infinite God.124 
In summary, the goal of Christ’s priesthood is to provide union, that is, the 
teleological participation of human beings in God. The divine Christ mediates this 
participation through material instruments. The material mediation achieves the final goal 
of participation in heaven as a result of its eternal effects (Aquinas) and as an intended 
characteristic of the eternal participation of creatures in God (O’Collins).  
Having provided this general depiction of the priesthood of Christ in the 
sacramental model, I move to the description of this priesthood in the functional model. 
The Functional Model 
The model depicted in this section is labeled functional due to the fact that a 
prominent notion in the comprehension of Christ’s priesthood in this model is that 
Christ’s priestly work is performed in two distinct and sequential functions, namely, 
(earthly) sacrifice and (heavenly) intercession. The emphasis of this model seems to be 
                                                
actually his position. 
123 O’Collins questions the idea of an original sinless condition of human beings to be recovered 
by redemption. In his interpretation of redemption in Paul he claims that “reconciliation means ‘bringing 
hostility to an end’ or ‘uniting those who were formerly separated’, and not necessarily ‘causing to be 
friendly again’ or ‘bringing back into harmony’. In other words, this Pauline language does not necessarily 
suppose an original state of harmony that was ruptured.” O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 12. In this way, 
the Jesuit theologian affirms that “redemption should not be taken as a divine rescue operation, mounted 
subsequently after an original plan of creation went astray.” O’Collins, Christology, 211. 
124 This idea is compatible with the notion that redemption does not restore an original human 
condition in creation, but is a progressive “continuity in the newness . . . through the one plan of God.” In 
this perspective of creation preparing the ground for redemption, “the creation of the world and humankind 
provided the possibility for the Son of God to assume a human nature.” O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 
35. This association of creation and incarnation seems to be different from Aquinas’ association of sin and 
creation (“the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed, 
the Incarnation would not have been.” ST III, q. 1, a. 3). These two notions of incarnation appear to imply 





on the process of the priesthood. While proponents of the sacramental model could argue 
that these functions are also found in their model, defenders of the functional model 
would probably answer that these two functions are not distinguished enough in the 
sacramental model. I will unpack this crucial notion in my treatment of the functional 
model both here and in the next chapter. The representatives selected for the functional 
model are the German theologian Martin Luther125 (1483-1546) and the French 
theologian John Calvin126 (1509-1564). I will describe their interpretations of each 
                                                
incarnation: one is meant to improve original creation (O’Collins) and the other to deal with sin (Aquinas). 
125 The texts in which Luther engages in an extensive discussion about priesthood and its 
relationship with Christ are his lectures on the book and Genesis (given from 1535 to 1545), and his 
commentaries on Psalm 110 (a series of eight sermons preached in 1535). For useful descriptions of the 
priesthood of Christ in Luther, see Jones, Toward a Christology of Christ the High Priest, 165-190; Alberto 
R. Timm, “The Priesthood of Christ According to Martin Luther,” in Christ, Salvation, and the Eschaton: 
Essays in Honor of Hans K. LaRondelle, ed. Daniel Heinz, Jiri Moskala, and Peter M. van Bemmelen 
(Berrien Springs, MI: Seventh-Day Adventist Theological Seminary, 2009), 171-187; Alberto R. Timm, 
“El Sacerdocio De Cristo Y De Todos Los Creyentes Según Martín Lutero,” Theologika 10, no. 1 (1995): 
2-47. Overall, “a theological break or departure is sometimes discerned within Luther’s scholarship 
between the ‘early’ Luther and the ‘later’ Luther. The idea is that the Reformer started with a view of the 
gospel that stressed spiritual warfare, the principalities and powers of the world against the authority and 
command of Christ, the overthrow of human strongholds by means of the exorcising power of God. The 
‘early’ Luther also stressed a theology of glory, i.e., of victory. The ‘later’ Luther moved more into ideas 
like forensic forgiveness and justification, imputation and also economic theories of the Atonement.” Paul 
F. M. Zahl, The First Christian: Universal Truth in the Teachings of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2003), 26n14. Probably, “Ritschl was the first to study Luther and his work with an evolutionary lens, 
distinguishing the early Luther from the later Luther, and separating Luther from Melanchton and the later 
confessional and dogmatic writings.” Mary Elizabeth Anderson, Gustaf Wingren and the Swedish Luther 
Renaissance, American University Studies 243 (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 14. Overall, the break 
between the ‘two Luthers’ is placed at 1517-1518. Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther: An Introduction to His 
Life and Work, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), 144-145. Even though Lohse 
acknowledges that Luther’s writings evidence “further development, precising, clarifying,” and “shifts in 
accent,” he indicates that “earlier and frequent attempts at sharply differentiating the ‘young’ and the ‘old’ 
Luther, at precisely dating the difference between them, a problem in and of itself, have in general been 
abandoned. On the whole, there is considerable consistency and continuity of views where Luther is 
concerned.” Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology: Its Historical and Systematic Development, trans. 
Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2011), 8. In the present dissertation, Luther’s writings are 
studied from this perspective of continuity.  
126 Calvin’s main discussion on the priesthood of Christ appears in ICR 12.15.6. For helpful 
introductions on this topic in Calvin, see Stephen Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 89-114; Jones, Toward a Christology of Christ the High Priest, 
190-217; Redding, Prayer and the Priesthood of Christ in the Reformed Tradition, 82-106; Robert A. 





component of the formal structure of Christ’s priesthood, starting with the need for His 
priesthood.  
The Need for Christ’s Priesthood  
The priesthood of Christ in the functional model is required by a sharp rupture in 
the personal relationship between human beings and God.127 This broken relationship is a 
consequence of human sin.128 Because of sin, an important aspect of such a rupture of is 
                                                
Company, 1983), 54-60; Paul Van Buren, Christ in Our Place: The Substitutionary Character of Calvin's 
Doctrine of Reconciliation (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1957), 66-73, 89-91; John Frederick Jansen, 
Calvin’s Doctrine of the Work of Christ (James Clarke & Co.: London, 1956), 93-97; James B. Torrance, 
“The Vicarious Humanity and Priesthood of Christ in the Theology of John Calvin,” in Calvinus Ecclesiae 
Doctor, ed. W. H. Neuser (Kampen, Netherlands: J. H. Kok, 1978), 69-84; Charles Partee, The Theology of 
John Calvin (Louisville; London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 164-167. For a more recent and 
specific study on Christ’s priesthood in Calvin, see John Christian Clark, “The Priestly Office of Jesus 
Christ in the Thought of John Calvin,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Toronto, 2013). 
127 This focus on relation is particularly perceived in the Protestant relational understanding of 
divine grace in human beings, the solution for the problem of the broken relationship. Kathryn Tanner 
highlights the “Protestant preference for an account of the effects of grace that stresses the creature’s 
changed relationship with God rather than the transformation of the creature’s own powers,” which is the 
emphasis of the sacramental model in the present dissertation. Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in 
Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005), 103; italics mine. 
Luther privileges the category of relation over that of substance. In his words, “a Christian is not inwardly 
and essentially (instrinsece et formaliter) holy. Neither is holiness a category of substance but of relation 
(praedicamento substantiae sed relationsi); it is given freely in mercy, simply by confessing and 
acknowledging that God is merciful to sinner.” WA 40/II: 354, 2-5 (comments on Ps 51:4, 1532). 
Translation taken from Oswald Bayer, Theology the Lutheran Way, trans. Jeffrey G. Silcock and Mark C. 
Mattes, Lutheran Quarterly Books (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), 249-250n420. Peter Wyatt sees 
the same emphasis in Calvin. He argues that “Calvin puts the matter in terms of relation rather than 
ontology, and he speaks of our need of a mediator rather than for (abstract) grace.” Peter Wyatt, Jesus 
Christ and Creation in the Theology of John Calvin, Princeton Theological Monograph Series (Allison 
Park, PA: Pickwick Publications, 1996), 39. Gehard Ebeling sees in Luther a “relational ontology” that is in 
many ways opposed to Aristotelian “substance ontology.” Gerhard Ebeling and Scott A. Celsor, “Luther’s 
Understanding of Reality,” Lutheran Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2013): 71. On the other hand, following the 
Finnish school of Luther interpretation, Antti Raunio rejects a “contradiction between substantial and 
relational ontology” in Luther. He stipulates that Luther “understood the terms ‘substance’ and ‘relation’ as 
Aristotelian categories,” and that “a relational ontology as an alternative to substantial ontology is in fact a 
more or less a Kantian idea, which was developed further by Hegel.” Antti Raunio, “The Human Being,” in 
Engaging Luther: A (New) Theological Assessment, ed. Olli-Pekka Vainio (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 
2010), 29. 
128 L’ubmoír Batka points out that, for Luther, “original sin is primarily a broken relationship with 
God that is deep-rooted in the human heart from the beginning of life.” L’ubmoír Batka, “Luther’s 
Teaching on Sin and Evil,” in The Oxford Handbook of Martin Luther's Theology, ed. Robert Kolb, Irene 




God’s reaction against sinful human beings. More specifically, sin causes God to react as 
a wrathful judge that condemns sin and sinners. Indeed, sinful human beings are afraid of 
God’s judgment against them.129 As they are guilty before Him, not even their prayers 
have access to God. This picture underlines their need for a priestly mediator. Through 
his mediation, God can hear human prayers, and human beings can have their guilty 
conscience quieted.130 
This situation raises the question about the nature of sin, and why it leads to such 
a personal rupture between God and human beings. In contrast to the sacramental model, 
the basic understanding of sin in the functional model is not an anthropological disorder 
                                                
129 Luther emphasizes that Christ as “our priest” reconciles “God with us and quietened our 
conscience.” LW, 52:280 (sermon on Matthew 2:1-12, 1522). Furthermore, the fact that Christ “is our 
Priest,” which means that God is not “angry with us” anymore, “is by far the sweetest and greatest comfort 
for consciences.” LW, 20:71 (Lectures on Zechariah, 1526). The German theologian seems to identify 
God’s wrath with the condemnation of His law against human sin. In his words, human beings “are all 
under sin and God’s wrath, and are condemned by the Law.” LW, 24:342 (Sermons on the Gospel of St 
John [14-16], 1537). In fact, he speaks of the “wrath of the Law.” In this context, there is a “terror of the 
conscience before the Law” or a “struggle of conscience” that “feels the wrath and judgment of God over 
the sin that the Law discloses and increases.” LW, 26:324-325 (Lectures on Galatians [1-4], 1535). All 
quotations of LW are taken from Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, ed. J. Pelikan, H. Lehmann, and Hilton C. 
Oswald, American ed., 55 vols. (Saint Louis, MO; Philadelphia: Concordia; Fortress, 1955–1986). 
Likewise, Calvin maintains that Adam’s sin “provoked the wrath of God” “to inflict . . . fearful vengeance 
on the whole human race.” ICR 2.1.4. For sinful human beings without a mediator, “no way and no access 
to God remain; nothing is left in his throne but wrath, judgment, and terror.” Ibid., 3.20.19. The French 
theologian explains that sinful human “minds are first struck and overwhelmed by fear of God’s wrath and 
by dread of eternal death.” Ibid., 2.16.2. Indeed, “apart from Christ, God is . . . hostile to us, and his hand is 
armed for our destruction.” Ibid. Calvin adds, “God, who is the highest righteousness, cannot love the 
unrighteousness that he sees in us all. All of us, therefore, have in ourselves something deserving of God’s 
hatred.” Ibid., 2.16.13. All quotations of ICR are taken from John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian 
Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960). 
130 In Calvin’s words, without Christ “as our High Priest”, “we or our prayers have no access to 
God.” ICR 2.15.6. “No prayer is pleasing to God unless this Mediator sanctifies it.” Ibid., 3.20.27. He adds, 
“no one can be helped by any prayers at all save when Christ intercedes.” Ibid., 3.20.19. Similarly, Luther 
argues that “we cannot come before God with our prayers without” Christ the “Mediator.” LW, 24:406 
(Sermons on the Gospel of St John [14-16], 1537). See also ibid., 24:397, 407; 8:277; 35:99-100. He argues 
that “without this Mediator no prayer is acceptable to God,” and that Christ “presents their prayers before 





caused by a lack of divine grace or original justice.131 Instead of a mere disorder that 
alienates human beings from God as their end, sin is essentially a personal attitude of a 
depraved human being against God as the sovereign ruler.132 This attitude is particularly 
defined as unbelief, which doubts and despises God’s word, making Him a liar.133 In fact, 
Luther stipulates that God deals with human beings through His word in two ways, as 
                                                
131 For Calvin, “those who have defined original sin as the want of the original righteousness 
which we ought to have had, though they substantially comprehend the whole case, do not significantly 
enough express its power and energy. For our nature is not only utterly devoid of goodness, but so prolific 
in all kinds of evil, that it can never be idle.” ICR 2.1.8. In this way, human nature is not only “wounded, 
but so corrupted, that mere cure is not sufficient. There must be a new nature.” Ibid., 2.1.9. According to 
G.C. Berkouwer, for the Reformers, “sin is more than a ‘defect in general’ and is always an active, dynamic 
and destructive force. Thus sin . . . was not a mera privatio. Rather, precisely as privation it was seen as a 
vitiositas, despoilment, or corruptio totalis.” Berkouwer adds, “The carentia-idea, as used in Catholic 
theology, had come to mean the loss of the donum superadditum and was very different from the biblical 
corruptio totalis. Therefore that concept came to have a certain negative flavor. In the Reformers there 
remained a connection or identity between the privatio and corruptio while in Catholic theology these two 
were held apart.” G. C. Berkouwer, Sin, Studies in Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1971), 259-
260. Oswald Bayer argues that, for Luther, “sin has a qualitative nature and is not simply deficit, as if 
something good is lacking, so that one minimizes the intensity of one’s being.” Oswald Bayer, Martin 
Luther’s Theology: A Contemporary Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008), 180.  
132 Calvin speaks of human sin as a revolt “against the authority of God” (ICR 2.1.4) and Luther 
maintains that sin “would not be sin if it did not offend God” (LW, 14:316 [comments on Ps 2, 1519]). For 
the German theologian, “the real nature of sin” is that it is “an attack on God as God.” Althaus, The 
Theology of Martin Luther, 169.  
133 In his remarks on the fall, Calvin defines the human revolt against God’s authority especially in 
terms of “despising His word. Instead of hanging upon God’s lips, Adam was “incredulous as to his word,” 
doing the “very utmost to annihilate the whole glory of God.” ICR 2.1.4. According to Luther, “there must 
first be in the heart faith or unbelief. Unbelief is the root, the sap, and the chief power of all sin.” LW, 
35:369 (Preface to the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, 1522). He explains that “unbelief is certainly the 
principal sin of mankind. It was the first sin committed in Paradise . . . When Adam and Eve had God’s 
Word, which they were obligated to believe and in which they also had God and life as long as they clung 
to it, they were tempted first of all, by unbelief toward this Word. . . . First of all, the devil attacks their 
faith by telling them to give up this Word and not to regard it as God’s Word. He is not interested primarily 
in the bite into the forbidden apple; it is his concern to lead them from faith, in which they were walking 
before God, into unbelief, from which disobedience and every other sin would necessarily follow as fruits.” 
LW, 24:343 (Sermons on the Gospel of St John [14-16], 1537). For the German theologian, unbelief in 
God’s promise is the greatest “rebellion against God” because it makes “God a liar.” LW, 31:350-351 (The 
Freedom of a Christian, 1520). For further instances where Luther defines sin as unbelief, see LW, 14:84; 
35:369; 24:341, 343-344; 31:347, 362. Batka outlines the development of Luther’s conception of sin in the 
following way: “Early in his lecturing career Luther understood the lack of belief as active resistance 
against the judgment of God,” namely, “the law’s judgment that a person is a sinner. . . . From 1519, in 
light of his newly developed reformational teaching, his understanding of unbelief deepened. It became an 
active resistance against the gospel, blasphemy against Christ, a refusal of grace, an abomination of the 




they correspond to the two forms of His word, namely, gospel and law.134 In the first 
case, God manifests His grace in the form of promise; in the second, He condemns 
sinners in His righteous wrath.135 In this view, sin started as unbelief in God’s word (an 
attack on God’s integrity), causing His wrath (condemnation of sinners), and the solution 
                                                
134 Luther divides “Christian doctrine into two parts, law and gospel,” which means that “there are 
two things set before us in God’s Word . . . the wrath or the grace of God, sin or righteousness, death or 
life, hell or heaven.” WA 39/I: 361, 1-6 (first disputation against the Antinomians, 1537). Translation taken 
from Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology, 268. He also affirms that “the words of God . . . mean both the law 
and the gospel, the law requiring works and the gospel faith.” LW, 33:105 (On the Bondage of the Will, 
1525). Ebeling emphasizes that, in Luther, the “one Word of God is to be differentiated in its disclosure as 
law and gospel.” Ebeling and Celsor, “Luther’s Understanding of Reality,” 66. See also Althaus, The 
Theology of Martin Luther, 251-265. Likewise, Calvin maintains a distinction between gospel and law, 
especially on the basis of Paul’s discussion of the law as a curse. See ICR 2.9.4. However, there are some 
differences between Luther and Calvin regarding this distinction, which I indicate in the footnote below. 
135 For Luther, “sin is to be dealt with either according to the law, or according to the gospel.” 
When treated “in terms of law alone, it is wrath and death, but if in terms of the gospel alone, it is grace and 
life.” LW, 32:230 (Against Latomus, 1521). According to Ebeling, “as law, what the Word says is not 
merely given, but rather what it demands from humans and from one’s actions. In the gospel God indeed 
gives his Word, but only his Word. In one case, a mere order, in the other, a mere promise.” Ebeling and 
Celsor, “Luther’s Understanding of Reality,” 66. See also Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, 251-
265. Similarly, Calvin points out that the gospel refers to “all the promises by which God reconciles men to 
himself” (ICR 2.9.2), while the law is associated with the wrath of God, destruction of sinners, accusation, 
guilty conscience (2.7.7), despair (2.7.4), curse (2.7.3, 7), condemnation (2.7.4, 6, 8), and death (2.7.3). 
However, the French theologian argues that this aspect of the law is “experienced by sinners not yet 
regenerated” (2.7.7), which means that the contrast between gospel and law is not absolute. In fact, Calvin 
sees a positive role of the law for the regenerate “in whose hearts the Spirit of God already flourishes and 
reigns,” as the law enables “them daily to learn with greater truth and certainty what that will of the Lord 
is.” (2.7.12). In this case, Calvin stipulates that the promises of the gospel “occur throughout the law.” 
(2.9.2). This positive role of the law in the believer is what the French theologian calls the “third use of the 
Law,” which is “the principal use” of the law, “and more closely connected with its proper end.” (2.7.12). 
Scholars generally indicate that the third use of the law adopted by Calvin is the main difference between 
Luther and him on the relationship of gospel and law. See, e.g., Edward A. Dowey, “Law in Luther and 
Calvin,” Theology Today 41, no. 2 (1984): 148, 151, 153; Jesse Couenhoven, “Grace as Pardon and Power: 
Pictures of the Christian Life in Luther, Calvin, and Barth,” Journal of Religious Ethics 28, no. 1 (2000): 
69. Conversely, Althaus and Lohse claim that the concept of this third use, not the expression itself, is 
found in Luther. Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, 273; Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology, 275. In 
my opinion, the basic difference between Luther and Calvin on this point is that they disagree, at least, on 
what the main function of the law is. For Calvin, as highlighted above, the principal function of the law is 
its positive role in the life of believers (the third use). On the other hand, for Luther, the chief function of 
the law is its negative role. In his words, “the true function and the chief and proper use of the Law is to 
reveal to man his sin, blindness, misery, wickedness, ignorance, hate and contempt of God, death, hell, 
judgment, and the well-deserved wrath of God.” Hence, “the proper and absolute use of the Law is to 
terrify,” which means that “when the Law is being used correctly, it does nothing but reveal sin, work 
wrath, accuse, terrify, and reduce the minds of men to the point of despair. And that is as far as the Law 




to this problem includes His word of promise or grace. This context suggests that divine 
grace is understood more as a declaration of acceptance or forgiveness than a power to 
regenerate sinful human beings,136 at least in terms of a logical priority.137 
According to the discussion above, the broken personal138 relationship between 
God and human beings has a cause, the inward depraved condition of human beings in 
                                                
136 Luther understands grace as “mercy, the good will [favor] of God.” He takes “grace in the 
proper sense of the favor of God—not a quality of the soul.” LW, 32:227 (Against Latomus, 1521). 
Likewise, Calvin conceives gospel/grace in terms of divine “mercy and paternal favor.” ICR 2.9.2.  
137 The distinction between grace as pardon and power is helpfully indicated by Couenhoven, who 
points out that, overall, “grace has been understood in two ways: as a declaration of acceptance and as a 
power that transforms.” These two ways relate respectively to justification and sanctification. Couenhoven, 
“Grace as Pardon and Power,” 63-64. The idea of a logical priority of grace as forgiveness over grace as 
regeneration matches the traditional protestant notion of a logical priority of forensic justification over 
transformative sanctification. I am aware that some scholars, especially those following the Finnish school 
of Luther research, reject this differentiation of justification and sanctification in Luther, because his view 
of justification includes forensic and transformational aspects. See, e.g., David S. Yeago, “Lutheran-Roman 
Catholic Consensus on Justification: The Theological Achievement of the Joint Declaration,” Pro Ecclesia 
7, no. 4 (1998): 452n7; Tuomo Mannermaa, “Justification and Theosis in Lutheran-Orthodox Perspective,” 
in Union with Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 38-39; Simo Peura, “Christ as Favor and Gift: The Challenge of 
Luther’s Understanding of Justification,” in Union with Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther, 
ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 47-48. While a proper 
assessment of this contention goes beyond the scope of the present study, it is possible to avoid the 
criticism of such scholars in the affirmation of a priority of grace as forgiveness over grace as regeneration 
in the present study. Peura argues that, in Luther, “Christ on the one hand is the grace that is given to the 
sinner that protects him against the wrath of God (the forensic aspect), and on the other hand he is the gift 
that renews and makes the sinner righteous (the effective aspect).” Peura, “Christ as Favor and Gift,” 48. 
Given the fact that Christ’s priestly mediation in Luther focuses on protecting believers from the wrath of 
God, my contention is that there is a priority of grace as fogiveness (the forensic aspect) in the context of 
His priesthood. A similar defense can be formulated in regards to Calvin. According to Alister McGrath, 
Calvin understands justification and sanctification as simultaneous “effects of union with Christ.” Alister E. 
McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, 3 ed. (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 256. This simultaneity is also perceived in François Wendel’s rejection 
of a chronological sequence in Calvin’s conception of justification and sanctification. François Wendel, 
Calvin: Origins and Development of His Religious Thought, trans. Philip Mairet (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1963), 256, 259. However, my contention of the priority of grace as forgiveness is confirmed by 
Wendel’s claim that Calvin advances “the doctrine of double justification; first, the justification of the 
sinner, and then the justification of the justified, or more correctly of their works.” This means that “even 
after we have received the faith, our works are still contaminated by sin: nevertheless God does not impute 
them to us as sins but holds them acceptable.” Wendel, Calvin, 260. In other words, in this life, there is an 
ongoing dependence of regeneration (the works of the justified person) on forgiveness (non-imputation). 
138 Luther emphasizes that “wrath and grace have to do with persons. He whom God receives in 
grace, He completely receives, and he whom He favors, He completely favors. On the other hand, He is 




which they attack God’s integrity,139 and a result, namely, an offended God who inflicts 
His wrath on them outwardly. This situation requires a priestly mediation,140 which has to 
focus primarily on the result of the broken relationship, as this is the most urgent problem 
to be solved.141 In other words, the primary target of this mediation is the offended God, 
not the sinful condition of human beings. Christ the priest addresses mainly God’s holy 
and wrathful reaction against sinful humans, which judges and condemns them in their 
unbelief against Him.142 This means that human beings can be regenerated only on the 
                                                
139 In Calvin’s language, the human “corrupt nature is at enmity with the Divine law.” ICR 2.7.7. 
He adds, “Perverted and corrupted in all the parts of our nature, we are . . . corruption, deservedly 
condemned by God, to whom nothing is acceptable but righteousness, innocence, and purity.” Ibid., 2.1.8. 
Similarly, Luther affirms that unbelief was “implanted in human nature since Adam,” and that through the 
mediation of Christ “this sin inherited from Adam will no longer keep us under the wrath and 
condemnation of God.” LW, 24:343 (Sermons on the Gospel of St John [14-16], 1537). Althaus explains 
that, for Luther, “the holy God, God cannot respond to man’s sin in any other way than with enmity and 
wrath. . . . Every sin insults and injures God for sin injures righteousness. Since God loves righteousness 
and himself is righteousness, sin strikes and injures him in his very being. In relationship to sin therefore 
God’s righteousness necessarily expresses itself as wrath.” In this sense, “the real nature of sin, as an attack 
on God as God,” finds “a corresponding basis for God’s wrath in his determination to remain God.” 
Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, 169. 
140 Luther and Calvin speak of Christ’s priesthood as a mediation. See LW, 13:315, 290, 23:195; 
24:103, 295; 26:28; ICR 2.15.6; 2.12.4. 
141 The priority of the divine (offended God) over the human (sinful nature) aspect of the sin 
problem is evident in Calvin’s understanding of original sin, which is defined as the “depravity of our 
nature, extending to all the parts of the soul, which first makes us obnoxious to the wrath of God, and then 
produces in us works which in Scripture are termed works of the flesh.” ICR, 2.1.8. A similar emphasis is 
found in Luther. The German theologian stipulates that the “law reveals a twofold evil” in human beings, 
namely, the “inward . . . corruption of nature” (inflicted by human beings themselves) and the “outward . . . 
wrath, death, and being accursed” (inflicted by God). After introducing “us to sin” and overwhelming “us 
with the knowledge of it,” the law is followed by the gospel, which announces “the righteousness and the 
grace of God.” While the righteousness (identified as the divine gift of “faith in Christ”—an “inward 
good”) “heals the corruption of nature” (the inward evil), the grace (identified as the mercy of God—an 
“outward good”) removes the wrath (the outward evil). The priority of the outward grace/mercy that 
removes the divine wrath over the inward gift that restores human nature is evident in the statement that, in 
this life, “everything is forgiven through grace, but as yet not everything is healed through the gift.” 
Because of the forgiveness of grace, the sin that still remains in forgiven human beings is treated “without 
wrath, without the law, dead sin, harmless sin, as long as one perseveres in grace and his gift.” In this way, 
grace “produces peace of heart until finally a man is healed from his corruption.” LW, 32:224, 226-227, 229 
(Against Latomus, 1521). 
142 In both Luther and Calvin, there is a strong emphasis on Christ as priest or mediator appeasing 





basis of the propitiation of God. 
In summary, the need of restoration of the personal relationship between God and 
human beings, with a special focus on the divine reaction to human sin, provides the 
context for the understanding of the agent of the priesthood in the functional model.  
The Agent of the Priesthood  
As the agent of the priesthood, Christ is a mediator sent by God the Father.143 
This means that the agent or priest is (1) sent by another person, and that He is (2) 
characterized as a mediator. First, the idea that the agent of the priesthood is sent 
highlights important information about the sender. While the priestly mediator is needed 
to propitiate the wrath of God against human beings, it is God Himself who provides the 
priest to propitiate His wrath. In other words, the agent of the priesthood is constituted as 
a priestly mediator according to the plan of God. Second, the concept of mediation is 
broader and includes the concept of priesthood, which implies that Christ is a priest as 
part of His identity as a mediator. Calvin describes Christ the mediator in terms of His 
threefold office as prophet, king, and priest.144 Similarly, Luther associates the roles of 
                                                
28:140; 51:279-280; ICR 2.12.3-4; 2.15.6; 2.16.6; 3.11.9; 3.20.18; 4.18.13), invoking His favor on behalf 
of believers (ICR 2.15.6; 2.16.5; 4.18.13), so that their sins are not imputed to them (LW, 13:290; 27:86; 
ICR 2.12.4). In their discussion of the priesthood of Christ, the German and the French theologians 
emphasize more the propitiation of God than the regeneration of believers. 
143 Luther underscores that “the Father Himself has introduced and given Him [Christ] to us as a 
Mediator and has also placed Him at His own right hand to remove all wrath, sin, and death from us.” LW, 
28:140 (Commentary on 1 Corinthians 15, 1534). See also ibid., 24:406-407. This is consistent with the 
idea that “a priest is a person whom God has ordained and commanded to mediate between God and men. 
That is to say, a priest comes from God.” Ibid., 13:315 (Commentary on Psalm 110, 1535). For Calvin, “the 
office which” Christ “received from the Father consists of three parts. For he was appointed both Prophet, 
King, and Priest.” ICR 2.15.1. Referring to Christ’s sacrifice, the French theologian claims that the Christ 
as mediator was “destined in the eternal counsel of God to purge the pollution of man.” Ibid., 2.12.4.  
144 For details about Christ’s threefold mediatorial office in Calvin, see ICR 2.15. The French 





Christ as king and priest.145 Therefore, the agent of the priesthood assumes other roles 
that relate to His activity as priest. In His role as king (Luther and Calvin), Christ rules in 
a spiritual kingdom (not visible).146 Calvin specifies that He is the head/governor and 
defender of the church, reigning through the Spirit, and will execute the final 
                                                
law prophets as well as priests and kings were anointed with holy oil. Hence the illustrious name of 
‘Messiah’ was also bestowed upon the promised Mediator.” Ibid., 2.15.2. Calvin’s Christology is more 
defined by the understanding of the threefold office of Christ as the mediator rather than by considerations 
about His person. Bruce McCormack points out that “Calvin never set forth a comprehensive account of 
Christology in the classical sense of a careful investigation into the ontological constitution of the 
Mediator.” Rather, “it was the office of the Mediator that dominated Calvin’s attention—the mediatorial 
activity of Christ that had brought salvation to the human race—and not (to his mind) more abstract 
question of the being of the Mediator.” Bruce L. McCormack, For Us and Our Salvation: Incarnation and 
Atonement in the Reformed Tradition, Studies in Reformed Theology and History (Princeton: Princeton 
Theological Seminary, 1993), 6. See also Richard A. Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and 
Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Durham, NC: The Labyrinth Press, 1986), 
28, 33; Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology, 5, 84, 220. For helpful information about Calvin’s Christology, 
see Dawn DeVries, Jesus Christ in the Preaching of Calvin and Schleiermacher, Columbia Series in 
Reformed Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996); Edmondson, Calvin’s 
Christology; McCormack, For Us and Our Salvation, 6-9; Partee, The Theology of John Calvin, 142-158; 
Jill Raitt, “Calvin’s Use of Persona,” in Calvinus Ecclesiae Genevensis Custos: International Congress for 
Calvin Research (New York: Peter Lang, 1984), 273-287; Van Buren, Christ in our Place, 3-23; Von 
Johannes L. Witte, “Die Christologie Calvins,” in Daskonzil Von Chalkedon: Geschichte Und Gegenwart, 
ed. Aloys Grillmeier and Heinrich Bacht (Wurzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1954), 3:487-529; Randall C. 
Zachman, The Assurance of Faith: Conscience in the Theology of Martin Luther and John Calvin 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 159-187; E. David Willis, Calvin’s Catholic Christology: The 
Function of the So-Called “Extra Calvinisticum”, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought (Leiden: 
Brill, 1966). 
145 The concept of the priesthood of Christ in Luther is largely defined by his understanding of 
Christ as king and priest, and by the contrast between the priesthood of Christ and the priesthood of the 
Roman church. The German theologian connects the concept of priesthood and kingship with the birthright 
of primogeniture in the OT. He points out that the birthright involved a “twofold honor, that of priesthood 
and that of kingship.” In this sense, the firstborn “was priest and lord over all the others and a type of 
Christ, the true and only first-born of God the Father and the Virgin Mary and true king and priest.” LW, 
31:353 (The Freedom of a Christian, 1520). For helpful studies on Luther’s Christology, see Althaus, The 
Theology of Martin Luther, 179-198; Neal J. Anthony, Cross Narratives: Martin Luther’s Christology and 
the Location of Redemption, Princeton Theological Monograph Series (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2010); 
Bayer, Martin Luther’s Theology, 214-238; Marc Lienhard, Luther, Witness to Jesus Christ: Stages and 
Themes of the Reformer’s Christology (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1982); Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology, 
219-231; Ian D. Kingston Siggins, Martin Luther’s Doctrine of Christ, Yale Publications in Religion 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2003); Vidar L. Haanes, “Christological Themes in Luther’s Theology,” 
Studia Theologica 61, no. 1 (2007): 21-46. 
146 According to Luther, Christ “will not only rule but will also bless . . . for not only royal 
authority but also a priesthood is dealt with, and the name and office of priest embrace the foremost 
benefits of Christ.” LW, 4:177 (Lectures on Genesis, 1539-1540 [chapters 22-23]). For the idea that Christ’s 





judgment.147 As a prophet (Calvin), Christ teaches doctrine and preaches the gospel.148 
Furthermore, the idea that Christ’s mediation is broader and includes His 
priesthood derives from Calvin’s understanding of the mediation of Christ before His 
incarnation. This perspective assumes that Christ in His divinity is a mediator between 
the Father and creatures since the beginning of creation, given the transcendent 
unapproachable glory of the Father.149 In this sense, mediation is not only about “the 
overcoming of a presupposed boundary” (created by sin) “between God [the Father] and 
creation but about the proper way God and creation are related.”150 According to this 
view, the mediatorial priesthood of Christ appears to be a necessary extension of His 
                                                
Calvin agrees that the His kingship has a spiritual nature, being related to a future life. See ICR 2.15.3. 
147 ICR 2.15.3-5. According to the idea that “the kingdom of Christ consists in the Spirit,” Christ 
the king sends the gifts of the Spirit, and “enriches his people with all things necessary to the eternal 
salvation of their souls, and fortifies them with courage to stand unassailable by all the attacks of spiritual 
foes.” In this way, He governs, cherishes, sustains us, keeps “us under his guardianship,” gradually 
bringing “us to full communion with God.” Ibid., 2.15.4-5. For Luther, in the spiritual church, Christ “rules 
as Priest or true pope through the office of the ministry and through the power of the Holy Spirit,” 
communicating “His eternal and divine gifts” for “forgiveness of sins,” and “His power and strength” for a 
“life of eternal righteousness.” LW, 13:324 (Commentary on Psalm 110, 1535). 
148 ICR 2.15.2. 
149 This emphasis is evident in his controversy against Stancaro on Christ as the mediator. 
Stancaro believed that Christ was not mediator between God and human beings in His divinity—because 
this would imply that His divinity is inferior to the Father’s, but only in His humanity. In opposition to this 
view and referring to passages such as Col 1:15, Calvin argues that Christ is the mediator between the 
Father and His creatures since the beginning of creation, which underlines a mediatorial activity performed 
by Christ before His incarnation and, therefore, a mediation of Christ in His divinity. In this sense, the 
priestly work of the incarnate Christ was characterized by a mediation performed not only by His humanity 
but also by His divinity. For an introduction of this controversy and a translation of Calvin’s reply to 
Stancaro, see Joseph N. Tylenda, “Christ the Mediator: Calvin Versus Stancaro,” Calvin Theological 
Journal 7 (1972): 5-16; Joseph N. Tylenda, “The Controversy on Christ the Mediator: Calvin’s Second 
Reply to Stancaro,” Calvin Theological Journal 8 (1972): 131-157. 
150 Julie Canlis, Calvin’s Ladder: A Spiritual Theology of Ascent and Ascension (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 66. For Calvin, “as the creative Word . . . Christ is already and eternally the 
Mediator between creatures and their Creator.” Wyatt, Jesus Christ and Creation in the Theology of John 
Calvin, 39. Calvin affirms that Adam, in his excellence, “approximated to the glory of his Maker” “by 
means of the only begotten Son.” ICR 2.12.6. He adds, “Had man remained free from all taint, he was of 




mediatorial work in creation due to the sin problem.151 A significant implication of this 
notion for the interpretation of Christ as the agent of the priesthood is that His divinity is 
able to perform mediation.152 While this implication could potentially lead to the 
conclusion that the incarnation is unnecessary for His mediation, the idea is that the 
incarnation allows a new level of mediation in the context of sin. In this sense, Christ’s 
humanity is not a mere instrument of the divine, but it adds a new type of mediation, a 
truly human mediation that is able to deal with sin. 
In fact, the functional model holds that the incarnation of Christ is foundational 
for His mediatorial priesthood,153 and both His human and divine natures are essential to 
the priestly activity. Christ’s humanity is necessary for Him to show obedience to the 
                                                
151 In his commentary on John 1:5, Calvin stipulates that “there are two distinct powers which 
belong to the Son of God: the first, which is manifested in the structure of the world and the order of 
nature; and the second, by which he renews and restores fallen nature.” CBC, Commentary on the Gospel 
According to John. All quotations of CBC are taken from John Calvin, Calvin’s Bible Commentaries, The 
John Calvin Collection (Albany, OR: AGES Software, 1998). These two powers relate to the two types of 
mediatorial work performed by Christ. According to the French theologian, in His mediatorial work of 
creation, Christ was “appointed head of angels and men” in the “first ordering of creation.” ICR 2.12.4. In 
this way, “the entire structure of the world” has its “beginning” in Christ. Ibid., 2.12.7. Since the beginning 
of creation the mediation of Christ provides unity between the creatures and God. The priestly work of 
Christ was necessary after the fall, adding a component of expiation to His mediation. Edmondson, 
Calvin’s Christology, 144. See the translation of the arguments elaborated by Calvin in Tylenda, “Christ 
the Mediator,” 12-13; Tylenda, “The Controversy on Christ the Mediator,” 147. 
152 Accounts in which only the humanity of Christ mediates seem to imply that mediation is made 
possible to Christ through the instrumentality of His humanity. For Muller, Calvin’s assertion that the 
divinity of Christ performs mediation is distinct from the “Christologies of Chalcedon and of the medieval 
scholastics,” since for them “the work of mediation focuses upon the flesh which is assumed and not upon 
the eternal person who assumes it.” While the medieval scholastics believed that Christ is mediator 
“according to his humanity,” Calvin attributes His mediation to the “divine-human person rather than the 
flesh assumed by the divine person.” Muller, Christ and the Decree, 33. 
153 In most cases, when Calvin speaks of Christ as the mediator, he refers to Christ’s incarnate life. 
He argues that “from the time that Christ was manifested in the flesh, he has been called the Son of God, 
not only in that he was the eternal Word begotten before all ages from the Father, but because he took upon 
himself the person and office of the Mediator, that he might join us to God.” ICR 1.13.24. He adds, “It was 
of the greatest importance for us that he who was to be our Mediator be both true God and true man,” as 




Father in the human flesh,154 assume the sin of human beings, and offer Himself as a 
sacrifice at the cross.155 From the perspective delineated above regarding the need for 
Christ’s priesthood, the obedience of the human Christ and His sacrifice propitiates the 
divine wrath against sinful human beings who are characterized by lack of faith. In other 
words, Christ propitiates the divine wrath as a human being. On the other hand, His 
divinity is required for the eternity156 and power157 of the priesthood. In short, “as God 
                                                
154 The idea of obedience is particularly emphasized by Calvin. As a result of disobedience, 
humanity became lost and in need of a mediated reconciliation with God. Then, the obedience of the 
incarnate Christ satisfied “God’s judgment” and paid “the penalties for sin.” ICR 2.16.5. “How has Christ 
abolished sin, banished the separation between us and God, and acquired righteousness to render God 
favorable and kindly toward us? . . . He has achieved this for us by the whole course of his obedience.” 
Ibid. Edmonson affirms that “the foundation of Christ’s sacerdotal work, both as priest and as sacrifice, is 
his obedience.” Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology, 96. Based on this notion of obedience, Calvin concludes 
that the entire life of the incarnated Christ is significant for His earthly work of reconciliation: “From the 
time when he took on the form of a servant, he began to pay the price of liberation in order to redeem us.” 
ICR 2.16.5. According to McCormack, the emphasis on Christ’s obedience underlines His acquired 
righteousness. In his polemic against Osiander, who maintained that Christ justifies us with His “essential 
divine righteousness,” Calvin argued that “the righteousness that is made ours in justification is the 
acquired righteousness of Christ, that is, that righteousness which the God-man acquired through the acts 
of obedience performed through His divine-human unity.” In this sense, “the redemptive significance of the 
life of Christ is not made to consist in the cleansing of a diseased human nature,” as a result of the contact 
of His human nature with the essential righteousness of His divinity, but “in the establishing if a divine-
human righteousness. It is the creation of a new humanity.” McCormack, For Us and Our Salvation, 22-23. 
155 For Calvin, “our Lord came forth as true man and took the person and the name of Adam in 
order to take Adam’s place in obeying the Father, to present our flesh as the price of satisfaction to God’s 
righteous judgment, and, in the same flesh, to pay the penalty that we had deserved.” ICR 2.12.3. “He 
offered as a sacrifice the flesh he received from us, that he might wipe out our guilt by his act of expiation 
and appease the Father’s righteous wrath.” Ibid. “The only reason given in Scripture that the Son of God 
willed to take our flesh, and accepted this commandment from the Father, is that he would be a sacrifice to 
appease the Father on our behalf.” Ibid., 2.12.4. In short, Christ “assumed flesh” in order to “become a 
sacrifice and expiation to abolish our sins.” Ibid. Likewise, Luther points out that Christ must have a human 
nature in order to be “our priest and mediator,” especially in the sense that “as our High Priest He had to 
assume our sin and pay for it.” LW, 13:323 (Commentary on Psalm 110, 1535). 
156 Luther points out that Christ “must also be true God,” since He “possesses in His person the 
quality of eternity,” as “an eternal priest.” Therefore, because “the true divine nature was in Him and His 
priestly office was eternally established, He could not remain in death or in the grave. He had to rise again 
and enter into another life, an eternal life, where He can function as our Priest forever in the presence of the 
Father.” LW, 13:323-324 (Commentary on Psalm 110, 1535). 
157 According to Calvin, if Christ “had not been true God,” He “could not cleanse our souls by his 
blood, nor appease his Father by his sacrifice, nor absolve us from guilt, nor, in sum, fulfill the office of 
priest, because the power of the flesh is unequal to so great a burden, yet it is certain that he carried out all 




only” Christ “could not suffer, and as man only could not overcome death.”158 
In summary, Christ as the agent of the priesthood is sent by the Father to be a 
mediator. As a mediator, His role as priest is associated with the roles of king and 
prophet. Moreover, the priestly mediation is an extension of His mediatorial work in 
creation due to the sin problem, which means that the human and divine natures of the 
incarnate Christ are involved in the activity of priestly mediation. While Christ’s 
humanity is necessary for His obedience and sacrifice that propitiate the divine wrath, His 
divinity is essential for the eternity and power of the priesthood. 
Having discussed the agent of the priesthood, I turn to the interpretation of the 
priestly actions performed by this agent. 
The Actions of the Priest  
The actions or functions of the priest in the functional model are basically three, 
namely, (1) teaching/preaching the word of God, (2) offering His sacrifice, and (3) 
making intercession.159 According to Luther, Christ has performed the function of 
teaching/preaching God’s word since His public ministry on earth.160 Even though Calvin 
                                                
158 ICR 2.12.3. 
159 Luther affirms that “a priest comes from God and brings us [1] His Word and doctrine; again, 
he presents himself to God to [2] sacrifice and [3] pray for us.” LW, 13:315 (Commentary on Psalm 110, 
1535). For Calvin, Christ’s “priesthood consists not in [1] teaching only but in appeasing God, which Christ 
by his [2] death has accomplished, and in that [3] intercession which he now makes in his father’s 
presence.” ICR 4.6.2. 
160 “This priestly office properly belongs to Christ and is completely derived from Him” because 
“He personally began the office of the public preaching of the Gospel.” LW, 13:316-317 (Commentary on 
Psalm 110, 1535). Based on his traditional distinction between the law and the gospel, Luther argues that 
the purpose of preaching the law is to let people recognize their sin and plead for God’s grace. In his words, 
“no one can repent and obtain forgiveness unless he knows his sin and feels God’s wrath. For this reason 
Christ Himself, as well as the apostles, began by preaching repentance. Thereby they confirmed the 
preaching of the Law.” However, the most important aspect of preaching is the presentation of the gospel. 





ascribes this function to Christ’s prophetic office,161 and tends to focus on the priestly 
functions of sacrifice and intercession,162 he does relate the priesthood of Christ with His 
teaching,163 which implies an overlap of the prophetic and priestly offices. 
The second function of the priest refers to Christ’s sacrifice on the cross,164 a 
penal substitutionary sacrifice.165 For Calvin, the term sacrifice generally refers to 
                                                
that “this office of preaching derives from Him who is Himself the High Priest; and the only content of its 
message is about Him.” Ibid. 
161 See ICR 2.15.2. 
162 Commenting on 1 Tim 2:6, Calvin argues that “there is a necessary connection between the two 
things, the sacrifice of the death of Christ, and his continual intercession. (Romans 8:34.) These are the two 
parts of his priesthood; for, when Christ is called our priest, it is in this sense, that he once made atonement 
for our sins by his death, that he might reconcile us to God; and now having entered into the sanctuary of 
heaven, he appears in presence of the Father, in order to obtain grace for us, that we may be heard in his 
name. (Psalm 110:4; Hebrews 7:17).” CBC, Commentaries on the Epistles to Timothy, Titus, and 
Philemon. Thus, for Calvin, “the priestly office of Christ refers not only to what he accomplished at 
Calvary, where, by the sacrifice of his death he blotted out the guilt of humankind and made satisfaction for 
their sins (the High Priest was also the sacrifice), but also to what he continues to do as an everlasting 
Intercessor.” Redding, Prayer and the Priesthood of Christ in the Reformed Tradition, 82. 
163 In his comments on Mal 2:6 and 2:9, respectively, Calvin argues that “the office of the 
priesthood and teaching” are two “inseparable” things, and that “there is no priesthood without doctrine or 
teaching, and no priest except he who faithfully performs his office as a teacher.” CBC, Commentary on the 
Prophet Malachi. In his remarks on John 7:14, he points out that “Christ undertook the office of a teacher; 
and justly, because he was the great High Priest.” CBC, Commentary on the Gospel According to John. 
Finally, commenting on Heb 7:12, the French theologian indicates that “Christ, being made a priest, was 
invested also with the authority of a legislator, that he might be the teacher and interpreter of the new 
covenant.” CBC, The Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Hebrews. According to 
Jansen, “while Calvin never minimizes the teaching of Jesus or the importance of doctrine, he does not 
make of teaching a separate messianic work alongside of the two-fold work of redemption.” In this sense, 
“the messianic work of redemption remains for Calvin a regal and reconciling work of king and priest,” 
since “the prophetic or teaching office nowhere in Calvin assumes a separate messianic function.” Jansen, 
Calvin’s Doctrine of the Work of Christ, 102, 97, 99. 
164 “Based on Heb 5:1, Luther indicates that the purpose of the divine appointment of a priest is to 
offer sacrifice for human sins, and that this function was fulfilled by Christ in His sacrifice on the altar of 
the cross.” LW, 13:318-319 (Commentary on Psalm 110, 1535). According to Calvin, as in the OT pattern 
of priesthood where the work of reconciliation demanded expiation through sacrifice, “we must begin from 
the death of Christ in order that the efficacy and benefit of his priesthood may reach us.” ICR 2.15.6. Being 
“both priest and sacrifice,” Christ “blotted out our own guilt and made satisfaction for our sins” by His 
death. Ibid. See also ibid., 4.14.21. 
165 Luther argues that Christ took “upon himself” the “guilt and sin” of human beings “as an 
innocent lamb,” and “paid for us by his sufferings.” LW, 37:362 (Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper, 





everything that is “offered to God.”166 However, from a more specific perspective, there 
are two types of sacrifices: (1) the “sacrifice of propitiation or of expiation,” which is a 
satisfaction for sin that redeems human guilt before God; and (2) the “sacrifice of praise 
and reverence” or the “sacrifice of thanksgiving,” which represents “veneration and 
worship of God,”167 and includes supplications for God’s favor, thanksgiving for 
blessings received, or “the exercise of simple piety.”168 According to this distinction, the 
death of Christ on the cross refers to the sacrifice of propitiation/expiation, “intended to 
appease God’s wrath, to satisfy his judgment, and so to wash sins and cleanse them that 
the sinner, purged of their filth and restored to the purity of righteousness, may return 
into favor with God.”169 As the sacrifice of Christ is identified exclusively with His death 
on the cross, sacrifice in the functional model is understood as a specific event.170 
Finally, the third function of the priest refers to Christ’s intercession. For Luther, 
this function was partially accomplished in Christ’s intercessory prayer in John 17 and in 
His intercessory prayers on the cross. However, Christ’s priestly intercession refers more 
directly to His ongoing office as mediator before God in heaven (Rom 8:34).171 
                                                
“the guilt that held us liable for punishment has been transferred to the head of the Son of God.” ICR 
2.16.5. 
166 ICR 4.18.13. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. Calvin affirms that “burnt offerings, libations, oblations, first fruits, and peace offerings” 
in the OT belonged to this second type of sacrifice. Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
170 This perspective is clear in Luther’s and Calvin’s rejection of the Catholic identification of the 
eucharist with Christ’s sacrifice. See LW, 13:313; ICR 4.18.2; 4.19.28. 
171 LW, 13:320 (Commentary on Psalm 110, 1535). Luther argues that Isa 53:12 and Heb 5:7 




According to Calvin, after Christ’s resurrection and ascension, His priestly work of 
propitiation continues in heaven as He intercedes for human prayers. In his words, “we or 
our prayers have no access to God unless Christ, as our High Priest, having washed away 
our sins, sanctifies us and obtains for us that grace from which the uncleanness of our 
transgressions and vices debars us.”172 The French theologian assumes that the biblical 
teaching of praying in the name of Jesus implies that the Father needs to be 
continuously173 appeased by the heavenly intercession of Christ before He receives the 
prayers of His people.174 Excluded from the divine presence, human beings need a 
mediator to appear before “God’s dread majesty” so that their prayers may be heard.175 
Luther summarizes the three priestly functions of Christ in the following way: 
first, in His preaching Christ “proclaims God’s grace and promises us the forgiveness of 
                                                
172 ICR 2.15.6. Human prayers need to be cleansed by the blood of Christ. Otherwise, they are 
tainted and unclean. Ibid., 3.20.18. “No prayer is pleasing to God unless this Mediator sanctifies it.” Ibid., 
3.20.27. “By Christ’s intercession are consecrated our prayers, which would otherwise have been unclean, 
so the apostle, enjoining us to offer a sacrifice of praise through Christ, warns us that our mouths are not 
clean enough to sing the praises of God’s name until Christ’s priesthood intercedes for us.” Ibid., 3.20.28. 
The French theologian derives this notion from the fact that the OT priests should enter alone in the 
sanctuary bearing “the names of the tribes of Israel upon his shoulders and the same number of precious 
stones on his breastplate, but the people should stand afar off in the court, and there join their petitions with 
the priest.” Ibid., 3.20.18. 
173 According to Calvin, passages such as 1 John 2:1; Rom 8:34; and 1 Tim 2:5 ascribe to Christ a 
continuous mediatorial work, instead of affirming a once for all intercession. Ibid., 3.20.20. 
174 Ibid., 3.20.18. “No one can be helped by any prayers at all save when Christ intercedes.” Ibid., 
3.20.19. 
175 Ibid., 3.20.17-18. Luther also emphasizes that human prayers are heard by God only through 
Christ’s mediation. The German theologian highlights that believers “do not base these prayers upon 
themselves nor upon their merit, but upon Christ the Mediator. He presents their prayers before God, and 
they become acceptable and are heard for His sake. LW, 13:334 (Commentary on Psalm 110, 1535). “Christ 
is our priest or minister in heaven before God.” He “takes up our cause, presents us and our prayer and 
praise, and also offers himself for us in heaven” LW, 35-99-100 (A Treatise on the New Testament, that is, 




our sins.”176 Considering that the priest directs the conscience of human beings toward 
God and provides them with the interpretation of God’s word and will,177 Christ is 
described as a “spiritual, internal priest” who “teaches us internally, in the heart.”178 
Second, Christ “has made the true priestly sacrifice for us, which has the power of 
reconciling God and of removing our sin from us.”179 Third, Christ “represents us before 
God with His intercessions in our behalf, so that we may continue in this reconciliation 
and grace and be preserved in it.”180 
In their polemic against Roman Catholicism, Luther and Calvin oppose the idea 
of participation in Christ’s activities of sacrifice and intercession, because they think such 
participation ultimately implies a replacement of His priesthood by an alleged mediation 
of human beings (priests and saints).181 Even though the German and the French 
theologians affirm the priesthood of believers,182 they distinguish it from Christ’s 
                                                
176 LW, 13:321 (Commentary on Psalm 110, 1535). 
177 Ibid., 13:304. 
178 Ibid., 39:80 (On the Papacy in Rome Against the Most Celebrated Romanist in Leipzig, 1520). 
179 Ibid., 13:321 (Commentary on Psalm 110, 1535). 
180 Ibid. 
181 From Luther’s perspective, the priesthood of Christ is perverted by the sacrifice of the mass 
and the belief in other mediators, which refer to the priestly functions of sacrifice and intercession. 
According to him, Christ did not institute the eucharist as a sacrifice, since the sacrifice was once 
performed by the true High Priest on the cross. Ibid., 13:313. However, for Luther, the medieval church 
created its own priesthood and sacrifice that silence, contradict, and ultimately replace Christ’s priestly 
work and sacrifice. Ibid., 13:325. In this context, the mediation of Christ is replaced by the intercession of 
Mary and other saints. Ibid., 13:327. As a result of the human inability “to do sufficient penance and good 
works,” and the consequent and constant fear of the wrath of Christ, the church “directed us further to the 
saints in heaven; these were supposed to be the mediators between us and Christ.” Ibid., 13:326. 
182  For Luther, all Christians are priests through baptism. LW, 13:329 (Commentary on Psalm 
110, 1535). However, although the priestly office is common to all Christians, it does not eliminate the 
necessity of ministers, preachers, or pastors in the church. Nevertheless, this ministry is not a priestly work 
in the common sense of the work of a priest in the Scriptures. Ministers must be selected by the church 





priesthood. Taking into account Calvin’s distinction between the sacrifice of 
propitiation/expiation and the sacrifice of praise/thanksgiving, the priesthood of believers 
refers only to the second type of sacrifice, as the first type belongs exclusively to 
Christ.183 And even their performance of the second type of sacrifice is only accepted by 
the Father because of the priestly intercession of Christ on their behalf.184 In fact, the 
French theologian concludes that when there is no distinction between the sacrifice 
offered by believers (including especially ecclesiastical leaders/priests) and the sacrifice 
offered by Christ and, therefore, the dependence of the former on the latter is disregarded, 
the priesthood of Christ is ultimately usurped. Calvin argues that this situation takes place 
when the eucharist is considered a sacrifice—the sacrifice of the mass, where priests 
                                                
two reasons for the distinction between common priesthood and the ministry office, namely, the different 
gifts of the Spirit and the necessity of order in the church. Ibid., 13:331-334. For further information about 
Luther’s understanding of the priesthood of all believers and of the Christian ministry, see Norman E. 
Nagel, “Luther and the Priesthood of All Believers,” Concordia Theological Quarterly 61, no. 4 (1997): 
277-298; Mark Rogers, “A Dangerous Idea? Martin Luther, E. Y. Mullins, and the Priesthood of All 
Believers,” Westminster Theological Journal 72, no. 1 (2010): 119-134; Brian A. Gerrish, “Priesthood and 
Ministry in the Theology of Luther,” Church History 34, no. 4 (1965): 404-422; Herman A. Preus, “Luther 
on the Universal Priesthood and the Office of the Ministry,” Concordia Journal 5, no. 2 (1979): 55-62; 
Markus Wriedt, “Luther on Call and Ordination: A Look at Luther and the Ministry,” Concordia Journal 
28, no. 3 (2002): 254-269; James R. Jeffcoat, Jr., “Martin Luther’s Doctrine of Ministry,” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Drew University, 1989). For information on Calvin’s notion, see John Richard Crawford, 
“Calvin and the Priesthood of All Believers,” Scottish Journal of Theology 21, no. 2 (1968): 145-156. 
183 In Christ “we all are priests, but to offer praises and thanksgiving, in short, to offer ourselves 
and ours to God. It was his office alone to appease God and atone for sins by his offering.” ICR 4.19.28. 
For Calvin, under the sacrifices of thanksgiving “are included all the duties of love,” and “all our prayers, 
praises, thanksgivings, and whatever we do in the worship of God.” Instead of seeking “forgiveness of sins, 
or with meriting righteousness,” these sacrifices are “concerned solely with magnifying and exalting God.” 
Calvin quotes on this regard Rom 12:1; Heb 13:16; and Phil 4:18, which generally highlight that “all the 
good works of believers are spiritual sacrifices.” Ibid., 4.18.16. “From this office of sacrificing, all 
Christians are called a royal priesthood (1 Pet 2:9), because through Christ we offer that sacrifice of praise 
to God.” Ibid., 4.18.17. 
184 Calvin highlights, “We do not appear with our gifts before God without an intercessor. The 
Mediator interceding for us is Christ, by whom we offer ourselves and what is ours to the Father.” Ibid., 
4.18.17. He is the high priest “who has entered the heavenly sanctuary and opens a way for us to enter. He 
is the altar upon which we lay our gifts, that whatever we venture to do, we may undertake in him. He it is, 




pretend to perform the sacrifice of Christ185 and “intercede before God for the people.”186  
Assuming a distinction of the priesthood of Christ and of believers, where the 
latter is dependent on the former, Calvin argues that Christ’s intercession enables 
believers to participate in His priestly work. Indeed, Christ’s ongoing intercession makes 
“us as his companions in this great office. For we who are defiled in ourselves, yet are 
priests in him, offer ourselves and our all to God, and freely enter the heavenly sanctuary 
that the sacrifices of prayers and praise that we bring may be acceptable” to God.187 
Hence, the priesthood of believers is a participation in Christ’s priesthood in terms of 
praise and prayers, particularly in intercessory prayers among believers.188 While 
                                                
185 For Calvin, the mass is a blasphemy against the eternal priesthood of Christ, and the priests 
who perform this pretended sacrifice are not successors, but substitutes of the heavenly Christ. “Those who 
sacrifice daily are required to appoint for their oblations priests whom they put in Christ’s place as 
successors and vicars. By this substitution they not only deprive Christ of his honor, and snatch from him 
the prerogative of that eternal priesthood, but try to cast him down from the right hand of his Father, where 
he cannot sit immortal without at the same time remaining eternal priest.” Ibid., 4.18.2. Calvin combats the 
idea that by offering bread and wine to Abraham (Gen 14:18) Melchizedek prefigured the sacrifice of the 
mass. Rather, he claims that “Melchizedek gave bread and wine to Abraham and his companions, to refresh 
them, wearied by their journey and battle. What has this to do with a sacrifice?” Ibid., 4.18.2. 
186 Ibid., 4.18.14. “All who call themselves priests to offer a sacrifice of expiation do wrong to 
Christ. Christ was appointed and consecrated priest according to the order of Melchizedek by the Father . . . 
without end, without successor. He once for all offered a sacrifice of eternal expiation and reconciliation; 
now, having also entered the sanctuary of heaven, he intercedes for us.” Ibid., 4.19.28. Affirming Christ as 
the only “Pontiff and Priest of the New Testament, to whom all priesthood’s have been transferred, and in 
whom they have been closed and terminated,” Calvin denies the existence of priests in the church that by 
the oblation of the mass “intercede before God for the people and, having appeased God, obtain atonement 
for sins.” Ibid., 4.18.14. 
187 Ibid., 2.15.6. For Luther, the ascended Christ not only prays for us; He also grants us the power 
and freedom to pray directly to God, by bringing our prayers to God. LW, 13:321 (Commentary on Psalm 
110, 1535). 
188 Calvin explains that besides commending “himself to the prayers of believers,” Christ, “the 
greatest and truest priest of the church,” requests “that all members of Christ’s body mutually pray for one 
another.” In this way, “the mutual prayers for one another of all members yet laboring on earth rise to the 
Head [Christ], who has gone before them into heaven, in whom ‘is propitiation.’” ICR 3.20.20. In short, the 
intercession of believers in prayer depends entirely on the priestly intercession of Christ in heaven. “Christ 
does not by his intercession hinder us from pleading for one another by prayers in the church,” provided 
that “all intercessions of the whole church” are directed “to that sole intercession,” as “those intercessions 





believers do not participate in Christ’s propitiatory sacrifice, and somehow participate in 
His intercession through their prayers (as long as their intercession is mediated by 
Christ’s intercession), they assume through the guidance of the Holy Spirit a more 
instrumental participation in the function of teaching, which is actually understood as 
Christ Himself preaching.189 More concretely, this priestly function is described as the 
preaching of the gospel and the administration of the sacraments (particularly the Lord’s 
Supper),190 where the salvific benefits of Christ’s sacrifice on the cross are communicated 
                                                
commend one another’s salvation to God,” as long as they “depend solely upon Christ’s intercession.” ICR 
3.20.19. 
189 According to Luther, although Christ “has ascended to heaven and no longer preaches on earth 
in person, He has not stopped speaking through the apostles and their successors; nor will He stop 
extending His Gospel farther and farther and powerfully working in it by means of the Holy Spirit. . . . If 
He did not stir up our hearts and preserve them through the Holy Spirit, no man would believe the Gospel 
or remain faithful to it.” LW, 13:324 (Commentary on Psalm 110, 1535). 
190 For Luther, sacrament is a word of divine promise or testament which has material/visible signs 
attached to it. LW, 36:124 (The Babylonian Captivity of the Church, 1520). In this view, God adds some 
external sign to His word as a “memorial or remembrance of the promise, so that thereby we may serve him 
the more diligently and he may admonish us the more effectually.” Ibid., 36:44. The remembrance provided 
by the sacrament “is nothing else than a preaching of the Word.” Ibid., 40:22 (Concerning the Ministry, 
1523). In this sense, Luther stipulates that “during the mass, we should do nothing with greater zeal . . . 
than to set before our eyes, meditate upon, and ponder these words, these promises of Christ—for they truly 
constitute the mass itself—in order to exercise, nourish, increase, and strengthen our faith in them by this 
daily remembrance.” Ibid., 36:41 (The Babylonian Captivity of the Church, 1520). For the German 
theologian, “the Eucharist was a visible Word of God,” as he “interpreted the Eucharist in the new context 
of Word and faith rather than in the older context of sacrifice and priest.” David C. Steinmetz, “Scripture 
and the Lord’s Supper in Luther’s Theology,” Interpretation 37, no. 3 (1983): 255. In The Babylonian 
Captivity of the Church (1520), Luther expounds a critique of the theology and administration of the 
sacraments in the Roman church. For instance, he (1) denies the existence of seven sacraments (LW, 36:18) 
and affirms that there are only baptism and the Lord’s Supper (36:124); he (2) rejects the thomistic notion 
of transubstantiation (36:29) and suggests that the body of Christ is “contained in every part” of the 
bread—without any distinction between substance and accidents, just like “in red-hot iron . . . the two 
substances, fire and iron, are so mingled that every part is both iron and fire” (36:32); he (3) repudiates the 
view that “the mass is a good work and a sacrifice” (36:35) and argues that “what we call the mass is a 
promise of the forgiveness of sins made to us by God, and such a promise as has been confirmed by the 
death of the Son of God. For the only difference between a promise and a testament is that the testament 
involves the death of the one who makes it” (36:38). For additional information on Luther’s understanding 
of the sacraments, see Wolfgang Simon, “Worship and the Eucharist in Luther Studies,” Dialog: A Journal 
of Theology 47, no. 2 (2008): 143-156; Steinmetz, “Scripture and the Lord’s Supper in Luther’s Theology,” 




or applied to believers.191 It is important to note that, according to Luther, “it is not the 
sacrament but faith in the sacrament that makes righteous.”192 This general picture 
suggests a correspondence between the application of the salvific benefits of Christ’s 
sacrifice provided by the Spirit on earth (through word and sacrament)193 and the 
intercession of Christ in heaven.194 From the perspective of the need for Christ’s 
                                                
191 Luther underscores that “teaching and praying” are “two priestly offices: to hear God speaking 
and to speak with God.” In the context of teaching, “through the blessing, through preaching, and through 
the administration of the sacraments God descends and speaks with me.” Ibid., 5:197 (Lectures on Genesis, 
1542 [chap. 28:5]). For Calvin, the salvific benefits of Christ’s sacrifice on the cross are communicated to 
human beings through the “the preaching of the gospel and the administration of the Sacred Supper.” ICR 
4.18.3 With regard to the Lord’s Supper, Calvin maintains that “after Christ’s sacrifice was accomplished,” 
God “instituted” a “method . . . to transmit to the believing folk the benefit of the sacrifice offered to 
himself by his Son. He has therefore given us a Table at which to feast, not an altar upon which to offer a 
victim; he has not consecrated priests to offer sacrifice, but ministers to distribute the sacred banquet.” 
Ibid., 4.18.12. McCormack emphasizes that, for Calvin, the Holy Spirit effects union with Christ through 
the preached word and sacrament. McCormack, For Us and Our Salvation, 23. According to Kilian 
McDonnell, “Calvin did not consider the sacraments as a necessary means of salvation, and though union 
with Christ was not considered as dependent on the sacraments—as is also the case in Roman Catholicism 
—he did consider union with Christ as quite unthinkable apart from the sacraments. Union with Christ was 
not considered without reference to the Eucharist . . .  just as union with Christ was not considered without 
reference to faith.” In this sense, “a comparison of Calvin’s teaching on the union with Christ which takes 
place in faith through the power of the Holy Spirit, with the union with Christ which takes place in the 
Eucharist, also through the power of the Holy Spirit, will show how Calvin subsumed the eucharistic eating 
under the larger moment of faith, the perpetual eating.” Kilian McDonnell, John Calvin, the Church and 
the Eucharist (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 179, 184-185. 
192 LW, 29:206-207 (Lectures on Hebrews, 1517-1518). 
193 The ontological meaning of this earthly application of benefits through word and sacrament 
will be explored in the next chapter in the section dealing with the Cosmology of the functional model.  
194 Luther affirms that Christ’s intercessory prayer in heaven communicates the power and merit of 
His sacrifice to human beings, for the forgiveness of sins, righteousness, and eternal life, giving strength to 
believers so that they might overcome sin and the temptations of Satan, and preserving them in God’s 
grace. LW, 13:320 (Commentary on Psalm 110, 1535). These benefits parallel what Luther calls “the 
significance or effect” of the Lord’s Supper, which is the “fellowship of all the saints,” where “all the 
spiritual possessions of Christ and his saints are shared with and become the common property of him who 
receives this sacrament.” As a result, this sacrament has “the property of strengthening” and encouraging 
believers in the battle against sin, because they are assured by God through these material signs that they 
“are not fighting alone”; rather, “Christ and his saints intercede for us before God, so that this sin may not 
be charged to our account by God’s strict judgment.” Ibid., 35:50-53 (The Blessed Sacrament of the Holy 
and True Body of Christ, and the Brotherhoods, 1519). Commenting on 1 John 2:1, the French theologian 
argues that “Christ appears before God” in order to “exercise towards us the power and efficacy of his 
sacrifice,” and that “the intercession of Christ is a continual application of his death for our salvation. That 
God then does not impute to us our sins, this comes to us, because he has regard to Christ as intercessor.” 





priesthood, described as God’s wrath against human sin or disobedience/lack of faith, and 
the obedient humanity of His priesthood that undergoes a substitutionary sacrifice, this 
application of benefits seems to be understood in terms of the acquittal of guilt and the 
imputation or participation of human beings in the righteous obedience of Christ.  
In short, the sacrifice of Christ was a past event at the cross, while His heavenly 
intercession and earthly teaching (through the Holy Spirit, and then through the preaching 
of the word and the sacraments/Lord’s Supper) are present and ongoing activities 
performed by Christ since His ascension (obviously, the activity of intercession and 
teaching marked His public ministry).195 On the basis of the penal substitutionary 
sacrifice at the cross, the ascended Christ constantly propitiates the Father in His 
heavenly intercession and communicates blessings (acquittal of guilt and imputation or 
participation in His obedience) to believers through His earthly teaching. 
The Goal of the Priesthood  
According to the description above, the priesthood of Christ in the functional 
model is needed primarily because God’s holy wrath condemns sinful human beings. As 
the priestly agent, Christ is the mediator sent by the Father. Calvin claims that He is the 
                                                
Lord’s Supper are understood in terms of application of salvation, then the parallel or identification 
between them is clearly affirmed. In his study of the eucharist in the theology of Calvin, Tylenda stipulates 
that, through the Lord’s Supper, Christ “today applies the salvation which he once obtained for us by his 
expiation on the cross.” Joseph N. Tylenda, “Eucharistic Sacrifice in Calvin’s Theology,” Theological 
Studies 37, no. 3 (1976): 466.  
195 Luther argues that “Christ is a spiritual, internal priest. He is seated in heaven and intercedes 
for us as a priest; he teaches us internally, in the heart.” LW, 39:80 (On the Papacy in Rome Against the 
Most Celebrated Romanist in Leipzig, 1520). The German theologian adds, “Nor does he only pray and 
intercede for us but he teaches us inwardly through the living instruction of his Spirit, thus performing the 
two real functions of a priest, of which the prayers and the preaching of human priests are visible types.” 




mediator between God in His transcendent unapproachable glory and creation since the 
beginning of the world, meaning that Christ’s priesthood is an added function to His 
mediatorial activity of creation and providence, which now includes a 
redemptive/propitiatory mediation. This new and necessary feature of Christ’s mediation 
comprises the activities of sacrifice, intercession, and teaching. While the sacrifice and 
heavenly intercession propitiate the wrath of God,196 the spiritual (through the Spirit) 
teaching comforts the conscience of believers who feel condemned for their sins.197 
In this context, the goal of Christ’s priesthood can be discussed in two levels: (1) 
His mediation between God and sinful human beings, and (2) the contribution of the 
priesthood to Christ’s broader mediation between God and creation. Regarding the first 
level, the goal of the priesthood of Christ is to provide salvation by grace.198 This goal 
                                                
196 Calvin points out that Christ, as an “advocate, took upon himself and suffered the punishment 
that, from God’s righteous judgment, threatened all sinners; . . . he purged with his blood those evils which 
had rendered sinners hateful to God; that by this expiation he made satisfaction and sacrifice duly to God 
the Father; . . . as intercessor he has appeased God’s wrath between us and God, and acquired 
righteousness to render God favorable and kindly toward us.” ICR 2.16.2; italics mine. For Luther, even in 
His intercession before the Father, Christ “bears the iniquities of us all as if they were His own to make us 
coheirs with Him of all the good things of His Father and to reconcile us to His Father.” LW, 20:71 
(Lectures on Zechariah, 1526). 
197 Luther associates the propitiation of God’s wrath with the comfort offered by the priesthood of 
Christ to the conscience of believers. See LW, 20:71 (Lectures on Zechariah, 1526). Actually, one of the 
main purposes of His priestly work is to comfort “those who have weaknesses, frailties, and sins, and who 
therefore possess a shy, burdened, and disturbed conscience.” The priestly office of Christ “is all our 
comfort and hope, all that needs to be preached and believed for our salvation. Everyone who enshrines this 
in his heart and keeps it will have comfort and joy all his life. He will never be afraid. Here he learns that 
Christ, the Son of God, wants to be our Priest. This is not for one hour or for one day; nor is His Mass or 
priestly office of as brief duration as the private Mass of a popish priest. But He has been a Priest since the 
day He became the Christ and began to sacrifice His body. He continues to present His sacrifice to the 
Father, to plead for us without ceasing, until the end of the world.” Ibid., 13:321, 325-326. Similarly, 
Calvin highlights that Christ’s intercession gives assurance to believers, as they can have peace of mind and 
“trust in prayer.” ICR 2.15.6. 
198 Luther emphasizes that the priesthood of Christ nullifies human works for salvation. The very 
existence of a priest that reconciles us to God through His sacrifice and intercession implies that human 




corresponds to the traditional Protestant understanding of justification and sanctification. 
Luther points out that, in His ongoing heavenly intercession, Christ “is our representative 
and pronounces us righteous.”199 Because of His intercession, sin is not “reckoned to our 
account” (justification: grace as forgiveness) and He may “grant us the strength and 
power of the Holy Spirit to overcome sin” (sanctification: grace as power).200 Taking into 
account the need for Christ’s priesthood, the idea of grace as forgiveness refers to the 
forensic acquittal of guilty human beings before a wrathful God, and the notion of grace 
as power is understood as the transformation of human beings, previously characterized 
by lack of faith, into obedient believers. However, this does not mean that original sin is 
removed from them, as believers can fall into disobedience. Therefore, there is a priority 
of the first aspect of Christ’s intercession (grace as forgiveness) in the functional model, 
                                                
199 Ibid., 13:326. 
200 LW, 13:320 (Commentary on Psalm 110, 1535). Luther claims that the reason why Christ 
“ascended to heaven to sit at the right hand of God was to preserve us forever in God’s grace through His 
intercessions and, further, to give us power and victory over the terrors of sin, Satan, and the temptations of 
the world and our flesh.” Ibid. Scholarship in Luther studies has debated about the relationship of forensic 
justification and sanctification, and consequently about Luther’s concept of justification. The so-called 
Mannermaa school at the University of Helsinki has fostered a new interpretation of Luther’s view of 
justification. In contrast to the prevailing German school approach and the theology of the Lutheran 
confessions, this new interpretation claims that “Luther does not make a distinction between forensic and 
effective justification, but rather argues that justification includes both. In other words, in line with Catholic 
theology, justification means both declaring righteous and making righteous.” Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, 
“Justification,” in Global Dictionary of Theology: A Resource for the Worldwide Church, ed. Veli-Matti 
Kärkkäinen William A. Dyrness, Juan F. Martinez, Simon Chan (Downers, IL; Nottingham, UK: 
InterVarsity, 2008), 449. See also Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, “Deification View,” in Justification: Five Views, 
ed. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2011), 220-222; Scott H. Hendrix 
Günther Gassmann, Fortress Introduction to the Lutheran Confessions (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 80; 
Tuomo Mannermaa, Christ Present in Faith: Luther’s View of Justification (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005). 
Another aspect of the debate is related to the fact that this new interpretation suggests that Luther’s view of 
justification implies the notion of deification or theosis. See W.D. Persaud, “Lutheran Theology,” in Global 
Dictionary of Theology: A Resource for the Worldwide Church, ed. Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen William A. 
Dyrness, Juan F. Martinez, Simon Chan (Downers Grove, IL; Nottingham, UK: InterVarsity, 2008), 512; 
Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology, 221. However, the discussion does not seem to take into account the 





since justified and sanctified believers are still sinful human beings in this life, awaiting 
the eschatological transformation or perfection.201 This situation requires a constant 
priestly intercession that does not take sin completely away from believers, but changes 
the way their sin is treated by God, that is, “as non-existent and as expelled.”202 In this 
sense, Luther’s notion of simul justus et peccator implies a “movement from sin to 
righteousness that begins every moment anew and continues without end until death.”203 
Therefore, salvation is purely by the grace of God’s forgiveness, and this is achieved on 
the basis of Christ’s ongoing mediatorial priesthood. Indeed, this conception of salvation 
that highlights exclusively God’s forgiveness, without any merit from human beings, is 
associated with the notion that Christ’s mediatorial priesthood is a divine provision—the 
priestly mediator sent by the Father is the Son, who communicates salvation to human 
beings through the Spirit—for the salvation of believers, and magnifies “the glory of 
God’s great generosity,” which in Calvin’s perspective is the final cause or goal of 
                                                
201 According to his idea of simul justus et peccator, Luther claims that “everything is forgiven 
through grace, but as yet not everything is healed through the gift” of transformation. LW, 32:229 (Against 
Latomus, 1521). Likewise, Calvin claims that “there is always sin in the saints, until they are freed from 
their mortal frame, because depraved concupiscence resides in their flesh, and is at variance with 
rectitude.” He explains, “In regenerating his people God indeed accomplishes this much for them; he 
destroys the dominion of sin, by supplying the agency of the Spirit, which enables them to come off 
victorious from the contest. Sin, however, though it ceases to reign, ceases not to dwell in them.” ICR 
3.3.10-11. 
202 LW, 32:229 (Against Latomus, 1521). In Luther’s words, “As far as its nature is concerned, sin 
in no way differs from itself before grace and after grace; but it is indeed different in the way it is treated. It 
is now dealt with otherwise than before. How was it treated previously? In such a way that it was existent, 
known, and overwhelmed us; but now it is treated as non-existent and as expelled.” It is important to note 
that, for Luther, this different treatment takes place “as long as one perseveres in grace and his gift” of 
transformation. Ibid. This means that the ongoing intercession of Christ is constantly forgiving and giving 
power. The only difference is that while the forgiveness is complete, the transformation produced by the 
power is not complete yet. 
203 Batka, “Luther’s Teaching on Sin and Evil,” 240. Quoting McGrath, Couenhoven argues that, 
“for Luther, the Christian life is repetition: ‘ever to be justified anew’. In emphasizing the metaphor of 
journey, Calvin is more like Augustine, for whom the Christian life is ‘ever to be made more and more 





The second level of the goal of Christ’s priesthood in the functional model takes 
into account the contribution of this priesthood to Christ’s broader mediation between a 
transcendent God in His glory and creation, a reflection stimulated by Calvin’s 
conception of the mediation of the divine Christ. More specifically, this reflection focuses 
on how the priesthood of Christ is related to God’s purposes for human beings in the 
context of creation, and not only salvation. The French theologian stipulates that human 
beings, either before or after sin, are supposed to receive “a better life” from Christ.205 If 
human beings had not sinned they would receive it from Christ’s divine mediation 
between God and creation. However, due to sin, they can only receive it now from 
Christ’s divine-human priesthood.206 This understanding is similar to the teleological 
                                                
204 In Calvin’s Trinitarian conception of the causes of salvation, “the efficient cause” is the love of 
the Father, “the material cause” is the obedience of the Son, “the instrumental cause” is the illumination of 
the Spirit—which is faith, and “the final cause” is “the glory of God’s great generosity.” ICR 3.14.21. This 
is the Trinitarian backfround for Calvin’s understanding of the work of Christ. For helpful information on 
the work of Christ in Calvin, see J. Todd Billings, “John Calvin’s Soteriology: On the Multifaceted ‘Sum’ 
of the Gospel,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 11, no. 4 (2009): 428-447; Jansen, Calvin’s 
Doctrine of the Work of Christ; McCormack, For Us and Our Salvation, 17-34; Richard A. Muller, Calvin 
and the Reformed Tradition: On the Work of Christ and the Order of Salvation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2012); Partee, The Theology of John Calvin, 158-167; Peterson, Calvin’s Doctrine of the 
Atonement; Van Buren, Christ in our Place. 
205 CBC, Commentary on the Book of Genesis (comment on 3:19). In this comment on Gen 3:19, 
Calvin maintains that “the first man would have passed to a better life, had he remained upright; but there 
would have been no separation of the soul from the body, no corruption, no kind of destruction, and, in 
short, no violent change.” Ibid. This statement indicates that human beings, both before and after sin, are 
supposed to pass to a better life. Such life seems to correspond to Calvin’s description of human perfection 
in his remarks on Gen 2:7, where he argues that “the state of man was not perfected in the person of Adam; 
but it is a peculiar benefit conferred by Christ, that we may be renewed to a life which is celestial, whereas 
before the fall of Adam man’s life was only earthly, seeing it had no firm and settled constancy.” Ibid., 58. 
This statement conflates the condition of humanity before (Adam) and after (“we”) sin, as in both cases 
human beings would receive perfection from Christ. 
206 Because “of the fall, the perfecting of human nature can occur in no other way than as the 
completion of Christ’s redemptive work.” Wyatt, Jesus Christ and Creation in the Theology of John 
Calvin, 40. In this sense, commenting on 1 Cor 15:45, Calvin claims that “Christ came to restore our nature 





perspective of the sacramental model. In fact, the better life or perfect human condition 
seems to refer to an incorporeal life characterized by constancy.207 This life is probably 
related to Calvin’s notion that the mediation of Christ will have an end, namely, when 
redeemed human beings “shall openly behold God reigning in his majesty, and Christ’s 
humanity will then no longer be interposed to keep us back from a closer view of 
God.”208 To put it in another way, the mediation of the incarnate Christ will 
eschatologically give way to the enjoyment of “the immediate presence” of the 
“Godhead,” when “we shall see God as he is.”209 Therefore, in this second level of the 
goal of Christ’s priesthood, His priestly work ultimately allows human beings to enjoy 
the immediate vision of God. 
                                                
Corinthians. 
207 The idea of constancy derives from Calvin’s affirmation that human beings will be “renewed to 
a life which is celestial, whereas before the fall of Adam man’s life was only earthly, seeing it had no firm 
and settled constancy.” CBC, Commentary on the Book of Genesis (comment on 2:7). There is a contrast 
here between earthly and celestial lives, which are differentiated by the implied notion that the latter is 
characterized by “firm and settled constancy.” A possible further description of the celestial life is 
incorporeality or immateriality. This description is inferred from Calvin’s assertion that, because “the 
prophets were unable to give a verbal description of that spiritual blessedness” of the eschatological 
kingdom of God, “they usually delineated it by corporeal objects” ICR 3.25.10. Arguing that, in Calvin, the 
“perfecting work would be necessary even without the fall” of human beings, Wyatt indicates that “the 
final goal of salvation includes the resurrection of transformed bodies as well as the gift of immortality to 
the soul.” Wyatt, Jesus Christ and Creation in the Theology of John Calvin, 40. 
208 CBC, Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (comment on 15:27). In this 
comment, Calvin points out that Christ will transfer the divine kingdom “from his humanity to his glorious 
divinity, because a way of approach will then be opened up, from which our infirmity now keeps us back.” 
Ibid. 
209 ICR 2.14.3. In this section Calvin maintains that Christ is sitting “at the right hand of the Father 
. . . only for a time, until we enjoy the immediate presence of his Godhead.” He adds, “When, as partakers 
of the heavenly glory, we shall see God as he is, then Christ, having accomplished the office of Mediator, 
shall cease to be the vicegerent of the Father, and will be content with the glory which he possessed before 
the world was.” This means that “God will then cease to be the head of Christ, and Christ’s own Godhead 
will then shine forth of itself, whereas it is now in a manner veiled.” Ibid. Wyatt comments, “In the 
consummation, the human nature of Christ will continue to exist in union with the divine nature of the 
eternal Son, but it will no longer exercise the functions of veiling, reconciling, or even ruling. The power 
and the glory which the human Christ once shared in the mediatorial ministry will revert to the divine 




In summary, the goal of Christ’s priesthood is to provide salvation by grace, 
which magnifies the glory of God for His great generosity, and ultimately leads believers 
to the eschatological immediate vision of God.  
Having provided this overall description of Christ’s priesthood in the functional 
model, I will turn to the discussion of His priesthood in the ontological model. 
The Ontological Model  
The model explored in this section is labeled ontological because a key idea in its 
account of Christ’s priesthood is that He is the object, and not only the subject, of the 
priesthood. According to this label, the emphasis of this model seems to be on the object 
of the priesthood. Even though supporters of the sacramental and functional models could 
find ontological aspects of Christ’s priesthood in their respective models, only in the 
ontological model is the person or being of Christ (even as God) the primary object of the 
priesthood (atonement). I will unpack this key idea in my treatment of the ontological 
model both in this chapter and in the next chapter. I must indicate at this point that 
because the conception of time is foundational for a complete picture of the ontological 
model, the priesthood of Christ in this model will come to a full view in the next chapter, 
which will directly address the notion of time. The representatives selected for the 
ontological model are the Swiss theologian Karl Barth210 (1886-1968) and the Scottish 
theologian Thomas F. Torrance211 (1913-2007). I will describe their interpretation of each 
                                                
210 Barth’s main discussions on the priesthood of Christ in CD appear in II/1, 156-159; IV/1, 135, 
143-146, 274-283, 314-316. For general comments of this theme in Barth, see JOP 222-224. 
211 Torrance’s main ideas about the priesthood of Christ are found in Torrance, Atonement, 61-96; 
Theology in Reconciliation: Essays Towards Evangelical and Catholic Unity in East and West (London: G. 





component of the formal structure of Christ’s priesthood, starting with the need for His 
priesthood. 
The Need for Christ’s Priesthood 
The need for the priesthood of Christ in the ontological model seems to be built 
on the understanding of the functional model about this issue.212 The ontological model 
assumes a sharp rupture in the relationship between human beings and God as a 
consequence of sin. According to the disruptive character of sin, humans are described as 
covenant breakers who have their humanity perverted and are under the condemnation or 
judgment of God, that is, under His wrath.213 Therefore, in line with the functional model 
and in contrast to some aspects of the sacramental model, sin is not merely an 
ontological/metaphysical distance between the Creator and His creatures or a lack of 
properties in the creatures that leads to an understanding of reconciliation as a 
                                                
2003), 1-22; Space, Time and Resurrection (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1976), 112-118. For comments 
regarding his view of on this theme, see JOP, 224-229; Myk Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas 
Torrance (Farnham, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 185-188; Griffith, “High Priest in Heaven,” 221-
243. 
212 This is certainly not surprising. The representatives of the functional model are classic 
Protestant theologians (Luther and Calvin), and the representatives of the ontological model are modern 
Protestant theologians (Barth and Torrance). For both models, human sin and God’s wrath are key concepts 
in the discussion of the need for Christ’s priesthood. 
213 Barth argues, “The sin and sins of man form the disruptive factor within creation which makes 
necessary the atonement.” CD IV/1, 252. He mentions the “human covenant breaker” being “put to death” 
and the need of “Jesus Christ as the priestly Representative of all men.” Ibid., 102; italics mine. 
Furthermore, the Swiss theologian emphasizes the “seriousness of God’s wrath against sin.” CD I/1, 410. 
Similarly, Torrance describes “human nature” as “determined and perverted by sin, and . . . under the 
accusation and judgment of holy God.” Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ 
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2008), 201. The Scottish theologian depicts sin as “repudiated 
fellowship with God,” a “rupture in the relation between God and man,” “disobedience and covenant-
breaking,” which is understood as the breaking of “the covenant of God with his creation” that “shattered 
the communion it entailed between God and his creatures.” Ibid., 254, 39, 114. Torrance’s conception of 
covenant as communion implies that the renewal of the covenant is in fact a renewal of the communion of 




continuation of creation.214 Rather, sin is a destructive rebellion and alienation from 
God.215 A rebellion in which human beings resist God’s love,216 and an alienation 
whereby humanity is untrue to his/her own nature,217 as human beings become 
disconnected from the relationship that constitutes their own beings, namely, the 
relationship with God.218 
                                                
214 Barth accuses Schleiermacher for “weakening” the “seriousness” of “God’s wrath against sin” 
by viewing sin as “a mere lack,” and then “logically” concluding that “reconciliation (‘redemption’)” is 
“the crowning of creation.” CD I/1, 410. For Torrance, “Sin is utter separation from God . . . but the 
distance between God and man is not constituted by any metaphysical magnitude such as the infinite 
distance between the creator and the creature.” Torrance, Incarnation, 247. The Scottish theologian 
explains that “what divides man from God is not the discrepancy between the finite and infinite . . . 
although that discrepancy does become a real disjunction for us when it is infected by sin and guilt and 
enmity.” Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection, 73. 
215 Barth describes sin as “the source of our destruction.” CD IV/1, 254. See also ibid., 252-253. 
The Swiss theologian points out that “the very heart of the atonement is the overcoming of sin: sin in its 
character as the rebellion of man against God, and in its character as the ground of man’s hopeless destiny 
in death.” Ibid., 253. For Torrance’s understanding of sin as alienation from God, see Incarnation, 247. 
216 Barth maintains that the wrath of God is part of the divine love. In fact, “when it is resisted His 
love works itself out as death-dealing wrath.” CD IV/1, 253; italics mine. The Swiss theologian associates 
the concepts of resistance and usurpation in his understanding of human sin. For him, “the fall of man is 
that he would not keep to the limits appointed for him in relation to God as a human creature. And man’s 
being in sin is that he will not accept that he is the rebel against God that he is, that he will not see and 
acknowledge his usurpation for what it is, that he will not confess it and therefore his own fall, that he 
wants to explain and excuse and justify himself, to be in the right against God. If he ceased to do this, He 
would acknowledge that God is in the right against him, thus returning to the place which is proper to him 
as a creature in relation to God, and reversing the fall which consists in his usurpation. His unwillingness to 
repent is the constant renewal of his sin.” Ibid., 258.  
217 According to Barth, “In sin, and therefore in disobedience, man . . . is . . . untrue not only to 
God but also to his own nature” CD IV/1, 257. Likewise, in his discussion on sin Torrance maintains that 
“mankind has fallen from true humanity, from true human existence.” Torrance, Atonement, 160. For the 
Scottish theologian, the locus of sin in human beings is the mind. In this sense, the distortion of true human 
nature takes place primordially in the mind. In his words, “It is in the human mind that sin is entrenched, 
and it is right there . . . that we require to be cleansed by the blood of Christ and to be healed and reconciled 
to God.” Ibid., 438. This focus on the mind derives from his understanding that there is no “body/soul or 
body/mind dualism” in biblical anthropology. Ibid. This perspective is similar to Barth’s conception of 
biblical anthropology as “concrete monism,” which contrasts with the soul/body “dualism of the Greek and 
traditional Christian doctrine.” CD III/2, 393. 
218 Torrance considers the human “fellowship with God” as “the relation which constitutes the 
very being of humanity.” Torrance, Incarnation, 254. From this perspective, sin is “a form of suicide. By 
rebelling against the creator and by asserting his or her independence, the creature is rebelling against the 
innermost relation which constitutes their very being as a creature, as a human being” Ibid., 247-248. Barth 





However, the differences between the ontological and the functional models, with 
regard to the comprehension of the rupture in the relationship between human beings and 
God, are at least two. One has to do with the historical initial cause of the rupture (sin) 
and the other is related to what the divine reaction (God’s wrath) to this rupture entails. 
First, while the functional model interpreted the fall of Adam and Eve historically, the 
ontological model tends to view it existentially (non-historically),219 as theistic evolution 
emerged as a major influence in modern theology in general.220 In the functional model, 
                                                
has completely lost the capacity for God,” which implies that “the reconciliation of man with God in Christ 
also includes, or already begins with, the restitution of the lost point of contact.” CD I/1, 238. 
219 As Stanton Norman nicely summarizes, “Karl Barth argued for an existential interpretation of 
the account of Adam and Eve in the garden. He contended that the events of Genesis are to be understood 
as saga, not history. The fall of Adam describes the event that happens to all as each individual reenacts 
personally the events described in the garden. Adam is thus an existential symbol for every person and the 
fall a saga of the existential, sinful demise of all people. Sin originated in the fall, but the precise details of 
sin’s origin transcend human comprehension.” R. Stanton Norman, “Human Sinfulness,” in A Theology for 
the Church, ed. Daniel L. Akin (Nashville, TN: B&H Publishing Group, 2007), 442. Arguing that the genre 
of the Genesis account of creation is saga and not history (not “susceptible as such of historical proof”), 
Barth maintains that it is a mistake to understand the “being and existence of Adam” as “history, relating it 
either favourably or unfavourably to scientific paleontology, or to what we know with some historical 
certainty concerning the oldest and most primitive forms of life.” According to this standpoint, the Swiss 
theologian interprets the fall as the divine statement of the pride of human beings. CD IV/1, 508. Who is 
Adam for Barth? He is “the truth concerning us as it is known to God and told to us.” Ibid., 511. Similarly, 
Torrance seems to understand the fall existentially, and not historically. In his words, “‘the Fall’” is “man’s 
estrangement from God resulting from his sin in seeking to make himself independent of him. Here there 
has opened up in man’s existence a gulf of corruption and perdition which threatens to swallow him up, but 
that does not altogether happen. God refuses to be estranged from man or to forego his claim over him, and 
so he does not allow man to fall completely away from him, but continues to sustain him in being in his 
fallen condition as the creature which he had made to be ‘good.’” Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and 
Contingent Order (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 123.  
220 In their account of science in modern theology, Robert Russell and Kirk Wetger-McNelly 
maintain that “Christian theologians have developed a diversity of positive responses to Darwin’s theory of 
evolution over the past 140 years, which by and large assume that what science describes in terms of 
evolutionary biology is what theology sees as God’s acting in the world. Simply put, evolution is God’s 
way of creating life, a view frequently called ‘theistic evolution.’” Robert John Russell and Kirk Wegter-
McNelly, “Science,” in The Blackwell Companion to Modern Theology, ed. Gareth Jones (Malden, MA; 
Oxord, UK: Blackwell, 2004), 523. While the validity of such position is debatable, Russell and Wetger-
McNelly correctly describe theistic evolution as a major influence in modern theology. Even though the 
ontological model does not seem to elaborate much on the notion of evolution, this notion can be identified 
in the writings of Barth and Torrance. In a letter to Christine Barth (Letter 181), Barth points out that “the 
creation story is a witness to the beginning . . . of all reality distinct from God . . . in the form of a saga or 





the fall is the historical point when human beings began to rebel against God, causing His 
wrathful reaction.221 Conversely, the ontological model seems to follow the influence of 
theistic evolution in modern theology, an influence that regards the historical 
understanding of origins in classical Christian theology as pre-scientific (scientifically 
untenable).222 Indeed, instead of approaching hamartiology from the starting point of 
protology, the ontological model treats sin from the standpoint of Christology.223 
                                                
explanation.” Hence, “one’s attitude to the creation story and the theory of evolution can take the form of 
an either/or only if one shuts oneself off completely either from faith in God’s revelation or from the mind 
(or opportunity) for scientific understanding.” Hinrich Stoevesandt and Jurgen Fangmeier, eds., Karl Barth: 
Letters, 1961-1968, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981), 184. Habets indicates that 
a close reading of Torrance reveals that “he supports an evolutionary view of the cosmos, an expanding 
universe that resulted from some form of original Big Bang, along with a concomitant commitment to some 
form of theistic evolution.” Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, 44. See, for example, 
Thomas F. Torrance, Preaching Christ Today: The Gospel and Scientific Thinking (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1994), 24; Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, 122. 
221 Luther treats Gen 1-3 as “facts in their historical meaning, which is their real and true one.” In 
fact, he criticizes Origen, Jerome and others who “depart from the historical account” in their allegorical 
treatment of these chapters. LW, 1:231 (Lectures on Genesis, 1535 [chaps. 1-8:14]). For further information 
regarding Luther’s understanding of the account creation and fall in Genesis as historical reality, see Theo 
Bell, “Man Is a Microcosmos: Adam and Eve in Luther’s Lectures on Genesis (1535-1545),” Concordia 
Theological Quarterly 69, no. 2 (2005): 161-162. Examples of Calvin’s reading the first chapters of 
Genesis from a literal/historical perspective are found in his comments on Gen 1:5 and 2:3 (literal days of 
creation); 3:1 (the serpent as non-allegorical); 5:1 (Adam and Eve were not born of previous creatures). See 
CBC, Commentary on Genesis. 
222 For recent examples of this posture in theistic evolution, in the particular context of original sin 
and Adam, see Daryl P. Domning and Monika Hellwig, Original Selfishness: Original Sin and Evil in the 
Light of Evolution (Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006); Peter Enns, The Evolution 
of Adam: What the Bible Does and Doesn’t Say About Human Origins (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 
2012). 
223 As Allen Jorgenson indicates, “Barth wants to develop a theological treatment of sin that 
begins at Christ and does not depend on a historical reading of the Adam story” Allen Jorgenson, “Karl 
Barth’s Christological Treatment of Sin,” Scottish Journal of Theology 54, no. 4 (2001): 458. See, for 
instance, Barth’s treatment of sin in CD IV/1, 145-146. Likewise, Torrance treats evil and sin from the 
perspective of “a theology operating from a central point of reference in Christ.” Torrance, Divine and 
Contingent Order, 117. In this view, “the incarnation, passion, and resurrection conjointly tell us that far 
from evil having to do only with human hearts and minds, it has become entrenched in the ontological 
depths of created existence.” Ibid., 116. For helpful studies on sin in Barth, see Wolf Krötke, Sin and 
Nothingness in the Theology of Karl Barth, trans. Philip G. Ziegler and Christina-Maria Bammel 
(Princeton: Princeton Theological Seminary, 2005); William David Ellington, “Karl Barth’s Doctrine of 
Sin in the Church Dogmatics, Vol. I/1-IV/3,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1965); Bruce A. 
Milne, “The Idea of Sin in Twentieth-Century Theology,” Tyndale Bulletin 26 (1975): 5-15; John Webster, 





Consequently, there was no time in history when human beings had a perfect relationship 
with the Creator that anteceded their rebellion against Him.224 A potential implication 
raised by the assumption that creation was characterized by sin since its beginning would 
be that God’s wrath was always active against human beings. If His wrath was active 
since the beginning of creation, the need of Christ’s salvific mediation that propitiates 
God’s wrath appears to be required ultimately by the original reality of creation, and not 
by a historical subsequent human rebellion against God. To be sure, this is not the 
justification of the need for Christ’s priesthood in the model, but the logical outcome of 
its methodological commitments seems to lead to this conclusion. 
The second difference concerns the notion of divine wrath.225 Whereas the 
                                                
29; Jorgenson, “Karl Barth’s Christological Treatment of Sin,” 439-462; Erin Kesterson Bowers, “In 
Opposition to God: The Doctrine of Sin in the Theologies of Friedrich Schleieramcher and Karl Barth,” 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 2013), 124-245; Matt Jenson, Gravity of Sin: 
Augustine, Luther, and Barth on Homo Incurvatus in Se (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 130-187; 
Ron Highfield, Barth and Rahner in Dialogue: Toward an Ecumenical Understanding of Sin and Evil, 
American University Studies Series VII (New York: Peter Lang, 1989). 
224 Barth’s rejection of original sin as a historical fall implies that “there is no time prior to man’s 
transgression: the life of man is transgression from the very first.” Accordingly, “there never was a golden 
age. There is no point in looking back to one. The first man was immediately the first sinner.” CD IV/1, 
508. Additionally, this rejection implies that there is no hereditary sin. See ibid., 500, 509. 
225 Barth views the wrath of God as a reaction of His love being resisted. The Swiss theologian 
wrote, “When it is resisted His love works itself out as death-dealing wrath.” CD IV/1, 253. Similarly, for 
Torrance, the wrath of God is the negative aspect of the divine love that resists sin. “When men and women 
assert themselves against the Godness of God they are actually asserting themselves to be God, and so 
placing themselves in direct contradiction to the Godness of God. God resists sin in the full Godness of 
God—that is the meaning of the wrath of God. That is the negative aspect of his holiness and love . . . God 
would abdicate from being God, would un-God himself, if he condoned sin.” Torrance, Incarnation, 249. 
Therefore, both Barth and Torrance describe the divine wrath as God’s resistance, that is, a divine negative 
reaction to a human attitude. Furthermore, they interpret the wrath of God as part of His love, and not as a 
divine attribute different from His love. This seems to be another important distinction between the 
functional and the ontological models, which is highlighted by the difference of Calvin and Barth regarding 
the relationship between divine wrath and divine love. According to McCormack, while in Calvin the wrath 
of God or His righteousness is distinct from (and even in contradiction with) His love and mercy, in Barth 
the wrath of God or His holiness/righteousness is part of His love. Hence, McCormack suggests that Barth 
attempts to remove the contradiction between divine wrath and divine love that is found in traditional 




functional model, as described above, relates the wrath of God with a final condemnation 
and destruction of the non-elected, the ontological model views the divine wrath as a 
crucial step for the transformation of human beings and their reconciliation with God.226 
In other words, while divine grace and wrath are two distinct attitudes of God towards 
human beings (which is compatible with the idea of two groups of people, the elect and 
the reprobate, as the respective recipients of grace and wrath) in the functional model, the 
ontological model views divine wrath as part of divine grace227 or its first step in God’s 
dealings with sin (which is compatible with the idea that reprobation and election do not 
refer to two groups of people, but to a twofold divine salvific action).228 In the 
ontological model, sinful human beings must be completely destroyed in order to be 
                                                
226 In his criticism of Luther’s distinction of law (divine holiness) and gospel (divine love), Barth 
argues that “in Scripture we do not find the Law alongside the Gospel but in the Gospel, and therefore the 
holiness of God is not side by side with but in His grace, and His wrath is not separate from but in His 
love.” CD II/1, 363. Following this idea of the divine wrath as part of God’s grace and love, Torrance 
emphasizes that “God’s judgement cannot be equated with annihilation,” which means that the “wrath of 
God is a sign of hope, not of utter destruction.” He adds, “God’s wrath is really a part of atonement.” 
Torrance, Incarnation, 249-250. Commenting on Barth’s notion of divine wrath, Andrew Hay points out 
that, for the Swiss theologian, “the target at which the wrath of God is aimed, once it has annihilated every 
hindrance in its path, is the gracious restoration of fellowship. Thus, the wrath of God attends the gracious 
will of God. His judgment is the instrument of our salvation.” Andrew R. Hay, “The Heart of Wrath: 
Calvin, Barth, and Reformed Theories of Atonement,” Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und 
Religionsphilosophie 55, no. 3 (2013): 375. 
227 As G. C. Berkouwer indicates, in Barth, God’s wrath is a form of His grace. G. C. Berkouwer, 
The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, American ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1956), 
135. 
228 Barth is against the idea of divine election “as the description of a differing and differentiating 
attitude of God towards the totality of individual men as such; an attitude in which God . . . divides this 
totality of individuals into two sections or groups, electing here and not electing or rejecting there, with the 
aim and result of salvation and blessedness in the case of the former, perdition and damnation in the case of 
the latter.” CD II/2, 42. As Matthias Grebe points out, “For Barth, election includes simultaneously both a 
Yes and a No, election and reprobation.” Matthias Grebe, Election, Atonement, and the Holy Spirit: 
Through and Beyond Barth’s Theological Interpretation of Scripture, Princeton Theological Monograph 
Series (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2014), 35. Following Barth’s perspective, Torrance maintains that 
there is “election and damnation” and not “election or damnation.” Thomas F. Torrance, “Predestination in 




totally recreated. Only the humanity recreated in this way is reconciled with God.229 This 
notion of God’s wrath implies that the need of priestly mediation receives a new spin in 
the ontological model, when compared with the functional model.230 Christ the priest 
needs to deal with God’s wrath against sinful humans not only by being the recipient and 
                                                
229 In Barth’s language, “God kills only to make alive,” “the Yes which in the end and after all is 
not concealed beneath God’s No.” CD II/2, 263. For the Swiss theologian, God redeems by destructing. CD 
IV/1, 222. In this view, God “effects a new creation . . . in judgment and grace.” CD I/1, 142. Commenting 
on Barth’s sermon on March 9, 1913, McCormack points out that, for Barth, “the house in which men and 
women live . . . would have to be torn down. Not one stone would be left standing on another. If God were 
to become master of this house, it would have to be rebuilt from the ground up.” Bruce L. McCormack, 
Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development, 1909-1936 (Oxford; 
New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1995), 101. In this same sermon, Barth stipulates 
that “judgement too cannot be the last word of God. Judgement too must be a means and the way of His 
grace. When God judges and punishes, He is at the same time the Creator who calls new life into 
existence.” [“Auch das Gericht mußte ein Mittel und Weg seiner Gnade sein. Auch wenn Gott verurteilt 
und straft, ist er zugleich der Schöpfer, der neues Leben ins Dasein ruft.” März: Markus 13,1-2. In 
Predigten 1913 (GA I.8). Available at Digital Karl Barth Library, http://solomon.dkbl.alexanderstreet.com 
(accessed 17 February 2015)]. Translation taken from McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic 
Dialectical Theology, 102. 
230 It is important to highlight here that Barth and Torrance do not reason from sin and divine 
wrath to Christ’s person and work. Rather, the starting point of their reflections is Christ, and from Him 
they explore the conception of sin, God’s wrath, divine predestination and all other theological themes. 
Nonetheless, the person and work of Christ is still an answer to the sin problem and, thus, to the reality of 
divine wrath. The decisive difference is epistemological, in the sense that Christ is the starting point for the 
human knowledge of other theological themes. In the present description, I have started with the need for 
the priesthood of Christ (which includes the discussion of sin and divine wrath) before moving to His 
priesthood itself because Christ’s priesthood still addresses the sin problem and the wrath of God. 
However, this description only attempts to organize the ideas that Barth and Torrance presumably articulate 
by using Christ as the starting point of their reflection. Besides the idea of divine predestination in Barth 
and Torrance, Barth’s approach to hamartiology is also a significant example of such epistemological 
decision. More specifically, his definition of sin as pride, sloth, and falsehood derives from his reflection on 
the threefold office of Christ (see table below, which summarizes what Barth explains in CD IV/1, 145-
146). As Jorgenson points out, in Barth, the “threefold basis of the knowledge of sin is drawn from the 
threefold revelation of Jesus Christ.” This means that sin is understood as the human opposition to what 
“God did in Jesus Christ; sin as pride in opposition to the humiliation of God in Jesus Christ, sin as sloth in 
opposition to the exaltation of humanity in Jesus Christ, and sin as falsehood in opposition to the witness of 
our atonement as evidenced in Jesus Christ.” Jorgenson, “Karl Barth’s Christological Treatment of Sin,” 
448. 
Threefold Office Christological Aspect Answer to Sin as Soteriological Content 
Priest (Christ as God) God’s self humiliation Human act of pride Justification (God’s verdict) 
King (Christ as man) Exaltation of man by God The sloth of man  Sanctification (God’s direction) 





the propitiation of His wrath (the view of the functional model),231 but also by 
undergoing this wrath as a divine means for the transformation of humanity.232 In this 
sense, the ontological model highlights the idea that God is both the object (God’s wrath 
is propitiated) and the subject (God transforms humanity) of Christ’s priestly mediation. 
In other words, in the context of sin, the priesthood of Christ is needed for divine 
propitiation and human transformation. 
In summary, there is an existential (non-historical fall) broken relationship 
between God and human beings since the beginning of creation. This situation requires a 
priestly mediation of Christ that propitiates the divine wrath against sinful humans and 
that also uses the judgment of this wrath to transform them. In the description below of 
other components of the priesthood of Christ, I will spell out how the ideas introduced in 
this section are elaborated in the ontological model, starting with the agent of the 
                                                
231 Barth and Torrance follow the traditional Protestant perspective that Christ’s priesthood is 
described by the propitiation of the wrath God. The Swiss theologian assumes that this priesthood is 
understood through the idea of sacrifice for sin, in the context of the separation of a sinful people and God 
(see CD IV/1, 275-277). According to this point of view, Barth interprets the priestly death of Jesus as 
substitutionary. In his words, “Jesus Christ as the priestly Representative of all men, that is, as the One in 
whom in the name of all, and therefore for us, the human covenant-breaker was put to death.” Ibid., 102. 
More specifically, this substitutionary death is propitiatory. “To be flesh means to exist . . . under the wrath 
and judgment of the electing and loving God.” Hence, Christ “stands under the wrath and judgment of 
God, He is broken and destroyed on God.” Ibid., 174-175. Similarly, Torrance highlights that Christ the 
priest “bears our sins,” in a substitutionary way. For him, we are “sinners who need the mediation of Christ 
in order to go to the Father.” Torrance, Incarnation, 146, 11. 
232 Barth and Torrance see this twofold relationship (propitiation and transformation) with the 
judgment of the wrath of God in the death and resurrection of Jesus, His destroyed humanity and His new 
humanity. For the Swiss theologian, God “is the One who is both gracious and wrathful, who both makes 
alive and kills, who both elects and rejects in this way. And this has been actualised in a single person 
[Christ], so that we cannot deny either aspect, or separate them, but can and must understand the one by the 
other, and see in the whole, i.e., in the one human figure.” CD II/2, 393. In this way, “the sentence executed 
and revealed in Jesus Christ and His death and resurrection, the No and the Yes with which God vindicates 
Himself in relation to covenant-breaking man, with which He converts him to Himself and therefore 
reconciles him with Himself. He does it by the destruction of the old and the creation of a new man.” CD 
IV/1, 96. Likewise, Torrance speaks about “the judgment accomplished upon the humanity of Christ, and 





The Agent of the Priesthood 
The idea that the priesthood of Christ is required to propitiate the divine wrath and 
at the same time to undergo this judgment to transform human beings implies that the 
person of Christ the priest (the agent of the priesthood) is the pivotal element of the 
understanding of this priesthood in the ontological model. To put it sharply, propitiation 
and transformation are not merely functions that Christ performs as a priest, but an event 
in His own being. According to this view, the person of the incarnate Christ is not 
construed merely as the agent of priestly actions, executing a salvific work, but He is the 
priestly or salvific work itself.233 In short, Christ is the agent who acts upon Himself. 
This ontological conception of the priesthood of Christ is particularly observed in 
two notions: (1) Christ does not merely make atonement, He is the atonement; (2) the 
threefold office of Christ does not characterize sequential phases of His work.234 
                                                
233 Discussing Christ’s atoning reconciliation, Barth claims that “Jesus Christ is not what He is—
very God, very man, very God-man—in order as such to mean and do and accomplish something else 
which is atonement. But His being as God and man and God-man consists in the completed act of the 
reconciliation of man with God.” CD IV/1, 126-127. The Swiss theologian indicates that Christ’s “being as 
a man is the whole of His action, suffering and achievement. His being as a man is His work.” CD III/2, 59. 
Likewise, Torrance emphasizes that “the atonement is his person in action, not the action by itself.” 
Torrance, Incarnation, 108. 
234 For studies on Christology in the respective theologies of Barth and Torrance, see Christopher 
R. J. Holmes, “The Person and Work of Christ Revisited: In Conversation with Karl Barth,” Anglican 
Theological Review 95, no. 1 (2013): 37-55; Paul Dafydd Jones, The Humanity of Christ: Christology in 
Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2008); Adam Neder, “History in 
Harmony: Karl Barth on the Hypostatic Union,” in Karl Barth and American Evangelicalism (Grand 
Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2011), 148-176; Darren O. Sumner, Karl Barth and the 
Incarnation: Christology and the Humility of God (London: Bloomsbury, 2014); Cornelius van Til, Barth’s 
Christology (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1962); George Hunsinger, 
“Karl Barth’s Christology: Its Basic Chalcedonian Character,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl 
Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 127-142; Paul D. Molnar, 
Incarnation and Resurrection: Toward a Contemporary Understanding (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2007), 1-44, 81-120; Paul D. Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian of the Trinity (Farnham, England; 





According to the first notion, “Jesus Christ is the atonement,”235 meaning that the atoning 
reconciliation occurs in the being of Christ.236 Barth argues that reconciliation “is not 
merely outward but” is an “inward” event that “corresponds . . . to being,” as it is 
“necessarily enclosed in” Christ.237 Assuming that Christ is both God and man as one 
person, reconciliation takes place in His being in the sense that divinity and humanity are 
united in His person.238 Exploring this ontological reconciliation in Christ, the Swiss 
theologian highlights what happened to the person of Christ that actually produced 
reconciliation in Him. For instance, he speaks of Christ culticly as the “High-priest 
sacrificing Himself.”239 This concept is also expressed in judicial language. The judgment 
“happened in His person, as His accusation and condemnation and destruction. He 
judged, and it was the Judge who was judged, who let Himself be judged.”240 Thus, 
                                                
and Inter-Relation in the Theology of T. F. Torrance,” Participatio 3 (2012): 1-63; Gunther Pratz, “The 
Relationship between Incarnation and Atonement in the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance,” Journal for 
Christian Theological Research 3 (1998). For helpful information on the development of Barth’s 
Christology in CD, see Bruce L. McCormack, “The Person of Christ,” in Mapping Modern Theology: A 
Thematic and Historical Introduction, ed. Kelly M. Kapic and Bruce L. McCormack (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic, 2012), 169-171; Bruce L. McCormack, “Christonomie,” in Barth Handbuch, ed. Michael 
Beintker (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 226-231. 
235 CD IV/1, 34. See also ibid., 122. Barth also speaks about the “act of atonement made in Him.” 
Ibid., 131. See also ibid., 135. 
236 Barth stipulates that “in the being of Jesus Christ as such, is atonement.” CD IV/1, 126. The 
Swiss theologian argues that “the reconciliation of the world with God and the conversion of the world to 
God took place in Him. To that extent He Himself, His existence, is this reconciliation.” Ibid., 135. 
Likewise, Torrance maintains that “reconciliation takes place within the personal Being of the Mediator” or 
“within the incarnate constitution of his Person as Mediator.” Thomas F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984), 73. 
237 CD IV/1, 123. 
238 Barth emphasizes that “the reconciliation of the world with God takes place in the person of 
man” who “is also true God.” CD, IV/1, 130. 
239 CD II/2, 474. 




Christ is the subject (the Judge) and object (judged) of judgment. In his turn, Torrance 
enlarges the scope of the ontological reconciliation in Christ by regarding the incarnation 
as a “redeeming event.”241 The Scottish theologian stipulates that the atonement begins 
with the incarnation and finishes with the resurrection and ascension.242 According to this 
view, “the hypostatic union means such a union of the Son with our own human nature 
under the servitude of sin and judgment, that it is one long act of atoning and sanctifying 
reconciliation, in which he both judges our sin and enmity, and restores our human nature 
to its true relation with the Father and therefore to its perfect nature.”243 Therefore, 
Torrance conceives the atoning reconciliation as an act (not functions), but a long act that 
encompasses the entire life, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ. This idea of the 
incarnation as an atoning act (1) construes the “hypostatic union not simply in terms of a 
state of union, but in terms of a divine movement of grace,”244 and (2) stipulates (like 
Barth) that Christ sinlessly assumed “our fallen humanity.”245 According to these two 
                                                
241 Torrance, Incarnation, 82. The Scottish theologian conceives “reconciliation not simply in 
terms of Christ’s work on the cross, but in terms of his incarnation.” Ibid., 226. 
242 In his words, “even when we begin with his incarnation . . . we are beginning right away with 
the atonement, for his birth, as the beginning of his incarnate person, is one end of the atoning work, with 
the resurrection and ascension as the other end.” Ibid., 37. 
243 Ibid., 206. As Geroge Hunsinger emphasizes, in Torrance, “the incarnation reaches its 
fulfillment in the atonement.” George Hunsinger, The Eucharist and Ecumenism: Let Us Keep the Feast 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 150. 
244 Torrance, Incarnation, 215. 
245 Torrance claims, “If Jesus Christ did not assume our fallen flesh, our fallen humanity, then our 
fallen humanity is untouched by his work—for ‘the unassumed is the unredeemed’, as Gregory Nazianzen 
put it.” Ibid., 62. For the Scottish theologian, “If Christ assumed neutral or perfect human nature . . . then 
the humanity of Christ is merely instrumental in the hands of God.” Ibid., 212. At the same time, he affirms 
the sinlessness of the incarnate Christ, who “did not become flesh of our flesh in a sinful way, by sinning in 
the flesh.” Actually, “by remaining holy and sinless in our flesh, he condemned sin in the flesh he 
assumed.” Ibid., 63. The same emphasis on a fallen but not sinful human nature of Christ is found in Barth. 




premises, Torrance argues that “in the very act of assuming our flesh the Word sanctified 
and hallowed it, for the assumption of our sinful flesh is itself atoning and sanctifying 
action.”246 In other words, “in his holy assumption of our unholy humanity,” Christ’s 
“purity wipes away our impurity, his holiness covers our corruption.”247 Hence, the 
Scottish theologian advances the idea that God heals human nature by communicating 
grace through the incarnation (grace as ontological healing).248 
This ontological notion of atonement in Christ is associated with an ontological 
rather than functional conception of Christ’s threefold mediatorial office. Barth criticizes 
the traditional idea that this office refers to “three mediatorial functions” or “different 
stages in the course of the history of Jesus,”249 which has “the prophetic office at the first 
(Galilean) stage, the priestly at the second (the passion) and the kingly at the third (the 
exaltation).”250 Considering that the priestly and kingly offices in this scheme are 
characterized respectively by the humiliation (cross) and exaltation 
(resurrection/ascension) of Christ, Barth’s critique rejects the notion that the humiliation 
and exaltation of Christ are “two ‘states’ . . . which succeed one another.”251 Rather, 
Christ’s priestly humiliation and His kingly exaltation refer respectively to God’s self-
humiliation in Christ (emphasis: Christ as God) and to human beings exalted by God in 
                                                
246 Torrance, Incarnation, 63. 
247 Ibid., 82. 
248 Torrance points out that “the divine nature was able to save and redeem that which it assumed 
into oneness with itself.” He views “the assumption of our humanity” as “a sanctifying and healing act.” 
Ibid., 207-208. 
249 CD IV/3.1, 15. 




Christ (emphasis: Christ as man), where “humanity is exalted in Him by the humiliation 
of Godhead.”252 In this sense, the priestly office corresponds to the “Son of God who 
became what we are [incarnation], going into the far country, and as such He suffers as 
the Judge judged in our place [cross], as the High-priest offering Himself as the 
sacrifice,” while the kingly office describes the “Son of Man returning to His Father’s 
house and He acts as such, namely, as the royal man who is the object of the pure divine 
good-pleasure.”253 In this ontological interpretation, the priesthood of Christ is construed 
as events in God, particularly, the incarnation and the sacrifice at the cross. As a result of 
these events in God, human beings are exalted in the man Jesus Christ (Barth’s account 
of Christ’s kingly office). Special emphasis is given here to God as the agent of Christ’s 
priesthood (“the divine Agent”), meaning that Christ “is not an instrument of divine 
action” but “He acts Himself divinely.”254 In his turn, Torrance elaborates on the 
relationship between the incarnation and God’s priestly humiliation in Christ.255 To the 
notion that humiliation and exaltation are not “two events following one another,” he 
adds that such events take place “at the same time all through the incarnate life of 
Christ.”256 In this view, the incarnation itself is a “twofold movement” of humiliation and 
                                                
251 CD IV.1, 133. 
252 Ibid., 131. See also ibid., 145-146. 
253 CD IV.3.1, 275. 
254 CD I/2, 105-106. Barth argues that the human priests described in the OT “could only hint at 
this divine action.” Thus, “they all signify the divine Agent, i.e., God Himself humanly present, God’s own 
Son.” Ibid., 84. 
255 See the connection between Christ’s priesthood and His humiliation in Torrance, Incarnation, 
57. 
256 Torrance, Atonement, 210. For Andrew Burgess, Torrance’s account of Christ’s heavenly 





exaltation, constituting a “divine condescension and humiliation, in which the Son . . . 
took upon himself our alienated humanity,” and at the same time an exaltation of “our 
poor human being into healing communion with the life of God.”257 Following this 
perspective, the Scottish theologian believes that “Christ the mediator . . . bridges the 
chasm of hell in his own incarnate person, and not only in his bodily suffering.”258 
However, Torrance does not reduce reconciliation to the incarnation. As mentioned 
above, he views the incarnation as the beginning of the reconciliation, while the 
resurrection is its end. More specifically, the resurrection is “the completion of that 
saving work” and is related to the “ontological structure of the mediator himself.”259 I 
will explore the completion of the saving work in the discussion below regarding the 
actions of the priest, as in this section on the agent of the priesthood I focused on the 
person of Christ. 
In summary, the need of divine propitiation and the transformation of humanity 
are intimately associated with the person of Christ the priest, as these atoning 
reconciliatory events (that are not historical sequential acts) take place in His own being. 
In this ontological perspective, Christ is the priest who sacrifices (subject) Himself 
(object), which means that He is both the subject and the object of reconciliation. The 
priestly office means God’s self-humiliation in Christ, which includes the assumption of 
fallen humanity (incarnation) and the suffering on the cross (sacrifice). In this priestly 
                                                
between the Scottish theologian and Barth in this issue. Andrew Burgess, The Ascension in Karl Barth 
(Hampshire, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 125-133. 
257 Torrance, Incarnation, 206-207. 




self-humiliation, God is both the subject and the object of atoning reconciliation (the 
propitiation element). The priestly divine humiliation is followed by the exaltation of 
humanity (the transformation element), which takes place in the man Jesus Christ. For 
Torrance, this exaltation or transformation begins in the incarnation. These ideas will be 
further clarified in the depiction of the actions of the priest. 
The Actions of the Priest 
The emphasis of the ontological model on the being of Christ as the locus of the 
atoning reconciliation does not exclude an account of His actions as priest. However, 
these actions are intimately related to His person. The model attempts to ontologically 
integrate the person and work of Christ, His being and acting.260 In large measure, this 
integration is articulated by making the being of Christ the object of His own salvific 
action. Following this perspective, Christ’s threefold office refers not only to His actions, 
but particularly to His being or person. In this ontological understanding of the offices of 
Christ, Barth and Torrance tend to reject a division or sequentiality of functions or 
activities.261 The Scottish theologian even stipulates that the prophetic office is “part of 
                                                
259 Torrance, Atonement, 212. 
260 Barth attempts to explain “the action and work of Jesus Christ by His person and being,” and 
“His person and being by His action and work.” CD IV/3.1, 275. The Swiss theologian claims that Christ’s 
“being as a man is the whole of His action, suffering and achievement. His being as a man is His work.” 
CD III/2, 59. 
261 In his remarks on the humiliation and exaltation of Christ, Barth argues that “His one work . . . 
cannot be divided into different stages or periods of His existence, but . . . fills out and constitutes His 
existence in this twofold form.” CD IV/1, 133. Therefore, the Swiss theologian affirms that Christ’s work is 
one (without stages or periods), even though it has more than one form. Similarly, Torrance claims that the 
twofold movement of humiliation and exaltation “are not two acts, but one act,” a “‘downward’ movement 




the priestly office,”262 in the sense that the mediation of the word and the law of God (a 
prophetic work) is the primary activity of the priesthood and constitutes the basis for the 
liturgical mediation of the sacrifice, the second activity of the priesthood.263 In this view, 
as far as the priesthood of Christ is concerned, the mediation of the word refers to the 
Pauline emphasis on the atonement as the “expiation and justification before the word or 
law of God,” whereas the liturgical sacrificial mediation relates to the emphasis of 
Hebrews on the atonement as “Christ’s high priestly oblation of himself and his heavenly 
intercession.”264 Thus, the activities of the priesthood are understood under the concept of 
atonement, which includes judicial and liturgical aspects. In this understanding, Christ’s 
sacrificial death and His heavenly intercession are aspects of the liturgical sacrificial 
mediation. As I describe the actions of the priest, I will discuss the notion of judicial and 
liturgical mediation and then the ideas of sacrifice and heavenly intercession. 
The distinction between judicial (word/law) and liturgical or cultic (sacrifice) 
mediation in the ontological model is not strict. According to Barth, there is a 
correspondence between them, even though the judicial imagery better explains the work 
of Christ.265 Despite the importance of the cultic imagery in the biblical materials 
                                                
262 Torrance, Atonement, 59. 
263 For Torrance, the mediation of the word of God is the primary function of the OT priest 
because “the priestly function of Aaron [liturgical mediation of sacrifice] was in dependence upon the 
priestly function of Moses in mediating the word and law of God.” In this sense, “the word and law were 
primary, the sacrificial liturgy was secondary.” The Scottish theologian even suggests that the tension 
between prophets and priests in several parts of the OT was actually a conflict between the law/word and 
sacrifice/liturgy, where “the priestly element sought to make itself independent of the mediating word given 
in the law” Ibid., 63. See also ibid., 17. 
264 Ibid., 73. 
265 Even though Barth clearly chooses the judicial or forensic framework for his treatment of the 
work of Christ, he acknowledges the possibility, in principle, of using other frameworks. Under the 





(particularly Hebrews, but also present in Pauline and Johannine writings),266 the Swiss 
theologian considers it distant from the modern world, more difficult, less clear, and less 
comprehensive than the forensic imagery.267 In his preference for the forensic imagery, 
Barth attempts to highlight similarities between the cultic and forensic imageries, as long 
as he can observe points in the former that correspond to the latter.268 Overall, he 
emphasizes two common points: (1) as judge or priest, Christ takes the place of man,269 
and (2) receiving the judgment as judge or being the sacrifice as priest, the work of 
                                                
explained through “other lines of approximation” besides the “forensic imagery,” such as imageries like 
financial/ransom, military/victory over the devil. CD IV/1, 274. Nevertheless, the Swiss theologian thinks 
that these two imageries are not comprehensive (logically and exegetically) enough to provide a proper 
framework for the systematic construction of the doctrine of the atonement. See ibid. 
266 In Barth’s estimation, the cultic framework belongs to “the most primitive Christianity,” has 
“great nearness to the” OT, and its language is very significant in the NT, especially the expressions “lamb 
of God” and “His blood.” In fact, the account of Christ’s priesthood in older Protestant dogmatics is an 
attempt to elaborate the work of Christ according to the cultic framework. Ibid. For a helpful study on 
Barth’s use of the cultic framework in comparison with the forensic framework, see John L. Drury, “The 
Priest Sacrificed in Our Place: Karl Barth’s Use of the Cultic Imagery of Hebrews in Church Dogmatics 
IV/1, §59.2,” (Paper presented at the 1st Annual Barth Conference, Thy Word is Truth: Reading Scripture 
Theologically with Karl Barth, Princeton Theological Seminary, May 21-24, 2006), 
http://www.drurywriting.com/john/The_Priest_Sacrificed_in_Our_Place.pdf (accessed 30 December, 
2016). 
267 CD IV/1, 275. Barth refers to the cultic framework as a “material which is already difficult 
would have been made even more difficult by trying to understand it in a form which is now rather remote 
from us.” The Swiss theologian believes that, by formulating the work of Christ from the perspective of the 
forensic framework, his approach enables us “to see the matter better and more distinctly and more 
comprehensively . . . than would have been possible even at the very best if we had committed ourselves 
radically to a cultic view.” An example of such weaknessess of the cultic framework is the difficulty of the 
older dogmatics in their exposition of the priesthood of Christ, which “at their heart slip into forensic 
notions,” as “they did not bring out the specific features on the cultic standpoint and terminology.” Ibid. 
268 According to Barth, the fact that he did not choose the cultic framework “need not prevent us 
from now trying briefly to see and test from this different standpoint, which is so very important in New 
Testament thinking, the knowledge which we have gained in the framework of this other outlook.” Ibid. 
The Swiss theologian presents the following correspondence between the two frameworks: (1) “Jesus 
Christ took our place as Judge”—“He is the Priest who represented us,” (ibid) (2) He took our place as the 
judged and (3) He was judged in our place—“He gave Himself to be offered up as a sacrifice to take away 
our sins,” (ibid., 277) and (4) He acted justly in our place—“in our place He has made a perfect sacrifice. 
He who as the perfect Priest took the place of all human priests, by offering Himself” (ibid., 281). 




reconciliation was finished in Christ, in the sense that it took place in Him.270 Hence, 
Christ the priest accomplished His work for us in a “single action” that is “effective once 
and for all . . . with His entry into the innermost tabernacle, the Holiest of Holies of God 
Himself.”271 This correspondence of the two imageries implies that Barth interprets the 
action of Christ the priest on the basis of his forensic conception. While Torrance sees the 
judicial or forensic mediation as part (the primary part) of Christ’s priesthood—
atonement as justification before God’s law, the Swiss theologian conceptualizes the 
priesthood of Christ in the liturgical or cultic imageries, which is different, although 
correspondent and somehow dependent on the forensic imageries.272 I have used the term 
imagery in this paragraph because they do not seem to have in themselves ontological 
bearing as the action in the being of God. They are only images of, or pointers to, a 
transcendent reality.   
                                                
270 Ibid., 283. 
271 Ibid., 276. 
272 In other words, the primacy of the judicial mediation in Torrance means that this mediation is 
the primary activity of Christ as priest, whereas in Barth this primacy implies that the judicial mediation is 
not part of the priestly activity per se but conceptually informs the understanding of that activity. In fact, 
Torrance’s distinction between judicial and liturgical mediations in Christ’s priesthood is somehow unclear. 
If the liturgical mediation involves Christ’s sacrifice and heavenly intercession, what is exactly the content 
of the judicial mediation? Would not the judicial mediation be materially characterized by His sacrifice on 
the cross? If so, would not this mediation be identical to the liturgical sacrificial mediation? If the answer to 
this question is negative, on the grounds that both the judicial mediation and the liturgical mediation refer 
to the cross but using different languages or frameworks to interpret this event, then we come to Barth’s 
position, who does not see the judicial mediation as a priestly activity per se. With this implication in mind, 
as far as Torrance’s account of Christ’s priestly activities is concerned, I will focus my description below 
on what he calls liturgical mediation. In regards to Barth, his position that the saving work of Christ can be 
described by different frameworks or imageries, among them the cultic framework, ultimately implies that 
Christ acting as priest is only “another symbolical representation of the atonement.” Ibid., 275. Barth 
argues that this “image indicates the fact. But the fact is greater and more powerful than the image. It 
necessarily transcends it.” Ibid. I doubt that, by using the language of symbolic representation, the Swiss 
theologian is suggesting that the notion of Christ acting like a priest goes beyond (which is the idea of 
going beyond, being greater, and transcending) any human idea of Christ as priest. In fact, the language of 
symbolic representation seems to imply that, in reality, Christ is not a priest. In this case, priesthood would 




Regarding the ideas of sacrifice and heavenly intercession in the ontological 
model, the single act of sacrifice is the key concept of the action of Christ the priest in the 
ontological model. Informed by Hebrews that the main priestly function is to offer 
sacrifice,273 Barth interprets Christ’s priesthood in terms of a substitutionary sacrifice that 
happened in Him at the cross, and this is the climax of His single and complete priestly 
action.274 Likewise, as mentioned above, Torrance conceives the priesthood of Christ as a 
liturgical sacrificial mediation that includes His heavenly intercession. For him, sacrifice 
and intercession are a single act performed by Christ the priest, not two activities. In 
contrast to the two sequential priestly activities of the offering of sacrifice and the 
intercession performed in the OT sanctuary, there is only “one act in the incarnate person 
of Christ” because He is “both the lamb and the priest.”275 Therefore, Christ’s life and 
sacrifice has an intercessory character.276 In the ontological model, the one act of Christ 
the priest corresponds to Him as one person, the locus of the atoning activity.277  
The concept of sacrifice in this model can be described by three basic 
characteristics: (1) obedient suffering, (2) divine action, and (3) destruction of sin. First, 
as priest and victim (sacrifice), Christ is the obedient servant who undergoes the path of 
                                                
273 Ibid., 277. 
274 These are the key points I mentioned above, at the end of my description of Barth’s 
correspondence between the forensic and cultic frameworks. 
275 Torrance, Atonement, 93. 
276 Torrance affirms, “In high priestly intercession Jesus Christ offered himself in sacrifice.” Ibid., 
67. The Scottish theologian sees intercession in “the actual historical events of the life and passion of 
Christ.” Torrance, Royal Priesthood, 12. 
277 As Torrance emphasizes, “Once and for all Christ sacrificed himself presented himself before 
God as our sacrifice thus entering into the presence of God as our advocate and mediator to be accepted by 
him. It is all one indivisible act in one indivisible person. . . . the atonement in act is identical with Christ 




suffering.278 According to Torrance, this is the obedience of man to God279 and 
encompasses Christ’s death (passive obedience) and His incarnate life (active 
obedience).280 This means that, in a broad sense, the active obedience of Christ in His life 
is part of the priestly sacrifice.281 Thus, the principle of substitution is not restricted to 
Christ’s death, but is already at work in the incarnation,282 and the obedience of His life 
substitutes the disobedience of human beings. According to this perspective, Christ’s 
whole life is a sacrifice that reaches its completion on the cross.283 In other words, 
Christ’s life (and not only death) is a substitutionary sacrifice. Second, while the idea of 
obedience highlights the human activity of the priest, the ontological model sees Christ’s 
sacrifice as a divine activity.284 Torrance stipulates that this sacrifice is a transcendent 
                                                
278 See CD I/1, 387. See also CD IV/1, 143; Torrance, Incarnation, 57. 
279 For Torrance, “the whole incarnate life of Jesus is” a “priestly representation and obedience 
from the side of man to God.” Torrance, Incarnation, 147. 
280 Torrance claims that Christ performed “expiation through his obedient submission to God in 
life and death.” Ibid., 77. Drawing from Calvin’s idea that the obedience of Christ pays the price of 
salvation and from the concept in Reformed theology of the passive and active obedience of Christ, the 
Scottish theologian points out that “the whole course of Christ’s active obedience is absolutely integral to 
his work of reconciliation, and that atonement cannot be limited to his passive obedience, that is to his 
passive submission to the penalty for our sin inflicted upon him in his death.” Ibid., 80-81. Torrance 
stipulates that Christ’s passive and active obedience corresponds respectively to the forensic justification 
(external, non-imputation of sins) and the communion (internal, sharing in His human righteousness) of 
human beings with Christ’s resurrected life. Ibid., 81-82. 
281 Torrance sees the “work of the cross . . . beginning immediately after his [Christ’s] birth, 
increasing in his growth into manhood, and deepening in intensity as he entered his public ministry. His 
whole life is his passion.” Ibid., 110; italics mine. 
282 In his description of the movement of redemption, Torrance emphasizes “God coming to man 
in order to restore man to God, of God taking man’s place in order to give man God’s place—the principle 
of substitution and the principle of incarnation.” Ibid., 40. 
283 Torrance argues that God’s condemnatory judgment on Christ “takes place supremely on the 
cross, but the cross reveals what was taking place all the time in the incarnate life of the Son.” Ibid., 112. 
He adds that God executes His judgment “in the incarnate life of Jesus, and above all in his death.” Ibid., 
150. 





event in God,285 as He bears the sins of the world.286 Similarly, Barth affirms that God 
condemns and at the same time assumes the condemnation.287 Third, the idea of sacrifice 
does not emphasize punishment,288 but the elimination of sin/evil through the destruction 
of the person.289 In Barth’s words, in the substitutionary sacrifice of Christ on the cross, 
                                                
human action—obedience and sacrifice—is seen as a response to the divine action), as in the incarnation 
“one person acts both from the side of God, and from the side of man.” Ibid., 184, 186. 
285 According to Torrance, “The sacrifice of the Son on earth derives from and remains one with a 
transcendent sacrifice in God.” Speaking of the “‘lamb slain before the foundation of the world,’” the 
Scottish theologian argues that the “the atonement begins in the will of the Son to become man,” and that 
“the historical crucifixion is grounded in a transcendent act of pure grace . . . although the transcendent act 
of self-giving and self-humbling fulfils itself in our human estate, in the death of the cross, it does not cease 
to be transcendent act.” Ibid., 75. 
286 For Torrance, “it is God in Christ who suffers and bears the sin of the world, and reconciles the 
world to himself.” He adds, “If the deity of Christ is denied, then the cross becomes a terrible monstrosity.” 
Ibid., 189. 
287 According to Barth, in Christ God made “His own not only the guilt of man but also his 
rejection and condemnation, giving Himself to bear the divinely righteous consequences of human sin, not 
merely affirming the divine sentence on man, but allowing it to be fulfilled on Himself.” CD IV/1, 175. As 
Garry Williams highlights, for Barth, the atonement is “a reflexive act, an event in which God acts upon 
himself.” Garry J. Williams, “Barth’s Doctrine of the Atonement,” in Engaging with Barth: Contemporary 
Evangelical Critiques, ed. David Gibson and Daniel Strange (New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 241. 
288 Even though Barth indicates that punishment is “not completely rejected,” this is not the main 
point. CD IV/1, 253. Similarly, Torrance avoids the idea of Christ being punished by the Father. According 
to his reading of the NT, “the whole concept of propitiation together with that of wrath, judgement and 
forgiveness is drawn into the personal Father-Son relationship,” and “the notion of priesthood” is 
“anchored deep in the personal and family relationship between God and his people.” In fact, the NT 
“speaks of the penal-substitutionary aspect of atonement, not in the detached forensic categories that have 
developed in the Latin west . . . but in terms of the intimacy of the Father-Son relation.” In this way, 
agreeing with John McLeod Campbell, the Scottish theologian assumes that “we cannot think of Christ 
being punished by the Father in our place and the New Testament nowhere uses the word kolazo, punish, of 
the relation between the Father and the Son.” Torrance, Atonement, 72. 
289 For Barth, the main idea of Christ’s sacrifice is “not that He has suffered what we ought to have 
suffered,” even though “this is true,” but that “in His own person He has made an end of us as sinners and 
therefore of sin itself by going to death as the One who took our place as sinners. In His person He has 
delivered up us sinners and sin itself to destruction. He has removed us sinners and sin, negated us, 
cancelled us out: ourselves, our sin, and the accusation, condemnation and perdition.” Therefore, “not by 
suffering our punishment as such, but in the deliverance of sinful man and sin itself to destruction, which 
He accomplished when He suffered our punishment, He has on the other side blocked the source of our 
destruction.” In short, in the passion of Christ God “attacks and destroys at its very root the primary evil in 
the world.” CD IV/1, 253-254. Similarly, Torrance argues that “in the incarnate life of Jesus, and above all 
in his death, God does not execute his judgment on evil simply by smiting it violently away . . . but by 




“His person made an end of us as sinners.”290 In the light of Christ’s resurrection, this 
destruction is followed by the creation of a new humanity.291 In short, the ontological 
model describes Christ’s sacrifice as the substitutionary human obedience of His life 
(Torrance) and death, as a transcendent event in God in which He assumes the 
condemnation of human beings, and as the destruction of evil in humanity that allows 
their re-creation. 
The understanding of Christ’s heavenly intercession in the ontological model 
presupposes that His reconciliatory work was finished/completed in His death and 
resurrection.292 In this substitutionary death, sinful human beings were condemned and 
destructed, and in Christ’s resurrection they have been re-created as a new humanity.293 
                                                
290 CD IV/1, 253. As Williams indicates, for Barth, there is a “primacy of the destruction of sin 
over punishment,” where “the punishment of sin is a means to another, higher end, the termination of sinful 
man and his replacement by the new man constituted in Jesus Christ.” Therefore, “although Barth affirms 
the idea of satisfaction, it is not the divine hostility to sin that is satisfied, for God does not require 
retribution for sin to himself and his own justice. Rather, the divine love is satisfied by the destruction of 
sinful man through the cross.” Williams, “Barth’s Doctrine of the Atonement,” 243, 246. According to 
Donald Bloesch, in Barth, “what occurs in the cross is more than the defeat of sin and the vindication of 
righteousness: there sin is removed from the life of man and replaced by righteousness.” Hence, “Barth 
does not break completely with the traditional understanding of substitution,” but he “sees in the event of 
the atonement not simply the removal of the penalty of sin but the renewal of the world.” Donald G. 
Bloesch, Jesus Is Victor!: Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Salvation (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2001), 50-52. 
291 Barth indicates that the divine judgment in Christ “brought in a new man, founded a new world 
and inaugurated a new æon—and all this in His passion.” CD IV/1, 254. The Swiss theologian argues that 
“the suffering and death of Jesus Christ are the No of God in and with which He again takes up and asserts 
in man’s space and time the Yes to man which He has determined and pronounced in eternity.” Ibid., 257. 
Torrance stipulates that “man’s wrong has been set aside in and with the judgment accomplished upon the 
humanity of Christ, and now in his humanity our new right humanity has been established before God.” 
Torrance, Incarnation, 186. 
292 As Torrance points out, Christ’s resurrection means “the completion of” His “saving work.” 
Torrance, Atonement, 212. Barth talks about Christ’s “finished work of reconciliation,” which was 
“finished in Him.” CD IV/1, 283. Horton argues that, for Barth, “everything that happens on this side of 
Golgotha” is not necessary “for human salvation per se.” Michael S. Horton, “Covenant, Election, and 
Incarnation: Evaluating Barth’s Actualist Christology,” in Karl Barth and American Evangelicalism (Grand 
Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2011), 139. 
293 According to Barth, in “the sentence executed and revealed in Jesus Christ and His death and 





In contrast to the sacramental and functional models, there is no further subjective 
salvific application to individual human beings of the reconciliation objectively 
accomplished by Christ. In Him, their reconciliation is achieved and salvifically 
appropriated.294 Barth argues that the death and resurrection of Christ did not create a 
possibility of salvation that needs to be appropriated by human beings.295 Because the 
person of Christ is the locus of atoning reconciliation and the material content of the 
atonement, human reconciliation is already a reality in Him—there is nothing to be 
further salvifically appropriated.296 This position raises the question of how the heavenly 
                                                
reconciles” them “with Himself. He does it by the destruction of the old and the creation of a new man.” 
CD IV/1, 96. The Swiss theologian claims that Christ “was justified by God in His resurrection from the 
dead. He was justified as man, and in Him as the Representative of all men all were justified.” Ibid., 305-
306. Likewise, Torrance believes that the resurrection of Christ means that “we have the new humanity in 
perfect union with God.” Torrance, Incarnation, 195. The Scottish theologian argues that “our resurrection 
has already taken place and is already fully tied up with the resurrection of Christ.” Torrance, Atonement, 
208. 
294 Torrance affirms that Christ “was at once the fulfilled act of reconciliation on the part of God 
toward man, but he was also the fulfilled appropriation of that reconciliation on the part of man toward 
God.” Torrance, Incarnation, 126. The Scottish theologian stipulates that “Christ must be recognised as 
acting in our place in all the basic acts of man’s response to God: in faith and repentance, in obedience and 
prayer, in receiving God’s blessing and in thanksgiving for it.” Thomas F. Torrance, “Karl Barth and the 
Latin Heresy,” Scottish Journal of Theology 39, no. 4 (1986): 479. Torrance states, Christ “has believed for 
you, fulfilled your human response to God, even made your personal decision for you, so that he 
acknowledges you before God as one who as already responded to God in him.” Torrance, The Mediation 
of Christ, 94. For helpful information on Torrance’s rejection of the traditional ordo salutis, characterized 
by a sequence of salvation accomplished and salvation applied, see James J. Cassidy, “T. F. Torrance’s 
Realistic Soteriological Objectivism and the Elimination of Dualisms: Union with Christ in Current 
Perspective,” Mid-America Journal of Theology 19 (2008): 165-194; Elmer M. Colyer, How to Read T.F. 
Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology (Downers Grove, IL; Eugene, OR: 
InterVarsity; Wipf and Stock, 2007), 218-219; Kye Won Lee, Living in Union with Christ: The Practical 
Theology of Thomas F. Torrance (New York: Peter Lang, 2003), 214; Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance, 178; 
Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, 125-129. 
295 Barth rejects the idea that the objective reconciliation of Christ created a possibility that needs 
to become a subjective actuality. He is against the distinction between objective and subjective, or 
possibility and actuality in the atonement. See CD IV/1, 285. In his view, the “participation of ours in the 
person and work of Jesus Christ does not have to be added as a second thing. As the one thing which has to 
be done it is already wholly and utterly accomplished in Him.” CD II/1, 157-158. Similarly, Torrance 
argues that Christ’s work is “a finished work and not a mere possibility.” Torrance, Atonement, 188. See 
also ibid., 187, 189. 





intercession of Christ is understood in the ontological model. In contrast to the traditional 
idea of an intercession that applies salvation to human beings,297 the heavenly 
intercession is interpreted along the lines of a full and eternal reality of reconciliation in 
Christ that is somehow accessible to earthly human beings. For the Swiss theologian, the 
ascension means that Christ, the ontological reality of human complete reconciliation, 
becomes contemporary to all times and to all human beings.298 In his turn, the Scottish 
theologian attempts to elaborate more on the heavenly priesthood of Christ299 and, 
                                                
in Him, that in and with Him we, too, are there as those for whom He is and has acted.” CD IV.1, 285. 
297 Barth criticizes the account of the priesthood of Christ in “older dogmatics” for the distinction 
between the person/work of Christ and the application of His work to human beings (applicatio salutis). 
For him, this idea of application implies the wrong notion that something needs to be added to the once for 
all work of Christ. CD IV/1, 314. As Williams explains, in Barth, “the work of Christ is not . . . something 
external, which is then applied to the sinner. . . . Rather, the sinner is included within the objective work of 
Christ.” Williams, “Barth’s Doctrine of the Atonement,” 249. 
298 According to Barth, Christ “stands before His Father now in eternity for us, and lives for us in 
God Himself as the Son of God He was and is and will be. Thus our appropriation of what He has won for 
us has not first to be executed by us. By the fact that He is for us in eternity in God Himself the man who is 
ready for God, it is executed in eternity, in God Himself, by Him, in the eternal continuation of His high-
priestly office.” He adds, “It is not another work that begins at this point, a work that will have to be ours.” 
In fact, “this representing of Jesus Christ is an eternal representing and therefore one which is 
contemporary to all time.” CD II/1, 156; italics mine. 
299 Torrance reports that, in a conversation with Barth, he expressed his qualms regarding the 
“account of the ascended Jesus Christ in CD IV/3, in which Christ seemed to be swallowed up in the 
transcendent Light and Spirit of God, so that the humanity of the risen Jesus appeared to be displaced by 
what he called ‘the humanity of God’ in his turning toward us. I had confessed to being astonished not to 
find at that point in Barth’s exposition a careful account of the priestly ministry of the ascended Jesus in 
accordance with the teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews about the heavenly intercession of the ascended 
Christ, which would have been fully consonant with Barth’s anticipatory references to the high-priestly 
ministry of Christ in CD IV/1 (cf. ‘The Verdict of the Father’) and with his persistent emphasis on the 
vicarious humanity of Christ.” Thomas F. Torrance, “My Interaction with Karl Barth,” in How Karl Barth 
Changed My Mind, ed. Donald K. McKim (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1986), 62; italics mine. Building 
on Torrance’s criticism, Douglas Farrow also disapproves Barth’s “unfortunate neglect of the priestly 
office.” Douglas Farrow, “Karl Barth on the Ascension: An Appreciation and Critique,” International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 2, no. 2 (2000): 143. See also Douglas Farrow, “Ascension and 
Atonement,” in The Theology of Reconciliation, ed. Colin E. Gunton (London; New York: T&T Clark, 
2003), 68-82; Douglas Farrow, Ascension and Ecclesia: On the Significance of the Doctrine of the 
Ascension for Ecclesiology and Christian Cosmology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 229-254. For a 
depiction of how Farrow expands Torrance’s critique, see Burgess, The Ascension in Karl Barth, 109-161. 
In light of his criticism, Torrance attempts to elaborate more on the heavenly priesthood of Christ. His 





likewise Barth, his reflection is related to the notion of time. According to Torrance, the 
ascended humanity of Christ is the content of the prayers and worship of earthly believers 
directed to God in heaven.300 This view assumes a close connection between Christ the 
heavenly priest and the eucharist in the church.301 Two points, however, nuance this 
connection. First, while Christ is described in His “eternal advocacy of us or intercession 
                                                
and blessing/benediction. First, the “endless self-oblation” of His ascended humanity before the Father is 
qualified by Christ’s “self-offering to the Father” in the ascension, a “thank-offering or tribute which we 
offer to the King of Kings.” In this view, the person of Christ is the ontological “content and sole reality of 
the worship and prayer of man,” and in this sense He is “the eternal leader of our prayer and intercession,” 
which means that the worship of the church is an echo of this priestly intercession. Second, the “ontological 
content” of Christ’s “eternal intercession or advocacy for us” is the “whole existence of the incarnate Son” 
in the indivisibility of His person and act. Third, the worship of the church is characterized by a 
communion (koinonia) with Christ through the distribution of the spiritual gifts that takes place in the 
celebration of the Lord’s Supper. In other words, Christ the priest blesses the church with the Spirit and 
then believers become participants of His priesthood in terms of their service to Him. Torrance, Space, 
Time and Resurrection, 115-118; Torrance, Atonement, 277. In Burgess’ estimation, even though Torrance 
uses more of the language and concepts of Christ’s ascended priesthood, the outcome of this theology is not 
much different from Barth. Indeed, “considering the nature of his criticism of Barth, Torrance’s treatment 
of Jesus’ ascended high priesthood is remarkably brief.” He adds, “Torrance’s treatment of Jesus’ endless 
self-offering” is not much different from Barth’s emphasis that the “entirety of Jesus’ life is a self-
offering.” Burgess, The Ascension in Karl Barth, 122. Burgess concludes, “It is hard . . . to see how this 
goes beyond Barth in achieving any insight into Jesus’ ascended agency on our behalf.” Ibid., 117. See also 
ibid., 119. 
300 For Torrance, Christ is the real and complete content of the worship of humankind. Christ’s the 
priest “became our brother man and He offered on our behalf a human obedience, a human response, a 
human witness and a human amen, so that in Him our human answer to God in life, worship, and prayer is 
already completed.” Torrance, Royal Priesthood, 14. 
301 The Scottish theologian stipulates that the eucharist “represents” Christ’s “advocacy and prayer 
for us.” Considering that the eucharist is the focus of Torrrance’s account of the worship of the church in 
connection with the priestly intercession of Christ, the he argues that the eucharist, “while being the 
worship of men on earth, is essentially a participation in the worship of the heavenly sanctuary which Jesus 
Christ their ascended High Priest renders to the Father in the oblation of his endless life.” Torrance, 
Theology in Reconciliation, 110. In this sense, “the risen and glorified Lord comes to meet us and gives 
himself to us that we, united with him through communion in his body and blood, may be lifted up with 
him into the holiest in the power of his resurrection and exaltation, and worship the Father with, in and 
through him.” Ibid., 121. Therefore, Torrance believes that “we worship the Father through the priesthood 
of the Son” Ibid., 111. This is different from worshipping the Father through the priesthood of the divine 
Son, and therefore requires the human mediation of Christ in heavenly prayer and worship to God (by 
definition, the divine Christ does not pray and worship God). Ibid., 116. The Scottish theologian criticizes 
the theological trend initiated after the Arian crisis of the fourth century that, by emphasizing the divinity of 
Christ, assimilated “the mediatorship of Christ to his Lordship, and a Priesthood interpreted in terms of his 




on our behalf,”302 this description does not imply another salvific act performed by Him 
in heaven. Rather, what Christ did once and for all on earth is, through His resurrection 
and ascension, an “enduring event” that is “continuously operative” and “eternally valid 
before the Father,” meaning that His salvific action on earth is “decisive for all time.”303 
Second, in contrast to the sacramental model, the eucharist is not identical with the 
priesthood of the heavenly Christ.304 For Torrance, the former is derivative305 or an echo 
of the latter through the communion (koinonia) established by the Spirit.306 With this idea 
of derivation in mind, the Scottish theologian argues that in the eucharist believers 
become participants of Christ’s priesthood.307 These two assumptions—(1) the content of 
                                                
302 Thomas F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement in the Church, 2 vols. (London: Lutterworth 
Press, 1960), 2:144. 
303 Ibid., 2:144, 158, 180. The Scottish theologian argues that “the very existence of Christ among 
us, his life, work, crucifixion, resurrection, are all modes of his divine-human intercession.” Torrance, 
Space, Time and Resurrection, 115-116. 
304 Torrance stipulates that “Christ’s Priesthood and the Church’s priesthood cannot be spoken of 
in univocal terms any more than Christ’s sacrifice and the eucharistic sacrifice.” Torrance, Conflict and 
Agreement in the Church, 2:195. Based on this assumption, Torrance believes that the problem of 
Catholicism is the univocal understanding of sacrifice and offering of God and the church. Ibid., 2:180. 
305 For Torrance, the eucharist is the “sacramental counterpart to the unique sacrifice of Christ” in 
the sense that the eucharist “echoes” it and “is derivative from it.” Ibid., 2:180. In this sense, “what the 
Eucharist proclaims is not our offering but Christ’s offering on our behalf, which only in that derivative 
way becomes our offering.” Ibid., 2:183. 
306 According to Torrance, “The reconciliation wrought by Christ has been completed once and for 
all and by its very nature cannot be repeated, but it is given a counterpart in the worship and adoration and 
confession of the church in the form of the eucharistic prayer and praise echoing the heavenly intercession 
of Christ.” Torrance, Atonement, 91; italics mine. In his remarks on “Christ’s royal priestly ministry,” the 
Scottish theologian maintains that “the church’s communion in the body and blood of Christ through the 
Spirit,” which is associated with the distribution of spiritual gifts, is an “echo the one priesthood of Christ.” 
Ibid., 277. Furthermore, he mentions that “the Church in its eucharistic liturgy does not participate in that 
sacrifice except by echoing it in the counter-sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving.” Torrance adds, “The 
earthly liturgy . . . echoes the heavenly,” and the “liturgy of heaven centres in the Self-presentation of the 
Lamb of God before the Father.” Torrance, Royal Priesthood, 95-96. See also Torrance, Space, Time and 
Resurrection, 118. 
307 For Torrance, the church “is sacramentally and analogically derivative from” Christ’s heavenly 
priesthood in the eucharist. “There in heaven is the ascended Lamb Himself ever before the Face of the 





Christ’s heavenly priestly intercession is the eternity of His once and for all salvific 
action, and (2) the eucharist is derived but not identical to His heavenly priesthood—
allow Torrance to delineate an interplay between new creation and old creation, which 
presupposes in the ontological model a respective distinction between new time and 
fallen time,308 where the reality of the new creation irrupts in the midst of old creation in 
the context of the eucharist.309 In this view, the eucharistic prayers and worship of 
believers310 are replaced by the prayer and worship of the new humanity of new creation 
(the ascended Christ in His humanity),311 as the eucharist offers a taste of new creation in 
Christ, confirming the enduring reality of new creation to believers surrounded by the 
                                                
sacrifice.” And “both are united in the koinonia of the eternal Spirit, through whom Christ offered Himself 
to the Father, and through whom we are given to participate in that oblation made on our behalf.” The 
Scottish theologian adds, “That is the profound mystery of Holy Communion, that the Church is given to 
participate (koinonein) in Christ’s substitutionary Self-consecration.” Torrance, Conflict and Agreement in 
the Church, 2:178. See further comments on the idea of participation depicted in the previous footnote. 
308 As Torrance indicates, “just as the original creation involved the creation of time, so this new 
creation involves new time, time that is no longer at variance with the eternal through sin, but time that is 
cleansed and restored to union with the eternal.” Ibid., 2:162. 
309 According to Torrance, “In this Supper the Church is given to taste and experience already the 
powers of the age to come; it is essentially a prelude to the new creation.” Ibid., 2:139. In other words, to 
participate in the eucharist is to “taste the powers of the age to come through sacramental incorporation into 
the new creation.” Ibid., 2:160. In this sense, the Scottish theologian sees the church as an eschatological 
reality in the eucharist. In his words, “in the Eucharist . . . the Church really becomes the Church, both as 
the ontological and eschatological reality.” Ibid., 2:189. 
310 Torrance defines the eucharist as “essentially a prayer and hymn of thanksgiving.” Ibid., 2:148. 
311 Torrance argues that “the worship and ministry of the Church on earth must be governed by the 
fact that Christ substitutes himself in our place, and that our humanity with its own acts of worship, is 
displaced by his, so that we appear before God not in our own name . . . but solely in the name of Christ 
and solely in virtue of what he has done in our name and on our behalf.” Thomas F. Torrance, Theology in 
Reconstruction (London: SCM Press, 1965), 167; italics mine. The Scottish theologian adds that “Christ's 
high-priestly prayer recorded in John 17 is perpetual in its virtue and ever obtains mercy for us in the 
presence of His Father; it is that intercession of Christ that stands behind our prayer when we approach God 
in the Name of Christ and plead His passion on our behalf, and offer ourselves to Him as sinners whom 




earthly conditions of old creation.312 Both Barth’s idea of the ascended Christ becoming 
contemporary to all times and Torrance’s notion of new creation in Christ becoming 
particularly tasted in the eucharist are further clarified by the concept of time and eternity 
in the ontological model, which will be explored in chapter three. 
In summary, the ontological model interprets the cultic activity of Christ the priest 
in the light of a judicial conception: His sacrifice (cultic) is substitutionary (judicial). The 
basic idea of this substitutionary sacrifice is not punishment, but the elimination of sin by 
the destruction of sinners in the death of Christ, which is followed by the actual re-
creation of human beings in His resurrection. This understanding of Christ’s death and 
resurrection assumes that He is the object of His own salvific action. Under the 
assumption that His one person corresponds to one action, Christ’s single priestly action 
is His sacrifice. This single action includes His whole life and death (Torrance), is an 
event in God, and has an intercessory character. Since Christ is the object of His own 
salvific action, the reconciliatory work was completed with His resurrection. Christ’s 
death and resurrection did not create a possibility of salvation that would become actual 
in a subsequent subjective application to individual human beings. This implies that the 
(post-resurrection) heavenly intercession of Christ is not another salvific action. As the 
complete reality of reconciliation, the resurrected person Christ is 
contemporary/accessible to all times (Barth) and is the human ontological content of new 
creation tasted in the eucharist (Torrance). 
I will conclude my depiction of the ontological model in this chapter by turning to 
                                                
312 According to Torrance, “The significance of eucharistic communion lies in the fact that by the 





the goal of Christ’s priesthood. 
The Goal of the Priesthood 
On the basis of the description above, the priesthood of Christ is necessary 
because of the existential broken relationship between humankind and God since the 
beginning of creation, which requires that Christ’s priestly mediation propitiate the divine 
wrath and provide the transformation of human beings. In this mediation, He is both the 
subject and object of the priesthood. The reconciliation Christ performs (subject) takes 
place in His own being (object).313 A distinct point of this mediation is that Christ’s 
substitutionary sacrifice is a means for the elimination of sin/evil by the destruction of 
sinners in His death, followed by the re-creation of human beings in His resurrection.314 
In this context, there is no further subjective application of salvation to individual human 
                                                
Conflict and Agreement in the Church, 2:187. 
313 In Him, both God and human beings are subjects and objects of His priesthood. In Christ, God 
humiliates Himself (subject) and is propitiated (object). In Christ, humanity is destroyed and re-
created/exalted (object), and renders to God obedience and worship (subject—Torrance’s emphasis). 
Torrance sees Christ’s obedience and worship, among other acts, as the “fulfilled response of men toward 
God.” Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection, 115. This emphasis on the active role of Christ’s humanity 
in His priesthood seems to be considered by some commentators as a corrective to Barth’s lack of 
reflection on the human priesthood of Christ. Alan Torrance stipulates that Barth left the theme of Christ’s 
priesthood underdeveloped, and this is evidenced by a lack of depth in his reflection on the sacraments and 
on the relationship between Christ’s vicarious humanity in His continuing priesthood and the theology of 
worship. Alan Torrance, “The Trinity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John B. Webster 
(Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 82-83. Likewise, Colin Gunton argues 
that Barth does not give a proper treatment to Christ’s continuing human priesthood. Colin E. Gunton, 
“Salvation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John B. Webster (Cambridge, UK; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 153, 157. In fact, Thomas Torrance makes a similar point when 
he claims that, in Barth, “the humanity of the risen Jesus” seems “to be swallowed up” by His divinity. 
Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 
134. 
314 As Barth puts it, “Reconciliation is a comprehensive occurrence, embracing many in the One in 
whom it was made.” CD IV/1, 251. He adds, “The resurrection of Jesus Christ affirms that which is actual 




beings,315 but rather access to the full and eternal reality of reconciliation in Christ, who 
is contemporaneous (divine eternity) to every individual in His revelation (Barth), and 
that can be tasted in the eucharist (Torrance).316  
In this way, the goal of reconciliation in this model of Christ’s priesthood is 
qualified by Barth’s notion of revelation (Christ’s prophetic office) and by Torrance’s 
emphasis on the continuing priesthood of Christ in the eucharistic worship of the 
church.317 In principle, both qualifications are largely compatible views of the reality 
described by the goal of Christ’s priesthood. The key to this compatibility is the 
connection between revelation and participation, which I will explore below. 
Simply stated, the goal of Christ’s priesthood is to bring God and humankind to 
fellowship and communion, the original purpose of creation threatened by the dissolution 
of sin.318 In the ontological model, this goal of reconciliation is already a complete 
                                                
315 According to Barth, “There can be no question of any repetition or representation of that event, 
or even of an actualisation which has still to be effected.” Ibid., 295. 
316 Hunsinger suggests that Torrance, as Barth’s student, sees “the full contemporaneity of Christ’s 
person in his work here and now, and his work in his person” taking place in the eucharist. The connection 
between His contemporaneity and the sacrament established by Torrance was never “quite managed to 
carry through” in Barth’s theology. George Hunsinger, Conversational Theology: Essays on Ecumenical, 
Postliberal, and Political Themes, with Special Reference to Karl Barth (New York: T&T Clark, 2015), 36. 
317 Worship seems to mark, for Torrance, the fulfillment of the salvific work of Christ. In his 
words, “the redeeming and atoning work of Christ reaches out in fulfilment, in worship at the mercy-seat, 
in worship at the throne of God.” He adds, “This aspect of the atonement” is “particularly evident in the 
worship and sacramental life of the church,” more specifically in the “eucharist,” in “the dramatic prayer in 
union with the mediation and intercession of our ascended high priest at the right hand of the Father.” 
Torrance, Atonement, 71. The Scottish theologian stipulates that the “worship and praise of the church,” 
understood as “its entry into the holy place in the name of Christ its high priest” is the moment when “the 
atonement reaches its appointed end or telos.” Ibid., 93. 
318 For Barth, reconciliation is the “the resumption of a fellowship which once existed but was 
then threatened by dissolution.” CD IV/1, 22. In this sense, “the work of atonement in Jesus Christ is the 
fulfilment of the communion of Himself with man and of man with Himself which He willed and created at 
the very first.” Ibid., 36. According to Torrance, “The restoration of creation involves the restoration of 
creation to communion and fellowship with him . . . in reconciliation and atonement.” Torrance, 





reality. However, the model needs to explain how such reality can be complete if 
reconciliation is not concretely observed in the present world (at least, not in its complete 
form). It is in this context that the concept of revelation becomes crucial for the 
ontological model. More specifically, reconciliation is incomplete only in terms of 
revelation, not in terms of its reality.319 The goal of Christ’s priesthood awaits fulfillment 
only noetically, not ontologically.320 For Torrance, the NT “speaks of justification and 
reconciliation as the completed and finished work of Christ, and that aorist and perfect 
tenses are used to do that.”321 Following this perspective, Barth describes the prophetic 
work of Christ as the “the disclosure of completed reconciliation and man’s opening up to 
                                                
nature in Christ into communion with the life of God.” Torrance, Atonement, 228. He claims that Christ 
“achieved within our creaturely being the very union between God and man that constitutes the heart of 
atonement, effecting man’s salvation and restoration to communion with God the Father.” Torrance, Space, 
Time and Resurrection, 47. Considering that Barth and Torrance employ the language of “resumption” and 
“restoration” of this communion, it is debatable if the use of such language would be appropriate, as long as 
their interpretation of Gen 1-3 is not historical (see footnote 219 above). 
319 Barth argues that, “if we could see with God’s eyes, we should realise that in spite of 
appearances everything is already very different, all things being made new and set right. The only thing is 
that we cannot see in this way. The actual alteration of our existence, of all things, of the whole being of the 
world, is hidden from us in the sense that it cannot be observed or experienced except in this event, in the 
living Jesus Christ Himself. The alteration of our situation effected in Him is concealed as it were by a veil 
which our eyes cannot penetrate.” CD IV/3.1, 316-317. Likewise, Torrance points out that “looked [at] 
from the side of God, the whole work of salvation is accomplished in the Son, but looked at from the 
human side . . . it is not seen to be completed and fulfilled as yet.” Therefore, God’s act of atonement, 
“from the point of view of revelation, is still outstanding or future, still to be fully and finally revealed or 
consummated.” Torrance, Atonement, 174. 
320 According to Barth, “The work of atonement, the conversion of man to God, was done for all. 
The Word of God is spoken to all. God’s verdict and direction and promise have been pronounced over all. 
To that extent, objectively, all are justified, sanctified and called. But the hand of God has not touched all in 
such a way that they can see and hear, perceive and accept and receive all that God is for all and therefore 
for them. . . . They do not know their justification, sanctification and calling as they have already taken 
place in Jesus Christ.” CD IV/1, 148. Similarly, Torrance maintains that “justification is a complete reality 
awaiting disclosure.” Torrance, Atonement, 134. 
321 Torrance, Atonement, 174. The Scottish theologian claims that the NT “emphasis is not on the 
future reality of the kingdom, but on the future of its full manifestation.” As a matter of fact, “new 
creation” is “already consummated and waiting for eschatological unfolding or fulfilment in the advent 




it.”322 This revelation is necessary because “the victory of Jesus . . . is not yet 
consummated” according to “our sphere and circle of vision.”323 In this sense, 
reconciliation takes place primarily (ontologically) in Christ, and secondarily (noetically) 
“in the knowledge of salvation created by Him” in human beings.324 This knowledge, 
however, is not only intellectual but entails participation in the event of salvation.325 The 
knowledge is more than intellectual because the content of the reconciliation that is 
revealed, as mentioned above, is not merely something Christ did (as the subject of 
reconciliation) but is His own being (as the object of reconciliation). He is the content of 
reconciliation and, consequently, of revelation.326 In other words, the revelation of 
                                                
322 CD IV/3.1, 220.  
323 Ibid., 262. Taking into account the traditional eschatological language of “already” and “not 
yet,” Barth seems to understand the “not yet” as a description of the human vision of reconciliation, and not 
a depiction of the reality of the reconciliation. In other words, for him, the “not yet” is noetic, not ontic. 
324 Ibid., 217. Adrian Langdon acknowledges that there is in Barth a tendency “to reduce the 
ascension and parousia to a noetic realization of the reconciliation completed on the cross.” Adrian 
Langdon, God the Eternal Contemporary: Trinity, Eternity, and Time in Karl Barth (Eugene, OR: Wipf & 
Stock, 2012), 42. Horton highlights that “instead of redemption accomplished and applied,” Barth’s 
“duality is between redemption and attestation or event and recognition. So if the resurrection, the 
ascension, Pentecost, and the parousia lie on the attestation/recognition rather than redemption/event side of 
the line, it only follows that pneumatology, preaching, and sacraments can only fall on the ‘witness’ side as 
well.” Horton, “Covenant, Election, and Incarnation,” 141-142. In Bloesch’s words, “Barth does not deny 
the subjective dimension of the atonement, but he sees this basically as the apprehension and 
acknowledgment of the reconciliation already give in Jesus Christ.” Bloesch, Jesus Is Victor, 49. 
325 According to Barth, “The one who participates in this knowledge participates in the event of 
salvation itself.” CD IV/3.1, 217. The Swiss theologian depicts the knowledge created by revelation in the 
following way: (1) it is not “mere acceptance or reflection,” “mere thought,” “mere conviction,” or “a 
subjective human attitude”; (2) “the whole man with all his possibilities and experiences and attitudes is 
grasped by the object which takes and retains the initiative in relation to him, and turned right about to face 
this object, to be wholly orientated upon it”; (3) “as a human action it takes place in participation in His 
action.” Ibid., 218, 220-221. 
326 For Barth, “revelation in fact does not differ from the person of Jesus Christ nor from the 
reconciliation accomplished in Him.” CD I/1, 119. See also the identification of reconciliation, revelation, 
and the being and work of Christ in CD IV/3.1, 165. Similarly, Torrance argues that “revelation and 
atonement are . . . inseparable, Christ revealing and Christ reconciling . . . within the one person of Christ.” 
Torrance, Incarnation, 37. He adds, revelation and reconciliation “are not two acts but one act, for 




reconciliation is Christ revealing Himself as the complete reality of reconciliation. 
Therefore, the revelation that creates in human beings the knowledge of this complete 
reality implies the contemporaneous presence of Christ, who reveals Himself to them. On 
the basis of Christ’s personal presence as revelation, the knowledge created by Him in 
human beings means participation and even impartation of the reconciliation in Christ.327 
For Barth, “this expressing, imparting, telling and reminding, which are not just verbal 
and intellectual but supremely real and powerful, are the new and particular feature of 
reconciliation in its form as revelation, . . . of the being and action of Jesus Christ in His 
prophetic office.”328 Hence, this awareness of the reconciliation created in human beings 
by revelation awakes not only the intellect but also their entire life.329 While 
reconciliation is already a complete reality, the awareness and awakening created by 
                                                
327 Barth emphasizes that this knowledge “is a secondary event, related to the primary event 
fulfilled in the one Jesus Christ and participating in this on the ground of His free address of grace. Yet 
with no less reality it is itself also an event of salvation. In Christian knowledge Jesus Christ comes to be 
and is really present to man. What He does for him He also does to and in him. He gives him the freedom, 
permission and command to be the man he is in Him, the new creature, the justified and sanctified sinner, 
His brother, the child of God, the responsible witness of the atonement which has taken place in Him. Less 
than this we may not think or say of the event of true Christian knowledge.” CD IV/3.1, 220; italics mine.  
328 Ibid., 281. Barth stipulates that, “after the Easter,” revelation also “takes place in the form of 
the impartation of the Holy Spirit.” Ibid., 293. According to Katherine Sonderegger, Barth’s notion of 
sanctification, which is defined by the idea of impartation, “is not repetition, or appropriation or disposition 
toward holiness, but rather only a following, an acknowledgment, a correspondence by sinners, standing 
under the Word in alien sanctification.” Katherine Sonderegger, “Sanctification as Impartation in the 
Doctrine of Karl Barth,” Zeitschrift für Dialektische Theologie 18, no. 3 (2002): 314. 
329 According to Barth, in Christ’s revelation “He discloses and manifests and announces and 
imparts Himself. . . . Their life already actualised in Him, in order that the place and power of sin, from 
which they are already liberated and separated in Him, should be destroyed in them too, in order that the 
alteration of the situation between God and man, which has validly taken place for them, should be 
effective and manifest in them too, in order that they, too, should grasp the grace of God which in Him is 
fully and unreservedly addressed to them already, in order that they, too, should thus begin to live by this 
grace. This is the outreaching, embracing and comprehending of reconciliation in its prophetic 
determination. It expresses itself. Its peculiar feature in this determination is that it shares with the world 
the fact that it is the world already reconciled with God. By this impartation it awakens and allows and 
commands it to know and experience and take itself seriously as such, to act as such, and therefore to exist 





Christ’s revelation demands from human beings recognition and gratitude expressed in 
service and praise.330 For the Swiss theologian, this awaking knowledge is created only 
by revelation, as until Christ’s final parousia “the alteration of the human situation” in 
reconciliation can be seen “only by faith and not by sight.”331 
While in Barth the participation of human beings in the complete reality of 
reconciliation takes place through Christ’s revelation, Torrance adds some features to the 
participation in this revealed reality, particularly in his emphasis on the incarnation and 
the Lord’s Supper. The Scottish theologian stipulates that there are three types of union 
or communion with God: (1) consubstantial (union/communion in the Trinity), (2) 
hypostatic (union/communion of the natures of Christ), and (3) koinonia 
(union/communion of human beings with God through the Spirit, partakers of the divine 
nature).332 Without disregarding the importance of Christ’s death and resurrection,333 
                                                
taken place among them is their own justification and sanctification.” CD IV/3.1, 280. 
330 In Barth’s words, “What remains for us is simply to recognise and respect it with gratitude in 
that provisional praise.” CD IV/2, 516. In this sense, the prophetic work of Christ demands “gratitude and 
obedience and service.” CD IV/3.1, 217. Similarly, Torrance associates the restoration of the fellowship of 
human beings with God (reconciliation) with obedience and adoration. Torrance, Incarnation, 115. In 
addition, he stipulates that service (as a servant) is the form in which the church participates in Christ’s 
priesthood. See Torrance, Atonement, 277; Torrance, Royal Priesthood, ix; Torrance, Space, Time and 
Resurrection, 118. 
331 CD IV/1, 318-319. “It is not yet, however, the light of the altered world itself which we can 
expect on the ground of this alteration. It is not yet the revelation of the altered creation, of the children of 
God as they are transformed by what has taken place for them and to them in Jesus Christ. It is not yet the 
time of the resurrection of all the dead. Obviously, therefore, it is not yet the time of the fulfilment of the 
resurrection which has come to them in Jesus Christ. To that extent it is not yet the fulfilment of 
His parousia and presence and salvation in the world reconciled by Him.” Ibid., 319. 
332 Torrance, Atonement, 231. This idea of koinonia describes Torrance’s notion of theosis. For a 
helpful study on this theme in Torrance, see Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance. 
333 Torrance also sees the communion of humankind with God as a result of Christ’s resurrection. 
He speaks of “the resurrection of our human nature in Christ into communion with the life of God.” 
Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection, 67. For him, in Christ’s resurrection is “new humanity in perfect 




Torrance indicates that the goal of a reconciled communion between human beings and 
God is already a reality in the hypostatic union. He views Christ’s incarnation “as our 
sanctifying union with his divine nature.”334 At the same time, the Scottish theologian 
highlights the participation of humankind in the revealed reality of reconciliation in terms 
of koinonia, “our participation in” the “completed work of atonement.”335 According to 
Torrance’s idea of koinonia, this participation takes place in the liturgical activity of the 
church.336 More specifically, in the Lord’s Supper the ascended Christ “comes to meet us 
and gives himself to us that we, united with him through communion in his body and 
blood, may be lifted up with him into the holiest in the power of his resurrection and 
exaltation, and worship the Father with, in and through him.”337 Furthermore, there is in 
the Lord’s Supper the distribution of spiritual gifts sent by Christ through the Spirit. By 
using these gifts, believers participate in Christ’s priesthood in terms of service to Him.338 
Therefore, the goal of communion is already a reality in the hypostatic union, and the 
participation (koinonia) in the revealed reality (a reality made complete through 
                                                
334 Torrance, Incarnation, 82. The Scottish theologian claims that “our human nature is united to 
his divine nature in the unity of the one person of the Son.” Ibid., 80. Indeed, the hypostatic union is a 
communion between divinity and humanity. Ibid., 221. However, Torrance emphasizes that “human nature 
was not divinised, but only raised into union and communion with God,” as the Greek Fathers held a “mild 
form of communicatio idiomatum” that “did not involve mutual penetration of the two natures.” Ibid., 223. 
335 Torrance, Incarnation, 171. 
336 For Torrance, believers participate “through the Holy Spirit in the mystery of Christ.” Ibid., 
172. As a result of the atonement, the koinonia takes place in the church in the “fellowship of word and 
sacrament.” Ibid., 173. 
337 Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation, 121. In his remarks on the koinonia of the eucharist, 
Torrance points out that “the Spirit who makes us feed upon Christ,” and that the eucharist “becomes the 
effective form of participation which he grants to us in his self-offering through the eternal Spirit to God 
the Father.” Ibid., 119. 
338 In Torrance’s account of the eucharist as “koinonia with Christ,” spiritual “gifts are distributed” 
to the church, and by using them as one body the church participates in His priesthood “through its service 




atonement) of reconciliation is particularly characterized by liturgical worship (Lord’s 
Supper) and service (the church exercising its spiritual gifts). 
In summary, the goal of Christ’s priesthood is to bring God and humankind to 
communion, the original purpose of creation that did not characterize the original 
creation. While this goal of reconciliation is already a complete reality (ontologically in 
Christ), it is still incomplete in terms of its revelation (noetically in human beings) until 
the parousia.339 Because this revelation is the disclosure of the reality in Christ, its 
content is His own presence, and the human reception of this revelation entails some kind 
of participation in this revealed reality. Barth emphasizes that this presence is 
contemporaneous to all human beings, while Torrance emphasizes the eucharistic 
presence in the Lord’s Supper. The Swiss theologian describes the human participation in 
terms of the creation of an awaking awareness (the form of participation) that leads to 
gratitude, worship, and service (results of participation). The Scottish theologian regards 
worship and service as forms of participation founded in the Lord’s Supper. Both cases 
involve partial participation because the revealed reality of reconciliation is not complete 
yet. I would say that this participation could be described as a partial awaking awareness 
(Barth) or a liturgical taste (Torrance) of the complete reality of reconciliation. 
Before I move to the end of the present chapter, it is important to highlight two 
points that will be helpful for the consideration of the ontological model in the next steps 
of this research. Both points are related to the innovative feature of this model, namely, 
that reconciliation is already a complete reality that does not involve any further 
                                                
339 In this sense, the parousia is the completion of the revelation of the reality of reconciliation, 




application to human beings. The first point has to do with the consistency of this 
position and the second concerns the meaning of Christ’s priesthood in light of this 
position. First, the model may face the challenge of not being fully consistent with the 
idea that reconciliation is already a complete reality with no further application, inasmuch 
as the notion of participation in the model sounds like application. Barth’s idea that 
Christ’s revelation is not only intellectual implies more than noetic participation and 
Torrance’s conception of eucharistic koinonia has ontological overtones. Furthermore, 
the model does assume that the parousia will bring about an eschatological alteration of 
our present reality (e.g., the eschatological resurrection of the dead).340 However, the 
model seems to make sense of this potential discrepancy by stipulating that our realm 
(where the reality of reconciliation is not complete) and Christ’s heavenly realm (where 
the reality of reconciliation is complete) are asynchronous, that is, they operate in 
different types of temporality. This idea will be explained and analyzed in the next 
chapter. Second, what does the priesthood of Christ accomplish in the context of all this 
discussion? Simply put, in Christ’s priesthood, God reconciles Himself to the world as a 
human being. Assuming that Christ’s death and resurrection fully execute the reality of 
this reconciliation, everything that comes after the resurrection (e.g., heavenly 
intercession) has only a revelatory character that allows our conscious participation in 
that complete reality. Therefore, strictly speaking, the priestly reconciliatory activity is 
effectively Christ’s sacrifice on the cross. In this sacrifice, God humiliated and 
condemned Himself as a human being. This condemnation meant the destruction of evil 
                                                




and the re-creation of humanity in Himself (the incarnate God). What this picture of 
Christ’s priesthood seems to imply is that God acted historically/temporally upon 
Himself (the incarnate God) on earth, whereas the priesthood of the ascended Christ takes 
a different form of temporality, as a revelatory activity. Hence, as I have indicated at the 
outset of the depiction of the ontological model in this chapter, a full picture of Christ’s 
priesthood requires an engagement with the concept of time in this model, which will be 
undertaken in chapter three. 
Having provided this general description of Christ’s priesthood in the ontological 
model, I will conclude the present chapter by briefly summarizing and comparing the 
sacramental, the functional, and the ontological models. 
A Brief Comparison of the Models  
Taking into account that the description of the models of Christ’s priesthood in 
this chapter was organized according to four components (need, agent, actions, and goal), 
I will follow that sequence in this brief summary and comparison of the models based on 
similarities and differences. In each component, comparative comments are accompanied 
by a table summary. Before I start this comparison, however, a clarification is necessary. 
We may find an overlap or a difference of ideas between the three models in each 
component of Christ’s priesthood. Nevertheless, the way these ideas are articulated (or 
even not articulated) in relationship with other notions formulated in the model produces 
a systematic conceptual force that leads to a specific emphasis of the model. In other 
words, a model is more than the sum of its parts. An idea may be present in the model, 




least not a dominant one) in its relationship with other notions.341 I begin this comparison 
with the need for Christ’s priesthood. 
The Need for Christ’s Priesthood 
All three models understand Christ’s priesthood as a reconciliatory mediation 
needed because of the sin problem. Nevertheless, each model has a specific emphasis 
regarding this problem.342 Similarities and differences can be organized according to two 
main questions: (1) What is the problem of sin?; (2) Why is CP necessary? The answers 
to the first question (see Table 1) are initially two. According to the sacramental model, 
the basic problem is an ontological disorder that hinders the teleological movement from 
                                                
341 One example of this systematic principle is the idea of propitiation in the sacramental model. 
The fact that this idea is present in Aquinas does not mean that propitiation has a dominant conceptual 
force (emphasis) in the sacramental model (and even in Aquinas), as it does in the functional model.  
342 Allen Jorgenson provides a basic framework for the understanding of sin in Christian theology. 
In this framework, original sin can be understood in terms of content (concupiscence) or lack of content 
(privatio of original justice). These conceptions are represented “by Augustine and Anselm, respectively.” 
Jorgenson, “Karl Barth’s Christological Treatment of Sin,” 461. In Augustine, “the guilt of concupiscence 
is forgiven in baptism,” but “remains as a force in the baptized. For this reason the baptized continue to 
battle the flesh in that concupiscence undoes the original justice that orders the flesh in its conflict with the 
spirit. Augustine understands this disorder as hereditary in that the primal pair’s ‘carnal concupiscence’ is 
both a penalty of their original sin and the infection which is passed on in the carnal act. Concupiscence, as 
such, is both a cause and an effect and provides a view of original sin that is something other than 
privation.” Ibid., 441. On the other hand, “by locating human sin in the human rational nature,” and not in 
the flesh, “Anselm identifies the will as the means for the transmission of original sin rather than the carnal 
act of procreation.” Ibid., 441-442. In Aquinas’ synthesis, sin is concupiscentia and privatio, as “the latter” 
is “the formal element of original sin and the former” is “the material element.” Ibid., 443. In his turn, 
Luther’s “synthetic contribution” consists in his proposal “that original justice” is “understood as faith and 
fear of God,” and that this justice “was originally part of being human” and not a superadded grace. This 
means that the lack of original justice (faith) was not a disorder but actually “marred humanity.” “While 
this lack is forgiven in Baptism, its presence as concupiscence remains and presumes the need for the Holy 
Spirit to mortify the flesh.” Ibid., 446. In Calvin, original sin is described as “a depravity with two attendant 
realities; guilt and the fruits of sin. The former is present in so far as humans bear a ‘contagion’ that justly 
deserves punishment and the latter is asserted to correct the definition of original sin as privation that lacks 
the nuance of the fruitful nature of sin.” Ibid., 447. Finally, “Barth eschews the traditional identification of 
original sin as concupiscence and privatio. Indeed, his interest in original sin is somewhat muted.” Ibid., 
457. Jorgenson’s explanation provides an interesting perspective for the comprehension of the nuances of 
the sin problem in the sacramental, functional, and ontological models, as far as Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, 




human beings to God. For the functional model, the basic problem is a moral rebellion of 
human beings against God. The ontological model follows the functional model on this 
point. Indeed, the status of creation lies in the background of these answers, and 
similarities are found on this regard from the vantage point of the discussion of the goal 
of CP in the present chapter. The evolutionary dynamics of the teleological movement 
presumed by the sacramental model assumes that the original creation was incomplete. 
Similarly, the functional model (Calvin) stipulates that Adam in his pre-fallen condition 
would pass to a better life, which also assumes incompleteness in original creation. 
Likewise, the ontological model affirms that, in contrast to the functional model and the 
classical version of the sacramental model (Aquinas), there was never a golden age in 
which creation was not characterized by sin. Therefore, in different ways, the three 
models view the original creation as incomplete and in need of fulfillment. Thus, whether 
the problem of sin is seen primordially as ontological disorder or moral rebellion, the 
incompleteness of original creation lies in the background. More specifically, sin either 
describes (theistic evolution—ontological model, O’Collins) or deepens (historical fall—
Aquinas, functional model) this incompleteness.  
 
Table 1. The need for CP (sacramental, functional, and ontological models) 
SACRAMENTAL MODEL FUNCTIONAL MODEL ONTOLOGICAL MODEL 
• The Problem of Sin 
o ontological disorder  
o background: original creation is 
incomplete 
 
• Why CP is necessary 
o human healing 
o improvement of original creation: 
qualified by a historical fall 
(Aquinas) or theistic evolution 
(O’Collins) 
• The Problem of Sin 
o moral rebellion  
o background: original 
creation is incomplete 
 
• Why CP is necessary 
o divine propitiation 
o improvement of original 
creation: qualified by a 
historical fall 
• The Problem of Sin 
o moral rebellion 
o background: original 
creation is incomplete  
 
• Why CP is necessary 
o divine propitiation  
o improvement of original 






Why, then, is CP necessary? According to the answers given in the previous 
paragraph regarding the problem of sin, the answers are initially two. If the basic problem 
is an ontological disorder that misses God as the target, the focus of the solution is on the 
ontological healing of human beings (sacramental model). On the other hand, if the basic 
problem is a moral rebellion that targets God (functional and ontological models), the 
solution will be focused on the propitiation of the offended/wrathful God. To put it more 
sharply, in the first answer CP is necessary primordially to heal human beings, and in the 
second answer it is necessary chiefly for the propitiation of God. From the broader 
perspective of the incompleteness of original creation, CP is ultimately needed to 
improve original creation, either directly (theistic evolution) through the activities of 
ontological healing (O’Collins) and divine propitiation (ontological model) or indirectly 
(historical fall, the incompleteness of original creation is now addressed under the new 
conditions of sin) through these same activities (Aquinas and Calvin respectively). 
The Agent of the Priesthood 
All three models view Christ, the agent of the priesthood, as a divine-human 
person. Therefore, in light of the need for His priesthood outlined above, the following 
questions will guide the comparisons regarding the agent of CP: (1) How is Christ’s 
divinity involved in His priesthood? (2) How is Christ’s humanity involved in His 
priesthood? Taking into account the first question, the sacramental model answers that 
the divinity of Christ is the main agent of the priesthood that works salvifically for the 
healing of human beings and the improvement of creation (see Table 2). According to the 
functional model, Christ’s divinity guarantees the eternity and power of the priesthood in 




model, the divinity of Christ in His priesthood implies that God is not only the object but 
also the subject of divine propitiation, the locus of salvific reconciliation. The self-
humiliation of God takes place in Christ as priest. At least two points of comparison 
emerge from these interpretations of the divinity of Christ in the context of the agency of 
His priesthood. First, in the sacramental model the divine agent focuses His priestly 
activity upon human beings, while in the functional and ontological models this agent 
focuses on God. Second, while the functional model seems to see the agency of the 
divine Son working to propitiate God the Father, the ontological model tends to draw a 
more general picture of God acting upon Himself. In this way, the divinity of Christ 
seems to be the agent of the priesthood in the ontological model. 
 
Table 2. The agent of CP (sacramental, functional, and ontological models) 
SACRAMENTAL MODEL FUNCTIONAL MODEL ONTOLOGICAL MODEL 
• Agency: Christ’s divinity 
o Main agent 





• Agency: Christ’s humanity 
o His human life as the scope 
of the priesthood 
o Human nature as the 
instrument of the divine 
agency (point of contact 
with the physical world) 
• Agency: Christ’s divinity 
o Guarantees: eternity and 
power of the priesthood 
o Focus: God (second person 
propitiates the first person)  
 
 
• Agency: Christ’s humanity 
o Main agent 




• Agency: Christ’s divinity 
o Main agent 
o Subject/object of the priesthood 
(acts upon Himself) 
o Focus: God Himself  (self-
humiliation) 
 
• Agency: Christ’s humanity 
o Earthly form of God’s self-
humiliation  




Regarding the question on how Christ’s humanity is involved in the priesthood, 
His humanity is a crucial feature of the interpretations of Christ as the agent of the 




as His priesthood. In the functional model, His obedience,343 teaching, and sacrifice are 
priestly activities performed by the man Christ. In the ontological model, the incarnation 
is seen already as God’s self-humiliation and human exaltation in Christ (although the 
cross and the resurrection are the climax of these events). However, the emphasis of the 
three models on Christ’s human priestly agency receives support from different 
assumptions operative in each model. The sacramental model regards Christ’s entire 
human life as His priesthood because His humanity is the point of contact of the divine 
with the physical world. In other words, the divine Christ is the main agent of the 
                                                
343 Bruce McCormack’s comments on the notion of Christ’s obedience in Calvin, especially when 
seen from the perspective of the differences between justification in Catholic and Protestant traditions, and 
shows significant distinctions between the sacramental and functional models. In the context of 
justification, the first difference is between an immediate divine imputation (Reformers) and a system of 
mediation of the church (Aquinas). In McCormack’s words, “the Reformers forensic understanding of 
justification” implies “an immediate divine imputation” that “renders superfluous the entire Catholic 
system of the priestly mediation of grace by the Church.” Bruce L. McCormack, “What’s at Stake in 
Current Debates over Justification? The Crisis of Protestantism in the West,” in Justification: What’s at 
Stake in the Current Debates, ed. Mark Husbands and Daniel J. Treier (Downers Grove, IL; Leicester, 
England: InterVarsity Press; Apollos, 2004), 82. The second difference refers to the idea of imputation. 
While Aquinas sustains negative imputation (non-imputation of sin), the Reformers affirm negative and 
positive (the alien justice of Christ) imputation. According to McCormack, this difference provides the 
conceptual basis for the Reformer’s distinction of justification and sanctification, which does not exist in 
Catholicism. As far as Aquinas is concerned, “in that the infusion of grace brings about the forgiveness of 
sins . . . the ‘non-imputation of sin’ is the effect of an infusion of justifying grace.” Thus, “Thomas limits 
‘imputation’ to its negative side, the non-imputation of sin. Of what would later be thought of as a positive 
imputation of Christ’s righteousness, Thomas knew nothing. In its place is the infusion of grace into the 
soul (i.e., regeneration). But this also means that the work of God ‘in us’ was made the basis of God’s 
forgiveness. And that was precisely the point at which the Reformers would finally have to raise the 
necessary objection.” In the Protestant alternative, justification is “a twofold imputation. . . . Christ’s 
righteousness is ‘imputed’ to us and, on that basis, we are forgiven (i.e., the negative nonimputation of sin 
is contained in the positive imputation of Christ’s righteousness).” McComarck concludes, “It is the role 
played by the imputation of Christ’s righteousness in justification, and that alone, which makes possible the 
Protestant distinction between justification and sanctification.” If regeneration is “the basis of the non-
imputation of sin—as Thomas has it—there remains no reason to distinguish between the two.” Ibid., 90-
92. The idea that the positive imputation is the key to distinguish the Protestant and Catholic understanding 
of justification leads to a particular emphasis on the importance of Christ’s human obedience. Calvin 
argued that “the righteousness that is made ours in justification is the acquired righteousness of Christ, that 
is, that righteousness which the God-man acquired through the acts of obedience performed through His 
divine-human unity.” In this sense, “the redemptive significance of the life of Christ is not made to consist 
in the cleansing of a diseased human nature,” as a result of the contact of His human nature with the 
essential righteousness of His divinity, but “in the establishing of a divine-human righteousness. It is the 




priesthood that works through the concrete instrumentality of His humanity. On the other 
hand, considering that the functional model interprets CP from the perspective of the 
performance of functions/activities, the main agent of the CP seems to be the human 
Christ, as the man Christ performs the priestly activities (as mentioned above, His 
divinity basically gives power and eternity to these activities). In the ontological model, 
the humanity of Christ is significant because, in God, it is the human recipient of the 
benefits (human transformation) of the priesthood. 
The Actions of the Priest 
The comparison of the priestly actions of Christ in the three models can be 
organized according to the following questions: (1) How are His actions seen as a whole? 
(2) What are the priestly actions of the earthly Christ? (3) What are the priestly actions of 
the ascended Christ? Regarding the first question, the sacramental model tends to view 
Christ’s priestly action as one (see Table 3). The unifying principle here is the notion of 
Christ’s invisible sacrifice, which has different forms of material expression and effective 
communication to human beings (sacraments). Similarly, the ontological model sees His 
action as one. But the unifying principle in this model is the one person of Christ, who is 
the object of His own priestly actions. On the other hand, the functional model 
emphasizes distinct and subsequent actions in Christ’s priesthood, particularly His 
teaching, His sacrifice on the cross, and the heavenly intercession. This leads us to the 
discussion of the second question. According to the principle of invisible sacrifice, 
Christ’s entire earthly life of devotion to God is a sacrifice in the sacramental model, and 
this sacrifice assumes a visible and material expression on the cross. For the functional 




lies on His penal substitutionary sacrifice on the cross. Likewise, even though Christ’s 
life (especially when in prayer) and death are regarded as intercessory in the ontological 
model, the focus is on His substitutionary sacrifice on the cross, which means the 
destruction of sin/evil. In this way, the life and/or ministry of the earthly Christ is counted 
as priestly activity in all three models.  
 
Table 3. The actions of CP (sacramental, functional, and ontological models) 
SACRAMENTAL MODEL FUNCTIONAL MODEL ONTOLOGICAL MODEL 
• Action: one (invisible sacrifice) – 
multiple material expressions 
 
 
• Earthly Christ 
o Entire life (devotion to God – 
invisible sacrifice)  
o Material expression (cross) 
§ Powerful influence on 
material human beings 
 
• Ascended Christ 
o Ministers the sacraments 
(eucharist – 
material/sacramental form of 
the sacrifice): heals human 
beings on earth (application of 
salvation) 
• Actions: multiple (teaching, 
sacrifice, intercession) and 
subsequent 
 
• Earthly Christ 
o Teachings  
o Penal substitutionary sacrifice 
(cross) 
§ Christ punished in the place 
of sinners 
 
• Ascended Christ  
o Intercession in heaven: 
subsequent propitiation of the 
Father 
o Teaching (word/sacrament): 
application of salvation to 
believers on earth (Lord’s 
Supper) 
• Action: one (Christ’s one person 
and action – subject/object the 
action) 
 
• Earthly Christ 
o Intercessory life/death 
o Substitutionary sacrifice 
(cross) 
§ Sinners destructed in 
Christ 
 
• Ascended Christ 
o Reveals the reality of 
complete reconciliation to 
human beings on earth 
(contemporaneous to all 
times, taste of the new 
reality in the eucharist) 
 
 
While there are distinct emphases (devotion, teaching, intercession) in the 
understanding of this priestly activity, the major differences are found in the 
interpretation of His sacrifice on the cross. In the sacramental model, which emphasizes 
that CP is needed for the healing of human beings and views divinity as the main agent of 
CP that acts through the instrumentality of His humanity, the material expression of 
Christ’s sacrifice on the cross is basically understood as a powerful influence on material 




propitiation and views His humanity as its main agent, the sacrifice of the cross describes 
the human Christ receiving the wrath of God in the place of elected human beings 
(propitiation by punishing Christ in the place of sinful human beings). In the ontological 
model, which emphasizes that CP is needed for divine propitiation but views God as its 
main agent, God as a human being takes the destructiveness of evil/sin (death) upon 
Himself in the cross and destroys it (propitiation by destructing sinful human beings in 
Christ).344 
With regard to the priestly actions of the ascended Christ, the sacramental model 
emphasizes the sacraments of the church (particularly the eucharist), which are ultimately 
ministered by the ascended Christ. According to the principle of invisible sacrifice, the 
eucharist is a material/sacramental form of Christ’s sacrifice that effectively heals human 
beings. For the functional model, the emphasis is on Christ’s ongoing heavenly 
intercession, which is a subsequent salvific activity that propitiates God the Father on the 
basis of the earthly sacrifice on the cross. This model also assumes that the priestly 
teaching of Christ continues after His ascension in the form of word and sacrament, 
which effectively applies (especially through the Lord’s Supper) salvific grace to human 
                                                
344 With regard to the sacramental model, a notion of divine propitiation compatible with its whole 
system could be discerned in the healing of human nature. The argument would follow like this: (1) human 
beings characterized by the disorder of sin do not follow the intended movement of creation toward God; 
(2) by not following the movement that leads them to their true end, human beings face the negative 
consequences of going through a path that is actually contrary to their true nature (this would be the 
experience of the wrath of God, which is not the active reaction of an offended God, but a natural 
consequence according to the structure of creation); (3) the healing of human nature leads human beings to 
their intended movement toward God, which means that they do not experience the negative consequences 
of going against their true nature. In other words, there is no more wrath of God. This wrath was, in this 
way, propitiated. I have outlined this account of divine propitiation on the basis of ST III, q. 22, a. 3; q. 49, 




beings. In the ontological model, the ascended Christ reveals345 the reality of complete 
reconciliation in His contemporaneity to all times, offering a taste of this new reality in 
the eucharist. In contrast to the sacramental and functional models, the ontological model 
attempts to avoid the notion of subjective salvific application of the priestly actions in 
Christ (the reality of salvation) to concrete human beings.346 Overall, only the functional 
                                                
345 According to Horton’s interpretation of Barth, “the subsequent events” after the cross “in the 
economy of grace are merely revelatory rather than constituent elements of God’s redemptive work.” 
Horton, “Covenant, Election, and Incarnation,” 132. 
346 The discussion of subjective salvific application here is not merely related to the discussion on 
whether concrete human beings receive the benefits of Christ’s priestly action through or without union 
with Christ. In other words, the main point here is not a decision between ordo salutis and the union (on 
this point I am referring to—without necessarily subscribing to—the assumption that ordo salutis is a 
postreformational construction and is different from the soteriological notion of the Reformation about 
union with Christ. See, e.g., A. T. B. McGowan, “Justification and the Ordo Salutis,” in Justification in 
Perspective: Historical Developments and Contemporary Challenges, ed. Bruce L. McCormack [Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006], 148-149). Both of these accounts could include a subjective salvific 
application, and the functional model could potentially accommodate both readings of subjective 
application. In either case, strictly speaking, the reality of salvation takes place in human beings at the 
moment of this application (even though these accounts could argue that the reality of salvation for human 
beings already took place in Christ). The novelty of the ontological model is that the reality of salvation in 
human beings took place in Christ, as He is the object of His priesthood. This view invalidates the idea of 
subjective application, at least in terms of the reality of salvation taking place in human beings, because 
such reality does not need to be communicated from Christ to them. To put it differently, the view 
advanced by the ontological model implies that when the reality of salvation took place in Christ, human 
beings were already in Him, so their subjective appropriation of salvation already happened in Him. My 
conclusion here is that a comparison of Calvin (and even the Finnish interpretation of Luther) and Torrance 
on the notion of union with Christ in the context of the eucharist does not necessarily undermine the 
distinction of the functional and ontological models. A close association of Torrance with Calvin regarding 
the reality of salvation taking place in human beings in the context of the eucharistic union with Christ, 
would imply that the Scottish theologian is inconsistent in his adoption of the barthian view of the reality of 
salvation in Christ. Hunsinger uses the terminology of salvation in the perfect tense (already accomplished 
in Christ) and salvation in the present or future tense (which I could refer to my comments about the 
moment of the application). Calvin is ambiguous in regards to salvation in the perfect tense and salvation in 
the present/future. According to Hunsinger, “like Barth (but unlike Calvin), Torrance has an unambiguous 
grasp on how salvation must be spoken of essentially in the perfect tense.” On the other hand, “like Calvin 
(but unlike Barth), Torrance” connects the sacraments with “union and communion with Christ,” seeing 
“the sacraments as vehicles of testimony that impart the very Christ whom they proclaim (by the gracious 
operation of the Holy Spirit), as opposed to Barth, who insists on seeing them ‘ethically’ as no more than a 
grateful human response to a prior divine grace not mediated or set forth by the sacraments themselves.” 
George Hunsinger, “The Dimension of Depth: Thomas F. Torrance on the Sacraments of Baptism and the 
Lord’s Supper,” Scottish Journal of Theology 54, no. 2 (2001): 157, 159. In this article, Hunsinger does not 
make the distinction I do here between the reality of salvation (in the perfect tense) for human beings and in 
human beings, which I find necessary in this discussion. Nevertheless, he does emphasize elsewhere the 
novum of Barth’s soteriology (presumably followed by Torrance): for Barth, “the simultaneity of 





model focuses on a salvific activity in heaven. In the sacramental and ontological models 
the emphasis is on the activity of the ascended Christ on earth, either sacramentally 
healing human beings (sacramental model) or revealing to them the complete reality of 
human reconciliation already effected by God in Christ (ontological model). 
The Goal of the Priesthood 
All models seem to indicate that the goal of Christ’s priesthood is the 
reconciliation of human beings with God. However, the models conceptualize this goal in 
different ways. The following questions will guide the comparison of the models: (1) 
What is the nature of the reconciliatory goal? (2) How does CP lead to this goal? 
Regarding the first question, the sacramental model emphasizes an ontological 
reconciliation, described in terms of a teleological union, a participation of human beings 
in God, which is ultimately the goal of original creation (see Table 4). This brings 
creation to its fulfillment. While the themes of ontological union and the eschatological 
vision of God as the goal of original creation are also found in the functional model, the 
emphasis of this model is on a moral reconciliation characterized by the grace of God’s 
                                                
ever takes place at the level of our active participation. He thereby forcibly shifts the whole axis of 
salvation (justification and sanctification) away from what takes place in us existentially . . . to that has 
taken place apart from us preveniently in Christ. . . . This shift is one of the most striking and momentous 
moves in his soteriology.” George Hunsinger, Evangelical, Catholic, and Reformed: Doctrinal Essays on 
Barth and Related Themes (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015), 202. In Hunsinger’s distinction of 
objective (which I call here the reality of salvation in human beings) and existential/active participation, the 
latter is not where our participation in Christ ultimately takes place. Coming back to my remarks on the 
eucharist, while Hunsinger believes that Torrance’s account of the sacraments (especially the eucharist) is 
an improvement on Barth (see Hunsinger, “The Dimension of Depth,” 175), it is my judgment that, if not 
carefully nuanced, this account can be easily read as subjective application, and this reading contradicts his 
commitment to the barthian idea of salvation in the perfect tense. My suggestion is that Torrance’s 
conception of the effects of the eucharist on human beings should not be read as subjective application of 
salvation, but as an intersection of old time and new time that allows a taste of the new creation (new time). 
This point will be elaborated in the next chapter. In my view, this is the reading that can protect Torrance 




forgiveness, who justifies and then sanctifies human beings. The ontological model 
pushes the functional model a little further by assuming that creation is in need of moral 
reconciliation since the beginning. The major emphasis of the ontological model is that 
the locus of the reality of reconciliation is Christ. In His divine-human person, God and 
humanity are reconciled. In this view, the goal of CP is already an ontological reality.  
 
Table 4. The goal of CP (sacramental, functional, and ontological models) 
SACRAMENTAL MODEL FUNCTIONAL MODEL ONTOLOGICAL MODEL 
• The Reconciliatory Goal 




• How CP leads to this goal 
o divine agent uses material 
instruments 
o ontological healing of 
human beings 
o guides the teleological 
movement towards God 
• The Reconciliatory Goal 




• How CP leads to this goal 
o sacrifice on the cross and 
heavenly intercession: 
propitiate the Father 
o Mediates the forgiveness 
and transformation of 
human beings through 
material instruments  
• The Reconciliatory Goal 
o moral reconciliation (in Christ) 
o Goal achieved ontologically 
o Remaining aspect: revelation  
 
• How CP leads to this goal 
o Achieved: in Christ, God destroyed 
(cross) and re-created human beings 
(resurrection) 
o Revelation (new reality): Christ 




In this context, how does CP lead to the reconciliatory goal? In the sacramental 
model, the ontological reconciliation is reached through the healing of human beings. 
Through material instruments (Christ’s humanity, sacraments), the divine agent in CP 
produces this ontological healing that leads human beings in their teleological movement 
towards God. According to the functional model, the moral reconciliation is reached 
primordially through the propitiation of the Father. The transformation of human beings, 
also mediated by material instruments (word/sacrament), is dependent and subsequent to 
His forgiveness. In this case, CP leads to the reconciliatory goal by primordially 




intercession), and then by mediating forgiveness and transformation to human beings 
through material instruments. In the context of the ontological model, the reconciliatory 
goal is already a complete reality (considering that its locus is Christ). However, it still 
needs to be revealed to human beings. In this sense, while CP already achieved the goal 
ontologically, it is still working to reach the goal of revealing what was achieved. In 
regards to the goal already achieved, in the person of Christ, God produced the moral 
reconciliation by destroying sinful human beings in His own death and by re-creating 
them in His own resurrection. In terms of the goal still to be reached, Christ is revealing 
the new reality of reconciliation by means of His contemporaneity to all times, using 
material instruments to provide a taste of this new reality. 
Having provided this brief comparison of the models of Christ’s priesthood, I will 
explore in the next chapter the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality assumed by each 









A STUDY OF MACRO-HERMENEUTICAL 




The previous chapter provided a general description of three theological models 
of Christ’s priesthood (sacramental, functional, and ontological models) from a 
systematic perspective (need, agent, actions, and goal). This general description prepared 
the ground for the study of the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality assumed by 
each model, which is the task of the present chapter. The relationship between the general 
description of the models (chapter 2) and the description of the macro-hermeneutical 
principles of reality (chapter 3) they assume can be clarified in the following way: The 
focus of the previous chapter was on the priesthood of Christ (need, agent, actions, and 
goal), whereas now the focus is on the priesthood of Christ.1 In other words, the present 
chapter intends to observe, from a macro-hermeneutical perspective, how ontological 
assumptions about Christ inform the interpretation of His priesthood in the sacramental, 
                                                
1 I am not assuming here that this is the whole picture of the priesthood of Christ. For example, 
this priestly intercession includes not only Christ but also human beings. However, the focus of the present 
study is Christological. Thus, I do not deal with anthropology per se in this analysis. At the same time, I do 
take into account anthropological conceptions as long as they are related with my Christological study. 
Despite this delimitation, the present study does offer an ontological picture of human beings in the context 
of Christ’s priesthood, as the Christological analysis of this chapter includes a treatment of the humanity of 
Christ (see the section Humanity), which is arguably the same human nature of human beings in general (I 
am not considering here the notion of a sinful or fallen human nature), and the nature of His interaction 




functional, and ontological models.  
To facilitate the study of these hermeneutical presuppositions and the comparison 
of their role in each model, I have selected three macro-hermeneutical principles of 
reality operative in the understanding of Christ in His priesthood. As in the previous 
chapter, the book of Hebrews is the source for my minimal formal description of the 
reality of Christ. Overall, it is possible to describe the reality of Christ, who is a priest in 
Hebrews, as follows: (1) He is God, (2) He became a human being on earth, and (3) 
ascended to heaven.2 Therefore, the priesthood of Christ is formally described here as the 
priesthood of a God-man who was on earth and ascended to heaven. Accordingly, the 
understanding of Christ’s priesthood is largely defined by the interpretation or material 
description of the categories (1) Divinity, (2) Humanity, and (3) Cosmology (earth and 
heaven), with reference to Christ. Hence, these three formal categories constitute the 
macro-hermeneutical principles of reality selected for the present study. Considering that 
these principles are ontological in nature, I will ascertain in which way time/timelessness 
and space/spacelessness factor in the interpretation of each model regarding the three 
principles of reality.3 
As a basic outline of this chapter, I will first describe how each theological model 
of Christ’s priesthood interprets the principles of reality (divinity, humanity, and 
                                                
2 Even though this formal description should not include at this point a precise definition of its 
categories, as this definition constitutes the material description of each model, I briefly indicate here how 
these broad categories can be generally found in the exposition of Christ in the book of Hebrews: (1) God 
(Heb 1:9-10); (2) Human (Heb 2:14, 17); (3) Earth/World (Heb 1:6; 10:5) and Heaven (4:14; 8:1; 9:24). 
3 The categories of time and space are explored by Jenson and Gorman in their studies of the 
priestly cult in the Hebrew Bible. See Gorman Jr, The Ideology of Ritual; Jenson, Graded Holiness. 




cosmology) with reference to Christ, indicating the main implications of these 
interpretations for the understanding of His priesthood in the specific model under 
discussion. Then, at the end of the chapter, I will summarize and briefly compare the 
interpretations of the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality and their implications in 
the sacramental, functional, and ontological models. My initial step is to materially 
describe the principles of reality in the sacramental model. 
The Sacramental Model 
Divinity: Christ and the Concept of Divine Nature  
In this analysis of the ontology of God in the sacramental model, I will focus on 
how this model conceptualizes the divine nature and its implications for divine action. 
This conceptualization informs the comprehension of Christ’s divinity and also His 
relationship with other members of the Godhead, which will be discussed later in the 
implications of the conception of divinity for the notion of Christ’s priesthood. 
In order to affirm the perfection and transcendence of God, the sacramental 
model, among other things,4 negatively defines divine nature by the absence of 
                                                
4 O’Collins explains that God can be described in two basic ways. First, from a “biblical, 
experiential, and concrete” perspective, He is both transcendent and immanent. In His transcendent 
characteristics, “God is supremely mysterious, indefinable, or even unknowable,” dwelling “beyond our 
sense experience ‘in approachable light’, without beginning or end (= eternal),” and “beyond the material 
world (=utterly spiritual) and all its categories of gender and class—infinitely wise, holy, apart, 
untouchable.” On the other hand, God is also “‘within’ or immanent—personal, relational, perfectly loving, 
and intimately compassionate; the creator of all things and lord of history, who is, nevertheless, ‘closer’ to 
us than we are to ourselves.” Second, from a philosophical standpoint, He is “perfectly free and perfectly 
good (as being personal and of the highest perfection), the ground of all being and of all life. God is 
subsistent Being itself . . . , the one necessary, infinite Being who is utterly self-sustaining, self-
determining, and therefore totally self-explanatory.” The Jesuit theologian seems to assume that the biblical 
and philosophical ways of describing God are compatible. He maintains that “in her creeds, liturgy, and 
teaching the Church has, for the most part, simply repeated the firmly held biblical attributes of God as one, 
all-powerful, eternal, all-good, and so forth. But, from the second century, strains of Platonic, Stoic, and 




components (God is simple),5 movement (God is unmovable),6 change (God is 
immutable),7 time (God is eternal/timeless),8 and space (God is immaterial).9 Aquinas 
affirms the interconnection of such characteristics, especially considering that they 
(components, movement, change, time, and space) involve potentiality (imperfection), 
that is, a lack of actuality (perfection).10 For instance, movement involves composition 
                                                
5 For O’Collins, “God is infinitely simple and profoundly uncomplicated—unlike spatial and 
temporal beings that are divided or separated into parts.” O’Collins, Christology, 232. This is similar to 
Aquinas’ affirmation of the absolute simplicity of God, explaining that “there is neither composition of 
quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form.” Hence, “God is 
nowise composite, but is altogether simple.” ST I, q. 3, a. 7. For further details, see his discussion of “The 
Simplicity of God” in q. 3. For Aquinas, something is perfect inasmuch as it lacks nothing, being pure 
actuality. See q. 4, a. 1. By affirming these attributes, he intends to show that God is a complete and self-
subsistent reality. In contrast, something characterized by composition, movement, change, and time is 
necessarily defined by potentiality and depends on other things to achieve actuality. For additional 
information on the attributes of God in Aquinas, see Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 44-117; 
Stump, Aquinas, 92-158; Rudi te Velde, Aquinas on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae, 
Ashgate Studies in the History of Philosophical Theology (Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2006), 77-94; Peter Weigel, Aquinas on Simplicity: An Investigation into the Foundations of His 
Philosophical Theology (Oxford; New York: Peter Lang, 2008). 
6 O’Collins describes God as “the uncaused cause or unmoved mover.” O’Collins, Christology, 
232. According to Aquinas, “God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved.” ST I, q. 3, a. 1. The 
medieval theologian defines motion as “the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality,” and 
argues that “whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another.” He concludes, “It is necessary to 
arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.” q. 2, a. 3.  
7 For Aquinas, “God is altogether immutable.” Considering that “everything which is in any way 
changed, is in some way in potentiality,” God is “pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality.” ST I, 
q. 9, a. 1. For further details, see his discussion of “The Immutability of God” in q. 9. 
8 O’Collins points out that “God is timeless (or beyond any temporal succession).” O’Collins, 
Christology, 114. Aquinas contrasts eternity and time by saying that “eternity follows immutability, as the 
idea of time follows movement. Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be 
eternal.” ST I, q. 10, a. 2. I am aware that, for Aquinas, God’s “eternity includes all times” q. 10, a. 2, ad 4. 
However, this statement should be understood in light of his definition of eternity and time. First, eternity is 
contrasted to time and movement (see q. 10, a. 2). Second, God moves things without experiencing 
movement (see q. 2, a. 3). Third, since time is “the numbering of movement” (q. 10, a. 1, ad 2), when God 
causes things to move he implicitly causes time to exist. Hence, God causes things to move without 
experiencing movement, and causes time to exist without experiencing it. In short, Aquinas’ statement that 
God’s “eternity includes all times” follows this perspective of causality: all times are included in God’s 
eternity in the sense that He causes them to exist. 
9 O’Collins maintains that God is “non-spatial, that is to say, incorporeal and immaterial.” 
O’Collins, Christology, 114. For Aquinas, “it is impossible that matter should exist in God.” ST I, q. 3, a. 2. 





and change: “everything which is moved acquires something by its movement, and 
attains to what it had not attained previously”11—a new attainment means a new 
component of the being or thing in movement, implying change. In other words, 
movement (and thus, composition and change) characterizes an imperfect being, who 
needs to attain something that he/she/it currently lacks. According to this view, to say that 
God is perfect means that He does not lack anything.12 Thus, He is not characterized by 
movement, composition, or change. Furthermore, as time is defined as the measure of 
movement and is composed by successive parts (not simple),13 God must be timeless. In 
other words, God is eternal in the sense that He is “outside of movement” and “has no 
succession, being simultaneously whole.”14 Hence, eternity/timelessness is simple 
(whole, without parts), unmovable (without succession), and unchangeable. Finally, 
considering that “matter is in potentiality,”15 God must be immaterial, meaning that His 
being is defined as cognition.16 Just as God is simple, unmovable, and eternal/timeless, so 
                                                
call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.” ST I, q. 4, a. 1; italics mine. 
11 ST I, q. 9, a. 1. Since “in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be 
found,” God is unmovable because in Him “there is no composition, for He is altogether simple.” 
Therefore, “movement in no way belongs to Him.” Ibid. 
12 God is “perfect, because He lacks not.” ST I, q. 4, a. 2. 
13 Time is “the numbering of movement” (ST I, q. 10, a. 1, ad 2) and is “successive” (ST I, q. 10, a. 
1, ad 5). In Aquinas’ words, “eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement. Hence, 
as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal.” ST I, q. 10, a. 2. 
14 ST I, q. 10, a. 1. 
15 ST I, q. 14, a. 1. “It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in 
potentiality.” Ibid. 
16 For Aquinas, in God “being and understanding are identical.” SCG IV, 11.7. “Free from all 
matter and potentiality . . . God is cognitive.” ST I, q. 14, a. 3. “The immateriality of a thing is the reason 
why it is cognitive.” As “God is in the highest degree of immateriality . . . He occupies the highest place in 
knowledge.” q. 14, a. 1. Indeed, “man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body,” but 




is His cognition or knowledge. His knowledge is simple or “not discursive”—it does not 
operate in a sequence of thoughts (without parts). Timelessly, He “sees all things together 
[at once], and not successively.”17 
The assumption that Christ is God implies that the characteristics mentioned 
above are found in the understanding of Christ’s divine nature.18 According to Aquinas, 
(1) the nature of Christ’s divinity is “altogether simple;”19 (2) He proceeded “from the 
Father by eternal generation;”20 (3) in the incarnation there was “no change” in His 
divine nature, “but only on the part of the human nature;”21 and (4) the intellectual (non-
spatial) nature of the pre-incarnate Christ is observed in His eternal/timeless generation, 
which is “an intellectual emanation.”22 As the Word, the pre-incarnate Christ is God’s act 
of understanding Himself, and because the divine intellect is eternal/timeless, God has 
                                                
17 ST I, q. 14, a. 7. 
18 It is important to note that, as far as O’Collins is concerned, the references to the understanding 
of the divine nature discussed in the paragraph above are found in his book on Christology. In his 
Christology, the Jesuit theologian suggests a “two-directional nature of our thinking about his divinity.” 
One goes from God to Christ, seeking to identify God’s attributes and then acknowledge that they are to be 
found in Christ, and the other direction goes from Christ to God, attempting to shape our notion of God in 
light of Christ. O’Collins, Christology, 234. 
19 ST III, q. 2, a. 4; italics mine. 
20 ST III, q. 3, a. 2; italics mine.  
21 ST III, q. 16, a. 6, ad 2; italics mine. Aquinas points out that “what belongs to the Divine Nature 
is predicated of the human nature—not, indeed, as it belongs essentially to the Divine Nature, but as it is 
participated by the human nature. Hence, whatever cannot be participated by the human nature (as to be 
uncreated and omnipotent), is nowise predicated of the human nature. But the Divine Nature received 
nothing by participation from the human nature; and hence what belongs to the human nature can nowise 
be predicated of the Divine Nature.” q. 16, a. 5, ad 3. 
22 SCG IV, 11.7. Aquinas maintains that “the Son of God proceeds naturally from the Father as the 
Intellectual Word.” ST III, q. 23, a. 3. In this context, the biblical statement “this day have I begotten You” 
(Ps 2:7) is interpreted as the eternal/timeless generation of Christ. SCG IV, 11.17. Aquinas points out that 
this idea of eternal/timeless generation of Christ shows the error of the Arians, who introduced the notion 
of time in the generation of Christ. See ibid. The medieval theologian also refers to Prov 8:24-25 in his 





always understood Himself, and “His Word necessarily always existed in God.”23 In 
order to avoid spatial and temporal categories,24 O’Collins prefers the language of 
Christ’s divine eternal/timeless25 existence rather than the expression Christ’s pre-
existence, because the latter implies a temporal sequence in which the divine Christ 
existed ‘before’ His incarnation.26 Moreover, in contrast to the human cognitive system 
that “must gather knowledge gradually,” “the divine system simply knows all things 
directly and eternally” at once, which means that Christ’s divine mind “does not think in 
                                                
23 SCG IV, 11.10. Aquinas stipulates that, in contrast to the generation or birth of corporeal things, 
the eternal generation of the Word does not involve motion or succession. Rather, “the Word of God is at 
once conceived, brought forth, and present.” SCG IV, 11.18. The notion of the Word as God’s act of 
understanding is stated in the following way, in God’s “act of understanding, the intellect conceives and 
forms the intention or the essence understood, and this is the interior word.” SCG IV, 11.7. By being the 
eternal/timeless act of God understanding Himself, the Word of God (Christ) is “necessarily the image of 
God in His essence” (Col 1:15) or “the figure of the substance of God” (Heb 1:3), in the sense that “the 
word conceived in the intellect is the image or the exemplar of the substance of the thing understood.” SCG 
IV, 11.14-15. 
24 Christ “belongs to an order of being other than the created, temporal one. His personal, divine 
existence transcends temporal (and spatial) categories; it might be better expressed as trans-existence, 
meta-existence, or, quite simply, eternal existence.” O’Collins, Christology, 248; italics mine. 
25 For O’Collins, “through sharing in the divine attribute of eternity” the divine Christ “exists 
timelessly, given that eternity is in itself timeless.” In fact, “eternity and eternal life . . . are not to be 
reduced to any such temporal duration. The eternal ‘now’ of the divine existence means perfect union and 
simplicity in unchangeable fullness of life, with no parts and with no relations of before and after, no 
having-been and no going-to-be.” In his view, the classical definition of eternity given by Boethius—
“‘interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio’ (the all- at-once, complete, and perfect possession of 
endless life) (Consolatio philosophiae, 5.6)” and “‘all-at-once’ (simul) positively and ‘endless’ 
(interminabilis) negatively”—is misleading because it recalls “time and temporal duration.” Ibid., 248. 
26 “To speak of the Son of God as pre-existing his incarnation and even the very creation of the 
world (when time began) could be (wrongly) taken to imply a ‘before’ and ‘after’ for his personal, divine 
existence. An addition that Constantinople I made to the Nicene Creed, ‘begotten from the Father before all 
ages’ . . . might mislead us into thinking here of temporal succession as if the Son merely anteceded or 
‘antedated’ everything that later began (in/with time). Hence, we strain language (in an anthropomorphic 
fashion) when we speak of the Logos personally existing and being active ‘before’ the incarnation.” Ibid. 
Likewise, Raymond Brown argues that Christ’s divine eternity (as timeless) is opposed to the idea of 
Christ’s preexistence. In his words, “preexistence is a more exalted category than thinking of Jesus 
becoming God’s Son in time but from another viewpoint there is no ‘pre’ in the timeless realm of God.” 




the propositional and discursive way.”27 
This understanding of divine nature has significant implications for the notion of 
divine action. One is the idea that “God causes things by His intellect” or “knowledge.”28 
For Aquinas, things happen because God knows them in Himself, and not that He gains 
knowledge or information from what happens to them in time.29 Ultimately, the locus of 
the reality of temporal things or beings is not the world, but God’s timeless intellect.30 In 
this ontological context, the medieval theologian elaborates the notion of divine 
providence, defined as “the type of the order of things towards their end” that necessarily 
“pre-exist in the divine mind.”31 In fact, God’s providence involves two aspects: (1) “the 
type of the order of things foreordained towards an end,”32 and (2) “the execution of this 
order,” which may include “certain intermediaries of God’s providence,”33 called 
                                                
27 O’Collins, Christology, 258. 
28 ST I, q. 14, a. 8. For helpful information about the causality of the divine ideas in Aquinas, see 
Gregory T. Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes (Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2008). For studies on God’s knowledge in Aquinas, see James Brent, “God’s Knowledge 
and Will,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 158-172; Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 124-138; Stump, 
Aquinas, 159-188. 
29 For Aquinas, God sees “things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence 
contains the similitude of things other than Himself.” ST I, q. 14, a. 5. “What is outside Himself,” God 
“does not see except in Himself.” ST I, q. 14, a. 5, ad 1. 
30 The medieval theologian claims that “things are more truly in God than God in things.” ST I, q. 
8, a. 3, ad 3. Because of that, “the knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His 
knowledge.” ST I, q. 14, a. 8, ad 2.  
31 ST I, q. 22, a. 1. Aquinas believes that this order of things also has room for contingency, 
because “God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently.” Thus, “to some effects He has 
attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise 
contingent effects.” ST I, q. 19, a. 8. 
32 ST I, q. 22, a. 1. 
33 ST I, q. 22, a. 3. “God has immediate providence over everything, because He has in His 




“secondary causes.” 34 O’Collins seems to agree that temporal things are a replication of 
the mind of the eternal/timeless God, as he apparently understands time as a reproduction 
of timeless eternity.35 He also explains the action of a timeless and non-spatial God in a 
temporal and spatial world by affirming that God, the first or primary cause, acts through 
intermediaries or secondary causes. 36 Therefore, God’s timeless and non-spatial action 
produces temporal and spatial effects in the world by means of temporal and spatial 
intermediaries.37  
An important distinction between Aquinas and O’Collins in the understanding of 
divine action is the notion of predestination. For the medieval theologian, as a “part of 
providence,”38 timeless predestination is a “type of the ordering of some persons towards 
                                                
34 ST I, q. 22, a. 3, ad 2. “There is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of 
predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first 
cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes.” q. 23, a. 5. 
35 O’Collins seems to subscribe to Plato’s view of “time as ‘the eternal image of eternity, moving 
according to number’ (Timaeus, 37d).” According to this perspective, he argues that “eternity transcends 
time but without being apart from it; eternity and time should be considered together. Through the attribute 
of eternity God is present immediately and powerfully to all times.” O’Collins, Christology, 248. 
36 Ibid., 113. The Jesuit theologian conceives action in terms of cause and argues that God’s action 
is not alongside other actions. He suggests two analogies of divine action, namely, the way in which the 
human mind controls bodily actions and the way human beings influence one another. Ibid., 115. 
37 The Jesuit theologian points out that “every effect and phenomenon in the world has God as its 
primary or first cause.” Ibid., 113. The primary cause is timeless and non-spatial, while the secondary 
causes are spatio-temporal. In his words, “unlike created, secondary causes, God is neither spatial nor 
temporal.” Ibid. 
38 ST I, q. 23, a. 3. The part of providence that refers to “those who turn aside from that end” is 
called “reprobation.” Ibid. For helpful secondary literature on the notions of providence and predestination 
in Aquinas, see Harm Goris, “Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination, and Human Freedom,” in 
The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 99-122; Jill Raitt, “St. Thomas Aquinas on Free Will and 
Predestination,” Duke Divinity School Review 43, no. 3 (1978): 188-195; Lee H. Yearley, “St. Thomas 
Aquinas on Providence and Predestination,” Anglican Theological Review 49, no. 4 (1967): 409-423; 




eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind.”39 Similarly to providence, predestination 
has a twofold structure: (1) “the act of predestination,” which is God’s eternal/timeless 
act, and (2) “the term and effect of predestination” in time.40 This twofold structure 
suggests that God has only one act, which is simultaneously whole, and not a sequential 
or successive series of acts. Indeed, “the newness of an effect produced by God does not 
demonstrate newness of action in Him,”41 since “God’s action existed from all eternity, 
whereas its effect was not present from eternity, but existed at that time when, from all 
eternity, He ordained it.”42 Nonetheless, the Jesuit theologian does not seem to agree with 
Aquinas’ idea of divine predestination.43 Rather, he points out that God’s action is 
                                                
39 ST I, q. 23, a. 2. For the eternal/timeless character of predestination, see a. 2, ad 3 and 4. 
According to Aquinas, the execution of predestination “is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively 
in God.” q. 23, a. 2. The medieval theologian argues that predestination is not caused by the divine 
foreknowledge of merits of the saved. See q. 23, a. 5. 
40 ST III, q. 24, a. 3. 
41 SCG II.35.2. “God acts voluntarily in the production of things, but not in such fashion that there 
be some other intermediate action of His, as in us the action of the motive power intervenes between the act 
of the will and the effect, as we have also previously shown. On the contrary, God’s act of understanding 
and willing is, necessarily, His act of making.” SCG II.35.3. 
42 SCG II.35.3. The eternal act of God preordains its effects not only in the sense that it determines 
“that this thing is to be such and such, but that it is to be at this particular time.” Ibid. Aquinas compares 
this notion to a physician who “determines that a dose of medicine is to be drunk at such and such a 
particular time, so that, if his act of will were of itself sufficient to produce the effect, the effect would 
follow anew from his previous decision, without any new action on his part.” Ibid. 
43 The theme of predestination is not explored in Christology, Jesus Our Redeemer, and Jesus Our 
Priest. In other writings, O’Collins is sympathetic to the Molinist idea of middle knowledge as a way to 
reconcile God’s foreknowledge and authentic human freedom. According to middle knowledge, “God 
knows and takes into account decisions that rational creatures would freely make in any situation in which 
they might be placed.” This is “more than knowing mere possibilities but less than a vision of actual future 
events.” Gerald O’Collins, Rethinking Fundamental Theology: Toward a New Fundamental Theology 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 11. The Jesuit theologian seems to reject the view that 
“God determines ‘in advance’ what human beings will decide and do; hence the divine knowledge about 
their actions is simply based on ‘predetermining decrees’.” Ibid., 20. In fact, he defines predestination as 
“being elected for salvation through the eternal foreknowledge and will of God (see Mt 20:23; Jn 10:29; 
Rom 8:28-30; Eph 1:3-14),” and denies Calvin’s double predestination. He argues that “predestination 
should not be pushed to the point of denying either God’s universal saving will (1 Tm 2:3-6) or human 
freedom.” CDT, 3 ed. (2013), s.v. “predestination.” The contrast between O’Collins and Aquinas on the 





characterized by “love and freedom,” which “allows for endless variation in the God-
world relationship and, in particular, for effects that are qualitatively distinct from God’s 
‘ordinary work’ in creating and then sustaining creation.”44 O’Collins does not explain 
how this variation occurs, but he does not see a variation in God (primary cause) in the 
relationship with human beings in the notions of reconciliation and divine judgment. For 
him, reconciliation in the NT “does not point to God being changed or reconciled to 
human beings; rather it is God or God through Christ who effects reconciliation by 
changing us.”45 Hence, there is no reconciliation in God, but only in human beings. 
Second, God’s judgment on human beings is not interpreted as an action “‘from 
                                                
Jesuit—Louis de Molina (1535-1600), and opposed by the Dominicans—particularly by Doming Bañez 
(1528-1604), who understood predestination from a Thomistic perspective. “Between 1598 and 1607 a 
commission, De Auciliis, met in Rome” in order to solve the debate between Jesuits and Dominicans, but 
the commission “failed to resolve the issue. It ended by forbidding Jesuits to brand the Dominicans 
Calvinists and the Dominicans to call Jesuits Pelagians.” CDT, 3 ed. (2013), s.v. “molinism.” “Although 
officially the dispute was left undecided, the Dominican Bañezians emerged victorious, in the sense that 
their theory became generally recognized as the Thomistic doctrine.” Goris, Divine Foreknowledge, 
Providence, Predestination, and Human Freedom, 100. As a Jesuit, O’Collins criticizes the Dominican 
position (Bañez) by saying that it “does not seem to do full justice to human freedom.” However, he 
affirms that “this debate indicates that the deepest theological questions cannot finally be answered 
adequately. The divine mystery has the first and the last word.” CDT, 3 ed. (2013), s.v. “molinism.” For 
additional information about the debate between Jesuits and Dominicans, see Willian Lane Craig, “The 
Middle-Knowledge View,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, ed. James K. Beilby, Paul R. Eddy, and 
Gregory A. Boyd (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 121-122; Margaret J. Osler, Divine Will 
and the Mechanical Philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on Contingency and Necessity in the Created 
World (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 133; Peter Johannes Thuesen, 
Predestination: The American Career of a Contentious Doctrine (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 139-142. For helpful information on Molinism and middle knowledge, see Eef Dekker, 
Middle Knowledge, Studies in Philosophical Theology (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2000); Hasker, God, 
Time, and Knowledge, 19-52; David Basinger, “Divine Control and Human Freedom: Is Middle 
Knowledge the Answer?” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 36, no. 1 (1993): 55-64; Dean 
Allan Kowalski, “Conditionals of Freedom as Bivalent: A Defense of Middle Knowledge,” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, The University of Wisconsin, 2000); Howard Prather Short, “On Middle Knowledge,” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, 2007); Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist 
Account, Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
44 O’Collins, Christology, 115. 




outside,’” but as He allowing “the natural consequences of sin to work themselves out.”46 
Thus, divine judgment is not a divine action that responds to a human action. Even 
though these statements are not explicitly related to the view of God as simple and 
timeless/non-spatial, they do cohere with a God who is not influenced by what happens in 
the world and does not act in response to human actions. To put it more sharply, the 
Jesuit theologian seems to suggest the possibility of variation only at the level of 
secondary/temporal causes (human beings). Hence, while he attempts to eschew the idea 
that human actions (secondary causes) are ultimately temporal effects of God’s timeless 
action (the primary cause) in his notion of variation in the God-world relationship, it is 
difficult to see how this conception of a timeless God does not lead to timeless 
predestination.47 If God does allow some freedom or variation for the secondary causes, 
how does He know about this variation in His non-discursive/timeless intellect? The 
logical answer would be that He does not know it from its reality in time, but rather from 
His own mind. Moreover, this knowledge implies causation, because any distinction 
between knowing and causing would be incoherent with a simple and timeless God. In 
this case, there is no real variation in the secondary causes. 
In summary, the conception of divine nature in the sacramental model implies that 
God’s timeless and non-spatial action (singular) is the primary cause that produces a 
                                                
46 Ibid., 52. This is O’Collins interpretation of the Genesis account of the Flood, which is 
“understood as a powerful symbol of the intrinsic self-destructiveness of human sin.” Ibid. 
47 O’Collins seems to suggest the possibility of variation at the level of secondary/temporal causes. 
However, if secondary causes are a temporal reflection of the timeless primary cause, there is no real 
variation here. If God does allow some freedom for the secondary causes, then the following questions is 
raised: how does God know about this variation in His non-discursive and timeless intellect? He cannot 
know it from its reality in time. If He knows the variation from Himself, then He is ultimately causing it, 





series of material and temporal effects (plural) in the world, by means of the actions 
(plural) of secondary temporal/material causes. This notion of divine nature and action 
informs not only the comprehension of Christ’s divinity, but also sets the stage for the 
understanding of His incarnation and salvific work on earth, which will be explored 
below in the discussion of humanity as the second principle of reality in this study. 
Humanity: Christ and the Concept of Human Nature  
The conception of a timeless and non-spatial divine nature in the sacramental 
model implies that Christ’s humanity is a secondary (temporal/material) cause by which 
the divine primary (timeless/non-spatial) cause produces material and temporal effects in 
the spatio-temporal world. For Aquinas, God acts indirectly (by means of an instrument) 
to guide the historical movement, which involves sequential or successive acts in time, of 
creatures to their end.48 Moreover, he understands instrumentality in the context of a 
hierarchy between created beings and God, where lower created beings are directed to 
Him by higher beings.49 In this way Christ’s humanity is part of God’s activity in 
                                                
48 According to “the principle of their being,” says Aquinas, “God touches each thing 
immediately, by causing and preserving it.” However, in regards to “things being directed to God as to their 
end,” He directs them through an instrument or “medium between the creature and God.” ST III, q. 6, a. 1, 
ad 1 (for further information on how God works in things, see ST I, q. 105, a. 5). According to this view, 
while God acts directly and immediately in the creation and preservation of creatures, His historical 
guidance is performed by means of instruments. In the first case, a simple and timeless God acts directly in 
an immediate and instantaneous way. In the second case, a simple/timeless God does not act in a sequential 
or successive way in history, unless He acts indirectly through temporal/spatial instruments. 
49 God directs things to their end through an instrument or “medium between the creature and 
God,” as “lower creatures are directed to God by higher.” ST III, q. 6, a. 1, ad 1. As William S. Brewbaker 
summarizes, “Thomas believes beings exist in a hierarchy of perfection with God, the immutable, spiritual 
intellect, at the top and with corruptible, inanimate matter at the bottom. In between (in descending order of 
perfection) are angels, humans, animals, and plants.” William S. Brewbaker III, “Thomas Aquinas and the 
Metaphysics of Law,” Alabama Law Review 58, no. 3 (2007): 605. See SCG IV.11; ST I.77.2. For a helpful 
selection of Aquinas’ writings on the ladder of being, see Thomas Aquinas, Selected Philosophical 
Writings, trans. Timothy S. McDermott, Oxford World’s Classics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 





directing things to their end, which is Himself.50 As lower beings are directed by higher 
ones, human beings are historically guided to their teleological end by Christ’s humanity, 
which is the instrument by which God works salvifically in space and time.51 The 
medieval theologian even understands Christ’s incarnation in the context of God’s 
timeless act of predestination,52 which distinguishes the eternal/timeless act of God and 
its temporal effect. As a temporal effect, the incarnate Christ is the cause of human 
salvation.53 However, He is not the primary cause of salvation, “because by one and the 
same act God predestinated both Christ and us.”54 Hence, the humanity of Christ is a 
secondary cause (an instrument) of salvation. 
Even though O’Collins does not seem to agree with Aquinas’ view of divine 
timeless predestination, the Jesuit theologian does assume that Christ’s humanity is an 
instrument of God’s presence in the spatio-temporal world. In his view, the incarnation 
                                                
that “a creature participates more in being and has more unity as it approaches the First Being.” Edward P. 
Mahoney, “Metaphysical Foundations of the Hierarchy of Being According to Some Late-Medieval and 
Renaissance Philosophers,” in Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval, ed. Parviz Morewedge 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 172. 
50 It is in the context of “things being directed to God as to their end” through “a medium between 
the creature and God” that Aquinas situates the “assumption of human nature by the Word of God.” ST III, 
q. 6, a. 1, ad 1. 
51 Aquinas summarizes the instrumentality of the humanity of Christ in the context of His salvific 
activity that directs human beings to their end, as follows: “Full participation of the Divinity, which is the 
true bliss of man and end of human life; . . . is bestowed upon us by Christ’s humanity.” ST III, q. 1, a. 2. 
52 “Christ was predestined,” in the sense that the union of His divine and human natures “falls 
under the eternal predestination of God.” ST III, q. 24, a. 1. See also q. 3, a. 8, ad 2. According to this view, 
predestination “is a certain Divine preordination from eternity of those things which are to be done in 
time,” and the incarnation “is something done in time by God.” ST III, q. 24, a. 1. 
53 For Aquinas, God eternally predestined or decreed that salvation should be achieved through 
Jesus Christ. The salvific work of Christ presupposes, he adds, that the “eternal predestination covers not 
only that which is to be accomplished in time, but also the mode and order in which it is to be 





explains how a timeless and non-spatial God can “be present to human beings and so, in 
that sense, be located in space and time.”55 He adds, “By personally assuming the human 
condition, the incarnate Son of God provided the bodily, spatial-temporal component . . . 
on the divine side,” supplying “the bodily ‘requirement’ on the side of God.”56 The 
notion of incarnation as a spatio-temporal component of a non-spatial and timeless God 
implies that Christ’s humanity is a mediatorial instrument of the divine presence. For the 
Jesuit theologian, while “presence is communicated immediately” “between the divine 
persons of the Trinity,” in the case of human beings presence “happens symbolically,” 
that is, “through the mediation of our voices, our actions, and things which have some 
special connection with us.”57 The assumption that presence in the human context is 
always “mediated and never strictly and exclusively immediate presence”58 seems to 
presuppose that spatio-temporal things, such as human voice and action, are not presence 
itself, but instruments that mediate it.59 Ultimately, humanity itself, while a spatio-
temporal reality, can be considered an instrument of presence. Thus, Christ’s humanity 
instrumentally mediates God’s presence in the spatio-temporal world.60 
                                                
55 O’Collins, Christology, 341. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 342. 
58 Ibid. 
59 This notion seems to be compatible with O’Collins’ view that “our bodies enable us to 
communicate” (ibid., 256), which appears to conceive the human body as a necessary instrument of 
communication. More specifically, the body is viewed instrumentally.  
60 This perspective presupposes a strong gap between a timeless/non-spatial God and 
temporal/spatial human beings. For O’Collins, the assumed “‘gap’ between the space-time universe and a 
Creator by nature non-spatial and eternal” is a challenge for philosophers and fundamental theologians. 




The idea that Christ’s humanity is a spatio-temporal instrument of divine presence 
and action in the world and, consequently, a secondary cause of salvation, informs the 
ontological notions of Christ’s divine and human natures and their respective functions. 
First of all, Christ’s twofold nature presupposes a twofold nativity. In His divinity He was 
born of the Father in timeless eternity (eternal generation), while in His humanity He was 
born from Mary in time (temporal generation).61 In this context, O’Collins highlights that 
Christ’s divine and human natures imply the miraculous coexistence of two “mutually 
exclusive sets of characteristics” in His person—“being simultaneously eternal, 
incorruptible, immutable, and non-spatial, on the one hand, and temporal, corruptible, 
changeable, and spatially determined, on the other.”62 In this way, there is no ontological 
                                                
61 ST III, q. 35, a. 2. Aquinas makes the following remarks about the humanity of Christ in time: 
(1) “the Word of God from all eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person; while in time the human 
nature accrued to it” (ST III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 2); (2) “the temporal sonship, whereby Christ is said to be the Son 
of Man, does not constitute His person, as does the eternal sonship; but is something following upon the 
temporal nativity” (ST III, q. 3, a. 5, ad 1); (3) “by union with the Person, the Man receives omnipotence in 
time, which the Son of God had from eternity” (ST III, q. 13, a. 1, ad 1); (4) “in Christ there is a twofold 
nature: one which He received of the Father from eternity, the other which He received from His Mother in 
time” (ST III, q. 35, a. 2). For O’Collins, the double generation is part of the confession of Chalcedon (AD 
451), in which the “scheme of double ‘consubstantiality’ matched the dyad of eternal/temporal generation.” 
O’Collins, Christology, 171. “The double, eternal/temporal generation of the Son flowered with Irenaeus 
(Adversus haereses, 2.28.6; 3.10.2) and a century later even more clearly with Lactantius (Divinae 
institutiones, 4.8.1–2).” Later, “Cyril of Jerusalem (c.313–386) included the double ‘nativity’: ‘his birth is 
twofold: one, of God before time began; the other, of the Virgin in the fullness of time’ (Catecheses, 
15.1).” Also, “Cyril of Alexandria cultivated the theme of the Word’s double generation: the first, eternal 
and divine, the second in history and ‘according to the flesh’ (e.g ., Quod unus sit Christus 721e, 731e, 
734b, 740d, 746c, 747a, and 752e).” This theme “figured prominently in Cyril’s second letter to Nestorius 
(February 430 ). In his Tome or dogmatic letter of June 449 to Flavian, bishop of Constantinople, Leo the 
Great endorsed the language of Christ’s double birth, eternal for his divine nature and temporal for his 
human nature. Two years later, this language passed into the Chalcedonian definition of faith.” Ibid. In this 
sense, “the person of the Son of God exists eternally and timelessly,” while “His historical humanity began 
its existence within the temporal order.” Ibid., 238. “The incarnation involves a divine being who is by 
definition eternal, without a body, and unlimited in power, knowledge, and presence (i.e., omnipotent, 
omniscient, and omnipresent) personally taking up an existence that is temporal, partly material, and 
thoroughly limited in power, knowledge, and presence. Through the incarnation, God, who is pure Spirit, 
assumes (and not merely creates and conserves) matter; the eternal, timeless God personally enters time. 
The incarnation involves an immortal, unchanging divine person becoming subject to change and, above 
all, death.” Ibid. 





interchange of properties (communicatio idiomatum) between Christ’s divine and human 
natures.63 Aquinas points out that “all the properties of the human, just as of the Divine 
Nature, may be predicated equally of Christ,” but with proper qualification: He is created 
and passible in His humanity, and uncreated and impassible in His divinity.64  
Accordingly, Christ’s divine and human natures also have mutually exclusive 
activities. Functions performed by His humanity justify the need of its instrumental 
activity inasmuch as they are not directly performed by His divinity.65 One example of 
these functions is the mediation of the divine presence in the spatio-temporal world 
(O’Collins), as I have indicated above. Other examples are prayer and passibility. As a 
sequential expression of thoughts and wishes, prayer implies a discursive mind, which 
belongs to human, not divine, cognition in the sacramental model.66 According to 
                                                
notion of temporal nativity (human generation) in the sense that “the filiation by which Christ is referred to 
His Mother cannot be a real relation, but only a relation of reason,” because “every relation which is 
predicated of God from time does not put something real in the eternal God.” ST III, q. 35, a. 5. The 
medieval theologian explains, “temporal nativity would cause a real temporal filiation in Christ if there 
were in Him a subject capable of such filiation. But this cannot be; since the eternal suppositum cannot be 
receptive of a temporal relation.” q. 5, a. 5, ad 1; italics mine. 
63 In his remarks on the communicatio idiomatum, O’Collins criticizes the tendency of modern 
writers defining this concept as “attributing the properties of one of Christ’s two natures to the other.” For 
the Jesuit theologian, historically, this concept “involves naming the person of Christ with reference to one 
nature (e.g., ‘the Son of God’) and attributing to him a property that belongs to the other nature (‘died on 
the cross’).” O’Collins, Christology, 173. 
64 ST III, q. 16, a. 8, ad 2. For further information about divine impassibility in Aquinas, see Brian 
Leftow, “God’s Impassibility, Immutability, and Eternity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian 
Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 173-186. 
65 Despite this distinction, Aquinas defends the unity in these activities because “the human nature 
shares in the operation of the divine nature, as an instrument shares in the operation of the principal agent.” 
ST III, q. 19, a. 1. As Aquinas points out, “the operation of Christ’s human nature, as the instrument of the 
Godhead, is not distinct from the operation of the Godhead; for the salvation wherewith the manhood of 
Christ saves us and that wherewith His Godhead saves us are not distinct; nevertheless, the human nature in 
Christ, inasmuch as it is a certain nature, has a proper operation distinct from the divine.” q. 19, a. 1, ad 2.  
66 In his remarks on Christ’s eternal/timeless divinity, Aquinas claims that His knowledge did not 
advance, since He had the whole perfect knowledge “at once” from the beginning. But according to His 





Aquinas, “to pray belongs to Christ as man,” as His divinity could not pray (“the divine 
will of itself is effective of whatever He wishes by it”).67 Considering Christ’s human 
action as a secondary cause of salvation under divine predestination, the medieval 
theologian claims that His human prayer is a temporal effect of God’s timeless 
predestination and, thus, Christ prayed only for those predestined for salvation.68 Since 
O’Collins avoids Aquinas’ position on predestination, he probably does not agree with 
the medieval theologian on this point. But the overall idea that prayer belongs to Christ’s 
human mind does cohere with the views of the Jesuit theologian. 
In regards to passibility, Aquinas argues that the incarnate Christ “assumed a 
passible body”69 in order to work instrumentally for human salvation in the sufferings of 
His body. As I mentioned above, the medieval theologian conceives instrumentality from 
a hierarchical perspective, where lower beings or parts work instrumentally for higher 
ones. This means that the sufferings of Christ’s body work instrumentally for His soul,70 
which is an instrument of His divinity. Likewise, Aquinas stipulates that in His passion 
                                                
produce the whole at once, but successively; and hence by this knowledge Christ did not know everything 
from the beginning, but step by step, and after a time.” ST III, q. 12, a. 2, ad 1. 
67 ST III, q. 21, a. 1. 
68 Aquinas highlights that Christ “did not pray for all those who crucified Him, as neither did He 
for all those who would believe in Him; but for those only who were predestinated to obtain eternal life 
through Him.” ST III, q. 21, a. 4, ad 2.  
69 ST III, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3. In the context of Christ, Aquinas seems to define passibiliby especially 
as the capability of experiencing hunger, thirst, suffering, and death. See q. 5, a. 2. For further information 
about the passibility of Christ in Aquinas, see Paul Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the 
Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Scranton, PA: University of Scranton Press, 2009), 101-460. O’Collins 
affirms the traditional view of divine impassibility because he finds “it very difficult to envisage God as 
both suffering (essentially and even eternally?) and also saving us from our suffering and sin.” O’Collins, 
Jesus Our Redeemer, 46. 
70 Christ’s soul “was the source of meriting,” whereas the body “was the subject of suffering” and 




“Christ’s actions and sufferings operate instrumentally in virtue of His Godhead for the 
salvation of men.”71 In other words, salvation is a result of the power of Christ’s divine 
nature, and not merely of the death of His body.72 The hierarchical and instrumental 
relationship between Christ’s divinity, His soul, and His body is central to Aquinas’ 
notion of Christ’s human nature and its union with the divine nature.73 Christ’s humanity 
is defined as a composition of soul and body,74 where the body is lower and works 
                                                
71 ST III, q. 48, a. 6. 
72 ST III, q. 50, a. 6, ad 1. For the medieval theologian, the divine nature “was not separated from 
the body at Christ’s death, much less was He separated from the soul.” But “His soul when separated from 
the body did go down into hell,” while “His body was laid in a sepulchre.” ST III, q. 50, a. 3; q. 49, a. 6. 
73 As a modern theologian, O’Collins does not emphasize the relationship of Christ’s body and 
soul in his discussion of the humanity of Christ, as Aquinas does. The Jesuit theologian enumerates the 
following necessary properties of a human being: “organic, bodily existence, coupled with rationality, free 
will, affectivity, and memory.” Also, human beings are dynamic (in the sense of constant development), 
social, limited (especially to space and time), and transcendent (going beyond themselves). O’Collins, 
Christology, 234-235. With regard to the relationship between Christ’s divine and human natures he claims 
that “Christ should be understood as a ‘subject-in-relation’” who “acted/acts through his two rational and 
volitional principles of operation—his divine and human natures.” Ibid., 243. For Aquinas, the incarnate 
Christ is composed by three elements which, in order of importance, are “the Word” (divine nature), the 
soul (human nature), and the body (human nature). ST III, q. 1, a. 1. Based on this hierarchical order, and 
its implied notion of hierarchical instrumentality, the medieval theologian affirms that the union of Christ’s 
human and divine natures takes place “through the medium of the soul.” ST III, q. 6, a. 1. See also q. 6, a. 1, 
ad 1. Aquinas points out that “the soul was united immediately with the Word,” while “the body was united 
with the Word through the soul.” ST III, q. 49, a. 6, ad 3. See also q. 33, a. 2; q. 50, a. 3. By being nobler 
than the body in “the rank of dignity,” the soul is the “midway between God and flesh.” ST III, q. 6, a. 1. 
The main reason for this conception of superiority of the soul over the body rests on the idea of intellect. 
Since Aquinas conceives God’s nature as an intellect, the human “intellect is the highest and noblest of the 
parts of the soul, and the most like to God.” In this sense, the soul “has a capacity for God, being in His 
likeness.” ST III, q. 6, a. 2. See also q. 33, a. 2. For Aquinas, intellect is called “spirit” in the Bible, and he 
mentions Eph 4:23 in this context. ST III, q. 6, a. 2. 
74 Christ’s human nature is understood according to the Aristotelian “double unity” of “soul and 
body.” ST III, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2. Aquinas rejects two views on human nature, one that holds that it has “being 
of itself, away from matter” (Platonists), and another that argues that this nature exists “in an intellect either 
human or divine.” In contrast to both these views, he believes that “human nature cannot be without 
sensible matter.” This conclusion is based on the Aristotelian notion that “sensible matter belongs to the 
specific nature of sensible things, and is placed in its definition,” which means that “flesh and bones” are 
“in the definition of man.” ST III, q. 4, a. 4. In this way, “the body lives by the soul” (ST III, q. 2, a. 5, ad 
3), and “if the soul is absent, there are no bones nor flesh.” ST III, q. 5, a. 3. The medieval theologian 
stipulates that in the statement “‘the Word was made flesh’” (John 1:14), “‘flesh’ is taken for the whole 
man,” which includes soul and body. Facing the objection that Jesus did not assume a soul, which argues 
that John 1:14 does not mention a soul but only flesh, he answers that this passage intends to show the 





instrumentally for the soul. Likewise, His humanity is lower and works instrumentally for 
His divinity.75 
In summary, Christ’s spatio-temporal humanity is distinct from His timeless and 
non-spatial divinity. This distinction assumes that Christ had a twofold birth 
(timeless/divine and temporal/human), and has a twofold cognition (non-
discursive/divine and discursive/human). Moreover, such distinction depicts the 
ontological gap between God and human beings, bridged through the instrumentality of 
Christ’s humanity. In this sense, His humanity is a spatio-temporal instrument (secondary 
cause) of the divine presence in the world (O’Collins) and for the divine guidance of the 
historical teleological movement of creatures to God in the context of His timeless 
predestination (Aquinas). I will further explore these conceptions of Christ’s divinity and 
humanity in the discussion on Christ and cosmology below. 
Cosmology: Christ, Heaven, and Earth  
In this last principle of reality to be described in the sacramental model, I will 
                                                
and flesh the last and lowest. Hence, wishing to commend the love of God’s humility to us, the Evangelist 
mentioned the Word and flesh, leaving the soul on one side, since it is less than the Word and nobler than 
flesh.’ Again, it was reasonable to mention flesh, which, as being farther away from the Word, was less 
assumable, as it would seem.” ST III, q. 5, a. 3, ad 1. For further information on Aquinas’ view on human 
nature in general and Christ’s human nature, see Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 207-226; Stump, 
Aquinas, 189-306; Paul Gondreau, “The Humanity of Christ, the Incarnate Word,” in The Theology of 
Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2005); Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. 
75 Aquinas contrasts two views of the humanity of Christ as the instrument of divinity, one 
defended by Nestorius and the other by Damascene. For Nestorius, “the human nature was assumed by the 
Word merely as an instrument, and not into the unity of the hypostasis. And therefore he did not concede 
that the man was really the Son of God, but His instrument.” Conversely, Damascene affirmed that “the 
human nature in Christ is an instrument belonging to the unity of the hypostasis.” Aquinas subscribes to 
this second view of the instrumentality of Christ’s humanity. ST III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 4. According to Paul 
Gondreau, “the ‘instrumentality’ of Christ’s humanity, is a doctrine inherited from John Damascene but 
modified and extended according to the refinements of his Aristotelian mind.” Gondreau, The Passions of 




focus on the relationship of the resurrected ascended Christ with heaven and earth, 
observing how the concepts of divinity and humanity explored above are related to 
cosmology or the ontological structure of the world.76 A key notion in this model is that 
incarnation and resurrection/ascension have inverse relationships with space and time. 
The former describes a timeless/non-spatial divine being receiving or assuming (not 
becoming) a temporal/spatial human nature, while the latter depicts a temporal/spatial 
human nature becoming somehow timeless/non-spatial. From a cosmological perspective, 
the incarnation is a movement from heaven to earth, and the resurrection/ascension is a 
movement from earth to heaven. In the movement toward earth, the emphasis is on a 
spatio-temporal reality, whereas the timeless/non-spatial reality is dominant in the 
movement toward heaven. Overall, the earth is characterized chiefly by temporal/spatial 
realities, and heaven is described mainly as a timeless/non-spatial reality. 
The glorification of Christ’s resurrected and ascended humanity is at the center of 
this discussion. In simple terms, the glorified humanity of Christ is defined as a more 
God-like condition,77 and described as a liberation from time and space.78 Aquinas argues 
                                                
76 For helpful information on Aquinas’ cosmology, see Oliva Blanchette, The Perfection of the 
Universe According to Aquinas: A Teleological Cosmology (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University, 1992). Overall, Aquinas adopted his cosmology from Aristotle. Brian Leftow, “God’s 
Omnipotence,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2011), 182. 
77 According to Aquinas, in the different glory of His resurrected body, Christ “did not return to 
the familiar manner of life, but to a kind of immortal and God-like condition.” ST III, q. 55, a. 2. Likewise, 
O’Collins points out that the transformed human existence of the raised and glorified Christ “became even 
more like unto God.” O’Collins, Christology, 117. 
78 O’Collins indicates that the glorious transformation of the resurrection “brought a dramatic 
change in the human operations of the risen Jesus: their liberation from the normal, earthly limitations of 
time and space.” O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 201. The Jesuit theologian believes that Christ’s 
resurrection increased and elevated His human powers. Ibid. Furthermore, he argues that “the incarnation 
provided a new way for a divine person to be present somewhere and (through the transformation of his 





that the glory of the soul coming from Christ’s divinity overflows in His body, turning it 
impassible,79 and O’Collins claims that glorification refers to the spiritualization of 
matter.80 Therefore, glorification is in some sense the reversal of incarnation. While the 
incarnation meant that the spiritual (timeless/non-spatial) being or the divine Christ was 
attached to a material (spatio-temporal) human nature, glorification implied the 
spiritualization (timeless/non-spatial) of the material (spatio-temporal) human nature of 
Christ.81 This view of glorification impacts the conceptualization of Christ’s ascension to 
heaven, where ideas of ascension as movement and heaven as a place are avoided. Taken 
at face value, the biblical account of the ascension (Acts 1:9-11) describes it as a 
movement from earth to heaven. Since movement is a spatio-temporal phenomena by 
                                                
the reasons why the resurrected Christ was able to enter a room with locked doors (John 20:26) and vanish 
from the sight of the disciples (Luke 24:31), even though He was a true human being with flesh and bones 
(cf. Luke 24:37-43). ST III, q. 54, a. 1. I emphasize here that this was one of the reasons, because the 
medieval theologian argues that “Christ had this not only from the condition of His glorified body, but also 
from the power of His Godhead, by which power it may happen that even bodies not glorified are 
miraculously unseen.” q. 54, a. 1, ad 2. Quoting Augustine, Aquinas compares those occurrences with the 
fact that Christ was born from a virgin mother. q. 54, a. 1, ad 1. However, he also affirms that, given the 
spiritual condition the glorified body, in the sense that it is “subject to the will of the spirit” (the intellectual 
aspect of the soul), “whoever has a glorified body has it in his power to be seen when he so wishes, and not 
to be seen when he does not wish it.” q. 54, a. 1, ad 2. 
79 For Aquinas, this did not happen to Christ’s humanity at the beginning of His incarnation 
because He needed to fulfill the work of salvation “in a passible body.” ST III, q. 45, a. 2. See also q. 49, a. 
6, ad 3. But this passibility was no longer necessary after His death. See q. 54, a. 2. In fact, “in the passion 
He merited His exaltation by way of recompense even on behalf of His body,” and therefore “the body, 
which from charity was subjected to the passion, should receive recompense in glory.” ST III, q. 49, a. 6, ad 
2. 
80 According to O’Collins, resurrection and glorification are “the full and final personalizing and 
spiritualizing of matter,” in which the human spirit dominates matter and the body serves the glorified 
spirit. O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 255. 
81 For O’Collins, while “the incarnation involved the timeless Son of God taking on a temporal 
existence, resurrection from the dead involves” a temporal being “becoming eternal” or timeless, “to the 
extent that created beings can participate in the divine attribute of eternity.” Gerald O’Collins, “Our Risen 




definition,82 there are at least two attempts of conciliation in the sacramental model 
between a spatio-temporal ascension and a primordially non-spatial/timeless 
glorification. Aquinas attributes the ascendant movement to Christ as man, not as God, 
stipulating that some movement can be ascribed to His glorified humanity.83 On the other 
hand, O’Collins seems to maintain that the ascension is a non-spatial/timeless reality that 
is described in the Bible according to human language, which in its limitation can only 
use spatio-temporal concepts.84 As he does not appear to assume a temporal sequence of 
the events after Christ’s death, the Jesuit theologian conflates the ascension with the 
death of Christ85 and chiefly with His resurrection.86 For these reasons, the sacramental 
                                                
82 Aquinas argues that, although divine power/action is instantaneous (not temporal/spatial), the 
disciples were able to see Christ using His divine power in the ascension in a way that was not 
instantaneous (temporal/spatial), that is, they saw Him being uplifted to heaven. He explains that while the 
divine power is instantaneous, its effect does not need to be so. Rather, the effect “is received in things 
according to their capacity, and as God disposes.” In this case, “a body is incapable of being moved locally 
in an instant, because it must be commensurate with space, according to the division of which time is 
reckoned.” ST III, q. 57, a. 3, ad 3. 
83 “Christ ascended into heaven as man, but not as God.” ST III, q. 57, a. 2. “The ascension in no 
wise belongs to Christ according to the condition of His divine nature; both because there is nothing higher 
than the divine nature to which He can ascend; and because ascension is local motion, a thing not in 
keeping with the divine nature, which is immovable and outside all place.” Ibid. The medieval theologian 
claims that, even though there is no “movement in God Himself, because He is utterly unchangeable,” 
some movement may be attributed to Christ on the basis of His human nature. ST III, q. 57, a. 1, ad 1.  
84 Based on the assumption that “human beings absorb and express events in terms of time and 
space,” O’Collins declares that “the first Christians took in and stated what had happened to the person of 
Jesus in terms of time (the resurrection) and space (the ascension). He had risen again on the third day and 
ascended into heaven.” Gerald O’Collins, “Christ’s Resurrection and Ascension,” America 160, no. 11 
(1989): 263. The Jesuit theologian advocates that “to the extent that the final reality of resurrection is more 
than a spatio-temporal reality, language fails.” O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 254. 
85 O’Collins portrays a form of Christ’s ascension from earth to heaven using the priestly language 
of Hebrews. In his words, “Christ’s passage through death to heaven” is “like the Jewish high priest 
moving behind the curtain or veil (Exod. 26:31-5) right into the Holy of Holies (Heb. 9:3). Christ has 
passed through the heavens (4:14) and entered the inner shrine of God (6:19-20).” Even though Christ died 
by crucifixion (6:6), the author of Hebrews “imagines the body of Christ moving into the heavenly 
sanctuary and not onto the cross.” In this way, the Jesuit theologian conflates the death of Christ, with a 
form of ascension and the Day of Atonement. JOP, 52-53. This interpretation seems to imply that Christ’s 
soul went to heaven at His death, while His dead body was still on earth. 





model tends to deny that God’s heaven is a place.87 In fact, place or space is understood 
in this model as a conceptual container.88 According to this view, God and Christ’s 
                                                
“originally resurrection and exaltation seem to have been relatively independent interpretations of the same 
event.” He suggests the following evidences for that affirmation: (1) “death is followed by resurrection (for 
example, 1 Cor 15:3-4; Mark 9:31)”; (2) “death is followed by heavenly exaltation (for example, Phil 2:8-
9) or entering into glory (for example, Luke 24:26)”; (3) “death is followed by resurrection and the 
effective continuation of resurrection by enthronement at ‘God’s right hand’ (for example, Rom 8:34)”; (4) 
“resurrection and exaltation are used interchangeably to describe what followed Jesus’ death (Luke 24:26 = 
24:46).” Gerald O’Collins, Believing in the Resurrection: The Meaning and Promise of the Risen Jesus 
(New York: Paulist Press, 2012), 57. For the Jesuit theologian, Christ’s “resurrection was much more than 
a mere coming back to life under the normal conditions of our present existence.” It also involved the fact 
that “Jesus went up into heavenly glory to sit at the right hand of the Father.” O’Collins, “Christ’s 
Resurrection and Ascension,” 263. 
87 In his remarks about heaven, O’Collins maintains that “according to primitive religious 
understanding, the place in or beyond the sky where the gods live. The Bible reflects an early cosmology 
about the vault of heaven resting on pillars (Job 26:11). It speaks of heaven as the place where God is 
enthroned (Pss 11:4; 115:16) and from which God descends (Exod 19:18-20), but recognizes that ‘heaven 
and earth’ cannot contain God (see Gen 1:1; 1 Kgs 8:27).” For the Jesuit theologian, heaven is “the ‘place’ 
or state where the blessed will dwell forever with God through Christ’s glorified humanity.” CDT, 3 ed. 
(2013), s.v. “heaven.” The emphasis on the word place and the qualification of heaven as a state seem to 
imply that, for O’Collins, heaven is more a state of being than a place. It seems that, in his understanding, 
the idea of heaven as a place is related to a primitive cosmology, which in his view is adopted by the Bible. 
A similar emphasis on the word place is found in his affirmation that “through the ascension motif, Luke 
(Luke 24:51; Acts 1:9-11) and John (John 20:17) . . . associate the risen Jesus with the ‘place’ now known 
to be his—heavenly glory.” O’Collins, Christology, 106. In the context of Aquinas’ conception of heaven, 
the medieval theologian affirms the existence of an empyrean heaven (this is not God’s heaven—see 
footnote 89 below), which is probably “the higher corporal place,” “the highest heaven,” and the “heaven 
of the angels.” ST I, q. 68, a. 4, ad 1. This heaven is basically “motionless” (ST I, q. 66, a. 3, ad 2), “outside 
the region of change,” and the place of human “final beatitude” or salvation (ST I, q. 102, a. 2, ad 1; see 
also ST III, q. 49, a. 5, ad 2). In fact, the empyrean heaven appears to be portrayed in terms of aeviternity, 
“which is a mean between eternity and time.” ST I, q. 10, a. 5. In other words, aeviternity is similar to 
eternity, in the sense of being “simultaneously whole,” but it is also compatible with time, particularly with 
the temporal succession of “‘before’ and ‘after.’” ST I, q. 10, a. 5, ad 2. “Aeviternity in itself has no 
‘before’ and ‘after,’ which can, however, be annexed to it; while eternity has neither ‘before’ nor ‘after,’ 
nor is it compatible with such at all.” ST I, q. 10, a. 5. However, the medieval theologian appears to indicate 
that the presence of time in aeviternity will disappear in the future. According to him, “sensible corporeal 
things,” which includes human beings, “are movable in the present state of the world, for by the movement 
of corporeal creatures is secured by the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is finally 
consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must have been from the beginning the 
condition of the empyrean.” ST I, q. 66, a. 3, ad 1. The question that seems unanswered by Aquinas, at least 
explicitly, is whether the ascended Christ experiences aeviternity in His glorified ascended humanity, in the 
sense of still experiencing time and movement in some degree, or His glorified body already came to this 
point of final consummation where the movement of His body ceases. For helpful information about 
conceptions of heaven in the Middle Ages, see Jan Swango Emerson and Hugh Feiss, eds., Imagining 
Heaven in the Middle Ages: A Book of Essays, Garland Reference Library of the Humanities (New York: 
Garland, 2000). 
88 For Aquinas, space or “place is a thing” (ST I, q. 8, a. 2) and “implies the notion of containing” 




glorified humanity are non-spatial because they cannot be contained by anything.89 For 
Aquinas, heaven is used metaphorically with reference to God in Scripture,90 and God 
and Christ have no real seat in heaven.91  
With regard to the earth, the sacramental model holds that the ascended Christ is 
sacramentally present in the eucharist. According to the medieval theologian, this means 
that Christ is not present as a body in a place, and that He is not in motion.92 Arguably, 
                                                
89 Aquinas claims that God in His being is “outside all place.” ST III, q. 57, a. 2. He argues that “in 
some way God is in every place . . . as He is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is 
in every place as giving it existence and locative power.” ST I, q. 8, a. 2. This statement seems to indicate 
that God is every place by His power, not in terms of His being. As the medieval theologian highlights, 
“incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of 
power.” ST I, q. 8, a. 2; italics mine. Therefore, God in His being is outside all place. In his discussion of 
the ascension of Christ above all the heavens, Aquinas mentions that “the first heaven” is a container that 
“has the formality of first place.” In this heaven, “bodies need in themselves to be in a place, in so far as 
they are contained by a heavenly body.” However, “glorified bodies, Christ’s especially, do not stand in 
need of being so contained, because they draw nothing from the heavenly bodies, but from God through the 
soul.” Thus, nothing prevents “Christ’s body from being beyond the containing radius of the heavenly 
bodies, and not in a containing place.” ST III, q. 57, a. 4, ad 2. 
90 Aquinas maintains that when the term heaven in Scripture is used in reference to the Trinity, it 
has a metaphorical meaning (ST I, q. 68, a. 4), particularly implying that this is not a spatial heaven (ST I, q. 
61, a. 4, ad 3). In effect, this notion of metaphorical heaven appears to be similar to his understanding of the 
expression above all the heavens, which is the destination of Christ’s ascension and the heavenly realm of 
God. ST III, q. 57, a. 4, ad 1; q. 57, a. 4, ad 5. “Above heaven there is nothing, the word ‘above’ signifies 
only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those of the 
heavenly body.” ST I, q. 46, a. 1, ad 8. In other words, when referred to God, heaven or above all the 
heavens refer to a place only according to the human limited way of thinking, not in terms of reality. A 
similar situation in Aquinas’ thought occurs when it is said that “an angel was, or is, or will be.” This kind 
of statement “is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of our intellect, which 
apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time.” Nevertheless, in terms of 
reality, “in the very being of an angel . . . there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards 
accidental change.” ST I, q. 10, a. 5, ad 3. 
91 With regard to Christ’s exaltation at the right hand of God, Aquinas indicates that this does not 
refer to space or place. Quoting Damascene, he states that “we do not speak of the Father’s right hand as of 
a place, for how can a place be designated by His right hand, who Himself is beyond all place?” ST III, q. 
58, a. 1, ad 1. Rather, “Christ is said to sit at the Father’s right hand inasmuch as He is on equality with the 
Father in respect of His divine nature, while in respect of His humanity, He excels all creatures in the 
possession of divine gifts.” q. 58, a. 4..  
92 ST III, q. 75, a. 1, ad 3. In this sense, “Christ’s body is upon many altars, not as in different 
places, but ‘sacramentally.’” Ibid. Furthermore, Aquinas argues that “Christ’s body does not begin to be 
present in this sacrament by local motion.” q. 75, a. 2. “Strictly speaking,” Christ “is immovably in this 
sacrament.” q. 76, a. 6. “Christ is not moved locally of Himself, but only accidentally, because Christ is not 




this sacramental presence is consistent with Christ’s non-spatial/timeless presence in 
heaven.93 Likewise, O’Collins stipulates that, being free from time and space, the 
ascended Christ is present everywhere. In his words, Christ’s glorified God-like condition 
“has made His entire life” and temporal “history irrevocably present.”94 The eucharist 
reveals Christ’s worldwide presence,95 and the Holy Spirit and the church are crucial for 
the ubiquitous presence of His risen body in the world.96 In fact, he considers the church 
the visible form of Christ’s presence in its preaching and sacraments.97 In short, the 
                                                
93 The twofold emphasis on Christ’s body in the sacrament as unmovable and not in a place seems 
to be directly related to His condition in heaven. Aquinas points out that if Christ’s body was present in the 
sacrament by local motion, as coming to a place, “it would cease to be in heaven.” ST III, q. 75, a. 2. In 
addition, he appears to assume that because “Christ’s body is at rest in heaven,” “it is not movably in this 
sacrament.” q. 76, a. 6. Therefore, Aquinas’ attempt to differentiate the forms in which the body of Christ is 
present in heaven and in the sacrament, by distinguishing Christ “being in Himself” in heaven and being 
sacramentally on earth (“In Christ, being in Himself and being under the sacrament are not the same thing.” 
q. 76, a. 6. Christ’s body “is in heaven under its own species, and on many other altars under the 
sacramental species.” q. 76, a. 5, ad 1.), ensures that Christ in His being is heaven when He present in the 
sacrament. It appears that the same characteristics of the reality of Christ in heaven are predicated on His 
sacramental presence on earth. This seems to suggest an interplay between the heavenly Christ and the 
earthly sacramental Christ, where the effects of His sacramental presence on earth appear to be derived 
from His very presence in heaven.  
94 O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 260. This presence means the liberation from time, in which 
the eternal/timeless ascended Christ “possesses fully his whole human story.” Ibid. The Jesuit theologian 
provides the following answers to the question on how a human history in time can “be resurrected in an 
existence which is not temporal” but eternal/timeless: (1) “Time and eternity are not exclusively different. 
Just as some kind of eternal life can already be present in temporality, so there could be some kind of 
temporality in eternal life”; (2) “Time is more than a pure and mere succession of events (as someone in the 
tradition of David Hume (1711–76) would lead us to believe), but has also something cumulative about it. 
Every moment is a coming together of many things which are all somehow preserved.” Hence, “resurrected 
life could be a coming together of a whole, accumulated past which remains present to us. In resurrection 
our time is summed up and completed.” Ibid. With regard to the liberation from space, Christ’s resurrection 
and glorification “freed his human condition to be actively present everywhere.” The ubiquitous presence 
of Christ’s risen body in the world represents a continuation of His earthly ministry “in a new and enhanced 
fashion.” Ibid., 201. 
95 O’Collins argues that “nothing expresses better the new communicative power of Jesus than the 
Eucharist, his worldwide presence and offer to communicate a life that will never end.” Ibid., 259. 
96 “The first Easter produced the outpouring of the Holy Spirit and the emergence of the Church, 
two essential elements in the new, saving presence of the risen Christ.” O’Collins, Christology, 347. 
97 O’Collins maintains that, “for the baptized, the Church bodies forth the living presence of the 





sacramental model seems to maintain that the non-spatial/timeless ascended Christ is 
present in the spatio-temporal earth through material instruments, especially the church, 
and particularly the eucharist. 
This idea of instrumentality or material mediation assumes a sacramental 
understanding of the world or a sacramental cosmology,98 in which created (spatio-
temporal) things have the potential of being signs that contain eternal (non-spatial/ 
timeless) realities.99 In this context, God uses spatio-temporal signs in order to be present 
in the created world and to convey spiritual (non-spatial/timeless) blessings.100 Aquinas 
explains such divine activity in terms of instrumental causality (spatio-temporal signs 
                                                
primary ministry in and through the service of the word and all the sacraments. Whenever the gospel is 
preached and the sacraments are administered, the risen Christ is personally and effectively present to help 
believers share in his perfect union with and presence to the God whom he called ‘Abba.’” Ibid.  
98 According to Kenan Osborne, “There is the possibility of sacramentality throughout all creation, 
since the world, the cosmos in its entirety, in its temporal, historical, and existential dimensions, is a 
possible locus for sacramentality.” Kenan B. Osborne, Christian Sacraments in a Postmodern World: A 
Theology for the Third Millennium (New York: Paulist Press, 1999), 146. For similar affirmations of a 
sacramental structure of created reality, see Edward Kilmartin, “Theology of the Sacraments: Toward a 
New Understanding of the Chief Rites of the Church of Jesus Christ,” in Alternative Futures for Worship: 
General Introduction, ed. Regis A. Duffy (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1987), 158; Louis Marie 
Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence (Collegeville, 
MN: Liturgical Press, 1995), 551-553; Judith Marie Kubicki, The Presence of Christ in the Gathered 
Assembly (New York: Continuum, 2006), 18; Rudolf B. Brun, “Cosmology, Cosmic Evolution, and 
Sacramental Reality: A Christian Contribution,” Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science 37, no. 1 (2002): 
190; Hans Boersma, “Sacramental Ontology: Nature and the Supernatural in the Ecclesiology of Henri De 
Lubac,” New Blackfriars 88, no. 1015 (2007): 242, 273; Hans Boersma, Heavenly Participation: The 
Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 9; Hans Boersma, Nouvelle 
Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 289. 
99 Osborne highlights that “a sacrament involves a relationship between sign and reality. The sign 
is not the reality, nor is it of the same value as the reality. If one is in direct contact with a reality, no signs 
are needed.” Kenan B. Osborne, Sacramental Theology: A General Introduction (New York: Paulist Press, 
1988), 35. In his explanation of sacramental ontology, Boersma highlights that “historical realities of the 
created order” serve “as divinely ordained, sacramental means leading to eternal divine mysteries. The 
interpenetration of sign (signum) and reality (res)” means “that external, temporal appearances” contain 
“spiritual, eternal realities.” Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology, 289. 
100 According to Osborne, as “profoundly temporal” and “profoundly spatial,” “sacramentality is 
God’s action within a thoroughly temporalized and existential event.” Osborne, Christian Sacraments in a 




mediate instrumentally the effects of the divine action),101 and O’Collins describes it as 
“personal causality”102 (spatio-temporal mediate the divine presence). An implication of 
this perspective is the understanding of Christ’s humanity as the “primordial sacrament” 
and the church as the “foundational sacrament” (concretely realized in the sacraments), 
which are spatio-temporal signs that convey a spiritual (non-spatial/timeless) reality.103 
Working through this causality, Christ ultimately produces a world where the movement 
of bodies will cease (Aquinas),104 and promotes a glorification or spiritualization of 
                                                
101 Contemporary theology labels Aquinas’ position as instrumental causality. See Osborne, 
Sacramental Theology, 50; David N. Power, “Sacraments in General,” in Systematic Theology: Roman 
Catholic Perspectives, ed. Francis Schüssler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2011), 475. Power points out that Aquinas closely linked the “Aristotelian idea of instrumental efficient 
cause . . . with the Platonic notion of a participation in the form or exemplar of the one who causes, Christ.” 
Ibid., 474. For Osborne, “both matter and word . . . are instrumental” in Aquinas. “The sacramental rite is 
only an instrumental, secondary agent.” Osborne, Sacramental Theology, 50, 52. In the twentieth century, 
Karl Rahner and Edward Schillebeeckx developed the Thomistic perspective in terms of symbolic 
causality, while Jean-Luc Marion and Louis-Marie Chauvet rejected the notion of causality in the 
sacraments and affirmed the idea of symbolic gift. For a helpful summary and explanation of these 
contemporary developments, see Power, “Sacraments in General,” 481-490. See also Bernhard 
Blankenhorn, “The Instrumental Causality of the Sacraments: Thomas Aquinas and Louis-Marie Chauvet,” 
Nova et Vetera 4, no. 2 (2006): 255-294. 
102 O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 213. For the Jesuit theologian, the sacraments actualize 
Christ’s presence, and effect “a particular relationship between the risen Christ and ourselves—his presence 
to us and our presence to him.” O’Collins points out that the divine presence is mediated by a temporal-
spiritual “component.” In this way, “God, being purely spiritual and non-spatial,” is “present to human 
beings,” “even if not . . . in a spatial-temporal way.” Moreover, he highlights the idea of physical mediation 
by saying that “all seven sacraments involve the human body and things done to the body.” Gerald 
O’Collins, “Vatican II on the Liturgical Presence of Christ,” Irish Theological Quarterly 77, no. 1 (2012): 
9, 10, 14. O’Collins idea of mediation of presence and personal causality is consistent with contemporary 
theological works on sacramental grace, which depict grace not “as a ‘thing,’ but as ‘presence’ or a 
‘relationship.’” According to this depiction, the sacraments “‘cause’ an intensification of this relationship.” 
Osborne, Sacramental Theology, 63. 
103 According to O’Collins, “modern theology speaks of (a) Christ as the primordial sacrament 
(Ursakrament) or the efficacious sign of God’s grace; and (b) the church he established as the foundational 
sacrament (Grundsakrament), which is realized concretely in the life of the seven sacraments.” CDT, 3 ed. 
(2013), s.v. “sacrament.” See also Osborne, Sacramental Theology, 10-14, 69-84, 89-94. 
104 For Aquinas, “sensible corporeal things . . . are movable in the present state of the world . . . . 
But when glory is finally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must have been from 




matter in the entire cosmos (O’Collins).105 In his evolutionary conception of 
cosmology,106 the Jesuit theologian conceives this final spiritualization of matter as God 
working from inside creation, which required especially the incarnation of Christ.107 
After His ascension, the church functions as His humanity on earth in its sacramental 
activity,108 and when human beings finally attain their “ultimate destiny,” Christ’s 
“glorified humanity” will be eternally “the means by which” they “enjoy the fullness of 
salvation.”109 This perspective seems to assume a sacramental view of the world (created 
                                                
105 Based on Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, O’Collins suggests that both human beings and the entire 
cosmos will experience something similar to Christ’s resurrection and glorification, particularly in terms of 
the progressive transformation and spiritualization of matter, which is mediated by Christ Himself. “As ‘the 
Personal Heart of the Cosmos’, the risen Christ inspires and releases the basic energy of love that 
progressively carries both humanity and the material universe towards its future goal.” O’Collins, Jesus 
Our Redeemer, 267. In this sense, the “redemptive reconciliation will bring into conformity with the divine 
plan not only human beings but also their cosmic environment, which will be completed, spiritualized, and 
transformed.” The Jesuit theologian believes that “at the end God will be free to change the laws of nature, 
so as to transform the material world.” Ibid., 265-266. For him, “resurrection brings matter to a most 
intense participation in the universe and in the life of God. By being raised from the dead, human beings as 
embodied spirits will not only belong in a new way to the universe but will also in a new way share in the 
divine life. As both material and spiritual beings they will receive their ultimate divinization so as to ‘live 
to God’ (Rom. 6: 10). In his bodiliness the risen Jesus himself takes part in a most intense way in the life of 
the universe, and is a ‘piece’ of this material world which has already been inserted into the life of God—to 
be fully and finally with God.” Ibid., 258. At the same time, O’Collins adds, “we should always remember 
the difference between Christ’s case and ours.” Ibid., 252. For information about Chardin’s view, see Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin, Science and Christ (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 27-76; Christopher F. Mooney, 
Teilhard De Chardin and the Mystery of Christ (London: Collins, 1966), 120, 135; Robert L. Faricy, All 
Things in Christ: Teilhard De Chardin’s Spirituality (London: Collins, 1981), 13-31.  
106 O’Collins claims that “the theory of biological evolution” provides an “admirable picture . . . of 
God working with wisdom and power ‘from the inside’ to bring about higher forms of life and eventually 
the emergence of human beings.” CDT, 3 ed. (2013), s.v. “evolution.” 
107 See O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 40. 
108 As Osborne emphasizes, “Jesus in his humanity” is “a sacrament of God,” while the church is 
“a sacrament of Jesus.” After His “resurrection, Jesus is no longer visible, tangible, perceptible.” Therefore, 
“the Church begins to function as sacrament.” Osborne, Sacramental Theology, 45, 74. See also Power, 
“Sacraments in General,” 480. 
109 O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 225. See also JOP, 269. This is an elaboration on Karl 
Rahner’s idea that “the Word—by the fact that he is man and insofar as he is this—is the necessary and 
permanent mediator of all salvation, not merely at some time in the past but now and for all eternity.” Karl 
Rahner, The Theology of the Spiritual Life, Theological Investigations (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1967), 




and redeemed) where ultimate (spiritual) reality is never directly attained by creatures, 
but always mediated by external signs (in this case, the glorified humanity of Christ).110 
In summary, the sacramental model holds that the resurrected ascended Christ is 
in a heavenly non-spatial/timeless realm (heaven is not a place) and is also present and 
active in the earthly spatio-temporal realm. His interaction with these two realms 
presupposes a sacramental structure of the world, in which the non-spatial/timeless reality 
of Christ’s presence and activity is mediated and effected by the use of created (spatio-
temporal) beings or things, particularly the sacraments of the church. 
Having described these principles of reality in the sacramental model, I will 
briefly explore below their implications for the understanding of Christ’s priesthood. 
Implications for Christ’s Priesthood 
In this discussion about the principles of reality, I have indicated that the 
sacramental model assumes an ontological incompatibility or gap between 
timeless/spaceless111 divinity and the spatio-temporal world of creation. According to this 
ontological perspective, the divine timeless and non-spatial action is the primary cause of 
material and temporal effects in the world, by means of the actions of secondary 
temporal/material causes. This conception presupposes a sacramental structure of the 
                                                
110 According to Osborne, there are two types of relationship between sign and reality: (1) 
Separable—“the sign becomes superfluous once the reality has been attained”; (2) Inseparable—a sign is 
always necessary “to reveal the reality,” because it “is never attained directly.” In his remarks on 
contemporary thought about sacramental causality, Osborne argues that sacraments are the second type of 
sign or symbol, “which must always be present, since the reality to which they point can only be present in 
and through a symbol.” Osborne, Sacramental Theology, 62, 67. O’Collins’ affirmation of the eternal 
mediatorial role of Christ’s glorified humanity is coherent with this sacramental understanding of the 
inseparability between sign and reality. 




world, where created beings or things can be instrumentally used by God to carry His 
presence and effect His action. In this context, God’s salvific action (primary cause) 
reaches human beings through the instrumentality of Christ’s humanity (secondary cause 
or sacrament). The sacramental structure of the world also allows that the presence and 
actions of the resurrected ascended Christ, whose glorified humanity is in a more godlike 
condition, to be instrumentally effected in the world particularly through the sacraments 
performed in the church (secondary causes). 
In the previous chapter I outlined the understanding of Christ’s priesthood in the 
sacramental model in the following way: (1) His priesthood is needed to solve the 
ontological and moral distance between human beings and God; (2) this priesthood 
encompasses Christ’s entire human life; (3) Christ’s priestly actions on earth and in 
heaven are conceived as His internal disposition that takes the form of visible actions by 
means of material instruments (sacraments). In this sense, the crucifixion was the 
climactic materialization of His earthly decisive devotion in the last supper, and the 
eucharist is the visible earthly expression of the invisible heavenly self-offering 
(intercession) of Christ before the Father; and (4) the goal of union or eternal 
participation of human beings in God results from the eternity of His priesthood. 
The ontological incompatibility or gap between timeless/spaceless divinity and 
the spatio-temporal world implies that the distance between human beings and God, 
addressed by Christ’s priesthood, is particularly characterized by the dichotomy between 
temporality and timelessness, between spatiality and spacelessness. According to a 
sacramental structure of the world, the humanity of Christ is the main aspect of His 




that effects temporally and spatially the divine salvific action or primary cause which is 
timeless/spaceless. In this context, the ultimate reality of the priestly activity is timeless 
and spaceless, as the invisible sacrifice (primary cause) and the visible sacrifice 
(secondary cause) are respectively described as timeless-spaceless and spatio-temporal 
realities. Although the importance of the crucifixion can be emphasized in this model, it 
does not constitute the ultimate reality of Christ’s sacrifice (or the primary cause of 
salvation).112 The crucifixion is a spatio-temporal instrument or sacrament that manifests 
temporally and spatially the ultimate reality of His sacrifice. Similarly, the eucharist 
instrumentally manifests in time and space Christ’s invisible (timeless-spaceless) 
sacrifice, communicating its benefit (His very timeless/spaceless being) to spatio-
temporal human beings.  
Actually, the sacrament of the eucharist is a secondary cause of the priestly action 
of the ascended Christ (the primary cause). It is important to notice that the principles of 
reality adopted by the sacramental model entail that any activity of Christ in heaven 
should not be understood in a spatio-temporal way. Christ’s eternal intercession in 
heaven is depicted in this model as the presentation of His own humanity to God, so that 
He can have mercy on human beings (Aquinas), or as Christ blessing people by 
presenting His sacrificial self-offering to the Father (O’Collins). However, how should 
this intercession be understood, considering that God, heaven, and even the ascended 
                                                
112 Interestingly, Nieuwenhove points out that “when one examines the Catholic theological scene 
of the last fifty years or so, one is bound to be struck by the fact that the most important Catholic 
theologians (such as Schillebeeckx, Rahner and Küng) fail, or refuse, to attribute salvific significance to the 
crucifixion itself.” Rik Van Nieuwenhove, “St. Anselm and St. Thomas Aquinas on ‘Satisfaction’: Or How 
Catholic and Protestant Understandings of the Cross Differ,” Angelicum 80 (2003): 159. This tendency 




glorified humanity of Christ are defined as timeless-spaceless realities? First, how does 
Christ present His humanity to God in heaven? Does this presentation imply that He 
shows to God something that was not shown before (temporality) in a place (spatiality) 
where He was not before (temporality)? The principles of reality adopted by the 
sacramental model invalidate this ontological possibility. Second, how does a timeless-
spaceless God, with His non-discursive mind, see the humanity of Christ being presented 
to Him in heaven and, then, react with an attitude of mercy for human beings? O’Collins 
seems to be more coherent than Aquinas with the timeless-spaceless notion of God, when 
he interprets Christ’s heavenly intercession only in terms of blessing people (a one-sided 
mediation targeting only human beings), and not as appeasing God (which would be a 
two-sided mediation targeting both God and human beings). Indeed, the concepts of 
Christ providing satisfaction for the divine wrath and making an intercessory 
petition/prayer that leads the Father to forgive human beings are not ontologically 
applicable to a timeless-spaceless God, as an ontological interpretation of these concepts 
would require a before and after (temporality) in God’s mind and action.113 Therefore, the 
                                                
113 Levering relates Christ’s priestly work with God’s timeless-spaceless immutability in the 
following way: “Christ’s priestly action does not cause God to forgive us by an outpouring of love, but 
rather removes the impediments in us to God's merciful outpouring of love.” Levering, “Christ the Priest,” 
407. Likewise, in his discussion of the medieval notion of satisfaction, Nieuwenhove indicates that “the 
idea that God’s anger was somehow appeased by the sacrifice of his Son” implies the “unacceptable” 
concept “of a changeable God.” He concludes that salvation “affects us and our relation with God rather 
than God himself.” Nieuwenhove, “St. Anselm and St. Thomas Aquinas on ‘Satisfaction’,” 169. Similar to 
Levering and Nieuwenhove, Davies affirms that any petition to God and also His divine forgiveness do not 
refer to God Himself but only to human beings. He argues that the belief on divine immutability precludes 
the notion “that God’s act of forgiveness involves him in going through a process of any kind. . . . To say 
that God has forgiven us is equivalent to saying that we have changed direction and turned to him.” Davies, 
The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 336. Furthermore, Davies recognizes that “petitionary prayer makes no 
sense given the traditional claim that God is immutable, because he changelessly wills what he wills from 
eternity and nothing that we can do or say can make any difference when it comes to what God wills.” He 
claims that Aquinas “cannot think of prayer as having a causal effect on God” and that “he does not think 
of it as informing God or as changing him in any way.” Brian Davies, “Prayer,” in The Oxford Handbook 





principles of reality assumed in the sacramental model preclude a literal intercession 
before the Father. Consequently, the ontological focus of the priestly work of the 
ascended Christ is on earth, not heaven. Whereas His humanity was the spatio-temporal 
instrument or the sacrament of God before the ascension, the sacramental activity of the 
church is the spatio-temporal instrument of the glorified humanity of Christ in heaven. 
Through them, human beings receive salvific grace, as they participate in the divine 
nature by means of His glorified body, which is temporally-spatially mediated in the 
eucharist. 
The principles of reality of the sacramental model also allow different nuances for 
the understanding of Christ’s priesthood, which are exemplified by Aquinas’ and 
O’Collins’ positions. As a medieval theologian, the former believes in a literal Fall and, 
in this context, Christ’s redemptive priestly work leads human beings back to the ideal 
condition of the beginning of this world. According to his understanding of redemption as 
a return, he stipulates (1) a two-sided mediation in which the ideas of divine satisfaction 
and appeasement point to a condition that needs to be reversed; (2) an incarnation that 
was required by human sin; and (3) an eternal priesthood of Christ in terms of its eternal 
effects, because at the end human beings will return to their original condition, which 
does not demand a mediation through spatio-temporal instruments anymore. On the other 
                                                
471. Aquinas emphasizes that petitions in prayer cause something in human beings, not in God. First, in his 
perspective, prayer informs us, not God. In other words, prayer does not make “our needs or desires” 
known to God, but reminds us “of the necessity of having recourse to God’s help in these matters.” ST II-
III, q. 83, a. 2, ad 1. Second, and more importantly, prayer is a secondary cause or a way through which 
human beings “obtain what God has appointed” (q. 83, a. 2, ad 2) in his timeless predestination. The 
medieval theologian explains that human beings pray not to “change the Divine disposition, but that by 
those actions they may achieve certain effects according to the order of the Divine disposition.” Through 




hand, as a contemporary theologian, O’Collins subscribes to the premise of theistic 
evolution or evolutionary creation that there is a progression, and not an interruption such 
as a literal Fall, between God’s creation and redemption.114 In this case, Christ’s priestly 
work is a continuation of the actualization of the divine plan, and not a return to an ideal 
condition. According to this perspective, the Jesuit theologian affirms (1) an one-sided 
mediation in which God blesses human beings through the priestly work of Christ; (2) an 
incarnation that was originally intended by God in His plan of creation-redemption; and 
(3) an eternal priesthood of Christ in terms of the eternal mediation of His glorified 
humanity, because created beings never attain ultimate reality directly. In the ontological 
structure of creation, as planned by God, human beings always need a sacramental 
mediation. Overall, while the notion of redemption as a return (Aquinas) leads to an 
emphasis on the moral distance (sin) between God and human beings, the concept of 
creation-redemption as a progression (O’Collins) entails an emphasis on the ontological 
distance (the structure of creation) between them. However, both concepts of redemption 
can be articulated from the standpoint of a timeless-spaceless God, which implies a 
divine non-discursive mind that timelessly determines the history of the world and the 
priestly work of Christ. In the framework of redemption as a return, God decided that (1) 
the Fall would take place after creation, (2) fallen creatures would be under divine 
punishment and anger, and (3) the incarnate Christ would work as a priestly mediator to 
save human beings. In the framework of redemption as a continuation of creation, God 
                                                
114 Following this perspective, Christopher Southgate declares that “a strong emphasis within 
contemporary Christian theology is on creation as a continuous process, rather than something completed at 
the beginning.” Christopher Southgate, The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and the Problem of Evil 




established the progressive mediatorial work of Christ in creation-redemption. 
Nevertheless, in light of the teleological movement of human beings toward God, which 
implies an ontological distance (even in the perfect creation assumed by Aquinas) 
between humankind and God,115 the distinction of redemption as a return (Aquinas) and 
creation-redemption as progress (O’Collins) does not have a decisive impact on the 
understanding of Christ’s priesthood. In both cases, human beings evolve toward their 
goal, and His priesthood serves this larger purpose. Hence, Christ’s priesthood is not 
ultimately defined in terms of redemption of sin, as His priesthood assists human beings 
evolve toward a goal that was not achieved when they were created. 
Having studied the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality in the sacramental 
model, I will turn now to the discussion of those principles in the functional model. 
The Functional Model 
Divinity: Christ and the Concept of Divine Nature  
In this description of the ontology of God in the functional model, I will outline 
how this model depicts in broad strokes the divine nature and action, inasmuch as such 
depiction informs the comprehension of Christ’s divinity and also His relationship with 
other members of the Godhead, which is a topic to be discussed later in the implications 
of the conception of divinity for Christ’s priesthood. 
The functional model attempts to avoid the discussion about the being of God.116 
                                                
115 I describe this idea in the descriptions of the need and the goal of Christ’s priesthood in the 
sacramental model, which are found in chapter 2. 
116 Overall, as Ziegler points out, “there is no discussion of God’s essence and attributes” in the 
Institutes. “Calvin is not interested in an abstract knowledge of God,” as God’s “essence is 





As Luther emphasizes, apart from the created things or coverings117 that God uses to 
reveal Himself, the divine nature is incomprehensible and we should not speculate about 
it. In his conception, God’s uncovered nature refers to the hidden God, namely, God in 
His majesty and terrible power. 118 The German theologian seems to assume that the 
hidden God is non-spatial and timeless,119 which is one of the reasons why He is 
unfathomable to spatio-temporal human beings.120 Stipulating that the beginning of 
God’s creation marks “the beginning of time” and that “our mind cannot grasp what lies 
outside time,” he argues that “it is folly to argue much about God outside and before 
time, because this is an effort to understand the Godhead without a covering, or the 
uncovered divine essence,” which is “an area where there is no measure, no space, no 
                                                
Differences,” Concordia Theological Quarterly 75, nos. 1-2 (2011): 78-79. For useful discussions about 
God in Calvin and Luther, see Brian A. Gerrish, “To the Unknown God : Luther and Calvin on the 
Hiddenness of God,” The Journal of Religion 53, no. 3 (1973): 263-292; Thomas F. Torrance, “Calvin’s 
Doctrine of the Trinity,” Calvin Theological Journal 25, no. 2 (1990): 165-193; Christine Helmer, “God 
from Eternity to Eternity: Luther’s Trinitarian Understanding,” Harvard Theological Review 96, no. 2 
(2003): 127-146; Dale Arthur Johnson, “Luther’s Understanding of God,” Lutheran Quarterly 16, no. 1 
(1964): 59-69; Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology, 207-218; Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, 20-24. 
117 For Luther, it is “insane to argue about God and the divine nature without the Word or any 
covering.” He speculates, “Perhaps God appeared to Adam without a covering, but after the fall into sin He 
appeared in a gentle breeze as though enveloped in a covering.” Thus, because of the depravation and 
corruption of sin, human beings “cannot recognize God or comprehend His nature without a covering. It is 
for this reason that those coverings are necessary.” LW, 1:11 (Lectures on Genesis, 1535). 
118 Luther affirms that we should “refrain from investigating the Divine Majesty and His terrible 
works. God does not want us to learn to know Him in this way. You cannot nakedly associate with His 
naked Godhead. . . . For you cannot grasp God in Himself.” LW, 16:55 (Lectures on Isaiah, 1527-1528 
[chap. 6]). For additional information on Luther’s understanding of the hidden God, see Steven D. Paulson, 
“Luther on the Hidden God,” Word & World 19, no. 4 (1999): 363-371. 
119 According to Scott Ickert, “Luther adopts the standard view that God is transcendent in 
timeless eternity,” which means that “timelessness is a component of divine transcendence.” Scott S. Ickert, 
“Luther on the Timelessness of God,” Lutheran Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1993): 53. Luther concurs with 
Augustine’s view that, for God, “neither a past nor a future, but outside of time and in eternity everything is 
in present time.” In other words, “in eternity, where there is no time, neither past nor future, but a perpetual 
today.” Based on 2 Pet 3:8, he points out that “the beginning, the end, and the middle of time are but one 
moment with God.” LW, 12:52-53 (Commentary on Psalm 2, 1532). 





time.”121 Therefore, Luther presupposes that the uncovered or hidden God is non-spatial 
and timeless. These presuppositions reveal ontological commitments about the being of 
God that should be supposedly avoided in the functional model. In other words, the 
model inevitably assumes that the hidden God has some specific ontological features. 
Another topic that reveals ontological assumptions regarding the divine nature in 
this model is the notion of divine knowledge.122 According to Calvin, God has a timeless 
knowledge, that is, in His “knowledge there is nothing future or past, but all things are 
present.”123 In this view, all things are present to God not merely as ideas of His 
imagination, but as actual realities before Him.124 This notion implies that all things are 
simultaneous (without the sequential flow of past-present-future) for God, and this is not 
simply a statement about His idea of them but rather about their actual reality.125 
                                                
the world.” LW, 1:11 (Lectures on Genesis, 1535). 
121 Ibid., 10-11. The German theologian affirms that human beings should not speculate “what has 
been outside time or before time” neither what “God was doing before there was any time,” as “God was 
incomprehensible in His essential rest before the creation of the world,” and “now, after the creation, . . . 
He is still incomprehensible.” Ibid. 
122 As Michael Saia indicates, “technically speaking, Calvin does not describe God’s nature as 
timeless, but rather his knowledge.” However, his notion of God implies that God lives “outside of time or 
in some state similar to the ‘ever-present now.’” In this sense, “Calvin’s position contributed nothing new 
to the doctrine of timelessness.” Michael R. Saia, Does God Know the Future? A Biblical Investigation of 
Foreknowledge and Free Will (Fairfax, VA: Xulon Press, 2002), 44. The following studies support the 
view that Calvin conceived God as timeless: Edward R. Wierenga, “Timelessness Out of Mind: On the 
Alleged Incoherence of Divine Timelessness,” in God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature, ed. Gregory 
E. Ganssle and David M. Woodruff (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 153; Helm, 
“Divine Timeless Eternity,” 28; Oliver D. Crisp, “Calvin on Creation and Providence,” in John Calvin and 
Evangelical Theology: Legacy and Prospect, ed. Sung Wook Chung (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2009), 50; Louis P. Pojman and Michael Rea, Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 7th ed. 
(Stanford, CT: Cengage Learning, 2013), 61. 
123 ICR 3.21.5. 
124 In Calvin’s words, “They are present in such a way that He not only conceives them through 
ideas, as we have before us those things which our minds remember, but he truly looks upon them and 
discerns them as things placed before him.” Ibid. 





Likewise, Luther claims that God sees things in time in a timeless way, as before Him 
“there is no reckoning of time.”126 The German theologian explains, “God does not see 
time longitudinally; He sees it transversely, as if you were looking transversely at a tall 
tree lying before you.”127 It is not clear if, in Luther, this divine transversal (timeless) 
cognition of things presupposes that God sees things as they are in Himself, as Aquinas 
and Calvin do in their notion of God’s timeless knowledge. Luther’s attempt to make 
some room for God seeing things in time (longitudinally)128 seems to indicate that he is 
not bound to the idea that God does not see things outside of Himself. However, the 
German theologian does not articulate an account of divine nature that allows for a 
timeless and a temporal (longitudinal) cognition in God, in which He sees things both in 
and outside of Himself.129 
                                                
foreknowledge: “All things always were, and perpetually remain, under his eyes.” Ibid. 
126 LW, 30:196 (Sermons on the Second Epistle of St. Peter, 1523). “With our reason we cannot 
look at time in any other way than longitudinally. Beginning with Adam, we must count one year after the 
other until the Last Day. But in God’s sight everything is in one heap. . . . Here there is neither measure nor 
number.” Hence, “Adam, the first man, is just as close to Him as the man who will be born last before the 
Last Day.” Ibid. See also ibid., 30:113-114; 13:99-100. 
127 Ibid., 30:196. 
128 Commenting on Gen 22:12, Luther suggests a twofold cognition in God: “one, eternal and 
invisible, by which God sees things before they are in existence; the other, by which he observes things that 
exist.” Thus, “by means of that second vision, with which He looks at existing things, God did not see 
Mary before she existed, and yet He saw her from eternity.” Ibid., 4:132 (Lectures on Genesis, 1539-1540 
[chaps. 22-23]). This second type of cognition is different from the explanation of God’s eternal/timeless 
knowledge, because it assumes that He sees things in time and not only in Himself. 
129 I am aware that Luther could answer that we should be “satisfied with this picture” and avoid 
“that inquisitiveness of the human intellect, which wants to investigate His majesty.” Ibid., 4:133. 
Nevertheless, the German theologian seems to break his own rule, as he provides details about the 
timelessness and the cognition of the hidden God. The quotation above represents Luther’s conclusion 
about “those expressions of Scripture when God is described in terms of human form and actions.” For 
him, “they are transferred from human beings to God because of the feebleness of our understanding.” Ibid. 
Luther’s ambiguity on God’s cognition is also evident in his interpretation of Gen 22:12, where he 
highlights that the “expression ‘now I know’ must be understood in a simple manner, although” he does 




The notion of timelessness is evident in the description of the divinity of Christ, 
who “cannot be categorized under ‘time’ or under ‘creature,’ but it is above ‘time’ and 
‘creature.’”130 In his explanation that the Son of God is “begotten from eternity,” Luther 
maintains that, since “God is outside time, a spiritual being,” the biblical statement “‘You 
are My Son, today I have begotten You’” (Ps 2:7; Heb 1:5) does not refer to God 
begetting “something temporal, something physical, but brings forth something like 
Himself, that is, eternal and spiritual.”131 In this perspective, the eternal generation of the 
                                                
130 Ibid., 52:42-43 (sermon on John 1:1-14, between 1521-1522). 
131 Ibid., 12:47 (Commentary on Psalm 2, 1532). It is important to highlight that Calvin did not 
read Ps 2:7 as the eternal generation of the Son, because Acts 13:33 applies this passage to Christ’s 
resurrection. See CBC, Commentary on the Psalms. However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
French theologian rejects the traditional belief of the eternal/timeless generation of the Son. In fact, he 
appears to affirm this belief. He argues that the Father “is the fountainhead and beginning of deity” in terms 
of “order and degree.” ICR 1.13.23-24. Calvin adds, “He is the Son of God, because the Word was begotten 
by the Father before all ages.” Ibid., 1.13.23. “He was eternal God solely because he was the Word 
begotten by the eternal Father” Ibid., 2.14.7. “The Son of God . . . was the eternal Word begotten before all 
ages from the Father.” Ibid., 1.13.24. Calvin seems to suggest that “the eternal begetting of wisdom” is 
depicted in Prov 8:22 and refers to Christ. Ibid. Obviously, if the eternity of the generation is not timeless, 
then the moment that the Son was begotten by the Father was preceded by a time when the Son did not yet 
exist. In contrast to Calvin’s position, this conclusion would represent a rejection of the eternity of the Son. 
Even though the French theologian does not explicitly define eternal generation as timeless, this 
qualification appears to be implied in the following statements: “the Son of God . . . had by virtue of eternal 
generation always possessed sonship.” Ibid., 2.14.5; italics mine. “God would not have been called ‘Father’ 
from the beginning unless there had already at that time been a reciprocal relationship to the Son” Ibid., 
2.14.7; italics mine. However, Calvin does seem to question the idea of continuous begetting. He asks, 
“what is the point in disputing whether the Father always begets? Indeed, it is foolish to imagine a 
continuous act of begetting, since it is clear that three persons have subsisted in God from eternity.” Ibid., 
1.13.29. The idea of continuous begetting was introduced by Origen and defended by the school of 
Alexandria. For further information, see John Behr, The Way to Nicaea, The Formation of Christian 
Theology (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001), 193-194; Christine Christ-Von Wedel, 
Erasmus of Rotterdam Advocate of a New Christianity, Erasmus Studies (Toronto; Buffalo; London: 
University of Toronto Press, 2013), 133-134. Brannon Ellis appears to indicate that the eternal generation 
may be understood either as “timelessly perfect” or as “a timeless process.” Brannon Ellis, Calvin, 
Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 64n1. 
However, Ellis does not elaborate on this distinction. Apparently, the notion of continuous begetting fits in 
the category of timeless process, while the position advanced by Calvin belongs to a timelessly perfect 
generation. According to Benjamin W. Swinburnson, there are two schools of interpretation of Calvin’s 
notion of the eternal generation of the Son. Both agree that he “embraced a form of the doctrine of the 
eternal generation of the Son, but they disagree as to how he defined it.” The main point of contention is 
whether he accepted or rejected the Nicene idea of “communication of essence in eternal generation.” 
Swinburnson argues for Calvin’s acceptance. Benjamin W. Swinburnson, “John Calvin, Eternal 





Son takes place in the eternal present (today) of timeless eternity.132 Associated with the 
idea of timelessness is the notion of the non-spatiality of the divine Christ. Regarding 
Christ’s earthly (spatio-temporal) birth, the German theologian assumes that, in His non-
spatial immutability, Christ’s divinity “cannot pass from one place to another as creatures 
do,” and affirms that the divine Christ “was already in the Virgin’s womb in essence and 
in person, as he was also in all other places, everywhere, according to the nature and 
character and power of divinity.”133 According to this idea of divine non-spatiality, 
Luther assumes that God “does not utter any physical speech,” which relates to his 
understanding that Christ is the eternal Word in the sense that God’s nature “is pregnant 
with a Word or a conversation in which He engages with Himself in His divine essence 
and which reflects the thoughts of His heart.”134 This is “an invisible and 
                                                
With regard to the idea of order and degree, Calvin claims that “in respect to order and degree the 
beginning of divinity is in the Father, yet we say that it is a detestable invention that essence is proper to the 
Father alone.” ICR 1.13.24. “The Father . . . is the beginning of deity, not in the bestowing of essence, . . . 
but by reason of order.” Ibid., 1.13.26. In his comments about the Trinity in Calvin, T. Torrance points out 
that ontologically there can be no “before or after in the eternal relations in God,” but “a significant 
distinction of order is to be considered.” Torrance, “Calvin’s Doctrine of the Trinity,” 177. 
132 For Luther, “The adverb ‘today’ refers to that eternal nativity of the Son . . . the most present 
nativity, . . . without a beginning and without an end.” LW, 12:52. The German theologian believes that the 
word “today” may also refer to the second birth of Christ, namely, His birth in time or His incarnation. 
Ibid., 29:113-114 (Lectures on Hebrews, 1517-1518). According to Luther, Christ “has two births, or two 
natures.” The “first birth” was “not in time but from all eternity,” while the second birth was “the temporal, 
human birth.” Ibid., 15:292-294 (Treatise on the Last Words of David, 1543). In other words, Christ has a 
twofold nativity, “outside time and within time.” Ibid., 12:53 (Commentary on Psalm 2, 1532). 
133 Ibid,, 37:62 (That These Words of Christ, “This is My Body,” etc., Still Stand Firm Against the 
Fanatics, 1527). Luther maintains that the divine Christ “did not climb down from heaven as on a ladder or 
descend as by a rope,” as He was “already present in essence and in person in the Virgin’s womb, and had 
to assume humanity there.” Ibid. 
134 Ibid., 22:9-10 (Sermons on the Gospel of St. John—chapters 1-4, 1537-1540). Luther indicates 
that “Christ is neither a mathematical word nor a physical word, but a divine and uncreated ‘Word’ which 
signifies substance and a person because the divine ‘Word’ is divinity.” Thus, “philosophically, a word 
means a sound or voice; but theologically speaking, word signifies the Son of God.” Martin Luther and 
Mitchell Tolpingrud, “Luther’s Disputation Concerning the Divinity and Humanity of Christ,” Lutheran 




incomprehensible conversation” that “God alone sees, hears, or comprehends.”135 
The association of Christ with God’s thoughts, in the context of non-spatiality and 
timelessness, is also part of the conception of divine action in the functional model. The 
simultaneity of thoughts in God’s timeless mind precludes any chronological distinction 
between divine foreknowledge and predestination, which means that these are not 
different activities of the divine mind. In other words, divine foreknowledge is identified 
with predestination, because what God contemplates is not different from His 
decision/decree or action. For Calvin, God “foresees future events only by reason of the 
fact that He decreed that they take place.”136 Thus, divine action is particularly defined as 
predestination, which is “God’s eternal decree, by which He compacted with Himself 
what He willed to become of each man. For all are not created in equal condition; rather, 
eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others.”137 The idea of divine 
                                                
135 LW, 22:9-10. 
136 ICR 3.21.6. For Calvin, “God foreknew what end man was to have before he created him, and 
consequently foreknew because he so ordained by his decree.” Thus, “God not only foresaw the fall of the 
first man, and in him the ruin of his descendants, but also meted it out in accordance with his own 
decision.” Ibid., 3.21.7. Similarly, Luther affirms God’s timeless predestination, conceiving divine 
foreknowledge in terms of action. This idea is emphasized in On the Bondage of the Will (1525). For 
instance, the German theologian argues that “God foreknows nothing contingently, but that he foresees and 
purposes and does all things by his immutable, eternal, and infallible will.” Thus, “everything we do, 
everything that happens, even if it seems to us to happen mutably and contingently, happens in fact 
nonetheless necessarily and immutably, if you have regard to the will of God. For the will of God is 
effectual and cannot be hindered, since it is the power of the divine nature itself.” LW, 33:37-38. As a 
result, the “omnipotence and the foreknowledge of God . . . completely abolish the dogma of free choice.” 
Ibid., 33:189. In short, God’s “foreknowledge is not simply seeing, but acting.” Ickert, “Luther on the 
Timelessness of God,” 55. Johnson points out that “predestination is an implicit part of Luther’s 
understanding of God’s dealings with men, but Luther does not attempt to explain it, for he sees it as a part 
of the mystery of the Godhead.” Johnson, “Luther’s Understanding of God,” 64. For further information on 
Luther’s conception of divine predestination, see Fredrik Brosché, Luther on Predestination: The Antinomy 
and the Unity between Love and Wrath in Luther’s Concept of God, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studiae 
Doctrinae Christianae Upsaliensia 18 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1978); James Edward McGoldrick, 
“Luther’s Doctrine of Predestination,” Reformation & Revival 8, no. 1 (1999): 81-103. 
137 ICR 3.21.5. In his explanation of “God’s eternal election,” Calvin affirms that “salvation is 





action, described in terms of the timeless predestination performed by God’s mind, 
informs the mediatorial role of Christ. More specifically, God’s eternal/timeless 
predestination is the cause of Christ’s mediation.138 Besides the decree about the 
incarnation,139 Christ was “appointed to appease God’s wrath with his sacrifice, and to 
blot out our transgressions with his obedience.”140 In other words, Christ the mediator is 
the secondary cause of salvation, which is dependent on God’s predestination (primary 
cause).141 One implication of this hierarchy of causes is that the mediatorial work of 
                                                
to disassociate salvation or damnation from human choice because he thinks that free will implies merit. He 
believes that everything is taken away “from free will in order not to leave any place for merits.” Ibid., 
2.5.2. With regard to those being saved, “God’s grace . . . is the rule of the Spirit to direct and regulate 
man’s will” in the work of regeneration. Ibid., 2.5.15. On the other hand, “God is said to blind and harden 
the reprobate, to turn, incline, and impel, their hearts. . . . The nature of this activity is by no means 
explained if we take refuge in foreknowledge or permission.” Ibid., 2.4.3. Even Satan is considered an 
instrument of God in His work with the reprobate. For Calvin, “Satan is properly said . . . to act in the 
reprobate over whom he exercises his reign, that is, the reign of wickedness. God is also said to act in His 
own manner, in that Satan himself, since he is the instrument of God’s wrath, bends himself hither and 
thither at His beck and command to execute His just judgments.” Ibid., 2.4.2. For helpful discussions of 
predestination in Calvin, see Muller, Christ and the Decree, 16-38; Paul Jacobs, Prädestination Und 
Verantwortlichkeit Bei Calvin (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968); Wilhelm Niesel, 
The Theology of Calvin, trans. Harold Knight (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), 159-181; Wendel, 
Calvin, 263-284; Charles Partee, “Predestination in Aquinas and Calvin,” Reformed Review 32, no. 1 
(1978): 14-22. 
138 Referring to the fact that “Christ became our Redeemer and the partaker of our nature,” Calvin 
argues that “these two” aspects “were joined together by God’s eternal decree.” ICR 2.12.5. Quoting 
Augustine, Calvin believes that “there is no more illustrious example of predestination than the mediator 
himself.” Ibid., 2.17.1. 
139 “Now it was of the greatest importance for us that he who was to be our Mediator be both true 
God and true man. If someone asks why this is necessary, there has been no simple (to use the common 
expression) or absolute necessity. Rather, it has stemmed from a heavenly decree, on which men’s 
salvation depended.” Ibid., 2.12.1. 
140 Ibid., 2.17.1. 
141 Assuming that salvation is “founded upon the decision of divine election alone” (ibid., 3.22.5), 
Calvin maintains that the beginning of “Christ’s merit” is not in Him, but in “God’s ordinance, the first 
cause.” Ibid., 2.17.1. In regards to the relationship between Christology and predestination in Calvin, 
Edmondson and Muller agree that Christ the mediator and God’s decree do not function at the same level: 
whereas the decree is eternal/timeless (the vertical/timeless causal axis of salvation—Mueller), the person 
and work of Christ are the execution of this decree in time (the horizontal/temporal vertical causal axis of 
salvation—Mueller). However, they reject the conclusion that Christ is merely the instrument of divine 





Christ focuses on those who are elected by God for salvation. Calvin emphasizes that 
Christ takes “under his protection all whom the Father wishes to be saved.”142 In other 
words, God’s eternal/timeless predestination defines not only the person and work of 
Christ the mediator, but also the target people of His work. 
In summary, the functional model describes the divine nature as non-spatial and 
timeless. According to this ontological framework, the divinity of Christ is described by 
the idea of eternal/timeless generation. In this view of the divine nature, divine action is 
understood particularly in terms of eternal/timeless predestination, in which God’s 
knowledge (foreknowledge) is basically identified with His decision or action 
(predestination).143 In this context, Christ’s mediation is caused and informed by timeless 
predestination.144  
Having discussed divinity as the first principle of reality in the functional model, I 
turn to the description of the second principle, namely, humanity. 
                                                
Christ as the eternal Son was also the author of the decree, since it was defined by the Trinity. Therefore, 
Christ is both the author (as divine) and the executor (as divine-human) of predestination. Edmondson, 
Calvin’s Christology, 96, 113-114, 147-149; Muller, Christ and the Decree, 10, 21, 25, 27, 37-38. 
142 ICR 3.24.6. Calvin seems to interpret John 6:37-39, 44; 17:6, 12 according to this perspective. 
Considering that Christ’s mediatorial work accords with the Father’s predestination, the French theologian 
argues that “though Christ interpose as a Mediator, yet he claims the right of electing in common with the 
Father, ‘I speak not of you all: I know whom I have chosen’ (John 13:18). If it is asked whence he has 
chosen them, he answers in another passages ‘Out of the world;’ which he excludes from his prayers when 
he commits his disciples to the Father (John 15:19).” Ibid., 3.22.7. 
143 According to Ziegler, the presuppositions about God adopted by Luther and Calvin allow them 
to choose different paths. Calvin chooses the doctrine of double predestination. Trying to avoid double 
predestination, Luther chooses the distinction between the hidden and revealed God. While the former pays 
the price of disregarding biblical “statements on universal grace,” the latter embraces an “almost 
unbearable” tension in God. Ziegler, “Luther and Calvin on God,” 87-88. Calvin opts for a twofold divine 
action (double predestination), whereas Luther maintains a twofold God (hidden/revealed God). 





Humanity: Christ and the Concept of Human Nature  
Overall, similarly to the sacramental model, the humanity of Christ in the 
functional model is conceived as a spatio-temporal instrument of mediation of the 
spiritual (non-spatial) and eternal (timeless) God. It could be said that, for Luther, 
Christ’s humanity is a (spatio-temporal) covering for the hidden (non-spatial/timeless) 
God, allowing (spatio-temporal) human beings to know Him.145 The distinction between 
the hidden (absconditus) and revealed (revelatus) God seems to present two faces of God. 
While the hidden God (God in Himself) is terrible and powerful in His majesty, which is 
associated with the law and predestination, the revealed God (God pro nobis) in the 
incarnate Christ demonstrates “the love, the goodness, and the sweetness of God. You 
will see His wisdom, His power, and His majesty sweetened and mitigated to your ability 
to stand it.”146 According to this perspective, by assuming a human nature Christ is able 
                                                
145 Affirming Christ as “our way to God,” Luther argues that “to keep us from striving to observe 
God in Himself . . . He came into the flesh . . . in which we might behold God dwelling bodily.” LW, 16:55 
(Lectures on Isaiah, 1527-1528 [chap. 6]). In this sense, Luther claims, “cling to Christ, otherwise you will 
hear the Father Himself speaking against you when He says (Matt. 17:5): ‘Listen to Him.’” Hence, “the 
incarnation of Christ powerfully calls us away from speculating about the divinity.” Ibid. In this sense, the 
Christian religion “does not begin at the top,” but “at the bottom,” which means that “all speculations about 
the Majesty, all thoughts of works, traditions, and philosophy—indeed, of the Law of God itself” must be 
put aside, and “you must pay attention only to this Man, who presents Himself to us as the Mediator.” LW, 
26:30 (Lectures on Galatians [1-4], 1535). For Ickert, Luther’s conception of Christ indicates that he “tends 
to interpret God’s timeless eternity by his timely reality, his eternity by his history.” In other terms, “God’s 
timeless transcendence, an attribute of God’s nakedness” can only be understood by “the historical reality 
of the Word—the divine mask.” Thus, “with the advent of the Word we move from one mask to another, 
from timelessness, which conceals the mysterious God of cross and resurrection, to the Word made flesh, 
which in the fullness of time and under that which is contrary to all expectation of God’s immutable glory, 
reveals the true hidden majesty of the Lord and creator of time.” Ickert, “Luther on the Timelessness of 
God,” 52-53. In the words of Werner Elert, “Christ is the temporalizing of God.” Werner Elert, The 
Structure of Lutheranism, trans. Walter Hansen, vol. 1 (St. Louis: Concordia, 1962), 478. Among Luther’s 
Christological writings, his understanding of the humanity of Christ is particularly expressed in the 
following texts: Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper (1528), The Marburg Colloquy (1529), The Word 
became Flesh (1539), On the Divinity and Humanity of Christ (1540). 
146 Ibid., 26:30. According to Ziegler, “in Luther research the question has been asked whether 
there is a dualism in Luther and if Luther has a unified concept of God.” There is a “contradiction” between 





to mediate or reveal the hidden God to human beings, even though the picture of the 
hidden God seems to be incompatible with the revealed God for the limited human mind. 
Indeed, Luther and Calvin understand the instrumentality of Christ’s humanity in 
different ways, as they hold distinct views on how Christ’s human nature relates to His 
divine nature (communicatio idiomatum). Emphasizing the unity between the two natures 
and the actual exchange of characteristics between them, Luther’s position implies that 
the human nature of Christ is a spatio-temporal instrument in the sense that it 
communicates properties to His divine nature (e.g., passibility, physical touch) and also 
receives properties from the divine nature (e.g., different modes of presence). The 
German theologian strongly highlights the union between Christ’s human and divine 
natures through his notion of communicatio idiomatum (communication of properties),147 
which is not explained by analogies such as the union of soul and body, as they are 
incapable of expressing the profound unity of Christ’s humanity and divinity.148 With 
                                                
nevertheless permits men to remain in sin and even hardens them in their sin,” and “Luther does not 
provide a solution.” Ziegler, “Luther and Calvin on God,” 64, 74-75. This contradiction seems to involve 
Luther’s “two ways of approaching the question of time and eternity in God, the metaphysical-theological 
and the biblical-theological,” which “run parallel to one another, not always harmoniously.” Ickert, “Luther 
on the Timelessness of God,” 58-59. 
147 According to this notion, “those things that are attributed to the human being may rightly be 
asserted with respect to God; and, on the other hand, those things that are attributed to God may rightly be 
asserted with respect to the human being.” Luther and Tolpingrud, “Luther’s Disputation Concerning the 
Divinity and Humanity of Christ,” 152. Joar Haga’s statement that Luther does not conceive the humanity 
of Christ as an instrument refers to a notion of instrumentality that does take into account Luther’s 
understanding of communicatio idiomatum. See Joar Haga, Was There a Lutheran Metaphysics? The 
Interpretation of Communicatio Idiomatum in Early Modern Lutheranism, Refo500 Academic Studies 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 61. For further studies on Luther’s view of communicatio 
idiomatum, see Dennis Ngien, “Chalcedonian Christology and Beyond: Luther’s Understanding of the 
Communicatio Idiomatum,” The Heythrop Journal 45, no. 1 (2004): 54-68; Johann Anselm Steiger and 
Carolyn Schneider, “The Communicatio Idiomatum as the Axle and Motor of Luther’s Theology,” 
Lutheran Quarterly 14, no. 2 (2000): 125-158. 
148 Luther and Tolpingrud, “Luther’s Disputation Concerning the Divinity and Humanity of 
Christ,” 155. “I confess two natures, but they can never be separated. This makes a unity which is a greater 





regard to the communication of properties from the human to the divine nature, “that 
which I assert with respect to Christ the human being,” Luther states, “I correctly assert 
also with respect to God—that God suffered, was crucified.”149 Even though “God cannot 
be crucified nor can God suffer,” by becoming a human being “God is capable of 
suffering.”150 Therefore, the German theologian claims that “Christ, the impassible son of 
God,” suffered and was crucified as God and man.151 In fact, the communicatio 
idiomatum enabled God not only to suffer, but to be touched.152 Furthermore, according 
to Luther’s idea of communicatio idiomatum, the humanity of Christ receives properties 
from His divine nature. In terms of spatiality, Christ’s divinity enables His humanity to 
have three different modes of presence, namely, the circumscribed/corporeal, the 
                                                
never separated.” Ibid., 161. However, Luther does believe that, by assuming a human nature, Christ 
assumed “that which consists of a soul and flesh.” Ibid., 167. For useful studies on Luther’s anthropology, 
see Denis Janz, Luther and Late Medieval Thomism: A Study in Theological Anthropology (Waterloo, ON, 
Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983); Wilfried Joest, Ontologie Der Person Bei Luther 
(Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967). 
149 Luther and Tolpingrud, “Luther’s Disputation Concerning the Divinity and Humanity of 
Christ,” 160. “That unity of the two natures in one person is so great that they are equal in predication; they 
communicate their attributes to each other just as if he were only God or only a human being.” Ibid., 168. 
150 Ibid., 161. “From eternity God has not suffered, but now that God has been made a human 
being, God is capable of suffering.” Ibid. Because of the communicatio idiomatum, “those things which 
Christ suffered are attributed also to God because they are one.” Ibid., 174-175. 
151 Ibid., 161. According to Ngien, “Luther transcends the Alexandrian Christology by asserting 
the idea of a real communication that moves not only from the divine nature to the human nature, but also 
from the human nature to the divine nature.” Ngien, “Chalcedonian Christology and Beyond,” 62. 
However, Althaus points out that Luther sometimes hesitates in affirming that the deity suffered. Althaus, 
The Theology of Martin Luther, 198. For further information on Luther’s notion of divine passibility, see 
Dennis Ngien, The Suffering of God According to Martin Luther’s ‘Theologia Crucis’ (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1995). 
152 For Luther, “the one who touches the [incarnate] Son of God touches the divine nature itself.” 
Luther and Tolpingrud, “Luther’s Disputation Concerning the Divinity and Humanity of Christ,” 164. 
Ngien argues that, for Luther, “the divine nature was present throughout the earthly life of Jesus, and was 




uncircumscribed/spiritual, and the repletive/divine modes.153 First, according to the 
“circumscribed corporeal mode of presence,” Christ “walked bodily on earth” and 
“occupied and yielded space according to his size.”154 Second, in His “uncircumscribed, 
spiritual mode of presence” Christ “neither occupies nor yields space but passes through 
everything created as he wills.”155 This mode of presence was employed by Christ “when 
he was born in his mother,” “when he left the closed grave” in His resurrection, and then 
when he “came through closed doors” in His appearance to the disciples.156 Third, in “the 
divine, heavenly mode . . . all created things are . . . permeable and present to” Christ, as 
far as He is God.157 This mode refers to divine omnipresence, by which the incarnate 
Christ “is simultaneously present in all places whole and entire, and fills all places, yet 
without being measured or circumscribed by any place, in terms of the space which it 
occupies.”158  
Conversely, Calvin emphasizes the distinction between Christ’s human and divine 
natures.159 For him, the humanity of Christ is a spatio-temporal instrument in the sense 
                                                
153 As Luther indicates, “The one body of Christ has a threefold existence, or all three modes of 
being at a given place.” LW, 37:222 (Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper, 1528). 
154 Ibid. For further information about this mode of presence, see ibid., 37:215. 
155 Ibid., 37:222. 
156 Ibid., 37:223. Luther seems to believe that this is the way in which “angels and spirits are in 
certain places. For an angel or devil can be present in an entire house or city; again, he can be in a room, a 
chest or a box, indeed, in a nutshell. The space is really material and circumscribed, and has its own 
dimensions of length, breadth, and depth; but that which occupies it has not the same length, breadth, or 
depth as the space which it occupies, indeed, it has no length or breadth at all.” Ibid., 37:215. 
157 Ibid., 37:223. For Luther, “Wherever God is,” Christ “must be also.” Ibid. 
158 Ibid., 37:216. According to this divine mode, “Everything is full of Christ through and through, 
even according to his humanity.” Ibid., 37:218. 
159 For helpful information about the humanity of Christ in Calvin, see Ho-Jin Ahn, “The 





that it enables the person of Christ (not His divine nature) to do things that cannot be 
done by His divine nature (e.g., to suffer, be seen or touched).160 In this perspective, 
Christ’s divinity is “so joined and united with his humanity that each retains its 
distinctive nature unimpaired, and yet these two natures constitute one Christ.”161 In 
contrast to Luther, the French theologian suggests that the best example of the distinction 
and conjunction of Christ’s divine and human natures is the analogy of the unity and 
distinction of body and soul.162 Accordingly, Calvin assumes that the communication of 
properties is only a figure of speech, and not an ontological exchange of 
                                                
Theology 65, no. 2 (2012): 145-158; R. Michael Allen, “Calvin’s Christ: A Dogmatic Matrix for Discussion 
of Christ’s Human Nature,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 9, no. 4 (2007): 328-397; M. 
Dominice, L’humanité De Jésus d’après Calvin (Paris: Je Sers, 1933); Torrance, “The Vicarious Humanity 
and Priesthood of Christ in the Theology of John Calvin,” 69-84. 
160 In Calvin’s words, “Surely God does not have blood, does not suffer, cannot be touched with 
hands. But since Christ . . . was true God and also true man,” He “was crucified and shed his blood for us.” 
ICR 2.14.2. “When the Lord of glory is said to be crucified [1 Corinthians 2:8], Paul does not mean that he 
suffered anything in his divinity.” Ibid., 4.17.30. 
161 Ibid., 2.14.1. Edmondson argues that Calvin’s “commitment to the immutability of the divine 
nature” resulted in the notion labeled as extra-calvinisticum, the idea that Christ in His divine nature has 
always been with God in heaven and with human beings on earth. According to this notion, “To say that 
Christ in his divinity was joined to his human nature in the virgin’s womb does not mean that he was 
contained therein, for he continued to dwell in heaven and throughout the earth in his ubiquitous being as 
the Word of God.” Hence, in the incarnation the divine Christ “descended from heaven . . . without leaving 
heaven.” Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology, 212-213. For further information about the extra-
calvinisticum, see Willis, Calvin’s Catholic Christology; Heiko Augustinus Oberman, “The ‘Extra’ 
Dimension in the Theology of Calvin,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 21, no. 1 (1970): 43-64. 
162 Calvin emphasizes that neither substance (soul, body) “is so mingled with the other as not to 
retain its own distinctive nature. For the soul is not the body, and the body is not the soul. Therefore, some 
things are said exclusively of the soul that can in no wise apply to the body; and of the body, again, that in 
no way fit the soul; of the whole man, that cannot refer—except inappropriately—to either soul or body 
separately.” ICR 2.14.1. The French theologian also understands the humanity of Christ according to the 
dichotomy of body and soul. See ICR 2.13.2. Such constitution of Christ’s humanity is highlighted in 
Calvin’s explanation of His sacrificial death. For him, the idea of Christ’s descent into hell refers to the 
spiritual suffering of His soul. “If Christ had died only a bodily death, it would have been ineffectual,” 
since He needed to “grapple hand to hand with the armies of hell and the dread of everlasting death” in 
order to “undergo the severity of God’s vengeance, to appease his wrath and satisfy his just judgment.” 
Thus, Christ gave not only His body “as the price of our redemption,” but “He paid a greater and more 




characteristics.163 He argues that, in some cases, Scripture attributes to Christ “what must 
be referred solely to his humanity,”164 in other cases it mentions “what belongs uniquely 
to his divinity; and sometimes what embraces both natures but fits neither alone.”165 
In summary, the functional model conceives the humanity of Christ as a spatio-
temporal instrument of mediation of the non-spatial/timeless God. Among other things, 
the human nature is described by a dichotomy of body and soul, and contrasted to the 
                                                
163 Calvin asserts that the communicatio idiomatum is only a “figure of speech” by which the 
Scriptures “so earnestly express this union of the two natures that is in Christ as sometimes to interchange 
them.” ICR 2.14.1. “The communicating of characteristics or properties consists in what Paul says: ‘God 
purchased the church with his blood’ [Acts 20:28], and ‘the Lord of glory was crucified’ [1 Cor 2:8]. John 
says the same: ‘The Word of life was handled’ [1 John 1:1]. Surely God does not have blood, does not 
suffer, cannot be touched with hands. But since Christ, who was true God and also true man, was crucified 
and shed his blood for us, the things that he carried out in his human nature are transferred improperly, 
although not without reason, to his divinity. Here is a similar example: John teaches ‘that God laid down 
his life for us’ [1 John 3:16]. Accordingly, there also a property of humanity is shared with the other nature. 
Again, when Christ, still living on earth, said: ‘No one has ascended into heaven but the Son of man who 
was in heaven’ [John 3:13], surely then, as man, in the flesh that he had taken upon himself, he was not in 
heaven. But because the selfsame one was both God and man, for the sake of the union of both natures he 
gave to the one what belonged to the other.” Ibid. 2.14.2. According to Tylenda, “The communication of 
idioms” in Calvin “is not a real ontological communication of properties (whereby the characteristics of 
one nature ontologically belong to the other nature), but it is the assigning of attributes to a person or 
subject.” Joseph N. Tylenda, “Calvin’s Understanding of the Communication of Properties,” Westminster 
Theological Journal 38, no. 1 (1975): 64. McCormack criticizes the lack of reflection on the hypostatic 
union in Calvin and stipulates that his avoidance of an ontological communication of idioms is related to 
the concept of divine immutability. McCormack, For Us and Our Salvation, 9, 33. 
164 ICR 2.14.1. “He is called ‘the servant of the Father’ [Isa 42:1]; he is said to have ‘increased in 
age and wisdom . . . God and men’ [Luke 2:52], and not to ‘seek his own glory’ [John 8:50]; ‘not to know 
the Last Day’ [Mark 13:32]; not to ‘speak by himself’ [John 14:10], and not to ‘do his own will’ [John 
6:38]; he is said to have been ‘seen and handled’ [Luke 24:39]. All these refer solely to Christ’s humanity. 
In so far as he is God, he cannot increase in anything, and does all things for his own sake; nothing is 
hidden from him; he does all things according to the decision of his will, and can be neither seen nor 
handled. Yet he does not ascribe these qualities solely to his human nature, but takes them upon himself as 
being in harmony with the person of the Mediator.” Ibid. 2.14.2; italics mine. 
165 Ibid. 2.14.1. With regard to Christ’s divinity, Calvin argues that “what Christ said of himself, 
‘Before Abraham was I am,’ [John 8:58]—was far removed from his humanity. . . . Paul declares him to be 
‘the first-born of all creation . . . who was before all things and in whom all things hold together’ [Col 1:15, 
17]. Also, he says that he was ‘glorious in his Father’s presence before the world was made’ [John 17:5]; 
and that he is working together with his Father [John 5:17]. These qualities are utterly alien to man. 
Therefore they and their like apply exclusively to his divinity.” Ibid. 2.14.2; italics mine. In reference to 
both Christ’s humanity and divinity, Calvin maintains, “for one reads there neither of deity nor of humanity 
alone, but of both at once: he received from the Father the power of remitting sins [John 1:29], of raising to 





divine nature by its passibility. Two conceptions of the instrumentality of Christ’s 
humanity derive from two different emphases about the relationship of His human nature 
with His divine nature. According to the emphasis on the unity of the natures (Luther), 
Christ’s humanity enables His divinity to experience human characteristics (e.g., 
passibility) and, at the same time, is enabled by the divine nature to experience divine 
characteristics (e.g., omnipresence). In accordance to the emphasis on the distinction of 
the natures (Calvin), Christ’s humanity does what cannot be done by His divine nature 
(e.g., human passibility and divine impassibility). In both emphases, the divine nature is 
impassible by default. The difference is that, for Luther, the divine nature can experience 
passibility through the human nature.  
My next step is to describe the third principle of reality in the functional model, 
namely, cosmology. 
Cosmology: Christ, Heaven, and Earth  
In the description of this principle of reality in the functional model, I will focus 
on the interaction of the resurrected ascended Christ with heaven and earth, highlighting 
how the concepts of divinity and humanity explored above relate to cosmology or the 
ontological structure of the world in this model. 
According to the functional model, the notion of God being in heaven is a 
metaphor (Luther) that accommodates non-spatial realities to human spatial cognition 
(Calvin). Hence, with reference to God, heaven is non-spatial. Luther tends to understand 
the biblical language about heaven and the throne of God metaphorically. With regard to 
                                                




the idea of “God as sitting on a throne,” he emphasizes that “uneducated persons” do not 
recognize this as a figure of speech, but “immediately think of a golden throne 
marvelously adorned, although they know that no such material is found in heaven.”166 
This notion of heaven is compatible to his description of the life to come, which is 
different from the physicality (space) and sequentiality (time) that characterizes the 
present earthly life.167 Likewise, Calvin maintains that the term “heaven” represents the 
best way the finite human mind can express “unspeakable glory,” since “wherever our 
senses comprehend anything they commonly attach it to that place.”168 Accordingly, he 
rejects the idea that God is actually in a place called heaven. For him, God “is not 
confined to any particular region but is diffused through all things.”169 He is “beyond all 
place,” which means that there is nothing “earthly or physical about Him, lest we 
                                                
166 LW, 1:15 (Lectures on Genesis, 1535). In his contention against Zwingli’s view that the 
eucharistic elements are the body of Christ in a metaphorical sense because He ascended into heaven, 
Luther highlights that “the figure of speech could much more conveniently be found in the word ‘heaven,’” 
rather than in the Lord’s Supper. LW, 38:41 (The Marburg Colloquy and the Marburg Articles, 1529). 
Luther justifies a metaphorical understanding of heaven by saying that this word is “used in Scripture in 
various meanings.” Ibid. For further information about Luther’s conception of heaven, see Hans Schwarz, 
“Luther’s Understanding of Heaven and Hell,” in Interpreting Luther’s Legacy: Essays in Honor of 
Edward C Fendt, ed. Fred W. Meuser and Stanley D. Schneider (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1969), 83-94. 
167 In Luther’s words, “this life amounts to eating, drinking, sleeping, digesting, begetting 
children, etc. Here everything goes by number: hours, days, and years in succession. Now when you want 
to look at the life to come, you must erase the course of this life from your mind. You dare not think that 
you can measure it as this life is measured. There everything will be one day, one hour, one moment.” LW, 
30:196 (Sermons on the Second Epistle of St. Peter, 1523). 
168 ICR 3.20.40. For Calvin, the term heaven “is only a metaphor. Since it is an abstract notion, the 
Scripture uses a concrete image which corresponds to the highest thing visible, because our ‘ignorance’ and 
‘stupidity’ prevents us from under-standing the abstract.” J. H. Mazaheri, “Calvin and Augustine’s 
Interpretations of ‘the Father in Heaven’,” Revue d‘histoire ecclésiastique 106, no. 3-4 (2011): 448-449. 
See also Christopher B. Kaiser, “Climbing Jacob’s Ladder: John Calvin and the Early Church on Our 
Eucharistic Ascent to Heaven,” Scottish Journal of Theology 56, no. 3 (2003): 250-251.  
169 ICR 3.20.40. Calvin seems to find biblical support for this argument in 1 Kgs 8:27; Isa 66:1; 




measure him by our small measure.”170 These statements reveal the assumption that being 
in a place implies being confined and measured. 
Taking into consideration the different accounts provided by Luther and Calvin 
regarding the relationship between Christ’s human and divine natures discussed in the 
section above on Humanity, the functional model accommodates two interpretations of 
the presence of the ascended Christ in heaven. One interpretation holds that Christ is in 
heaven according to the divine mode of presence—omnipresent (Luther: Christ’s third 
mode of presence).171 Hence, Christ’s ascended body is not physically present in a 
particular place with the Father—although Christ still can employ His circumscribed 
mode of presence, but is everywhere.172 In Luther’s words, “Christ’s body is everywhere 
because it is at the right hand of God which is everywhere.”173 While this interpretation 
assumes that the humanity of Christ receives the divine property of ubiquity from His 
divine nature, the other interpretation maintains that the humanity of Christ, in order to be 
a real humanity, is distinct from His divinity, which means that the humanity of the 
                                                
170 Ibid. Calvin claims that when we seek God “we must rise above all perception of body and 
soul.” Ibid. 
171 Affirming that Christ is in heaven according to His third mode of presence, that is, the divine or 
ubiquitous mode, Luther claims in his disputation against Zwingli that the biblical notion that the ascended 
Christ is at the right hand of God in heaven does not imply that He cannot be in the sacrament at the same 
time, since the right hand of God is not “a particular place in heaven.” LW, 37:213 (Confession Concerning 
Christ’s Supper, 1528). 
172 Even though Luther indicates that the ascended Christ can still employ His circumscribed mode 
of presence, “He is not in God or with the Father or in heaven according to this mode,” as “God is not a 
corporeal space or place.” Ibid., 37:222. Luther points out that the ascended Christ will employ His 
circumscribed mode of presence in the Parousia. Ibid. 
173 Ibid., 37:213. For further information about the ubiquity of the ascended Christ in Luther, see 
David R. Law, “Descent into Hell, Ascension, and Luther’s Doctrine of Ubiquitarianism,” Theology 107, 




ascended Christ is not ubiquitous as His divinity (Calvin).174 In other words, the second 
interpretation stipulates that Christ’s ascended body has limited dimensions and is 
localized in a place in heaven.175 Calvin seems to assume that the ascension was a 
bodily176 and visible movement177 into a place in heaven.178 Moreover, he argues that the 
ascended Christ “entered a sanctuary not made with hands” to appear “before the Father’s 
face as our constant advocate and intercessor.”179 Calvin appears to indicate that the 
notion of Christ entering a heavenly sanctuary is not a metaphorical idea. In his criticism 
                                                
174 Calvin calls Luther’s position the “monstrous notion of ubiquity.” ICR 4.17.30. 
175 According to Calvin, “Christ’s body is limited by the general characteristics common to all 
human bodies, and is contained in heaven (where it was once for all received) until Christ return in 
judgment [Calvin seems to refer to Acts 3:21] . . . so we deem it utterly unlawful to draw it back under 
these corruptible elements or to imagine it to be present everywhere.” Ibid., 4.17.12. “The body of Christ 
from the time of his resurrection was finite, and is contained in heaven even to the Last Day.” Ibid., 
4.17.26. In fact, Calvin argues that the conception that Christ’s glorified body is “invisible and infinite,” 
being “in many places at once and not held in any space,” constitutes a denial “the resurrection of the flesh” 
and an affirmation that Christ’s “body was swallowed up by his divinity.” For the French theologian, “if to 
fill all things in an invisible manner is numbered among the gifts of the glorified body, it is plain that the 
substance of the body is wiped out, and that no difference between deity and human nature is left. Then, if 
Christ’s body is so multiform and varied that it shows itself in one place but is invisible in another, where is 
the very nature of a body, which exists in its own dimensions . . . ?” Ibid., 4.17.29. See also ibid., 4.17.17, 
19, 24, and 28. Assuming that “the true nature of a body to be contained in space, to have its own 
dimensions and its own shape” Calvin stipulates that the fact that the resurrected Christ “went in to his 
disciples through closed doors” in John 20:19 needs to be understood in the same way that He, before the 
resurrection, walked upon the water (Matt 14:25) miraculously. Ibid., 4.17.29. 
176 According to Calvin, Christ’s “body was raised up above all the heavens.” Ibid., 2.16.14. “He 
entered heaven in our flesh.” Ibid., 2.16.16. 
177 Referring to Acts 1:11, the French theologian affirms the visible form of Christ’s second 
coming based on the visibility of His ascension. “He will come down from heaven in the same visible form 
in which he was seen to ascend.” Ibid., 2.16.17. The idea of movement seems to be implied in the statement 
that “‘departing’ and ‘ascending’ do not signify giving the appearance of one ascending and departing, but 
actually doing what the words state.” Ibid., 4.17.26. 
178 “But why do we repeat the word ‘ascension’ so often? Does it not imply moving from one place 
to another? They deny this: according to them, height signifies only the majesty of his rule. But what is the 
manner of the ascension itself? Is he not lifted up on high before his disciples’ very eyes? Do not the 
Evangelists clearly relate that he was received into heaven?” Ibid., 4.17.27; italics mine. “We safely infer 
that his abode is now in heaven.” Ibid. “By His ascension into heaven” Christ “made it plain that it is not in 
all places, but when it passes into one, it leaves the previous one.” Ibid., 4.17.30 




of those who defend the ubiquity of Christ’s humanity, he states that they “drag Christ’s 
body from the heavenly sanctuary.”180 Depicting the heavenly intercession, the French 
theologian stipulates that Christ “turns the Father’s eyes to his own righteousness to avert 
his gaze from our sins.”181 This emphasis on the Father’s eyes implies that Christ’s 
intercession does not involve bodily (kneeling) or oral (pleading) communication with 
the Father, but it is only a physical appearance before Him.182 However, when such 
description of the intercession of Christ is compared with the non-spatial/timeless 
understanding of God and heaven described above, one wonders whether the language of 
Christ entering the heavenly sanctuary in order to appear before the Father really depicts 
a spatio-temporal reality or this is only a spatio-temporal metaphorical expression that 
accommodates a non-spatio/timeless reality to the spatio-temporal cognition of the 
human mind.183 
Regarding the earth, the functional model embraces the sacramental presence of 
the ascended Christ on earth. As this presence is related to His presence in heaven, the 
                                                
180 Ibid., 4.17.30. In his words, “The greatest and truest priest of the church had not figuratively 
entered the inner precincts of the veil to the Holy of Holies but through express and steadfast truth had 
entered the inner precincts of heaven to a holiness real and eternal, also commends himself to the prayers of 
believers.” Ibid., 3.20.20. “Having entered the heavenly sanctuary, even to the consummation of the ages,” 
Christ “alone bears to God the petitions of the people.” Ibid.  
181 Ibid., 2.16.16. Calvin adds, Christ “so reconciles the Father’s heart to us that by his intercession 
he prepares a way and access for us to the Father’s throne. He fills with grace and kindness the throne that 
for miserable sinners would otherwise have been filled with dread.” Ibid. 
182 For Calvin, Christ is not “kneeling before God” and pleading “as a suppliant for us,” but 
“appears before God’s presence.” Ibid., 3.20.20. 
183 For McDonnel, “Calvin’s emphasis on Christ’s body having its place in heaven can be 
misleading. He did not think of Christ’s body being assigned to a definite place in heaven.” Indeed, “He is 
quite aware that there is not a celestial circumscription reserved to the divinity and the glorified creatures, 
that the glorified body of Christ is not bound by the Aristotelian category of place. Christ is not in a place 





two interpretations of the presence of Christ in heaven lead to two different accounts of 
His sacramental presence on earth. The interpretation that Christ is not physically present 
in heaven holds that He is physically present in the eucharistic elements (Luther).184 The 
German theologian explains that Christ is present both in heaven and in the sacrament.185 
He is in the sacrament according to the uncircumscribed/spiritual mode of presence (the 
second mode of presence),186 and is also in heaven according to the divine/ubiquitous 
mode of presence (the third mode of presence).187 Therefore, like in heaven, on earth 
Christ is not present in the sacrament as circumscribed in a place (this would be the first 
mode of presence).188 On the other hand, the interpretation that Christ is physically 
present in heaven leads to the conclusion that He is not physically present in the 
eucharistic elements (Calvin). The French theologian argues that the body of Christ is 
truly present in the sacrament,189 but in a spiritual (not physical) way through the power 
                                                
184 In his contention against Zwingli’s view that the eucharistic elements are the body of Christ in 
a metaphorical sense because He ascended into heaven, Luther highlights that “the figure of speech could 
much more conveniently be found in the word ‘heaven,’” rather than in the Lord’s Supper. LW, 38:41 (The 
Marburg Colloquy and the Marburg Articles, 1529). For Luther, in the Lord’s Supper the mouth of 
believers “receives the body of Christ.” He uses the language of “eating Christ’s body.” Ibid., 38:46, 55. 
The German theologian advocates the substantial presence of Christ in the eucharistic elements but not in 
terms of transubstantiation. For him, “Christ is in the sacrament substantially as he was born of the Virgin.” 
Ibid., 38:30. However, “the bread and wine in themselves remain unaltered and unchanged.” Ibid., 37:217 
(Confessions Concerning Christ’s Supper, 1528). 
185 “I confess that the body is in heaven, I also confess that it is in the sacrament.” Ibid., 38:58. See 
also ibid., 38:29; 37:213. 
186 Ibid., 37:216-217 (Confessions Concerning Christ’s Supper, 1528). 
187 This point was explained in the paragraph above regarding Luther’s understanding of Christ’s 
presence in heaven. 
188 In Luther’s words, Christ’s “body is not in the sacrament as in a place.” Ibid., 38:61 (The 
Marburg Colloquy and the Marburg Articles, 1529). 
189 “In his Sacred Supper” Christ “bids me take, eat, and drink his body and blood under the 
symbols of bread and wine. I do not doubt that he himself truly presents them, and that I receive them.” 





of the Holy Spirit.190 These two accounts of Christ’s sacramental presence on earth affirm 
in different ways the conviction assumed by the functional model that the ascended 
Christ works salvifically with believers on earth by means of the word191 and the 
sacraments,192 whose climax is His real presence in the eucharistic elements.193 Thus, the 
                                                
see ourselves made partakers in it . . . the power of his life-giving death will be efficacious in us.” Ibid., 
4.17.1. “The Lord’s body was once for all so sacrificed for us that we may now feed upon it, and by feeding 
feel in ourselves the working of that unique sacrifice.” Ibid. Calvin rejects a purely symbolic view of the 
Lord Supper when he indicates that “there are some who define the eating of Christ’s flesh and the drinking 
of his blood as . . . nothing but to believe in Christ.” In contrast to this view, he argues that Christ’s “life 
passes into us and is made ours—just as bread when taken as food imparts vigor to the body,” because “the 
soul must truly and deeply become partaker of Christ that it may be quickened to spiritual life by his 
power.” Calvin is aware of the fact that his view has an ontological emphasis, since he underlines that the 
difference between these two views “small difference indeed in words, but no slight one in the matter 
itself.” Ibid., 4.17.5. Quoting Chrysostom, he affirms that “‘Christ makes us his body not by faith only but 
by the very thing itself.’” Ibid., 4.17.6. Redding and Canlis argue that Calvin’s understanding of the role of 
the Spirit in the Lord’s Supper implies a non-substantial, but relational (Redding), view of grace and of 
participation in Christ. Redding, Prayer and the Priesthood of Christ in the Reformed Tradition, 88; Julie 
Canlis, “Calvin, Osiander, and Participation in God,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 6, no. 2 
(2004): 177, 184. 
190 “For us the manner is spiritual because the secret power of the Spirit is the bond of our union 
with Christ.” ICR 4.17.33. Meyer qualifies the idea of spiritual presence in Calvin by highlighting that “it is 
inadequate to explain this presence simply as a ‘virtual’ or a ‘spiritual’ presence. Rather this 
communication of Christ’s presence as expressed in Calvin’s teaching is ‘a divine spiritual event that 
includes the bodily and hence not a ‘pure’ spiritual event.’” Boniface Meyer, “Calvin’s Eucharistic 
Doctrine, 1536-39,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 4, no. 1 (1967): 64. In his criticism of “those who 
conceive no presence of flesh in the Supper unless it lies in the bread” (which would be Luther’s position), 
Calvin emphasizes that “the question is therefore only of the manner, for they place Christ in the bread, 
while we do not think it lawful for us to drag him from heaven.” ICR 4.17.31; italics mine. “I reject only 
absurd things which appear to be either unworthy of Christ’s heavenly majesty, or incompatible with the 
reality of his human nature.” Ibid., 4.17.32; italics mine.  
191 For Luther, “Christ no longer preaches physically but is present with the Word and preaches to 
the spirits in their hearts.” LW, 30:114 (Sermons on the First Epistle of St. Peter, 1522).  
192 The German theologian stipulates, “Nobody will obtain salvation . . . without external things,” 
which highlights especially the physical necessity of the word, baptism, and the eucharist—“all these are 
indeed externals, but they are included in the Word. Hence the Holy Spirit works nothing without them.” 
LW, 3:274-275 (Lectures on Genesis, 1539 [chapter 19]).  
193 For Luther argues that Christ is present “in baptism, the Supper, and preaching until the end of 
the age.” LW, 38:29 (The Marburg Colloquy and the Marburg Articles, 1529). “Christ gives himself to us 
in many ways: first, in preaching; second, in baptism; [third,] in brotherly consolation; fourth, in the 
sacrament, as often as the body of Christ is eaten.” Ibid., 38:19. In the context of the Lord’s Supper, “the 
words are not only the sound of a man who speaks them but of God who conveys [something] to the person 
who eats the bread,” and this effect is particularly produced by the bodily presence of Christ in the 
eucharistic elements. Ibid., 38:41. More specifically, “The body [of Christ] nourishes man’s body for 





functional model presupposes that Christ conveys spiritual blessings and realities (His 
own body) by means of physical instruments (the spoken word and the sacramental 
elements).194 According to Luther, these instruments are masks of the hidden God being 
                                                
basis of God’s command supplies strength.” Ibid., 38:57. According to Calvin, “Christ Himself is the 
matter of the Supper” (ICR 4.17.33) and effects “redemption, righteousness, sanctification, and eternal life, 
and all the other benefits Christ gives to us.” Ibid., 4.17.11. “In the mystery of the Supper, Christ is truly 
shown to us through the symbols of bread and wine, his very body and blood,” so “that we may grow into 
one body with him,” and “having been made partakers of his substance, that we may also feel his power in 
partaking of all his benefits.” Ibid. For helpful information on Calvin’s understanding of the sacraments and 
the Lord’s Supper, see M. Eugene Osterhaven, “Calvin on Word and Sacrament, and Man,” Reformed 
Journal 8, no. 5 (1958): 21-24; Herman Bavinck, “Calvin’s Doctrine of the Lord’s Supper,” Mid-America 
Journal of Theology 19 (2008): 127-142; Meyer, “Calvin‘s Eucharistic Doctrine,” 47-65; Brian A. Gerrish, 
Grace and Gratitude: The Eucharistic Theology of John Calvin (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1993); 
McDonnell, John Calvin, the Church and the Eucharist. 
194 Luther explains, “When God sends forth his holy gospel he deals with us in a twofold manner, 
first outwardly, then inwardly. Outwardly he deals with us through the oral word of the gospel and through 
material signs, that is, baptism and the sacrament of the altar. Inwardly he deals with us through the Holy 
Spirit, faith, and other gifts. But whatever their measure or order the outward factors should and must 
precede. The inward experience follows and is effected by the outward. God has determined to give the 
inward to no one except through the outward. For he wants to give no one the Spirit or faith outside of the 
outward Word and sign instituted by him.” LW, 40:146 (Against the Heavenly Prophets in the Matter of 
Images and Sacraments, 1525). In this perspective, while the physical preaching of the apostles reaches the 
ears of the hearers, Christ reaches the hearts of the hearers spiritually. In this sense, the preaching of the 
word works sacramentally, as it is a physical instrument that conveys a spiritual effect. According to the 
German theologian, Christ “Himself comes, is spiritually present, and speaks and preaches to the hearts of 
the people, just as the apostles address their words orally and physically to the ears of the people.” LW, 
30:114 (Sermons on the First Epistle of St. Peter, 1522). Phillip Cary points out that, for Luther, the gospel 
is “a sacramental word.” Phillip Cary, “Why Luther Is Not Quite Protestant: The Logic of Faith in a 
Sacramental Promise,” Pro Ecclesia 14, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 452. For further information about the Word of 
God as a means of grace, see John T. Mueller, “Notes on Luther’s Conception of the Word of God as the 
Means of Grace,” Concordia Theological Monthly 20, no. 8 (1949): 580-600. In Luther’s sacramentarian 
view, “when the words are spoken at the command and in the name of God,” the sacraments “not only 
signify but also at the same time effect and offer that which they signify.” LW, 38:41 (The Marburg 
Colloquy and the Marburg Articles, 1529). According to Calvin’s understanding of the sacraments as 
means of grace, God performs a physical accommodation of spiritual realities, through which the divine 
Spirit effects what the sacraments symbolize. In his view, as corporeal creatures, human beings “always 
creep on the ground, cleave to the flesh, and, do not think about or even conceive of anything spiritual.” 
Therefore, God “tempers Himself to our capacity” by using corporeal elements as “a mirror of spiritual 
blessings.” Quoting Chrysostom, the French theologian argues that, “if we were incorporeal,” God “would 
give us” spiritual “things naked and incorporeal.” “Now, because we have souls engrafted in bodies, he 
imparts spiritual things under visible ones.” ICR 4.14.3. Calvin joins “reality and truth to the sign,” since 
“God works through outward means.” Ibid., 4.15.15. God “does not feed our eyes with a mere appearance 
only, but leads us to the present reality and effectively performs what it symbolizes.” Ibid., 4.15.14. The 
French theologian agrees with Augustine, who defines the sacrament as “a visible form of an invisible 
grace.” Ibid., 4.14.1. Calvin emphasizes “the working of divine grace in the sacraments” (Ibid., 4.14.7) and 
the “inner grace of the Spirit” making the sacraments “bear fruit” (Ibid., 4.14.17). Taking into account that 
“God accomplishes within what the minister represents and attests by outward action,” the sacraments are 





used now by the ascended Christ, who previously revealed God through the mask or 
clothing of the humanity in His public ministry on earth.195 In this sense, the masks of the 
word and sacraments can be seen as a continuation of Christ’s humanity on earth.196 This 
interpretation appears to emphasize a heavenly Christ who descends on earth through the 
word and sacraments, assuming that He is physically present in the Lord’s Supper. On the 
other hand, the interpretation that assumes that Christ is spiritually present in the Lord’s 
Supper, but physically present in heaven, seems to emphasize that believers somehow 
ascend to Christ through the sacraments. To put it more sharply, while the sacramental 
idea of the physical presence of Christ on earth tends to interpret Christ working to save 
                                                
“whole fruit of the visible sacraments.” Ibid., 4.14.17. In this context, the Lord’s Supper is not “an empty 
symbol” (Ibid., 4.17.10) and the sacraments are not signs that “lack their own effect” (Ibid., 4.14.17). As 
McDonnell highlights, Calvin insists “that grace is given in the sacraments, and also through the 
sacraments.” McDonnell, John Calvin, the Church and the Eucharist, 369. For the idea of the eucharistic 
elements as instruments of grace in Calvin, see also Redding, Prayer and the Priesthood of Christ in the 
Reformed Tradition, 88; Bavinck, “Calvin’s Doctrine of the Lord’s Supper,” 134. 
195 In Luther’s sacramental perspective, physical elements of creation veil “God, for in this life we 
cannot deal with God face to face.” LW, 26:95 (Lectures on Galatians [1-4], 1535). Because human beings 
are not supposed to deal with God “naked but clothed and revealed in His Word,” God “is dressed and 
clothed in His Word and promises, so that from the name ‘God’ we cannot exclude Christ.” Ibid., 12:312 
(Commentary on Psalm 51, 1532). In other words, “God must therefore be left to himself in his own 
majesty, for in this regard we have nothing to do with him, nor has he willed that we should have anything 
to do with him. But we have something to do with him insofar as he is clothed and set forth in his Word.” 
LW, 33:139-140 (On the Bondage of the Will, 1525). Referring to “the Son glorified and enthroned in 
majesty,” Luther maintains that He is “enveloped in an image, namely, in the Word and the sacraments. 
These are His masks or His garments, as it were, in which He conceals Himself. But He is certainly present 
in these, Himself working miracles, preaching, administering the sacraments, consoling, strengthening, and 
helping. We see Him as we see the sun through a cloud. For now we cannot bear to see and look at His 
brilliant Majesty.” LW, 24:67 (Sermons on the Gospel of St John [14-16], 1537). For additional information 
about the idea of divine masks in Luther, see Anthony J. Steinbronn, “Luther’s Use of Larvae Dei,” 
Concordia Journal 19, no. 2 (1993): 135-147. 
196 Lienhard argues that Luther closely relates Christ’s bodily presence in the eucharist with His 
incarnation. “The incarnation continues in the sense that God continues to offer himself to us by the 
physical elements . . . of the eucharist.” These elements do not supplant “the humanity of Christ as such, 
but prolong it in some way, constituting his current way of being present.” Lienhard, Luther, Witness to 
Jesus Christ, 220. See also Paul Wilhelm Gennrich, Die Christologie Luthers Im Abendmahlsstreit 
(Königsberg: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1929), 28, 146; Kjell Ove Nilsson, Simul: Das Miteinander Von 
Göttlichem Und Menschlichem in Luthers Theologie, Forschungen Zur Kirchen Und Dogmengeschichte 17 




believers by sacramentally descending to the earth (Luther), the idea of a physical 
presence in heaven tends to interpret Christ working to save them by sacramentally 
ascending them to heaven (Calvin). Hence, in the second view there is a shift of emphasis 
from earth to heaven.197 Instead of bringing the physical body of Christ to earth, the Holy 
Spirit enables believers to ascend spiritually to heaven, where Christ is.198 In both 
interpretations, the believers targeted by Christ’s sacramental work are predestined by 
God to benefit from this work.199 The second interpretation that emphasizes heaven 
                                                
197 According to Cary, a crucial difference between Calvin and Luther in the sacraments is the 
“direction of attention.” For Calvin, the “sacrament directs our attention away from earth to heaven.” Cary, 
“Why Luther Is Not Quite Protestant,” 464, 466, 480. McDonnell believes that Calvin is influenced by 
Plato in his notion of heaven and earth in the context of the Lord’s Supper. In his words, “If the realities of 
which Calvin is speaking are biblical realities, his categories here are greatly influenced by Plato. The 
dialectic here is between the earthly and the heavenly, between the image and the intelligible reality. It is 
by means of the earthly sign that one participates in the heavenly body of Christ. The earthly sign assures 
us that we participate in the heavenly reality even though it must of necessity remain in heaven.” According 
to this perspective, the idea of Christ’s physical presence in the eucharistic elements, as affirmed in 
different ways by Catholics and Lutherans, “destroys the Platonic tension: sign becomes signified, the 
intelligible reality becomes the image, heaven comes to earth.” McDonnell, John Calvin, the Church and 
the Eucharist, 231. 
198 For Calvin, “there is no need to draw Christ to earth that he may be joined to us.” ICR 4.17.31. 
He adds that the wrong notion that Christ is physically “attached to the element of bread” draws “men’s 
minds from heaven.” Ibid., 4.17.12. Conversely, the correct understanding that Christ is in heaven indicates 
that, in the Lord’s Supper, “we are lifted up to heaven with our eyes and minds, to seek Christ there in the 
glory of his Kingdom.” Ibid., 4.17.18. Indeed, “in order that pious souls may duly apprehend Christ in the 
Supper, they must be raised up to heaven.” Ibid., 4.17.36. In the Supper, “the only lawful adoration is that 
which does not rest in the sign, but is directed to Christ seated in heaven.” Ibid., 4.17.37. Kaiser indicates 
that there are “at least 33 passages in Calvin’s writings” that indicate that “Christians are raised up to 
heaven in the celebration of the eucharist.” In contrast to a merely mental ascension that seems to be 
assumed by A. M. Hunter and Gordon Pruett, Kaiser argues for an actual ascent of the soul to heaven in 
Calvin. Kaiser, “Climbing Jacob’s Ladder,” 247-248, 252-253. See A. M. Hunter, The Teaching of Calvin: 
A Modern Interpretation, 2nd ed. (London: James Clarke, 1950), 187; Gordon E. Pruett, “A Protestant 
Doctrine of the Eucharistic Presence,” Calvin Theological Journal 10, no. 2 (1975): 174. According to 
Redding, this spiritual ascension of believers to heaven is particularly associated with the priesthood of 
Christ: “Calvin sees the church being lifted by the Spirit in the act of worship into the presence of God 
through the High Priest, Jesus Christ.” Redding, Prayer and the Priesthood of Christ in the Reformed 
Tradition, 88. 
199 For Luther, “one should not inquire into the predestination of the hidden God but should be 
satisfied with what is revealed through the calling and through the ministry of the Word. For then you can 
be sure about your faith and salvation.” LW, 5:50 (Lectures on Genesis, 1542). In other words, 
predestination is “guaranteed through the Son of God and the sacraments.” Ibid., 5:46. The German 





(Calvin) is even more specific. While non-believers may have contact with the bread and 
wine in the church on earth, only elected believers spiritually ascend to heaven through 
the Holy Spirit in the Lord’s Supper to have communion with the physical Christ.200 
In summary, under the assumption that being in a place implies confinement and 
                                                
Holy Scripture.” In this sense, they strengthen believers “over against uncertainty and doubt.” Ibid., 5:43. 
As Ickert indicates, “Luther binds together revelation, Word, sacraments, faith and grace on the one hand, 
and speculation concerning God’s foreknowledge and pre-destination, and the righteousness of works, on 
the other. Accordingly, God’s revelation in time in which the timeless God achieves his identity as Savior, 
that is, through Word and sacraments, stands against all conjectures concerning divine foreknowledge and 
pre-destination.” Ickert, “Luther on the Timelessness of God,” 54. In the context of Calvinism, the notions 
of limited atonement and Christ’s intercession have been debated especially after Kendall’s study Calvin 
and English Calvinism to 1649. As Redding summarizes, according to Kendall’s interpretation of Calvin, 
“Christ’s priesthood on the cross at Calvary is for all humankind,” while His ongoing intercessory 
priesthood in heaven “is for the elect only.” Redding, Prayer and the Priesthood of Christ in the Reformed 
Tradition, 99. Assuming that “all which Christ did on the cross ‘remains useless and of no value’ until we 
believe,” Kendall aligns the moment of belief with the ongoing intercession of Christ in heaven: “The 
origin of saving faith [is] in the intercessory work of Christ at the Father’s right.” This means that “the 
decree of election . . . is not rendered effectual in Christ’s death but in His ascension and intercession.” 
Therefore, whereas “Christ died for all,” His “intercession is for the elect only.” R. T. Kendall, Calvin and 
English Calvinism to 1649, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 13, 
16-17. Charles Bell agrees with Kendall that Calvin taught both a “doctrine of universal atonement” and “a 
doctrine of predestination in which faith is limited to the elect.” However, he thinks that Calvin “did not 
link the doctrines of election and atonement in a logical order of cause and effect,” and criticizes Kendall 
for not considering the “unity between Christ’s atonement and his priestly intercession in Calvin’s 
teaching.” M. Charles Bell, Calvin and Scottish Theology: The Doctrine of Assurance (Edinburgh: Handsel, 
1985), 17-18. In my opinion, Bell’s affirmation of both universal atonement (in Christ’s death and 
intercession) and Calvinist predestination is unsatisfactory, because it implies either a disruption of the 
unity between the intercession of Christ and the work of the Spirit applying the benefits of the atonement 
(saving faith and participation in Christ), or an incoherent picture of atonement and election. On the other 
hand, Muller and Helm agree with Bell that Kendall severs the unity of the priestly work of Christ in His 
death and intercession, but they reject the idea of universal atonement in Calvin. For them, the whole 
priesthood of Christ is an application of eternal predestination. See Muller, Christ and the Decree, 33-35; 
Muller, Calvin and the Reformed Tradition, 70-106; Paul Helm, Calvin and the Calvinists (Edinburgh: 
Banner of Truth Trust, 1982), 1-50; Paul Helm, “Calvin, English Calvinism and the Logic of Doctrinal 
Development,” Scottish Journal of Theology 34, no. 2 (1981): 179-185. For an overview of the debate on 
limited atonement in Calvin, see Muller, Calvin and the Reformed Tradition, 70-71. 
200 Considering the Spirit as “the bond of our union with Christ,” Calvin claims that “those who 
are devoid of Christ’s Spirit” do not “eat Christ’s flesh.” Hence, in the case of unbelievers, Christ does not 
come to them. This view is different from the position that “the wicked receive Christ’s body and blood 
without the power of the Spirit or any effect of grace.” ICR 4.17.34. While those who maintain that Christ 
is physically present in the sacramental elements may argue that unbelievers do not receive the benefits of 
the body and blood of Christ (Calvin accuses this position of wrongly casting “Christ’s body to dogs to 
eat.” Ibid., 4.17.34), he goes one step further: Since Christ is physically in heaven, unbelievers do not have 
any contact with the body of Christ. The spiritual contact with the body of Christ is available through the 
Spirit only to the elect. Quoting Augustine, Calvin affirms, “In the elect alone do the sacraments effect 




measurement, the functional model holds that God’s heaven is non-spatial. In accordance 
with this conception about heaven, one interpretation (Luther) advances the idea that 
Christ is not physically present in a particular place with the Father in heaven, while the 
other interpretation seems to be incompatible with the conception of a non-spatial heaven 
in its emphasis on Christ’s physical presence there (Calvin). With regard to the 
relationship between the ascended Christ and the earth, the functional model presupposes 
that He conveys spiritual blessings to believers by means of physical instruments (the 
word and the sacraments). The interpretation that assumes that Christ is not physically 
present in heaven tends to highlight that He sacramentally descends to earth through 
these physical instruments to bless believers, whereas the interpretation that Christ is 
physically present in heaven tends to indicate that He uses physical instruments to make 
believers sacramentally ascend to heaven so that they can have communion with Him. 
After the description of these principles of reality in the functional model, I will 
concisely outline below their implications for the understanding of Christ’s priesthood. 
Implications for Christ’s Priesthood  
In the discussion above about the principles of reality, I have pointed out that the 
functional model seems to assume an ontological distinction between a non-
spatial/timeless God in heaven and spatio-temporal human beings on earth. Accordingly, 
heaven and earth are respectively understood as non-spatial/timeless and spatio-temporal 
realms. This ontological distinction, however, does not seem to be consistently 
maintained in the model. For instance, as I have indicated above, Calvin affirms a 
physical presence of Christ in heaven, and Luther’s understanding of communicatio 




glimpses of spatio-temporal interpretation, the humanity of Christ on earth appears to be 
considered the spatio-temporal instrument of mediation between a non-spatial/timeless 
God and spatio-temporal human beings. Likewise, the ascended Christ uses spatio-
temporal instruments (the word and the sacraments) to work with believers on earth. In 
fact, this mediatorial work performed by Christ on earth and in heaven is caused and 
informed by divine timeless predestination, which is the true ontological “action” of a 
non-spatial/timeless God. 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the understanding of Christ’s priesthood in the 
functional model in the following way: (1) His priesthood is needed primarily because 
God’s holy wrath condemns sinful human beings; (2) as the priestly agent, Christ is the 
mediator sent by the Father, and His redemptive/propitiatory priesthood is an added 
function to the mediatorial activity of creation and providence; (3) Christ’s priestly 
mediation comprises the activities of penal substitutionary sacrifice, intercession, and 
teaching. The first two propitiate the wrath of God, while the latter provides comfort for 
the guilty conscience of believers. The first activity is an earthly event (the cross), 
whereas the other two are current ongoing heavenly activities; and (4) the goal of the 
priesthood is to provide salvation by the grace of God’s forgiveness, which magnifies the 
glory of God for His great provision (sending the mediator) and generosity (forgiving), 
and ultimately lead believers to the eschatological immediate vision of God, the goal of 
creation. This last point regarding the goal of creation is similar to the sacramental model. 
If the discussion about the principles of reality revealed a potential for spatio-
temporal interpretation, not systematically articulated from an ontological standpoint, in 




spatial/timeless divine nature experiencing passibility on earth (Luther), other potential 
ontological challenges emerge from a comparison between the principles of reality and 
the understanding of Christ’s priesthood in the model. In fact, the central idea that the 
priesthood of Christ is a propitiatory work does not seem to be ontologically supported by 
the principles of reality assumed in the model. It is difficult to ontologically 
conceptualize how Christ’s priesthood propitiates the wrath of a non-spatial/timeless 
God. If God is a timeless/spaceless being, has a timeless knowledge and, therefore, 
performs a timeless action (predestination), the priestly activity of Christ on the cross 
(sacrifice) and in heaven (intercession) seem an unlikely candidate to propitiate a 
wrathful God. A timeless God cannot be propitiated. In fact, even His wrath is timeless, 
which means that the divine wrath is not caused by human sin in time, but is eternally 
constituted and therefore it can never “cease” to exist.  
In this context, an ontological account of heavenly intercession seems 
problematic. Even though Calvin affirms the presence of a physical Christ in heaven, His 
intercessory interaction with a non-spatial/timeless Father seems puzzling. The 
conclusion that the language of propitiation is actually an accommodation to human 
cognition seems to be coherently drawn by the French theologian.201 Therefore, Christ’s 
                                                
201 Referring to biblical passages such as “God was men’s enemy until they were reconciled to 
grace by the death of Christ” (Rom 5:10); “They were under a curse until their iniquity was atoned for by 
his sacrifice” (Gal 3:10, 13); “They were estranged from God until through his body they were reconciled” 
(Col 1:21-22), Calvin affirms that “expressions of this sort have been accommodated to our capacity that 
we may better understand how miserable and ruinous our condition is apart from Christ.” ICR 2.16.2; 
italics mine. Referring to the language of appeasing God, the French theologian points out that “in some 
ineffable way, God loved us and yet was angry toward us at the same time, until he became reconciled to us 
in Christ.” Ibid., 2.17.2. For useful studies on the language of divine accommodation in Calvin, see J. Todd 
Billings, Union with Christ: Reframing Theology and Ministry for the Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2011), 70-75; Jon Balserak, Divinity Compromised: A Study of Divine Accommodation in the 
Thought of John Calvin, Studies in Early Modern Religious Reforms (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006); Arnold 





heavenly intercession seems to constitute a metaphor, as far as His interaction with a non-
spatial/timeless Father is concerned. If all events are already a reality in the mind and will 
of God (timeless predestination), Christ’s priestly work is, in fact, a spatio-temporal 
actualization of what is already real in God. However, whereas such actualization could 
be conceptualized in the earthly spatio-temporal sacrifice on the cross, it is not clear how 
a spatio-temporal actualization could take place in a non-spatial/timeless heaven. Thus, 
the logical outcome is that Christ’s heavenly intercession in the functional model seems 
to be better understood as metaphorical. 
In fact, the net effect of a divine propitiation that is not ontologically real is that 
God is not really the object of Christ’s priestly work, but only its author.202 In other 
                                                
Literarum Interpres: Papers of the International Congress on Calvin Research, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 119-130; David F. Wright, “Calvin’s Accommodating God,” 
in Calvinus Sincerioris Religionis Vindex: Calvin as Protector of the Purer Religion, ed. Wilhelm H. 
Neuser and Brian G. Armstrong (Kirksville, MO: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1997), 3-20; 
Wyatt, Jesus Christ and Creation in the Theology of John Calvin, xv, 48. Following this perspective of 
accommodated language, Calvin indicates that the notion of Christ’s sacrifice and intercession propitiating 
God’s wrath is powerful to move the human heart, as human beings do not eagerly accept or have deep 
gratitude for the divine work of salvation, unless their “minds are first struck and overwhelmed by fear of 
God’s wrath and by dread of eternal death.” ICR 2.16.2. Hence, Calvin attempts to solve the apparent 
contradiction between God’s love and His wrath, and explain why “God, who anticipates us by his mercy,” 
is described as “our enemy until he was reconciled to us through Christ.” Ibid. The reconciliation provided 
by Christ did not change God in the sense that He began to love people who He previously hated. Rather, 
God the Father, in His love, “goes before and anticipates our reconciliation in Christ.” Ibid., 2.16.4. 
However, although the language of the divine wrath is an adaptation “to our feeble comprehension,” this is 
not a false concept. Ibid., 2.16.13. For McCormack, “Calvin’s solution to this ‘contradiction’ was not 
finally satisfactory. The notion of a divine accommodation is itself problematic, for it all too easily suggests 
that the way God reveals Himself to be is not finally commensurate with what He is in Himself.” 
According to this evaluation, Calvin makes “the righteousness of God, abstracted from His love, the object 
toward which the atonement of Christ is directed.” McCormack concludes that “Calvin’s difficulty in this 
area was due in no small measure to the scant attention he gave to the classical problem of the attributes of 
God. His treatment of the being and attributes of God was thin, to say at least.” McCormack, For Us and 
Our Salvation, 27-28. 
202 This statement seems to be opposed by Wyatt. He claims that, “in Calvin’s thought, God is 
both the author and the object of the work of reconciliation. One might attempt to argue that God is only 
the author of the work of reconciliation and that the language of wrath is therefore only an 
‘accommodation.’ But this does not take into account the fact that only the elect actually receive the benefit 
of the atonement; the reprobate continue under the condemnation of God’s wrath.” Wyatt, Jesus Christ and 





words, the priestly actions of substitutionary sacrifice and intercession do not have God 
as their real object. In this case, Christ’s sacrifice and intercession are only divine actions 
for the benefit of human beings, and not propitiatory acts before God. This would mean 
that, in the model, only the priestly activity of teaching appears to be ontologically 
grounded (meaning that the priestly action and its meaning is coherent with the principles 
of reality assumed in the model). As indicated above, in this activity the heavenly Christ 
provides comfort for the guilty conscience of believers on earth. According to the 
principles of reality assumed in the functional model, this activity is sacramentally 
performed through spatio-temporal instruments (the word and the sacraments) that reach 
elected spatio-temporal human beings. 
After this analysis of the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality in the 
functional model of Christ’s priesthood, my next step is to explore the principles of 
reality in the ontological model. 
The Ontological Model  
Divinity: Christ and the Concept of Divine Nature 
In this discussion of God in the ontological model, I will briefly outline how the 
divine nature and action is understood in the model, inasmuch as this understanding 
informs the comprehension of Christ’s divinity and His relationship as a priest with the 
other persons or modes of being of the Trinity.203 In many aspects, the ontological model 
                                                
regarding divine propitiation. My main point is not that the language of the wrath of God is an 
accommodation, but that the language of propitiation of His wrath becomes an accommodation in this 
perspective, as God already elected in His timeless predestination those who will not be punished by His 
wrath. In this sense, God is only the author and not the object of the work of reconciliation. 





attempts to redefine the notion of divine nature and action affirmed by classical theism. 
Before I start the description of divinity in this model, it is noteworthy that a feature of 
this attempt is the affirmation that God is somehow spatio-temporal. Eventually, as I will 
explain below, the model does not represent a substantial redefinition of the classical 
understanding of the relationship between God and time, since God’s time is 
conceptualized as simultaneity, which is equivalent to the non-sequentiality of divine 
timelessness in classical theism.  
An appropriate starting point for the investigation of the concept of divinity in the 
ontological model is the question of the status of Christ’s divinity in His incarnation. 
More specifically, from the perspective of the incarnation, is God immutable or mutable? 
Does God become? Did He undergo an ontological change in the incarnation? Since the 
ontological model does not conceive God as the “‘Moved Unmover’ of Whiteheadean 
process theology,”204 God is not mutable in a panentheistic sense. On the other hand, the 
model is not confortable with the “‘Unmoved Mover’”205 of classical theism either. A 
chief concern with the “Unmoved Mover” is that it creates a separation/contradiction 
between God for us and God in Himself in the interpretation of the incarnation. As God 
cannot really become a man and live/act in space-time, there is behind Christ’s earthly 
life/actions a God absconditus who is ontologically different (incompatible) to what is 
                                                
three modes of being, not three persons. See, for example, CD I/1, 390, 393, 410. By contrast, Torrance 
keeps the language of persons in the Trinity, according to his “onto-relational concept of divine persons.” 
Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh; New York: 
T&T Clark, 2001), 102. 





seen in the incarnate Christ.206 To be sure, the ontological model rejects any ontological 
separation of God in Himself and God for us.207 What is revealed in Christ refers directly 
to God’s being (God in Himself), even though the revelation in Christ does not give an 
exhaustive view of God.208 This position has at least two related consequences for the 
notion of God in the ontological model, one related to the conception of becoming in 
                                                
206 In Barth’s words, there is in this case an ontological “rift or gulf in God Himself, between His 
being and essence in Himself and His activity and work as the Reconciler of the world.” CD IV/1, 184. 
Agreeing with Barth, Torrance argues that “God is not one thing in himself and another thing in Jesus 
Christ—what God is toward us in Jesus he is inherently and eternally in himself. . . . There is thus no God 
behind the back of Jesus Christ, but only this God whose face we see in the face of the Lord Jesus. There is 
no deus absconditus, no dark inscrutable God, no arbitrary Deity of whom we can know nothing.” 
Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 243. 
207 Torrance explains that “we may not properly separate knowledge of what God is toward us and 
for us from knowledge of what he is eternally in himself, but must consider them together in such a way 
that our thought moves back and forward between them, from what God is for us to what he is in himself 
and from what he is in himself to what he is for us.” Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 28. At the 
same time, he recognizes the importance of keeping a distinction between God in Himself (ontological 
Trinity) and God for us (economic Trinity) because His ineffable being “remains transcendent over all 
space and time.” Ibid., 97. Barth expresses a similar understanding. He organizes the perfections or 
attributes of God under the categories of love (God as completely knowable to us) and freedom (God as 
completely unknowable to us), and rejects a separation—although he accepts a heuristic distinction—
between “a God in Himself” (unknowable) “and a God for us” (knowable/revealed), “in which the essential 
being of God” is ultimately defined by the attributes of His sovereign/unknowable freedom, while the 
attributes of His love do not actually describe the fundamental reality of His being. CD II/1, 343, 345. In 
Barth’s words, when this separation is done “the essential being of God will probably be decisively sought 
in His sovereign freedom and the perfections proper to it, eternity, omnipotence and so on, while the love 
of God and its perfections, holiness, justice, mercy and so on, are treated nominalistically or semi-
nominalistically as a question of mere economy, as non-essential, as perhaps purely noetic determinations, 
so that the final and decisive word in our doctrine of God is the affirmation of God as the impersonal 
absolute.” The Swiss theologian concludes, “We cannot . . . attribute to this whole distinction between God 
in Himself and God in His relation to the world an essential, but only a heuristic, significance. It does, of 
course, have this significance. That God is both knowable and unknowable to us, the One who loves and 
the One who is free.” Ibid., 345. 
208 According to Barth, “we cannot discern the being of God in any other way than by looking 
where God Himself gives us Himself to see, and therefore by looking at His works.” CD II/1, 261. 
Likewise, Torrance argues that “the economic Trinity and the ontological Trinity overlap with one another 
and belong to one another, and can no more be separated than the Act of God can be separated from his 
Being or his Being from his Act.” Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 8. A Christological interest can 
also be identified in this approach. Jesus Christ (God for us) is the revelation of what God is in Himself. 
This Christological interest is aligned with the theological projects of Barth and Torrance, as they intend to 
use Christology as the starting point of their theologies. Barth perceives “Jesus as the starting point of our 
thinking about the divine being.” CD III/2, 553. Likewise, Torrance highlights that it is in Jesus Christ “that 
we may really know God in accordance with the inmost nature of his eternal being.” Torrance, The 




God, and the other for the relationship between God and space-time.  
First, the ontological model attempts to make room for the idea of divine 
becoming, especially in the context of the incarnation.209 Instead of interpreting this 
becoming under the panentheistic rubrics of the ‘Moved Unmover’, the model seeks to 
formulate a dynamic conception of the being of God as Self-Moved.210 Such attempt 
assumes that “the one being of God” is a “dynamic being, not static being but unique 
divine becoming.”211 As matter of fact, several moves can be identified in the ontological 
model that point to a divine becoming or a dynamic being: (1) the affirmation of 
potentiality in God and the emphasis on His freedom212; (2) the acknowledgment of a 
before and after in the life of God—He became Creator (He has not been always Creator) 
and became incarnated, died and resurrected in Christ (He has not been always man and 
                                                
209 Barth guides this discussion posing the Latin question Quo iure Deus home? (CD IV/1, 184). 
Scott Swain correctly indicates that, with this question, the Swiss theologian asks, how or “by what right or 
inner law of the divine being did God become a man?” Scott R. Swain, The God of the Gospel: Robert 
Jenson’s Trinitarian Theology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2013), 59. Barth comments on this 
question defining the incarnation as God “becoming a creature, becoming a man—and how this is possible 
to God without the alteration of His being is not self-evident.” CD IV/1, 185. Likewise, Torrance highlights 
the idea of becoming in the incarnation. “In Jesus Christ God has become what he never was before, a 
human being, the Creator has become a creature.” In the incarnation, “the eternal Word of God became 
historical event, and the eternal became time. The fact that in the incarnation God became man without 
ceasing to be God, tells us that his nature is characterised by both repose and movement, and that his 
eternal Being is also a divine Becoming.” Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 241-242. 
210 For Barth, “God’s being is being which knows, wills and decides of itself, and is moved by 
itself.” He adds, “The being of God as we know it from revelation is moved in itself.” CD II/1, 268. 
Similarly, in Torrance’s discussion about the being of God, the Scottish theologian speaks of the “self-
moving God.” Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 237. 
211 Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 237. 
212 According to Barth, “In God all potentiality is included in His actuality and therefore all 
freedom in His decision.” CD I/1, 157. Similarly, Torrance highlights “the biblical conception of the 
freedom of God who . . . is eternally new and constantly surpasses himself in all that he does.” Torrance, 




has not always had these human experiences)213; (3) the notion of God becoming 
passible214 in Christ (assuming that He suffered not only in his humanity but also in his 
divinity215); (4) the affirmation that God can change His mind or attitude in some 
                                                
213 Torrance speaks of a “before and after the creation” and a “before and after the incarnation.” 
He points out that “God was always Father, but not always Creator.” Hence, “the creation of the world and 
of mankind was an utterly new event for God.” In fact, “the creation registered a distinct ‘moment’ in the 
eternal life of God.” More importantly, the incarnation was “an absolutely new event for God: ‘the Word 
became flesh.’ God was not always incarnate. He was always God the Son as well as God the Father and 
God the Holy Spirit, but not always God become man in Jesus Christ in whom divine and human nature are 
for ever united.” In other words, “in Jesus Christ God has become what he never was before, a human 
being, the Creator has become a creature.” Furthermore, “the death and resurrection of God incarnate in 
space and time” were events “utterly new even for God, . . . God crucified and risen again.” Torrance even 
adds the Pentecost, arguing that what happened there “was not only quite new in the experience of 
mankind, but something incomprehensibly new in the life and activity of the eternal God and the mode of 
his presence to all flesh.” Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 237-238, 241. 
214 For Barth, in the act of giving Himself to humanity, God “ordained the surrender . . . of His 
own impassibility.” CD II/2, 163. Likewise, Torrance argues that “it was Christ as God and God as Christ 
who suffered for us and our salvation.” Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 248. The Scottish 
theologian adds that “the notion of divine impassibility would evidently exclude the possibility of any real 
movement of God in a loving and vicarious self-identification with us in incarnation and redemption which 
would posit a deep gulf between God as he is in himself and God as he is toward us.” Ibid., 250. Torrance 
seems to agree with Barth that God surrendered His impassibility or became somehow passible. He points 
out that God is “intrinsically impassible for in its own divine Nature he is not moved or swayed by anything 
other than himself or outside of himself.” Quoting Athanasius’ remarks on Jesus’ pain, the Scottish 
theologian claims that “‘‘one cannot say that these things are natural to Godhead, but they came to belong 
to God by nature.’” Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 248. 
215 For Torrance, “it cannot be said that Christ suffered only in his humanity and not in his 
divinity,” with the caveat that “the kind of physical and emotional suffering Christ endured in his incarnate 
historical existence in body and spirit is not the kind of suffering that we may attribute to God.” Torrance, 
The Christian Doctrine of God, 252. For comments on Torrance’s view of divine impassibility, see Molnar, 
Thomas F. Torrance, 147-158. Torrance interprets the sacrifice of the rite of the Day of Atonement that 
culminated in the holy of holiness as something that takes place in the being of God. In his words, “The 
fact that the ritual of sacrifice on the Day of Atonement . . . culminated hidden behind the veil in the holy of 
holies, taught Israel that the ultimate ground and rationale of atonement is hidden deep in the mystery of 
God’s own Being into which it is impossible to intrude.” Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, 45. According 
to Barth, “In Himself God cannot be affected either by the possibility or by the reality of that will which 
opposes Him. He cannot be affected by any potentiality of evil.” But “when from all eternity He elected to 
be one with man in Jesus Christ, He did it with a being which was not merely affected by evil but actually 
mastered by it.” CD II/2, 163. McCormack suggests that “the death of Jesus Christ . . . , precisely as a 
human experience, is understood by” Barth “to be an event in God’s own life.” Bruce L. McCormack, 
“Grace and Being: The Role of God’s Gracious Election in Karl Barth’s Theological Ontology,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
98. For studies on Barth’s notion of divine impassibility, see Bruce L. McCormack, “Divine Impassibility 
or Simply Divine Constancy? Implications of Karl Barth’s Later Christology for Debates over 
Impassibility,” in Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering, ed. James Keating and Thomas 
Joseph White (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 150-186; George Hunsinger, Reading Barth with 




situations (e.g., negative reaction to sin,216 positive response to intercessory 
mediation217); and (5) the concept of multiplicity in God’s being,218 instead of the 
classical idea of simplicity.219 These moves, however, to use Torrance’s words, do not 
assume that “God ever becomes other than he eternally is or that he passes over from 
becoming into being something else, but rather that he continues unceasingly to be what 
he always is and ever will be in the living movement of his eternal Being.”220 In fact, 
                                                
216 Torrance claims that human sin causes “a real ‘change’ in God’s mind and attitude toward 
man,” making His judgment on sin necessary. In other words, sin does not affect solely the human mind 
and attitude toward God, but also God’s mind and attitude toward sinful humans. Torrance, Incarnation, 
227. 
217 For Barth, biblical passages that speak of God repenting (e.g., Gen 18:20-22; Exod 32:9-14; 
Num 11:1-2; Amos 7:1-6) of His judgment because of the intercession of a human being “are not merely 
figurative.” CD II/1, 498. See ibid., 496-497. The Swiss theologian rejects the interpretation that God’s 
repentance in the Bible means “only an alternation in man in his relation to God, but not an alternation in 
God in His relation to man.” Ibid., 498. The Swiss theologian argues that God “promises to go back and 
does in fact go back on warnings and even judgments which have already fallen.” Ibid. Barth wants to 
acknowledge God as “the real subject of” His “real history.” Ibid., 502. God is “not prevented from 
advancing and retreating, rejoicing and mourning, laughing and complaining, being well pleased and 
causing His wrath to kindle.” Ibid., 498. 
218 For Barth, “the multiplicity, individuality and diversity of the perfections of God are those of 
His simple being, which is not therefore divided and then put together again. In God multiplicity, 
individuality and diversity do not stand in any contradiction to unity. Rather the very unity of His being 
consists in the multiplicity, individuality and diversity of His perfections.” CD II/1, 332. 
219 Barth criticizes the “semi-nominalistic” notion of classic theism that “the multiplicity of the 
divine attributes” does not actually refer to the nature of God per se but to the “discursiveness of the human 
intellect and the manifoldness of the created world.” Ibid., 335. In other words, the multiplicity belongs to 
the being of God (ontic), and not merely to the human way of understanding of God (noetic). 
220 Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 242. The Scottish theologian adds, God’s “Becoming 
is not a becoming on the way toward being or toward a fullness of being, but is the eternal fullness and the 
overflowing of his eternal unlimited Being. Becoming expresses the dynamic nature of his Being. His 
Becoming is, as it were, the other side of his Being, and his Being is the other side of his Becoming. His 
Becoming is his Being in movement and his Being in movement is his Becoming in a way which we cannot 
adequately grasp or express.” Ibid. Barth affirms that principle that God becomes what He already is by 
maintaining that God Himself is both the basis and goal of His attributes and actions. God “has no basis 
which is not Himself, no goal which is not Himself and no standard or law which is not Himself. . . . He is 
His own basis, goal, standard and law.” CD II/1, 468. Following Jüngel’s interpretation of Barth’s 
theological ontology, McCormack argues that, for Barth, God does not become, but “has his being ‘in 
becoming.’” Bruce L. McCormack, Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 259. See Eberhard Jüngel, God’s Being Is in Becoming: The 




God’s potentiality is grounded in His own actuality.221 According to this view, in the 
incarnation God “became toward us what he eternally is.”222 To put it another way, 
incarnation, and also creation, did not change God.223 Indeed, the ontological model 
prefers the language of God’s “dynamic unchangeableness”224 or “constancy” rather than 
the traditional idea of divine immutability.225 To use the current divide in Barth 
scholarship as an example, the logic that God becomes what He already is can basically 
assume two ontological forms of the dynamic idea of being-in-act226: essentialism or 
actualism.227 In principle, both forms agree that God has a stable aspect (being) that 
                                                
221 As Barth points out, “In God all potentiality is included in His actuality.” CD I/1, 157. 
222 Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 237. According to Barth, “This possibility [the 
incarnation of God] is included in His unalterable being.” CD IV/1, 187. 
223 Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 237-238. In these “new” events, “God does not 
change but remains ever one and the same . . . without ceasing to be what he eternally was and is and ever 
will be in himself.” Ibid., 238. For instance, “God was not different after the creation from what he was 
before it.” Ibid., 241. Barth assumes that in the incarnation God became a creature “without an alteration of 
His being. . . . He does not give up being God in becoming a creature.” CD IV/1, 185.  
224 Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 237. For Torrance, “We must think of all the changes 
in God’s mighty acts of creation and redemption which constantly surprise us as flowing from and reposing 
upon his eternally unchanging life.” Ibid., 236. 
225 For Barth, “God’s constancy—which is a better word than the suspiciously negative word 
‘immutability’—is the constancy of His knowing, willing and acting and therefore of His person.” CD II/1, 
495. According to this perspective, the opposite of God’s constancy is not mutability per se, but “the 
unholy mutability of men” (see Isa 1:21f). Ibid., 496. The Swiss theologian qualifies this constancy as God 
not becoming nor being “other than He is in Himself from eternity and in eternity.” Ibid., 502. For 
Torrance, God is “constant in faithfulness but not immutable.” Thomas F. Torrance, Space, Time, and 
Incarnation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 75.  
226 The idea of being and becoming is observed in Barth’s dynamic notion of God’s being-in-act. 
For him, “God’s being is event, the event of God’s act.” Hence, “God exists in His act. God is His own 
decision. God lives from and by Himself.” CD II/1, 271-272. In other words, “the whole being and life of 
God is an activity.” CD IV/1, 7. For Torrance’s remarks on the oneness of act and being in God, see 
Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 4, 6, 22, 24, 30, 95, 115, 149, 152, 194, 236, 243. In principle, 
the idea of being-in-act enables the ontological model to avoid the classical divide between God for us 
(action) and God in Himself (being). As Barth indicates, God is not “who He is only in His works. Yet in 
Himself He is not another than He is in His works.” CD II/1, 260. 
227 As McCormack indicates, in an essentialist ontology (classical theism) God is “complete in 





precedes and grounds His dynamic aspect (becoming). The disagreement lies on what 
constitutes the stable and dynamic aspects. Closer to classical theism, the essentialist 
view holds that the stable aspect refers to God’s identity (triune) and essential properties 
(aseity, simplicity, eternality, impassibility), while the dynamic aspect is described by His 
“self-determination” (election), His decision to be God for us (incarnation).228 
Conversely, the actualist view stipulates that God’s identity and properties are defined by 
His self-determination.229 Therefore, according to these two views, the ground of God’s 
becoming is either His essential being or His decision (self-determination). However, 
these two options can only characterize a real becoming if God’s being or decision 
precedes His becoming chronologically, and not merely logically.230 Otherwise, the 
                                                
essence of God is “given in the act of electing.” McCormack, “Grace and Being,” 98-99. According to this 
classification, McCormack is the main representative of the actualist interpretation of Barth’s ontology, 
while Paul Molnar and George Hunsinger are the main representatives of the essentialist view. While the 
notion that “Barth understood election to be an eternal act of Self-determination, an act whose primary 
‘object’ was none other than God Himself,” is “beyond dispute,” McCormack identifies the key point of the 
debate as “the question of whether God’s eternal act of Self-determination had ontological consequences 
for God Himself and, if so, what they might be.” McCormack, “Christonomie,” 228. For a helpful study on 
the debate of the relationship between the being of God and divine election in Barth, see Kevin W. Hector, 
“God’s Triunity and Self-Determination: A Conversation with Karl Barth, Bruce McCormack and Paul 
Molnar,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 7, no. 3 (2005): 246-261. 
228 Hunsinger, Reading Barth with Charity, 165. This position is closer to classical theism because 
in this view Barth tempers his actualist tendencies (Hegel) with the classical idea of the divine perfection of 
being (Anselm). Ibid., 163. 
229 According to McCormack, the logic of Barth’s mature doctrine of election implies that 
“election is the event in God’s life in which he assigns to himself the being he will have for all eternity.” 
McCormack seems to give ontological content to divine election (self-determination) to secure divine 
immutability. In regards to the incarnation, for instance, he explains that God “is not changed on an 
ontological level by this experience for the simple reason that his being, from eternity, is determined as a 
being-for this event.” Therefore, “as a consequence of the primal decision in which God assigned to 
himself the being he would have throughout eternity (a being-for the human race), God is already in pre-
temporal eternity—by way of anticipation—that which he would become in time.” McCormack, “Grace 
and Being,” 98-100. 
230 Addressing the debate of essentialism and actualism in Barth’s doctrine of God, as represented 
respectively by Molnar and McCormack, Hector highlights that the language of God’s self-determination 
preceding His triune being (actualism) or God’s triune being preceding His self-determination 





language of becoming would be a misleading label for some kind of God’s act of self-
repetition.231 The question whether the ontological model supports a chronological divine 
becoming leads us to the discussion of God and time in this model. 
The ontological model attempts to avoid (without completely rejecting, as Barth 
explicitly states)232 the characterization of God as timeless-spaceless.233 Assuming that 
                                                
Hector, “God’s Triunity and Self-Determination,” 246, 258. The assumption of a chronological sequence 
would imply that either God’s triune being (actualism) or His self-determination (essentialism) is not 
eternal, since it would be chronologically preceded by something else. Such implication is avoided in Barth 
scholarship because it does not fit into Barth’s theology. 
231 I am borrowing here Barth’s language of God in self-repetition. For instance, in his explanation 
that “the constancy of God is not . . . in conflict with the life of God,” he argues that God lives in “eternal 
self-repetition.” CD II/1, 492. Furthermore, he describes the triune God in terms of self-repetition. In his 
words, God is “one Subject, not three. But He is the one God in self-repetition, in the repetition of His own 
and equal divine being.” CD IV/1, 205. The secondary literature on Barth also employs this language to 
discuss the idea of divine being and action. Paul Collins mentions the divine becoming as a repetition: “the 
being of God is a repetition or a becoming.” Paul M. Collins, Trinitarian Theology, West and East: Karl 
Barth, the Cappadocian Fathers, and John Zizioulas (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
29. Sang Lee points out that “Barth dealt with the issue of being and becoming in the divine being,” using 
“the concept of self-repetition or self-reiteration to conceive God’s involvement in time.” In this view, 
“Jesus Christ is the event of God’s temporal reiteration.” Sang Hyun Lee, “Jonathan Edwards’s 
Dispositional Conception of the Trinity: A Resource for Contemporary Reformed Theology,” in Toward 
the Future of Reformed Theology: Tasks, Topics, Traditions, ed. David Willis-Watkins, Michael Welker, 
and Matthias Gockel (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 445. Holmes speaks about God’s action or 
“self-movement” in Barth as “a repetition of God’s being.” Christopher R. J. Holmes, Revisiting the 
Doctrine of the Divine Attributes: In Dialogue with Karl Barth, Eberhard Jüngel and Wolf Krötke  (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2007), 74. Aaron Smith argues that “God has his being in eternal self-repetition . . . in 
the concrete modality of the Word’s ongoing realization.” Aaron T. Smith, A Theology of the Third Article: 
Karl Barth and the Spirit of the Word (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014), 82. 
232 Barth indicates that Jesus Christ “is the refutation of the idea of a God who is only timeless.” 
He adds, “God Himself is not only timeless, but that in this readiness for time, in the timeless ordering and 
succession of His triune being, He is also temporal.” In a sense, God is “both timeless and temporal. He is 
timeless in that the defects of our time, its fleetingness and its separations, are alien to Him and disappear, 
and in Him all beginning, continuation and ending form a unique Now, steadfast yet moving, moving yet 
steadfast.” CD II/1, 616-618; italics mine. 
233 According to Torrance, “Far from being some kind of timeless eternity or eternal now that 
devalues or negates time, the real time of God’s eternal Life gives reality and value to the created time of 
our life.” Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 241. Similarly, Barth maintains that “the eternal God 
does not live without time. He is supremely temporal. For His eternity is authentic temporality.” CD III/2, 
437. Emphasizing the freedom of God, he challenges the idea that God is a “non-spatial and timeless 
spirit.” For him, “non-spatiality and timelessness on the one hand and spatiality and temporality on the 
other, do not enclose and imprison Him, so that He is confined by His being.” The Swiss theologian adds, 
“If we call God infinite, measureless, limitless, spaceless and timeless, this does not mean that we will try 





the language of timelessness-spacelessness establishes a negation or devaluation of time-
space, the model seeks to formulate a positive relationship of God and time-space. In 
fact, God’s eternity is temporal and His presence is spatial. Barth, who is more explicit 
than Torrance in explaining what this means, stipulates that God as creator has in Himself 
the prototypes of time and space, which are the form of creation.234 The idea of prototype 
does not mean that the space-time of creation has its origin in a mere timeless-spaceless 
being called God,235 because “God does not do anything which in His own way He does 
                                                
measure and limit, space and time.” And “God does not do anything which in His own way He does not 
have and is not in Himself.” CD II/1, 467. For studies on time in Barth and Torrance, see Christophe 
Chalamet, “No Timelessness in God: On Differing Interpretations of Karl Barth’s Theology of Eternity, 
Time and Election,” Zeitschrift für Dialektische Theologie 4 (2010): 21-37; Kim, Time, Eternity, and the 
Trinity, 191-240; Li Qu, Concrete Time and Concrete Eternity: Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Time and Eternity 
and Its Trinitarian Background (Carlisle, United Kingdom: Langham Monographs, 2014); Li Qu, 
“Newton, Einstein and Barth on Time and Eternity,” Scottish Journal of Theology 67, no. 04 (2014): 436-
449; Richard Henry Roberts, “Barth’s Doctrine of Time: Its Nature and Implications,” in Karl Barth: 
Studies of His Theological Method, ed. Stephen Sykes (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford 
University Press, 1979), 88-146; Langdon, God the Eternal Contemporary; Luco Johan van den Brom, 
“Time and Eternity in Christian God-Talk,” Zeitschrift für Dialektische Theologie 4 (2010): 38-66; Mark 
James Edwards, “The Divine Moment: Eternity, Time, and Triune Temporality in Karl Barth’s Church 
Dogmatics,” (Princeton Theological Seminary, 2013); George Hunsinger, “Jesus as the Lord of Time 
According to Karl Barth,” Zeitschrift für Dialektische Theologie 4 (2010): 113-127; Douglas Alan Trook, 
“The Unified Christocentric Field: Toward a Time-Eternity Relativity Model for Theological Hermeneutics 
in the onto-Relational Theology of Thomas F. Torrance,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Drew University, 1986). For 
studies on space in Barth and Torrance, see Elizabeth Jarrell Callender, “A Theology of Spatiality: The 
Divine Perfection of Omnipresence in the Theology of Karl Barth,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Otago, 2011); Stephen H. Webb, Jesus Christ, Eternal God: Heavenly Flesh and the Metaphysics of Matter 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 287-292; David Wilkinson, Christian Eschatology 
and the Physical Universe (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2010), 129-131; Chan Ho Park, 
Transcendence and Spatiality of the Triune Creator, European University Studies Series XXIII, Theology 
(Bern; New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 81-94. 
234 Describing time and space as the form of God’s creation, Barth highlights that “the prototypes 
in God’s being in Himself which correspond to this form are His omnipresence in regard to space, and His 
eternity in regard to time.” CD II/1, 612. Barth even clarifies the distinction between eternity (God 
Himself) and time (God’s creation). For him, “eternity is not created. Eternity is God Himself. For as God 
is self-existent, He is also His own dimension. But time is willed and created by God as a reality distinct 
from Himself.” CD III/2, 526. 
235 Torrance, for example, criticizes Newton for identifying objective or mathematical time and 
space “with the mind of God, which contains and imposes objective order upon the universe. God contains 
the universe, however, without being affected by it impassibly and immutably.” Thomas F. Torrance, The 
Ground and Grammar of Theology: Consonance between Theology and Science (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 





not have and is not in Himself.”236 It is important to notice that this statement emphasizes 
that God is temporal and spatial in His own way, which means that His space-time is not 
univocal to the space-time of creation.237 The rejection of univocality is clearer in the 
description of God’s temporality than in the depiction of His spatiality. Regarding space, 
God the creator is “the principle of space,” but not “a non-spatial principle.”238 In this 
sense, biblical passages about the presence of God among creatures—particularly those 
referring to Him dwelling in an earthly sanctuary or temple—should not be interpreted 
figuratively (non-spatially).239 In this view, God’s omnipresence means that “there is no 
                                                
transfer absolute time and space from the mind of God to the mind of the human knower.” Ibid., 26. 
236 CD II/1, 467. 
237 The same idea is found in Torrance, who maintains that “we may speak of the ‘place’ and 
‘time’ of God in terms of his own eternal life and his eternal purpose in the divine love.” In this sense, 
“‘time’ for God himself can only be defined by the uncreated and creative life of God, and ‘place’ for God 
can only be defined by the communion of the persons in the divine life.” Torrance, Atonement, 291. 
238 CD II/1, 471. Barth indicates that “the spatiality of God is to be distinguished from the 
spatiality of every other being by the fact that it is the spatiality of the divine being.” Ibid., 470. He adds, 
“In virtue of His own proper spatiality God is present in space and in all the spaces of His creation. Note 
that He is present. This implies both distinction and relationship.” Barth believes that the ideas of 
distinction and relationship, implied in the concept of presence, suggest some kind of distance (spatiality). 
In his words, “where there is distance, there is necessarily one place and another place. To this extent God’s 
presence necessarily means that He possesses a place, His own place, or, we may say safely, His own 
space. The absolute non-spatiality of God, deduced from the false presupposition of an abstract infinity, is a 
more than dangerous idea. If God does not possess space, He can certainly be conceived as that which is 
one in itself and in all.” Ibid., 468. The Swiss theologian contends that, according to Scripture, “the relation 
of God to space is an absolutely free and superior relationship, but it definitely does not say that it is 
a negative relationship or, consequently, that God is non-spatial. There is nowhere where God is not, but 
He is not nowhere. . . . He is always somewhere.” Ibid., 471. 
239 Barth comments on Solomon’s prayer in 1 Kgs 8:27-30. “‘Will God indeed dwell on the 
earth?’ This prayer does not dispute that God actually dwells on earth. Indeed, this is expressly affirmed in 
the later verses, but it clearly points to the fact that God dwells on earth in His own way, not in the way in 
which anyone else dwells on earth. ‘Behold, the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot contain thee.’ Thus 
heaven and any place higher than heaven cannot as such be God’s place. Again, this does not dispute that 
God dwells in heaven.” The Swiss theologian adds, “Although there is a strong emphasis on the 
particularity with which God possesses space beyond all other spaces, there is also no denial but the 
assertion that He does actually possess space, His particular space, and that He possesses it also in other 
spaces, in heaven and on earth.” Ibid., 469. Following this perspective, Barth argues that the presence of 
God in Exod 24:16; 25:8; 29:45 should not be understood “figuratively but literally.” Ibid., 479. It is 





place where He is not present in His essence.”240 With regard to time, the difference 
between God’s time and creation time centers on the difference between simultaneity241 
(God’s time) and sequentiality (creation time).242 More specifically, God has “His own 
time, superior to ours, undisturbed by the fleetingness and separations of our time, 
simultaneous with all our times.”243 Interpreting God’s eternity as pre-temporality, 
temporality, and post-temporality,244 Barth indicates that His eternity is “not 
timelessness,” but “simultaneity . . . of past, present and future.”245 This simultaneity 
                                                
sanctuary or a temple. For Barth, in the biblical way of thinking, the idea of God’s presence in a place 
precedes the notion of omnipresence, and not the other way around. See ibid., 478, 483, 485.  
240 Ibid., 470. 
241 Barth does speak of God’s reality as “eternal simultaneity and successiveness” (ibid., 343), but 
his emphasis is on simultaneity. In his words, “Even the eternal God does not live without time. He is 
supremely temporal. For His eternity is authentic temporality, and therefore the source of all time. But in 
His eternity, in the uncreated self-subsistent time which is one of the perfections of His divine nature, 
present, past and future, yesterday, to-day and to-morrow, are not successive, but simultaneous.” CD III.2, 
437. 
242 Similarly, Torrance distinguishes between the “uncreated time of God and the created time of 
our world.” Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 209. 
243 CD II/1, 613. In Barth’s words, “In Himself and in all things God is simultaneous.” Ibid., 608. 
He adds that God is “before and beyond all time and equally before and beyond all non-temporality. He is . 
. . the possessor of life completely, simultaneously and perfectly, and therefore to the inclusion and not the 
exclusion of the various times, beginning, succession and end.” Ibid., 611. 
244 Barth stipulates that the divine eternity is (1) pre-temporal, (2) supra-temporal, and (3) post-
temporal. Ibid., 620, 630-631. First, the pre-temporality of God means that “His existence precedes ours 
and that of all things.” In His pre-temporality, God determined everything that would take place in time, 
including time itself. Also, in the “pure time” of this “pre-time” the eternal Son was appointed “for the 
temporal world.” Ibid., 621-622. Second, God’s supra-temporality means that He is “co-temporal” or “in-
temporal,” and describes “His presence in time.” Ibid., 626. See also ibid., 623-624, 626-627, 629. Third, 
the divine post-temporality refers to the goal of eternity, the completion of all God’s works. Ibid., 629-630. 
The Swiss theologian seems to combine these three concepts (pre-temporality, supra-temporality, post-
temporality) with the threefold language that all things are from Him, in Him, and for Him (ibid., 631-632), 
and that God was, is, and will be (see CD III/2, 545). Furthermore, Barth uses his threefold conception of 
divine eternity to criticize the Reformers for interpreting God’s eternity only as pre-temporality. See CD 
II/1, 631. 
245 CD III/2, 526. In other words, “eternity is not timelessness. It is beginning, middle and end in 
fulness, for it is all three simultaneously.” Ibid., 558. It is important to clarify that, for Barth, “eternity is 
not . . . an infinite extension of time.” CD II/1, 608. Thus, the key word that defines God’s eternity is 





means that, for Him, “beginning, succession and end are not three but one, not separate as 
a first, a second and a third occasion, but one simultaneous occasion.”246 Accordingly, 
there is no ‘not yet’ for God.247 At least two conclusions may be drawn from such 
understanding of divine temporality. First, taking into account the contrast of 
simultaneity and sequentiality, God’s time and creation time are equivocal. The same 
word (time) is used to describe two different things. Second, it is not clear why the idea 
of simultaneity, which logically rejects sequentiality, should be called temporal. In fact, 
the notion of temporal simultaneity does not seem to be too far from the timeless eternity 
of classical theism, which also rejects sequentiality.248 Indeed, Barth underlines that God 
is timeless in the sense that “the defects of our time, its fleetingness and its separations, 
are alien to Him.”249 I will leave the discussion on why sequential time is a “defect” of 
creation in the ontological model for the section below on Cosmology.  
According to this notion of God’s time as simultaneity, the language of divine 
                                                
simultaneity.” Hunsinger, “Jesus as the Lord of Time According to Karl Barth,” 126.  
246 CD II/1, 608. For Barth, “eternity does not lack absolutely what we know as present, as before 
and after, and therefore as time. Rather this has its ultimate and real being in the simul of eternity. Eternity 
simply lacks the fleeting nature of the present, the separation between before and after.” Ibid., 613. 
247 CD III/2, 545. 
248 In his idea of God’s eternal now Barth attempts to avoid the notion that all things are present to 
God in reality before their actual creation. In his words, “from the fact that God’s eternity in its eternal 
Now embraces and contains all parts of time and all things in itself simultaneously and at one moment, we 
cannot deduce the general truth that things are present to God either in physical reality or even in intention . 
. . from eternity. God knows them and wills them. In this way they are certainly present to Him from 
eternity, enclosed in the Now of eternity even before their existence and without it. But they have their 
existence and also their co-existence with God only in the positive act of the divine creation.” CD II/1, 614. 
It is not clear how Barth can sustain this statement without an affirmation of sequentiality in God, since it is 
the notion of sequentiality that can sustain the idea that created things did not actually exist before creation. 
249 CD II/1, 617. Likewise, Torrance claims that the “finite distinctions and limits between past, 





becoming mentioned above does not appear to describe an ontological event. His 
essential being or His decision does not seem to actually ground a divine becoming 
because they cannot ontologically precede anything in God, who is a simultaneous 
being.250 A significant example of this point is Barth’s account of divine action, in which 
he applies the same ontic/noetic distinction he criticizes in the traditional account of the 
attributes of God.251 In his words, “the action of God in His reconciliation of the world 
with Himself in Jesus Christ is unitary. This action consists of different ‘moments’ with a 
different bearing.”252 He appears to qualify these different moments noetically, by saying 
that “we cannot see it [the unitary action] all at once.”253 To put it differently, the divine 
action is ontologically one, but the human perception of it is manifold, as if it were 
sequential actions. The action that is ontologically one, but noetically manifold in the 
sequence of time, is constantly repeated (each time with a different noetic bearing) in 
sequential time. Thus, God’s “executed decision” was “executed once for all in eternity, 
and anew in every second of our time.”254 What is executed once for all in the 
simultaneity of God’s eternity is a constant new event in the sequentiality of creation 
time. This is also the case of the eternal generation of the Son before all time (which is 
                                                
250 Indeed, Hector criticizes both the essentialist and the actualist views of the barthian doctrine of 
God by affirming the “simultaneity of God’s triunity and self-determination.” Hector, “God’s Triunity and 
Self-Determination,” 258. See also ibid., 259, 261. 
251 Barth criticizes the “semi-nominalistic” notion of classic theism that “the multiplicity of the 
divine attributes” does not actually refer to the nature of God per se but to the “discursiveness of the human 
intellect and the manifoldness of the created world.” CD II/1, 335. In other words, the multiplicity belongs 
to the being of God (ontic), and not merely to the human way of understanding of God (noetic). 
252 CD IV/2, 501. 
253 Ibid., 502. 




not related to Ps 2:7).255 The expression “before all time” is not “a temporal 
definition,”256 but it includes time.257 This inclusion means that, as an eternal and 
transcendent event over all time, “it takes place to-day,” “it took place yesterday,” and “it 
will take place tomorrow,” since “what is real in God” (eternity) “must constantly 
become real” (according to time).258 According to this view, the divine becoming takes 
place only in the context of sequential time as an act of self-repetition. While the divine 
action is ontologically one, its self-repetition takes the form of manifold and different 
actions for the human perception under the conditions of sequential time.  
In summary, the ontological model attempts to formulate a dynamic account of 
divine nature and action, making some room for the ideas of divine becoming, 
potentiality, passibility, sequentiality, changeability, and multiplicity. However, these 
ideas are interpreted under the presuppositions that, although God is somehow spatio-
temporal, He only becomes what He already is (self-repetition), and His time is not 
sequential but simultaneous. According to these presuppositions, the divine becoming, 
potentiality, passibility, sequentiality, changeability, and multiplicity take place only in 
the space-time of creation. In the context of the sequential time of creation, the divine act 
of self-repetition takes the form of becoming. The action that is ontologically one, 
                                                
255 According to Barth, he agrees with Calvin that Ps 2:7 does not refer to the eternal begetting of 
the Son by the Father, but to “the appearing of the Messiah King in time.” Ibid., 625.  
256 CD I/1, 427. Torrance seems to agree with this point when he argues that “the incarnation was 
not a timeless event like the generation of the Son from the Being of the Father.” Torrance, The Christian 
Doctrine of God, 144. In this statement, the Scottish theologian indicates that while the incarnation is a 
temporal event, the eternal generation of the Son is a timeless event. 
257 Ibid., Barth affirms that the language that the Son was eternally begotten from the Father is a 
figure of speech, as it portrays a reality that is beyond human understanding. See ibid., 430-434, 436-437. 




according to the principle of simultaneity, is repeated in the sequence of time in the form 
of manifold actions. It is precisely here that there is room for the dynamic ideas of divine 
becoming, potentiality, passibility, sequentiality, changeability, and multiplicity. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear how they can ultimately have an ontological status (even 
though the ontological model pushes in that direction), since the divine being is 
simultaneous by definition. Perhaps, they would be a secondary ontological form of the 
divine being and action in the spatio-temporal realm of creation. But again, it is not clear 
how this formulation would be compatible with a simultaneous divine being. Overall, the 
impression is that the dynamic nature of divinity in this model has a noetic, not an 
ontological status.   
Having discussed divinity as the first principle of reality in the ontological model, 
I turn now to the description of humanity, the second principle in this model. 
Humanity: Christ and the Concept of Human Nature 
The attempt to affirm a dynamic view of divinity, where God is somehow able to 
experience temporality, spatiality, suffering, and relative mutability, as indicated above, 
seems to be related to the understanding that Christ’s human nature is not merely a 
material tool required to enable His divinity to experience instrumentally these 
characteristics of the life of human beings.259 In other words, according to this conviction, 
the divine Christ experiences such characteristics as a human being, and not through a 
                                                
259 Both Torrance and Barth attempt to argue that God is able to have a direct contact with the 
material world. As Torrance puts it, “God was not simply using the humanity of Christ as his organ or 
instrument, while he remained transcendent to it all.” Torrance, Incarnation, 227. Similarly, Barth argues 
that “the divine being must be allowed to transcend both spirit and nature, yet also to overlap and 




human nature. This perspective supports the conception of the ontological model that, in 
Christ, God is both the subject and object of the priestly work.260 Christologically 
speaking, an instrumental human nature implies that God is the subject of the priestly 
action (He acts through the instrument), but not its object.261 It is noteworthy that the 
language of Christ as the subject and object of the priesthood, in which His human nature 
is not understood merely in an instrumental way, aligns with the notion of the ontological 
model that the incarnate Christ is the electing God and the elected human being,262 the 
subject and object of salvific predestination.263  
At this point, it is important to delineate how Christ’s humanity is conceptualized 
in the context of His person as the subject/object of election and of the priestly action. It 
could be said that the priestly work is in the service of salvific election264 (the divine 
                                                
260 See in the previous chapter the discussion regarding The Agent of the Priesthood in the 
Ontological Model. 
261 The language of object here means that an action is not directed toward God. God is not the 
recipient of an action. It is in this sense that He is not an object of priestly action. For instance, He is not 
propitiated by a priestly action because He does not receive an action. 
262 For Barth, the problem of the traditional doctrine of predestination is to see “God as the Subject 
of the election and man as its object.” CD II/2, 52. He argues that, in reality, Christ is the “the electing 
God” and “the elected man.” Ibid., 59. Likewise, Torrance refers to Christ as “the elect one and as the 
electing one.” Torrance, Incarnation, 113. In this view, “in Jesus Christ, it is revealed that the election of 
one for all becomes salvation for all in the rejection of one for all.” Ibid., 52. For helpful studies on election 
in Barth and Torrance, see David Gibson, Reading the Decree: Exegesis, Election and Christology in 
Calvin and Barth (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2009); Myk Habets, “The Doctrine of Election in 
Evangelical Calvinism: T. F. Torrance as a Case Study,” Irish Theological Quarterly 73, no. 3-4 (2008): 
334-354. 
263 Barth speaks of Christ as “the subject and object” of predestination. CD II/2, 102. Similarly, 
Torrance argues Christ is “the judging God and the judged man at the same time.” Torrance, Incarnation, 
113. 
264 Barth argues that the NT speaks of the election of the man Jesus “as our Savior, Head and 




eternal decision to save human beings in Christ265), in the sense that the priestly work 
noetically266 (see previous section on Divinity) actualizes election. Taking into account 
the distinction between subject and object, the notion that Christ is the electing God 
(subject) clearly situates His humanity on the object side. This does not necessarily mean 
that His humanity is passive in His priesthood. Christ acts as a man. However, the subject 
of election (and of the priesthood) is God. In Christ, God noetically267 (see previous 
section on Divinity) acts as a man. However, by situating Christ’s humanity on the object 
side of such action, this does not mean that His divinity is not an object as well. In 
Barth’s words, “God elected or predestinated Himself.”268 The difference is that, in 
Christ, there is a positive predestination of man and a negative predestination of God. To 
put it more sharply, there is a double predestination according to His divine and human 
natures. In Christ’s human person, God is the object of reprobation or death (God 
reprobates Himself or, using a priestly language, He sacrifices Himself) and man is the 
object of salvation or life.269 Obviously, as one person, the humanity of Christ is involved 
                                                
265 For Barth, “in the beginning, before time and space as we know them, before creation . . . God 
anticipated and determined within Himself . . . that the goal and meaning of all His dealings with the as yet 
non-existent universe should be the fact that in His Son He would be gracious towards man, uniting 
Himself with him.” Ibid., 101. The Swiss theologian concludes, “Whoever is elected is elected in Christ 
and only in Christ.” Ibid., 62. 
266 The word noetically is not explicitly stated by Barth or Torrance, but it is implied in the 
account of Divinity in the ontological model. Without ontological temporality, God does not really act in 
time. At best, His action is a noetic action in the sense of revealing election in time. 
267 The explanation for the use of noetically here is the same of the previous footnote. 
268 Ibid., 162.  
269 In Christ, “God has ascribed to man . . . election, salvation and life; and to Himself He has 
ascribed . . . reprobation, perdition and death.” Ibid., 163. Torrance claims that God has revealed Himself in 
Jesus Christ as sharing our lot” and making Himself poor, that we through His poverty might be made 
rich.” Torrance, Space, Time, and Incarnation, 75. Furthermore, he argues that “it is God in Christ who 
suffers and bears the sin of the world, and reconciles the world to himself.” He adds, “If the deity of Christ 




in the two events of reprobation and salvation, but in different levels. In the case of 
reprobation, His humanity is the form270 in which God reprobates Himself. But in the 
case of salvation, the humanity of Christ per se is the object of salvation.271 
In fact, this account of election seems to imply that the human person of Christ is 
some kind of micro-cosmos where the reconciliation of God and human beings takes 
place.272 In this context, His human nature must be conceived in such a way that allows 
God to be the real object of reprobation and also human beings to be saved. To be more 
specific, Christ’s humanity must have a non-instrumental relationship with divinity and 
human beings. As mentioned above, if His humanity is an instrument of the acting 
divinity, divinity cannot be the real object of the reprobatory action (negative election). 
To give an example, if God sacrifices Himself through the instrumentality of Christ’s 
humanity, the actual object of this sacrifice is His humanity, and not His divinity. 
Likewise, if His humanity is an instrument to communicate salvation to concrete human 
beings, Christ’s humanity is not the real object of salvific action (positive election). In 
this case, Christ is not the elected man. Rather, His humanity is only a means of election. 
Concrete human beings are the actual elected (object). In short, if Christ’s humanity is an 
instrument of His divinity, the man Jesus becomes the object of reprobation. 
Furthermore, if His humanity is an instrument for the salvation of human beings, the man 
                                                
270 In this section, I use the word form in a non-technical philosophical way. In other words, I am 
simply saying that God is in human form, a mode of existing. 
271 As indicated in the previous chapter, the ontological model conceives salvation basically as 
human transformation. This transformation entails the elimination of sin/evil by means of the destruction of 
sinful human beings, which is followed by the (re-)creation of transformed human beings. This is seen in 
Christ’s death (destruction) and resurrection (re-creation). 
272 Barth, for example, indicates that “the theme of the divine election is primarily the relationship 




Jesus cannot be the object of salvific election. Therefore, Christ’s humanity needs to be 
conceptualized as the form273 (not instrument) of His divinity in reprobation, and as the 
form (not instrument) of human beings in salvation. Hence, in my view, the ontological 
model would need to formulate a dynamic notion of divinity that includes the ability to 
suffer (passibility), which enables God to be the object of Christ’s sacrifice, and a 
corporate conception of human beings who are ontologically connected with the 
humanity of Christ, allowing the conclusion that the salvation of the man Jesus Christ 
automatically means the concrete salvation of human beings.  
At this point, a few questions may be raised. Does the ontological model have 
conceptual resources for a non-instrumental view of Christ’s humanity? More 
importantly, are there resources to support a dynamic conception of divinity and a 
corporate notion of human beings ontologically connected to the man Jesus? In the next 
paragraphs I will present arguments for the following concise answer: There are some 
resources that could be further elaborated to substantiate these conceptions, namely, a 
monistic view of humanity and a relational view of space-time. But they do not seem to 
be sufficiently developed to support these conceptions in the ontological model.  
There are some logical moves in the arguments of the ontological model that tend 
to view the constitution of Christ’s humanity, and by extension the constitution of human 
being in general, in terms of a strong union between soul and body.274 In his “concrete 
                                                
273 In this sense, God receives reprobation as (in the form of) a human being. 
274 According to Barth, “Far from existing as the union of two parts or two ‘substances,’ He 
[Christ] is one whole man, embodied soul and besouled body: the one in the other and never merely beside 
it; the one never without the other.” CD III/2, 326. Similarly, Torrance affirms, “We do not find St Paul, 
anymore than in the Old Testament, any body/soul or body/mind dualism.” Torrance, Atonement, 438. “We 





monism,”275 Barth correlates time-space with soul-body, stipulating that the soul is 
“movement in time” and has the body as its “inalienable spatial complement.”276 In 
contrast to the Greek dualism that dominates the Christian traditional anthropology,277 the 
human soul is the life of the body,278 which implies that the soul “cannot exist for 
itself.”279 This idea of concrete monism is significant because the dualism of soul and 
body, as assumed in the sacramental model, entails an instrumental relationship of the 
body with regard to the soul, which in Christ patterns the instrumental relationship of His 
                                                
Time and Resurrection, 178. The Scottish theologian emphasizes that human existence is “not separable 
from the material universe, for man precisely as man is body of his soul as well as soul of his body,” 
forming the “wholeness of . . . soul-body.” Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 226. 
275 Barth points out that “soul and body” are not “two parts,” but “two moments of the indivisibly 
one human nature, the soul as that which quickens and the body as that which is quickened and lives. It is 
to this concrete monism that we found ourselves guided by the biblical view and the biblical concept of the 
‘soul.’” CD III/2, 393; italics mine. Marc Cortez indicates that, “from one perspective, Barth’s ontology is 
clearly monistic.” However, the holistic language employed by the Swiss theologian “does not resolve the 
body/soul question,” and it seems that “his ontology at least implicitly affirms some form of dualism.” For 
Cortez, Barth’s focus is not on the body/soul question, but “on understanding the implications that the 
person and work of Jesus Christ as the true human and the covenantal relationship in which all humans 
have been summoned to participate have for understanding human nature.” Marc Cortez, “Body, Soul and 
(Holy) Spirit: Karl Barth’s Theological Framework for Understanding Human Ontology,” International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 10, no. 3 (2008): 328-330. For further studies on Barth’s anthropology, see 
Daniel J. Price, Karl Barth’s Anthropology in Light of Modern Thought (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2002); Stuart D. McLean, Humanity in the Thought of Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981). 
276 Assuming that the “soul is movement in time,” Barth asks, “How could it be this if it did not 
have an inalienable spatial complement, if it had no place?” CD III/2, 373. 
277 Barth points out that in this traditional anthropology “the soul is spiritual, non-spatial, 
indissoluble, and immortal; the body material, spatial, dissoluble and mortal.” Ibid., 380. He clearly rejects 
the “doctrine of the immortality of the soul,” and considers as “quite unbiblical” the notion that the soul is 
an “immortal spiritual substance of human reality, contrasted with the body as its lower and mortal part.” 
Ibid., 378-379. 
278 In Barth’s words, “soul is life. What is lifeless is souless.” Ibid., 374. The soul is “the besouling 
of a material body,” “the principle of its becoming and being alive.” Ibid., 376-377. He sees the soul as life, 
activity, inner being, the “product of the breath of God.” Ibid., 373-374. 
279 Ibid., 373. For Barth, “the soul is not a being for itself, and it cannot exist for itself. Soul can 




humanity with regard to His divinity.280 Therefore, as long as the ontological model 
moves away from a dualistic conception of human nature, there is more room for a non-
instrumental view of Christ’s humanity. To be sure, the non-instrumentality of the human 
body in the context of anthropology is not an argument against the instrumentality of 
human nature as such in the Christological context of divine and human natures. 
However, the non-instrumentality of the human body could be a step in this direction.   
Another important conceptual resource in the ontological model, specially 
emphasized by Torrance, is the relational interpretation of space-time. If a monistic view 
of human nature could be an initial step in the articulation of a non-instrumental 
conception of Christ’s humanity, the relational view of space-time can be useful for the 
formulation of an account of Christ’s divinity that experiences space-time without the 
need of the instrumentality of His humanity. According to this relational view, time and 
space are not things in themselves but the form or characteristic of creation.281 Hence, 
space-time is not a container (the container view) in which creatures are contained, but a 
                                                
280 See the description of Humanity in the sacramental model, which is outlined above in this 
chapter. 
281 According to Barth, “Created time” is “co-created.” This means that “time is not a something, a 
creature with other creatures, but a form of all the reality distinct from God, posited with it, and therefore a 
real form of its being and nature.” CD III/2, 438. Similarly, as Hunsinger emphasizes, eternity is not an 
entity but a characteristic. “Eternity for Barth is not the container in which God lives. It is a predicate of 
God’s triune being.” George Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 189. Torrance points out that “we are accustomed . . . to imagine space as 
something abstract and as something in itself, as though space could exist or be an entity in itself quite 
apart from the things it ‘contains’. Thus we work with a dualism between ‘space’ and the things thought to 
be ‘in it’, and so think it possible to have ‘empty’ space.” However, “space and time should not be 
conceived in themselves as abstract entities but only in relation to active agents and therefore relationally—
they are not ‘receptacles’ apart from bodies or forces, but are functions of events in the universe and forms 
of their orderly sequence and structure.” Torrance, Atonement, 288-289. David Fergusson argues that, 
drawing on relativity theory, Torrance advances a relational view of space and time, where time and space 
are defined by functions or forces of other principles that relate with them. David Fergusson, “The 
Ascension of Christ: Its Significance in the Theology of T. F. Torrance,” Participatio 3 (2012): 99. See 




characteristic they relate to (the relational view).282 Because space-time is not a container, 
God is not inside or outside space-time. Rather, this is a matter of God relating to 
creation, more specifically, to a spatial-temporal creation. Since God’s being is different 
from created human beings, His relationship is distinct from their relationship with 
spatiality-temporality.283 Thus, God and humankind experience temporality and spatiality 
in different ways.284 In this sense, in Christ’s humanity, God does not start to experience 
temporality and spatiality. Rather, what happens is that He can experience them in a new 
way, that is, in a human way. 
However, considering the interpretation above regarding Divinity embraced by the 
                                                
282 Torrance rejects what he calls the “Greek container conceptions of space,” arguing that the 
“Greek fathers” did not accept “the pre-Christian Greek conceptions of space as a ‘container’, or 
‘receptacle’.” The Scottish theologian stipulates that in this notion of container there is an “interdependence 
between the container and its contents.” In his reflections on Solomon’s prayer (1 Kgs 8:27; 2 Chr 2:6) and 
the “presence of God bodily” in the incarnate Christ, Torrance affirms a “relational notion of space” instead 
of a “container notion.” In this relational view, “there is no concept of space as an entity in itself apart from 
things and agents.” Rather, “space and time come into being with creation as orderly functions of creaturely 
events,” a “continuum of relations given in and with created existence.” The Scottish theologian points out 
that Calvin did not “develop a thoroughly relational concept of space and time as the Greek fathers did; he 
merely rejects, with the fathers, any idea that the incarnation involves an enclosing of the deity of Christ 
within the limits of a containing vessel.” Conversely, “the Lutherans . . . operated with a receptacle notion 
of space,” as “they took over” the “Ockamist form the Aristotelian concept of space.” Torrance, 
Incarnation, 217-219. Torrance stipulates that Christological theories of kenosis and ubiquity presuppose a 
receptacle view of space. Torrance, Space, Time, and Incarnation, 35. He also claims that there are two 
forms of the receptacle view, a finite receptacle and an infinite receptacle. The idea of an infinite receptacle 
was emphasized by the Renaissance and in Newtonian science. Ibid., 37-38. In Kant, the human mind 
becomes the receptacle of space-time “which conditions and makes possible our knowledge of nature.” 
Ibid., 43. The Scottish theologian advocates that, in contrast to this receptacle/container view, the relational 
and dynamic conception of space-time is consistent with the notion of space-time in relativity theory. Ibid., 
45. 
283 As Torrance highlights, “Space and time are relational and variational or differential concepts 
defined in accordance with the nature of the force that gives them their field of determination.” Thus, “time 
is to be understood as time for something, time in which we live our life . . . and the ‘time’ of God is 
understood as the time in which God lives his own life.” Likewise, “we must think of space as room for 
something, as place defined in terms of that which occupies it.” In this sense, “man’s place is defined by 
the nature and activity of man, and God’s place is defined by the nature and activity of God.” Torrance, 
Atonement, 289. 
284 According to Torrance, in the relational view, space and time are “differentially or variationally 




ontological model as a principle of reality (see above), the relational view of space-time 
depicted in the previous paragraph does not seem to be able to substantiate a dynamic 
notion of God at the ontological level, inasmuch as God experiences time simultaneously, 
not sequentially. Therefore, it is difficult to ontologically sustain the thesis that in Christ 
God experiences time sequentially and to avoid an instrumental use of His humanity. In 
other words, without sequentiality, the notion of divine passibility seems ontologically 
void, at least in a historical sense, inasmuch as suffering is not chronologically preceded 
and caused by actions that take place in history. For instance, the suffering of the passible 
God would not be caused historically by what happens (physically or spiritually) on the 
cross. A divine “simultaneous” suffering seems to suggest an eternally existing 
experience. In this context, Christ’s humanity seems to be a noetic instrument that 
historically reveals the eternal (simultaneous) suffering of God in the sequentiality of 
creation space-time. This historical revelation would be compatible with the idea of 
divine self-repetition in history that was highlighted in the discussion above about 
Divinity in the ontological model. 
The simultaneity of God also informs the ontological connection of human beings 
to the man Jesus in this model. According to a chronological reading of the ontological 
model, the historical life, death, and resurrection of Christ are not simply Christological 
events in the place of human beings. Rather, individual human beings are somehow 
objectively in the humanity of Christ,285 particularly when these events took place.286 
                                                
285 This is an example of a non-historical interpretation of ontology: all humanity is assumed “to 
be” chronologically and actually in Christ. 
286 As Berkouwer emphasizes, “The Church confesses ‘not we, but He’ as the essential element in 





This chronological reading would seem to require an instantaneous visible transformation 
of individual human beings since Christ’s resurrection, in the same way that His 
resurrection was visible and real for this model.287 In this case, the question would be: 
What makes what happens in Christ after His resurrection instantaneously real in human 
beings? In other words, what is the connection between His humanity and our humanity? 
The problem with these questions is that they assume a chronological or sequential view 
of divine salvific action (death then resurrection), and not a simultaneous action. 
Simultaneously, the man Jesus and all human beings are supposed to be eternally 
connected in God’s election.288 In the simultaneous reality of God, human beings are 
(ontologically exist) already transformed and reconciled.289 In other words, in the 
                                                
also. . . . But from everything it appears that this exchange does not exclude but includes our extinction.” 
Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, 317. Likewise, Bloesch argues, “It is not 
that Christ bore the judgment of God in our place, thereby enabling us to escape judgment. Instead the 
judgment has been executed upon us in Christ, and therefore we and all men have already passed through 
this judgment.” Bloesch, Jesus Is Victor, 50. With regard to Torrance’s idea that in the incarnation Christ 
heals human nature, Cassidy points out that “in the incarnation we have God who takes to himself not just a 
man, but humanity itself.” Cassidy, “T. F. Torrance’s Realistic Soteriological Objectivism and the 
Elimination of Dualisms,” 176. 
287 According to Gunton, Barth has received criticisms that Jesus Christ in his theology is “a kind 
of platonic form of humanity, so that salvation is universally achieved already, and its appropriation only a 
matter of knowing that we are saved.” However, Gunton argues that “charges of Platonism must not 
obscure the fact that this universal salvation is not established by Barth in any way philosophically, but in 
God’s personally active eternity.” Gunton, “Salvation,” 155-156. 
288 In his actualist interpretation of humanity, McCormack’s reading of Barth suggests that divine 
election establishes the connection between Christ’s humanity and our humanity. In McCormack’s words, 
“The ground of the ‘exaltation’ of human ‘nature’ in the history of Jesus of Nazareth is to be found in the 
election of all human beings in Him. It is because all are in Him by virtue of election that He can constitute, 
through His lived obedience, human being as such.” Bruce L. McCormack, “So That He May Be Merciful 
to All: Karl Barth and the Problem of Universalism,” in Karl Barth and American Evangelicalism (Grand 
Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2011), 227-228. 
289 Regarding the idea of simultaneity and election, Torrance argues that “election is . . . not some 
static act in a still point of eternity.” Rather, election moves “into time as [the] living act that from moment 
to moment confronts people in Jesus Christ.” In fact, “election is Christ . . . and the act of election in him is 
once and for all, a perfectum praesens, an eternal decision that is ever present.” Therefore, “election is 




chronological reality space-time creation, the humanity of Christ reveals through the 
sequential events of His death and resurrection the new reality of reconciliation or new 
creation that already exists as a simultaneous reality in God (I will explore the 
relationship between old and new creation and their relationship with simultaneity and 
sequentiality in the next section, which deals with Cosmology). Moreover, I would say 
that the ontological model advances a non-instrumental interpretation of the humanity of 
Christ in space and time in the sense that the historical realities of the divine suffering 
and the human salvific transformation in the life of Jesus Christ already took place (and 
exist) ultimately and ontologically in the simultaneous/eternal reality of God, and not in 
our (sequential) history. In the experience of believers, Christ’s humanity plays the role 
of a noetic instrument of the revelation of these eternally existing simultaneous realities 
(some kind of divine repetition) in sequential time.  
In summary, in order to make Christ Himself the object of election (as man) and 
reprobation (as God in the form of man), the ontological model seeks to articulate a view 
of Christ’s humanity that is not instrumental. From a non-instrumental perspective, His 
humanity would be the form in which God Himself supposedly suffers (divine 
passibility) the judgment in the place of sinful human beings. Likewise, Christ’s 
humanity would be the form in which individual human beings are saved and become a 
new creation in God. To substantiate this interpretation and argue in favor of a non-
instrumental understanding of Christ’s human nature, the ontological model could further 
articulate ideas such as the monistic view of human nature and the relational conception 
of space-time. However, the assumption that God experiences time simultaneously, and 




an ontological connection between the humanity of Christ and individual human beings 
in history points to the existence of an eternally (simultaneous) reconciled humanity (in 
the sense of concrete human beings) in God. As long as God’s suffering and reconciled 
humanity are realities existing ultimately in a simultaneous God and not in our sequential 
history, the humanity of Christ is not instrumental. In this context, however, human 
beings would experience His humanity as a noetic instrument revealing these eternal 
simultaneous realities (divine self-repetition) in sequential history. 
My next step is to describe the third principle of reality in the ontological model, 
namely, cosmology. 
Cosmology: Christ, Heaven, and Earth 
In the discussion of this principle of reality in the ontological model, I will focus 
on the interaction of the resurrected and ascended Christ with heaven and earth, 
highlighting how the concepts of divinity and humanity explored above relate to 
cosmology or the ontological structure of the world in this model.  
The ontological model indicates that the resurrection of Christ is the beginning of 
a new age, having a revelatory character.290 In other words, “the risen Christ is the living 
                                                
290 According to Barth, “the old æon . . . ends with the cross of Christ” and “the new one . . .  
begins with His resurrection—this transition is revelation, is the light of fulfilled time.” CD I/2, 56. 
Regarding the revelatory character of the resurrection, the Swiss theologian points out that Christ’s “work, 
His being and action, were not augmented by His resurrection. How could they be? His work was finished. 
Yet without this event following His life and death, His finished being and action, this alteration of the 
situation between God and man as accomplished in Him, would have remained shut up in Him, because it 
would have been completely hidden from the disciples and the world and us, being quite unknown and 
therefore without practical significance. Without this event it would have lacked the glory and revelation 
and therefore the prophetic character of His being and action. His life would still have been the life of the 
whole world, but it would not have been light shining in this world and illuminating it.” CD IV/3.1, 282. 
For studies on Christ’s resurrection in Barth, see Adam Eitel, “The Resurrection of Jesus Christ: Karl Barth 
and the Historicization of God’s Being,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 10, no. 1 (2008): 36-





atonement”291 in person and that, fundamentally, the “whole physical universe has 
already been resurrected in Christ,”292 the reality of this new age is particularly 
characterized by the re-creation of time and space or the space-time of new creation.293 
While Christ’s resurrection reveals to believers this new reality in space and time, His 
ascension somehow conceals it.294 Thus, the parousia will not bring about a reality 
different from the resurrection, but will be a consummation of the revelation of the new 
reality, a revelation that took place at first in the resurrection.295 In this view, resurrection 
and parousia are a single event for Christ. They seem to be distinct events to human 
beings because the new reality in Christ is largely hidden to the inhabitants of the earth 
                                                
Fortress, 2014); R. Dale Dawson, The Resurrection in Karl Barth (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2007). 
291 Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection, 55. “The risen Christ is the living Atonement . . . not 
only in overcoming the separation of sin, guilt and death, but in consummating union and communion with 
God.” In this way, “the divine life overflows freely through him into mankind.” Ibid. The Scottish 
theologian affirms that “the resurrection and ascension bring the work of atoning reconciliation and 
recreation to their consummation in the humanity of Christ.” Torrance, Atonement, 298. 
292 Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection, 55. Torrance explains that “the resurrection of Christ” 
is “the pledge that the whole physical universe will be renewed, for in a fundamental sense it has already 
been resurrected in Christ.” Ibid. 
293 Torrance points out that “the resurrection means the redemption of space and time.” With the 
resurrection, “space and time are not abrogated or transcended” but “healed and restored.” Torrance, 
Atonement, 247. Similarly, Barth speaks of God as re-creating time and healing “its wounds.” CD II/1, 617. 
294 For Torrance, the ascension “means that this time of the new creation in Christ is hidden from 
us.” Torrance, Atonement, 256. 
295 Regarding the resurrection, Barth explains that the resurrected Christ “is already He who 
comes, who restricts His coming to the circle of His then followers, and then interrupts it, to resume and 
complete it at a later point.” Therefore, “nothing which will be has not already taken place on Easter Day—
included and anticipated in the person of the one man Jesus. And so Jesus in His coming is simply the risen 
Jesus resuming and completing His coming,” as “the time given for the conversion of the world, will then 
be completed.” CD III/2, 489. See also ibid., 490, 496. Likewise, Torrance stipulates, “the final parousia of 
Christ will be more the apocalypse or unveiling of the perfected reality of what Christ has done than the 




due to His ascension.296 
At this point, a question may be asked: What do these statements mean in light of 
the previous sections on Divinity and Humanity? To be more specific, what does the 
reality of new creation in the resurrected Christ mean in the context of a simultaneous 
divine action that is self-repeated (revealed) in the sequentiality of our time through the 
humanity of Christ? The answer seems to be that the historical resurrection is not the 
ultimate reality that marks the ontological beginning of a new creation. Such historical 
reading would seem to require a divine sequential action that chronologically does 
something at Christ’s death and resurrection. Rather, what seems to happen in the 
historical resurrection is the revelation (self-repetition) of the simultaneous (eternally 
existing) reality of new creation in the divine Christ.  
However, it appears that the humanity of Christ experienced some kind of change 
in the resurrection and ascension. This does not mean an immaterialization of Christ’s 
body297 or the rejection of any kind of spatiality regarding the ascended Christ at the right 
hand of God298 in the heavenly throne.299 At the same time, the ascension was not a literal 
                                                
296 Barth highlights that “for us . . . the resurrection and the parousia are two separate events. But 
for Him [Christ] they are a single event.” CD III/2, 490. In his remarks on the Gospel of John, the Swiss 
theologian argues that “Easter, Ascension, Pentecost and parousia are here seen as a single event.” In this 
view, Easter and parousia are “different moments of one and the same act.” Ibid., 497. For Barth, we 
should “see them together as forms of one and the same event,” or “one continuous event in all its forms,” 
as “the New Testament knows of only one coming again of Jesus Christ.” CD IV/3.1, 293-294. For studies 
on the ascension in Barth, see Burgess, The Ascension in Karl Barth; Farrow, “Karl Barth on the 
Ascension,” 127-150. 
297 Torrance maintains that “‘the forty days’ between the resurrection and the ascension” did not 
involve a “spiritualisation or immaterialisation of the body of Christ.” Torrance, Atonement, 281. 
298 According to Barth, since “God Himself is spatial,” “the biblical picture of the throne of God 
(at whose right hand His Son sits and is our Representative as the One who wears our humanity) is not 
merely a picture or symbol. For it denotes the real place of God, and as such the one which is superior to all 




event such as the rising of a balloon, but an affirmation that Christ left the earth and went 
to a higher side of the created world,300 as God’s heaven is “not God Himself,” but part of 
His creation.301 While the ontological model affirms some kind of spatiality in heaven, 
this spatiality is apparently incomprehensible, which means that the language of heavenly 
space seems to be equivocal to earthly space.302 According to a divine heavenly equivocal 
space (incomprehensible) and time (simultaneous), Christ manifested Himself in the 
mode of God in the resurrection,303 and since the ascension He exists and acts in this 
                                                
299 Barth speaks of a spatial presence of Jesus in the throne of God in heaven in connection with 
Heb 9:24. See ibid., 482. He emphasizes the “spatiality of Jesus Christ in heaven and on earth.” Ibid., 483. 
In the incarnate Christ, especially the ascended one, “the Creator has given the creature not only space but 
His own most proper space. God has raised man to His throne.” Ibid., 486. The Swiss theologian criticizes 
Luther’s understanding of God’s right hand as omnipresence. “In this interpretation of the right hand of 
God, the presence with which God is present to Himself in His supraheavenly place seems to melt or sink 
into His presence in general, His presence in creation. It has no biblical justification, but is clearly linked up 
with the fatal and, in this case, violently applied presupposition of all the older theology, that the essence of 
God is the non-spatial infinite, and that God is omnipresent as this non-spatial infinite.” Ibid., 488. Barth 
argues that the ascended Christ is not “at a specific and limited point in creaturely space. Nor is He 
extended over all points in creaturely space as maintained by the original Ubiquitarianism of the Lutherans. 
He is to be sought in heaven ‘at the right hand of God the Father Almighty’ and therefore up above (Col. 
31). This does not mean, however, that He is imprisoned there . . . It does not mean that He is prevented 
from being and working and revealing Himself here too.” CD IV/3.1, 357. 
300 Barth explains that “‘heaven’ in biblical language is the sum of the inaccessible and 
incomprehensible side of the created world . . . There is no sense in trying to visualise the ascension as a 
literal event, like going up in a balloon. . . . The point of the story is not that when Jesus left His disciples 
He visibly embarked upon a wonderful journey into space, but that when He left them He entered the side 
of the created world which was provisionally inaccessible and incomprehensible.” CD III/2, 453-454. 
Similarly, Torrance indicates that, “in so far as” Christ “is man, truly and perfectly man, we must think of 
the ascension as related to the space and time of creaturely reality. But this involves a duality in itself, 
between our fallen space-time and redeemed space-time. . . . In him space and time were recreated or 
renewed. We have no adequate language to describe this.” Torrance, Atonement, 286.  
301 CD III/2, 453. See also Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection, 129n8, which is a quotation 
from Barth. For the Swiss theologian, “heaven—or supernatural, imperceptible, spiritual reality—is not in 
any way to be identified with God,” but is “God’s creation, as earth is.” CD II/1, 266. He adds, to say that 
“dwells ‘in heaven,’ . . . does not deny that He is the Creator and Lord of heaven too and of all heavenly 
beings and all heavenly hosts.” Ibid., 474. 
302 See the two previous footnotes above. 
303 In the context of a discussion about the resurrection, Barth argues, “In this time the man Jesus 





Ontologically speaking, the humanity of Christ in the resurrection and ascension 
is spatially incomprehensible and temporally simultaneous.305 The shift from an earthly 
spatiality and temporality to this other (divine) “spatiality” and “temporality” in the 
humanity of Christ is associated with the distinction of “fallen” time (old age/creation) 
and “redeemed” time (new age/creation). Fallen time (“our time”) describes the time of 
sinful and condemned human beings,306 and is characterized by a negative sequentiality 
(past-present-future), namely, “the separation between before and after,” beginning and 
end, and “the fleeting nature of the present” that flows away to the past or expects the 
future.307 The time of this fallen world “runs backward,” enslaving humankind in an 
irreversible movement to the dust of nothingness (decay and finally death).308 In contrast, 
                                                
304 According to Barth, the ascended Christ is in the “God-ward side of the universe, sharing His 
throne, existing and acting in the mode of God.” Ibid., 454. 
305 In this discussion of Christ as the Lord of time, Barth claims that “His time acquires in relation 
to their times [the time of other human beings] the character of God’s time, of eternity, in which present, 
past and future are simultaneous. Thus Jesus not only lives in His own time, but as He lives in His own 
time, and as there are many other times both before and after Him, He is the Lord of time.” CD III/2, 440. 
As Hunsinger emphasizes, “Because past, present and future occur simultaneously for God in eternity, the 
same is true for Jesus’ time, since by virtue of his resurrection, his time is brought to exist in the mode of 
God.” Hunsinger, “Jesus as the Lord of Time According to Karl Barth,” 123. 
306 Barth qualifies this time as “lost, fallen, condemned time, as time that some day will cease to 
be.” CD I/2, 49. He adds, “The time we think we know and possess, ‘our’ time, is by no means the time 
God created. Between our time and God-created time as between our existence and the existence created by 
God there lies the Fall. ‘Our’ time, as Augustine and Heidegger in their own ways quite correctly inform 
us, is the time produced by us, i.e., by fallen man.” Ibid., 47. 
307 CD II/1, 613. For Barth, in this time, “beginning, middle and end are distinct and even opposed 
as past, present and future.” Ibid., 608. See also ibid., 617. Regarding the problem of the present, the Swiss 
theologian asks, “What is Now? What is the present? . . . as we actually experience it, is no time at all, no 
duration, no series of moments, but only the boundary between past and future, a boundary which is never 
stationary, but always shifts further ahead. . . . Always it has already gone or not yet come. In practice, the 
present can be experienced only in the form of recollections and expectations.” CD III/2, 514. See also CD 
I/2, 48. 
308 Torrance, Atonement, 244. According to Torrance, “the kind of time we have in this passing 





the resurrected Christ (the new humanity, the new creation) constitutes the new “time” 
created by God for human beings.309 Instead of being characterized by the limits of 
sequentiality, this new “time” is qualified by the simultaneity of eternity, in which there 
is no fleetingness or separation.310 In this sense, the new creation has a new “time” in the 
heavenly Christ, but the complete revelation of this new “time” on earth will take place in 
the parousia.311 The new “time” of the resurrected Christ essentially describes Him as 
contemporary or simultaneous to all times,312 as His present includes past (His past did 
                                                
nothingness.” Ibid. Hence, time in this fallen world is “irreversible—time that flows only one way, 
backwards and down into the dust.” Ibid., 248. The Scottish theologian concludes that “the kind of time we 
have in our fallen existence is refracted time.” This is the “time within which we are all servants.” Ibid., 
255. Likewise, Barth concludes that sinful human beings experience a “continual loss of time.” CD III/2, 
517. See also ibid., 514. 
309 See CD I/2, 50. Affirming that the fallen time is resisted by Christ’s resurrection, which 
“overcomes corruption and decay,” Torrance stipulates that “the resurrection . . . breaks redemptively 
through the framework of space and time as we know it in a fallen world.” Torrance, Atonement, 246-247. 
In his comments on the “the resurrection of the man Jesus and his exaltation to the right hand of the 
Father,” the Scottish theologian claims that “in Christ the time of human beings and life is wedded to 
eternity.” Ibid., 256. Similarly, Barth speaks of “real time” breaking “in as new time, as the now and to-day 
of the Saviour.” CD I/2, 53. The Swiss theologian seems to suggest that this new time is present on earth 
since Christ’s incarnation. For Barth, in the man Jesus “God takes and has time for us . . . He is temporal in 
unity and correspondence with His eternity,” which means that “He is temporal in a way which also 
corresponds to man as His creature, in the original and natural form of the being of man in time before it 
was perverted and corrupted.” In fact, “that Jesus is the Lord of time, He who was and is and is to come.” 
CD III/2, 519. My focus here on the resurrected Christ is justified on the grounds that it is at this point that 
Barth’s conception of Jesus as the Lord of time has more significant implications for the understanding of 
His priestly intercession in heaven. 
310 In Barth’s language, the new time is “eternal time.” Advocating that Christ “is still flesh even 
in His glory at the right of God the Father,” Barth argues that “the time God has for us, as distinguished 
from our time that comes into being and passes away, is to be regarded as eternal time.” CD I/2, 50. 
311 In this sense, Barth considers the new time a promise. For him, “human existence no longer 
possesses its time as that which is to be taken for granted in its created state. Its possession of time . . . has 
now become the object of a special promise, a work of special divine goodness.” Ibid., 47; italics mine. 
312 Barth seems to enlarge Luther’s notion of Christ’s ubiquity to include not only space, but time. 
While the German theologian emphasized the presence of the heavenly Christ in all places, the Swiss 
theologian sees His presence also in all times. See Hunsinger, “Jesus as the Lord of Time According to 




not cease to be) and future (His future already existed).313 For Barth, this is the reality of 
the simultaneity of time in God’s eternity—God as the “I AM”—and also the meaning of 
the sameness of Christ’s past, present, and future in Heb 13:8.314 The idea that Christ’s 
future already existed in His contemporaneity is observed in the notion of divine 
predestination. God’s decree is not merely a past decision, but is contemporaneous.315 
Even though this decree is a complete work (once and for all), it is never temporally 
exhausted but is present before, above, and in every time.316  
                                                
313 Barth describes Christ’s time as a “present” that “includes the past and future,” as a 
“simultaneously present, past and future.” CD III/2, 465. Commenting on Heb 13:8, he argues that this 
passage “means more than that the man Jesus lived in a movement from yesterday through to-day to to-
morrow.” Ibid., 463. For the Swiss theologian, “Jesus Christ belongs not only to yesterday, or to-day, or an 
indefinite future. He belongs to all times simultaneously. He is the same Christ in all of them. There is no 
time which does not belong to Him. He is really the Lord of time.” Ibid., 466. Barth claims that “the time of 
Jesus is not only a time like all others; it is also different from them. For all other times are confined to the 
three dimensions. They begin, they endure, and they come to an end. According to the standpoint of the 
observer, they are future, contemporary or past.” However, “these limitations . . . do not apply to the time 
of the man Jesus.” The Swiss theologian explains the time of Jesus in the following way: (1) “the life of the 
man Jesus has a beginning, and His time was once future. Yet this does not mean that it did not then exist”; 
(2) “the life of Jesus has duration, and therefore it was once contemporary. Yet this does not mean that it 
was present only in its duration, and from the standpoint of contemporaries.” Rather, “this present reaches 
back to His past when His time was still future, and forward to His future when His time will be past”; (3) 
“the life of Jesus comes to an end and therefore it became past. Yet,” in the light of the resurrection, “this 
does not mean that it then ceased to be.” Ibid., 463-464; italics mine. 
314 Referring to Exod 3:14 as “the being of Yahweh in time,” Barth stipulates that “the all-
inclusive ‘I am’ rules out any notion that the three dimensions, present, past and future, simply follow one 
another in succession.” In his Christological remarks, the Swiss theologian claims, “I [Christ] am all this 
simultaneously. I, the same, am; I was as the same; and I will come again as the same. . . . That is why I am 
the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, the first and the last. Since my present includes the 
past and future it is both the first and last of all other times.” Ibid., 465. According to Barth, “the removal 
of the limitations of its yesterday, to-day and tomorrow, of its once, now and then, is the distinctive feature 
of the time of the man Jesus. For as such, according to its manifestation in Easter-time, it is also the time of 
God; eternal time.” Ibid., 464. For Barth’s comments on Heb 13:8, see the previous footnote. 
315 Torrance indicates that “the act of election in” Christ “is once and for all,” which means that 
this is “an eternal decision that is ever present” in its “identity with the living person of Christ. As such 
election is contemporary with us.” Torrance, Incarnation, 180. 
316 For Barth, “God’s predestination is a completed work of God, but for this very reason it is not 
an exhausted work, a work which is behind us. On the contrary, it is a work which still takes place in all its 
fulness to-day. Before time and above time and at every moment of time God is the predestinating God, 
positing this beginning of all things with Himself, willing and ordaining, electing and deciding, pledging 





Likewise, the notion that Christ’s past does not cease to be,317 emphasized in the 
constant contemporaneity of His earthly history, is the meaning of the heavenly 
intercession (Rom 8:34; 1 John 2:1; Heb 7:25) of Christ’s eternal priesthood.318 Even 
though the emphasis of this notion is on what happens after the ascension, a systematic 
reflection in light of the ontological commitments described in the previous sections on 
Divinity and Humanity gives the impression that the simultaneous divine salvific action 
did not take place (in an ultimate ontological sense) in Christ’s earthly history, but was 
already simultaneously real in God’s eternity. In other words, this earthly history would 
not be made eternal in the ascension, but would be already real in the simultaneous God. 
Barth does not seem to draw this implication of his own theology, but he emphasizes the 
                                                
and it also happens,” as “an act which occurs in the very midst of time no less than in that far distant pre-
temporal eternity.” Ibid., 184-185. 
317 According to Torrance, the history of the earthly Jesus is different from all other historical 
happenings in the sense that it does not flow away to the dust of the past. His history is not made up of 
“temporal or temporary actions” or characterized by the limits of “corruption and decay,” but “remains 
eternally real and alive happening.” Torrance, Incarnation, 67, 187. In his remarks on the “historical life of 
Jesus,” Torrance points out “that historical happening is one that does not simply fall within the limits and 
corruption and decay of mere historical happening. Unlike other historical happenings that flow away into 
the past and tumble down into the dust, this historical happening remains eternally real and alive 
happening.” Ibid., 67. For the Scottish theologian, “the deity of Christ is . . . the guarantee that the actions 
of Christ are not in time only, not just temporary or temporal actions, but the eternal action of God, 
eternally real in the Godhead.” Ibid., 187. 
318 Barth reads these biblical passages of intercession under the assumption that Christ “not only 
did but does stand before God for us—not in a different form but in exactly the same form as He stood 
before Him for us ‘in the days of His flesh’ as the Judge judged and the priest sacrificed.” CD IV/1, 314; 
italics mine. This same assumption underlies his reading of passages related to Christ’s eternal priesthood 
in Hebrews (5:6; 6:20; 7:17, 24; 9:12, 24; 10:14), as is connected to his understanding of the sameness of 
Christ in Heb 13:8. The Swiss theologian claims, “It is no accident that the Epistle to the Hebrews which 
emphasises this so strongly brings out the To-day [contemporaneity] so sharply in the call to faith, 
repentance and obedience (37, 15, 47). These are just a few of the explicit statements of the New Testament 
about the eternal unity, or the temporal togetherness, of the humiliated and the exalted, the crucified and the 
risen Jesus Christ, the obedience of the Son and the grace of the Father.” According to the assumption 
mentioned above, Barth stipulates that “a number of verses in the so-called ‘high-priestly’ prayer (Jn. 17) 
ought to be regarded even in the sense of the Evangelist himself as prayers of the exalted Christ for His 
own and for His work in the world. This unity and togetherness are—if we look back to the event of Easter-




contemporaneity or simultaneity of what happened in the life and death of Christ, “the 
atonement made then and there,” to those who lived and live before and after this 
historical event.319 In this view, there is no sequence of actions—Christ’s earthly sacrifice 
followed by His heavenly intercession—as affirmed by “older dogmatics,” which would 
chronologically distinguish the person and work of Christ from a soteriology of 
applicatio salutis.320 Instead of initiating another type of action (heavenly intercession) 
that makes His atonement on earth contemporary and available to people throughout 
history, the resurrected/ascended Christ inaugurated another type of time, which makes 
His atonement contemporary to people at all times.321  
In this context, the atonement of the cross does not come to human beings 
because Christ initiated a new intercessory activity in heaven that is contemporaneous to 
                                                
319 Ibid. In his words, this atonement comes “to us and become our atonement.” Ibid. Barth 
elaborates on this question as follows. “How can that which has happened once, even if it did happen for 
us, be recognised to-day as having happened for us, seeing it does not happen to-day? . . . How can that 
which happened once have happened for us when we who live to-day were not there and could not 
experience it ourselves? . . . How can we to-day exist as those for whom it happened when it happened 
once and not to-day?” Ibid., 287. This is not only a temporal but also a spatial problem. See ibid., 288-290. 
320 Barth explains that “the doctrine of the munus sacerdotale the older dogmatics had a second 
section on the intercessio Christi side by side with the idea of the satisfactio vicaria,” which attempted to 
solve the “transition from the understanding of the person and work of Christ to soteriology proper, to the 
question of the applicatio salutis.” Ibid., 314. Barth’s position seems to presuppose that the atoning work of 
Christ was finished with His death and resurrection. According to this presupposition, the applicatio salutis 
cannot be considered part of Christ’s atoning work. In the applicatio salutis of older dogmatics there is a 
“temporal sequence, in which the Holy Spirit does His work here and now in men [which parallels Christ’s 
intercession in heaven]—the outworking of the reconciliation accomplished there and then on Golgotha.” 
In contrast, for Barth, there is not “a series of different divine actions, but only as the order of different 
‘moments’ of the one redemptive occurrence coming to man in the simul of the one event,” which means a 
collapse of “the dualism between an objective achievement of salvation there and then and a subjective 
appropriation of it here and now, in favour of a recognition of the simultaneity of the one act.” CD IV/2, 
502-503. 
321 Barth argues that the resurrected Christ “did not continue to be enclosed in the limits of the 
time between His birth and death, but as the One who was in this time He became and is the Lord of all 
time, eternal as God Himself is eternal, and therefore present in all time.” CD IV/1, 313. Therefore, “the 
eternal action of Jesus Christ grounded in His resurrection is itself the true and direct bridge from once to 





us, but because Christ is in another “time” where His life/death is contemporaneous to us 
(His intercessory life/death is now a heavenly intercession in the sense of being an ever 
present reality).322 According to this perspective, the intercession of the ascended Christ 
does not constitute a new activity in heaven for human salvation, but the universalization 
of His intercessory life and death (His once and for all salvific work) to all times on earth. 
In other words, in His resurrection and ascension, the earthly history of Christ is an ever 
present reality.323 In this view, the heavenly intercession of Christ “is the eternal act of 
the crucified and risen One for us, the one truly contemporaneous divine act to us, the To-
day, To-day! Of atonement.”324 Because Christ’s resurrection is a contemporaneous 
event, believers are not justified by God on the basis of an application (performed by the 
heavenly Christ) of the benefits of Christ’s crucifixion in the past. Rather, if His 
                                                
fact of His death on the cross can never be past, it can never cease to be His action.” Ibid., 315. 
322 According to the idea of “togetherness in time” of the resurrected Christ, the ascended Christ 
“not only did represent us, He does represent us. He not only did bear the sin of the world, He does bear it. 
He not only has reconciled the world with God, but as the One who has done this, He is its eternal 
Reconciler, active and at work once and for all. He not only went the way from Jordan to Golgotha, but He 
still goes it, again and again. His history did not become dead history. It was history in His time to become 
as such eternal history—the history of God with the men of all times, and therefore taking place here and 
now as it did then.” Ibid., 313-314. In this sense, “there is no moment in which Jesus Christ is not Judge 
and High Priest and accomplishes all these things. There is no moment in which this perfect tense is not a 
present. There is no moment in which He does not stand before God as our Representative who there 
suffered and died for us and therefore speaks for us.” Ibid., 315. “He is the same here and now as He was 
there and then: the Mediator between God and us men.” Ibid., 314. 
323 According to Barth, “He who was crucified is risen, and as such He lives unto God (Rom. 610). 
He is the same yesterday, to-day and for ever. This temporal togetherness of the Jesus Christ of Good 
Friday and the Jesus Christ of Easter Day as created by the divine verdict is the basis of life for men of all 
ages. And as such it is the basis of the alteration of their situation. The event of Easter Day is the removing 
of the barrier between His life in His time and their life in their times, the initiation of His lordship as the 
Lord of all time. What He has done in His time He has done as the Representative of all other men, as the 
elect man, for them. In His resurrection it is fixed that what He did in His time He did in their time for and 
to them.” Ibid., 316. This entire notion seems to be based on the idea that the ascended Christ is 
ontologically (particularly in terms of space-time) like God. Barth argues that the resurrected Christ “is (in 
the same way as the One God) the one Mediator between God and man (1 Tim. 25), He was this in the 
event of Good Friday to be it for ever.” Ibid., 313. 




resurrection is contemporaneous to all human beings, “God’s verdict when he raised Him 
to life beyond death was His verdict on them.”325  
In the transition from the existent and visible old time or old age to the full 
revelation of the already existent new time/age,326 the presence of the contemporaneous 
ascended Christ on earth is mediated by the Spirit327 through physical instruments in the 
church (such as Scripture, preaching, and the sacraments),328 which are somehow 
                                                
325 Ibid. As Barth emphasizes, “In Jesus Christ the alteration of the human situation did take place, 
and does take place to-day.” Ibid., 317. The Swiss theologian interprets the NT imperatives about the dying 
of the old humanity (Rom 8:13; Col 3:9; Gal 5:24) as “consequences of the dying of man which has already 
taken place. They are commands to attest this event.” Hence, “there can be no question of any repetition or 
representation of that event, or even of an actualisation which has still to be effected. It needs no 
completion or re-presentation.” Ibid., 295. 
326 Barth argues that “the new time which already exists triumphs over the old which therefore still 
exists also.” CD I/2, 56. But he emphasizes that “the alteration of the human situation which has taken 
place in Him can be, and apart from the community is in fact, hidden from the world,” being perceived 
“only by faith and not by sight.” CD IV/1, 318-319. Likewise, Torrance highlights that “the church . . . 
lives . . . in two times,” in “the time of decay that flows down into the past and into the ashes of death, but 
also in the time of the risen Saviour and of the new creation that is already a perfected reality in him.” 
Torrance, Atonement, 256. 
327 By implication, it is the Spirit who really performs a mediatory role, and not necessarily the 
ascended Christ. To put it differently, Christ is salvation in act, and the Spirit performs revelatory 
mediation of the new age in the old age. 
328 According to Barth, after Christ’s ascension, “there began a time in which He was no longer, or 
not yet again, directly revealed and visible and audible and perceptible (as He had been) either to the 
disciples, the community, or the world: directly, of course, in the divine verdict pronounced in that event 
and received by them, but not without the mediation of recollection, tradition and proclamation; the living 
Word of God, but not without the ministry of the attesting word of man which is proclaimed and heard. 
There began a time in which He was and continues to be and ever again will be directly present and 
revealed and active in the community by His Spirit.” CD IV/1, 318. For the Swiss theologian, the “being of 
Jesus Christ is not directly present to us. It must be present to us and can be present to us only indirectly, 
namely, through the proclaiming of the Word first by Holy Scripture and then also by the Church. If the 
being of Jesus Christ is present to us, this occurs altogether in such a way that it is equated with the word as 
a physical medium of self-understanding and self-impartation on the part of the human spirit, the word of 
Scripture and the word of preaching becoming the Word of God.” CD I/1, 138. Therefore, the “Word of 
God is also natural and physical because without this it would not be the Word of God that is directed to us 
men as spiritual-natural beings, really to us as we really are. This is why the sacrament must stand 
alongside preaching. This is why preaching itself is also a physical event.” Ibid., 134. In this sense, the 
Swiss theologian claims that “Jesus Christ becomes contemporaneous through Scripture and proclamation.” 
Ibid., 150. Likewise, Torrance stipulates that “communion with Christ through the Spirit gives the church 
participation here and now in the mystery of Christ, which takes concrete forms in the word and 
sacrament.” Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection, 305. The Scottish theologian adds, “Although we 





analogous to the earthly spatio-temporal humanity of Christ.329 Concerning this point, 
two emphases may be discerned in the ontological model.  
The first emphasis (Barth) sees the physical instruments as revelatory pointers or 
witnesses of the new time/age.330 Concisely, Scripture is a witness of past revelation,331 
and on this basis proclamation and the sacraments proclaim future revelation in the form 
of promise.332 In the condition of witness, preaching does not put the Lordship of Christ 
                                                
only through the sacramental elements.” Ibid., 310. For studies on the sacraments in Barth and Torrance, 
see James J. Buckley, “Christian Community, Baptism, and Lord’s Supper,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 195-211; Hunsinger, 
“The Dimension of Depth,” 155-176; Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance, 295-394. Barth seems to consider 
himself a new-Zwinglian in his understanding of the sacraments. See CD IV/3, 130. 
329 Barth assumes that “the spiritual nature of the Word of God as distinct from naturalness, 
corporeality, or any physical event. We hasten to add that there is no Word of God without a physical 
event. The fact that preaching and sacrament belong to it is also a reminder of this. So, too, is the letter of 
Holy Scripture. So finally and supremely is the corporeality of the man Jesus Christ. But all this does not 
justify us in saying that the Word of God is equally and in the same sense both spiritual and also natural or 
physical. There is here in all forms of the Word of God an upper and lower aspect.” CD I/1, 133; italics 
mine. The identification of the Word of God with Christ is evident in the statement that “Jesus Christ 
Himself lives in the message of His witnesses, lives in the proclamation of His Church . . . experience of 
God’s Word, then, must at least be also experience of His presence.” Ibid., 206. The Swiss theologian 
seems to make a parallel between Christ’s humanity, Scripture, and proclamation when he claims, “It is by 
choice that the Word of God is identical with the humanity of Christ, Holy Scripture, and proclamation, and 
is thus a temporal event.” Ibid., 157. Barth explains that “the event of revelation . . . has everywhere a 
natural, bodily, outward and visible component-from the creation . . . , by way of the concrete existence of 
the people of Israel in Palestine, the birth of Jesus Christ, His physical miracles, His suffering and death 
under Pontius Pilate, His physical resurrection, right down to His coming again and the resurrection of the 
body.” CD II/1, 265. 
330 According to Barth’s definition, a witness points “in a specific direction beyond the self and on 
to another.” CD I/1, 111. Therefore, Scripture, preaching, and sacrament are witnesses in the sense that 
they point to revelation, which is beyond them. 
331 For Barth, Scripture “is not in itself and as such God’s past revelation.” Rather, “the Bible, 
speaking to us and heard by us as God’s Word, bears witness to past revelation.” Ibid. The Swiss 
theologian stipulates that Scripture can become an instrument of present revelation. In his words, “the Bible 
is God’s Word to the extent that God causes it to be His Word, to the extent that He speaks through it.” 
Ibid., 109. In this case, Barth argues that Scripture “must be proclaimed in the Church” in order “to become 
God’s Word for us.” Ibid., 121. 
332 Barth speaks of “revelation attested in Holy Scripture and proclaimed in preaching and 
sacrament.” Ibid., 160. He explains that “preaching and sacrament are . . . the promise of future revelation 
on the basis of the revelation that has already occurred.” Ibid., 92. Taking into account that preaching and 
sacrament are proclamation, they seem to be qualified by Barth as instruments and witnesses, as he 





in effect, but only attests that it “is already in effect.”333 Similarly, the sacraments are a 
symbolic expression of the reality that the church is gathered around Jesus in its 
worship.334  
In its turn, the second emphasis (Torrance) views the physical instruments in a 
deeper level of revelation. They do not merely point to the new time/age but offer a taste 
of it. According to this second emphasis, the eucharist is a revelatory taste of the new 
time/age in the old time/age.335 While the new time in its wholeness is simultaneously 
one, the sequentiality of the old time implies a brokenness of the fractions of time (the 
fleeting nature of the present) that requires a constant repetition, in which what is given 
once and for all (eternity/new time) must be given anew (sequential/fallen time).336 In this 
                                                
witness” with regard to the Christ’s work. CD IV/1, 315. 
333 CD I/1, 153. “Preaching does not put it [the lordship of Christ] into effect; preaching declares 
and confirms that it is in effect. It is proclamation of the Word of God when it proclaims it as something 
that is already in effect.” Ibid. 
334 According to Barth, “There is obviously no baptism or Lord’s Supper without His real presence 
as very God and very Man, both body and soul. But this presence cannot be regarded as restricted to what 
were later called the ‘sacraments.’ For these are only a symbolical expression of the fact that in its worship 
the community is gathered directly around Jesus Himself, and lives by and with Him, but that through faith 
He rules over the hearts and lives of all even apart from worship.” CD III/2, 467-468; italics mine. See also 
CD IV/1, 296; I/1, 95. 
335 Torrance stipulates that the church lives already in the time of new creation (even though it still 
lives in the old time of this passing world) “through the koinonia of the Spirit.” Torrance, Atonement, 256. 
The Scottish theologian sees the eucharist as the main locus of this koinonia. In his view, “as often as we 
communicate in the sacrament [the eucharist], we participate in the new time of that kingdom.” Ibid., 260. 
In this way, he describes the eucharist as an “eschatological anticipation both of the Advent of the Son of 
Man and the rapture of the Church.” Torrance, Conflict and Agreement in the Church, 2:189. 
336 Torrance explains that, in Christ, “redemption has been wrought once and for all, nevertheless 
it is an event that involves this new time, and as such it transcends the limitations and relativities of history 
. . . and endures for ever. It endures and abides for ever as new time just because it is indissolubly united to 
the eternal.” Torrance, Conflict and Agreement in the Church, 2:162. The Scottish theologian believes that 
“baptism and eucharist as two aspects of the same event,” but these two sacraments work with different 
temporal dimensions. In baptism, redemption is revealed according to the dimension of new time, as “a 
datum once and for all” and, therefore, it is celebrated only once. On the other hand, in the eucharist, 
redemption is revealed according to the dimensions of old time, as “a dandum which must be given anew, 





sense, the eucharist, constantly celebrated in the church, is an instrument for the revealed 
presence of new time in the midst of old time.337 When the new creation/time is 
completely revealed in the eschaton,338 the instrumentality of the eucharist will not be 
necessary anymore.339 The revelatory taste provided by the eucharist constitutes an echo 
of new time in fallen time, an echo of the heavenly worship before the throne of God in 
the church.340 In both emphases of revelatory pointers (Barth) and revelatory taste 
                                                
old time, wholeness/simultaneity and division/sequentiality, redemption is “at once a complete reality and 
an eschatologically reiterated event until Christ comes.” Ibid., 2:156. Torrance speaks of baptism as the 
“sacrament of justification” and the eucharist as the “sacrament of the sanctification.” Torrance, Atonement, 
307. The idea of sanctification as a complete reality (in Christ) being always given anew in the broken 
sequentiality of fallen or old time, as implied in Torrance’s conception of eucharist, is similar to Barth’s 
notion of sanctification. According to Hunsinger, the Swiss theologian understands sanctification not as a 
“process of gradual growth” (the “more and more” of Calvin), but as an “again and again, continually from 
without, and ever anew.” Hunsinger, Evangelical, Catholic, and Reformed, 211. Again, the complete reality 
is sequentially perceived only because of the present human condition in time. Hunsinger adds, 
“Justification and sanctification were, for Barth, two ways of describing reconciliation as a whole. 
Although they took place in Christ simultaneously, we cannot apprehend them simultaneously, but only 
sequentially.” Ibid., 204-205. Therefore, sanctification in the ontological model, to use Hunsinger’s 
language, is not a final state to be reached through a growing process. Rather, it is a “provisional 
anticipation” of the final state of redemption. See ibid., 214-215. For further information regarding 
Torrance’s idea of justification and sanctification, see Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 150-168. 
337 For Torrance, the eucharist “is the form which our sacramental union with Christ takes place 
within the brokenness and the divisions of history, in which the Church inevitably partakes, are revealed to 
be but the shell of the old life which passes away.” Torrance, Conflict and Agreement in the Church, 2:173. 
In this sense he describes the eucharist as a “temporal repetition or continuity in the relativities of historical 
succession.” Therefore, in the eucharist, “the Church transcends itself in the new creation . . . transcends its 
embroilment in the passing forms of this world.” Ibid., 2:174. 
338 According to Torrance, “The sacraments tell us . . . that the reality of the new creation is 
temporal fact here and now, even though its reality, veiled since the ascension of the Lord, is yet to be 
unveiled at the parousia. The New Testament emphasis upon the future is not so much the future of the 
reality but the future of its full manifestation, so that the eschatological tension involved in the sacraments 
is the tension between the time of a present but hidden reality and the time of the same reality revealed in 
the parousia.” Ibid., 2:163. 
339 For Torrance, the sacraments “will finally break up at the parousia,” as they “will give way to 
literal reality.” Ibid., 2:173-174. He adds, “In the Eucharist the wholeness of its union in Christ is received 
only sacramentally in the brokenness of time, and the more that wholeness presses toward its complete 
unveiling at the parousia the more evident does it become that the forms of the Church’s existence in this 
passing world are broken up in order that the abiding reality of the new creation may appear.” Ibid., 2:173.  
340 See Torrance, Atonement, 71; Torrance, Royal Priesthood, 95-96. Torrance believes that the 
eucharist brings about a twofold participation (a general participation in baptism, and a special participation 





(Torrance), the contemporaneous Christ uses physical instruments in His interaction with 
human beings on earth, but they are witnesses of the reality of Christ (new creation/time) 
or echoes of His reality in fallen time. 
Overall, the ontological model advances the idea that old time (sequentiality) will 
be eschatologically replaced by new time (simultaneity).341 The first elucidation 
necessary here is whether the new time should be named time.342 More specifically, is it 
ontologically meaningful to call non-sequentiality time? Since the simultaneity of new 
time actually refers to the simultaneity of eternity, is there a significant ontological 
difference between new time and eternity that justifies the use of these two different 
                                                
Scottish theologian affirms that “the priesthood of the Church is not a transcription in the conditions of this 
passing age of the heavenly Priesthood of Christ. No transubstantiation or fusion between the two is 
involved.” The priesthood of the church is “not a translation into terms of space and time of a heavenly 
order” nor a historical “replica of an eternal and celestial reality.” Ibid., 97. According to Torrance, it is 
“not easy to state precisely the relation between the ministry of the Church and the ministry of Christ 
described as participation.” In contrast to Catholicism, this is not “a relation of identity.” On the other hand, 
against the “sectarian view of the Church or ministry,” this is “not another ministry different from the 
ministry of Christ, or separable from it.” In fact, this participation is defined in terms of service. “The 
Church participates in Christ’s ministry by serving Him who is Prophet, Priest, and King.” Ibid., 37. This 
service is described as “the edification of the whole Body” until it “reaches the fulness of Christ.” Torrance 
points out that “this order of the ministry will pass away at the parousia, when the real priesthood of the 
one Body, as distinct from the institutional priesthood, will be fully revealed.” Ibid., 81. 
341 I was not able to find in the writings of Barth and Torrance an explanation of the nature and 
shape of this eschatological event. While the present research is not an exhaustive study of Barth and 
Torrance, I suspect that the lack of interest of the ontological model in questions regarding the origin of this 
world (including the discussion on original sin) is compatible with the lack of details in the model about the 
end of the present world. 
342 Van den Brom criticizes Barth’s view of time (and I would add Torrance here) because he uses 
the term time for different cases. More specifically, he underlines “the differences between God’s time” 
(related to the new time) “and human time” (the old time): “in God’s time, past, present, and future are seen 
as a simultaneous unity or as nunc aeternitatis, whereas in human time there is the fleeting nature of the 
present and its separation from past and future.” However, “the weak point in Barth’s argument is that he 
does not give a clarification of why we should use the same word ‘time’ in both cases.” Van den Brom 
adds, “The logic of Barth’s arguments assuring us that God (1) is ‘pure/real duration’, (2) that he is 
‘absolutely real time’, (3) that he is the prototype of time, and, at the same time (4) that he is simultaneously 
‘timeless’, seems to me an obscure and paradoxical enterprise. The simplest solution of this paradox is the 





terms?343 Furthermore, if the non-simultaneity of fallen time is a problem to be healed, is 
the non-simultaneity of space problematic as well?344 If so, why is there no mention of a 
new (simultaneous) space?345 In fact, these questions introduce an unclear ontological 
aspect of the conception of time-space in this model, namely, the transition from old time 
to new time.346 To be sure, the ontological model holds a relational view of space-time, 
                                                
343 Langdon highlights that one of the main criticisms that the doctrine of time in Barth has 
received is the charge of timelessness, which could be related in my view to his idea of simultaneity found 
in the accounts of new time and eternity. According to this critique, even though he attempted to escape the 
traditional view of timelessness in Christian theology he was not able to go too far from it. Langdon, God 
the Eternal Contemporary, 22-35. For examples of this type of criticism, see Robert W. Jenson, God after 
God: The God of the Past and the God of the Future, Seen in the Work of Karl Barth (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1969), 154; Roberts, “Barth’s Doctrine of Time,” 100-146; Colin E. Gunton, Becoming and Being: 
The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
1978), 181; Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time, 141-145. Langdon adds that another type of 
criticism to Barth’s doctrine of time concerns the problem of a fulfilled time (the reality of reconciliation as 
completely fulfilled), in which the church, the ascension and the future parousia receive inadequate 
attention. Langdon, God the Eternal Contemporary, 37-41. For examples of this type of criticism, see 
David Ford, Barth and God’s Story: Biblical Narrative and the Theological Method of Karl Barth in the 
Church Dogmatics (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1981), 145-146; Farrow, Ascension and Ecclesia, 229-
254. 
344 This point raises the question whether sequentiality is really a problem to be removed. Henry 
Blocher argues that “Barth expressly deprives succession of any ultimate significance.” Indeed, “for 
theological meaning, Barth rejects the sequence of history, the ‘coming after’ through successive stages.” 
Henry Blocher, “Karl Barth’s Christocentric Method,” in Engaging with Barth: Contemporary Evangelical 
Critiques, ed. David Gibson and Daniel Strange (New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 39. If sequentiality is a 
problem, this begs the question whether sequentiality (fallen time) was caused by sin or creation. 
Interpreting Barth, Langdon and Hunsinger disagree on this point. For the former, “time’s falleness is not 
inherent in its being created.” Rather, “fallen time . . . is a result of human sin filling the created time 
humans are given.” Langdon, God the Eternal Contemporary, 42. On the other hand, Hunsinger stipulates 
that “time’s healing is distinct from salvation from sin,” as “time’s wounds . . . are inherent in the good 
creation. They may be exacerbated and corrupted by sin, but they are not identical with it, nor are they 
hostile to God. When measured by eternity, they are merely imperfections, not corruptions.” Accordingly, 
“the incarnation resolves a plight logically independent of sin, namely, the plight of transitoriness and 
dissolution into nonbeing.” Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace, 204. 
345 Comparing Barth’s notions of space and time, Callender finds a lack of distinct terms to speak 
of ‘God’s space’ (i.e., ‘eternity’) in differentiation from ‘creaturely space’ (i.e., ‘time’),” as he has distinct 
terms for God’s time (eternity) and creaturely time (time). Callender, “A Theology of Spatiality,” 241. In 
this dissertation I add to this comparison the fact that Barth and Torrance do not use the language of fallen 
space and new space as they do with time, even though they assume that space and time need to be healed. 
346 I agree with van den Brom that “Barth’s distinction of revelation time and fallen time” (and I 
would add Torrance also) “causes rather more conceptual confusion than conceptual clarity.” Van den 




meaning that they are not entities in themselves or containers.347 Rather, different beings 
have distinct experiences of spatiality-temporality. Thus, God and human beings 
experience spatiality-temporality differently because they are different kinds of beings, 
establishing peculiar relationships with space-time (God simultaneously, and human 
beings sequentially). However, the idea of healing space-time seems to imply that they 
are considered entities in themselves (containers or even realities), with characteristics 
that need to be changed.348 In other words, the container/reality of sequentiality (old time) 
would be replaced by the container/reality of simultaneity (new time).349  
A possible solution to the seemingly discrepancy of holding a relational view of 
time-space, on the one hand, and affirming a replacement of old time by new time, on the 
other, would be the explanation that the language of replacement is metaphorical. In this 
explanation, it is the transformation of humankind (new beings) that will bring about a 
new experience of temporality or a new relationship with time. Time as such does not 
change. Nevertheless, this option does not seem to be available to the ontological model, 
as the model holds that the being of humankind is already (and always) “changed”350 in 
                                                
347 See the discussion above about Humanity in the ontological model. 
348 Van den Brom argues that by “using an independent entity named ‘the time,’” Barth (and I 
would add Torrance) “neglects the fact that the notion of time is always used in relation to events, actions, 
life stories and processes. By distinguishing between God’s reality and the reality of human creatures 
having their own time, Barth s reconstruction of the revelation event results in a realistic conception of 
time, that is to say: a container view of time which is independent of events or actions implied by this 
realistic concept.” Van den Brom, “Time and Eternity in Christian God-Talk,” 41-42. 
349 As Van den Brom puts it, in “a clash between God’s real time and the human fallen time, there 
is also present a clash of two different realistic time containers one of which will finally disappear.” Ibid., 
42. 
350 In fact, the entire logic of the ontological model, as described up to this point, indicates that 
there is no real change here. The reality of transformed human beings eternally exists in God. If there is 




Christ. It is the difference of the nature of the times (old and new) that makes this new 
being (existing in simultaneous temporality) invisible to us. To put it more sharply, the 
difference of times is necessary for the connection between Christ’s humanity and our 
humanity in the ontological model, as it justifies the gap between the full reality of a new 
humanity and the fallen humanity we see in our world. As a result, the relational view of 
time-space becomes unclear. Moreover, the transition from old time to new time does not 
seem to include a proper account of the status of space in this transition.351 
In summary, the ontological model depicts the heavenly realm of the ascended 
Christ as incomprehensible spatiality and simultaneous time. Thus, His earthly spatio-
temporal (characterized by sequentiality) humanity became a different (equivocal) spatio-
temporal reality. After the resurrection, Christ not only exists in this incomprehensible 
and simultaneous reality, but He Himself is a micro-cosmos352 that contains the reality of 
the new creation of the earthly world, including the new humanity of concrete human 
beings. This new reality is particularly characterized by a new (simultaneous) time that 
will replace the reality of old (sequential) time of the fallen world. In short, the 
ontological model describes the resurrection and ascension of Christ as the 
transformation of His earthly atoning history into an eternal 
(simultaneous/contemporaneous) event that becomes present at all times. This 
                                                
351 Discussing the status of space, and even time, in the new creation, Wilkinson is unsatisfied 
with the depth of Torrance’s proposal. He asks, “How is space-time different? Torrance uses the language 
of redemption, healing and restoration.” However, “for someone who specifically states that he wants to 
explore this issue in both theological and scientific terms, Torrance is then disappointing in actually 
describing what it means for space-time to be healed and restored.” Wilkinson, Christian Eschatology and 
the Physical Universe, 131.  
352 I use the term micro-cosmos here to refer to the person of Christ. However, the term is not 




“transformation” is the ontological reality of His priestly heavenly intercession.  
Furthermore, the ontological model depicts Christ’s death and resurrection as the 
precise eschatological moment when the transformation of human beings and of the 
world takes place. However, in contrast to this chronological reading that presupposes 
some kind of ontological turning point in the transformation of human beings and the 
world as taking place in Christ’s historical death-resurrection-ascension, the assumption 
that God has a simultaneous being and action (described in the section above on Divinity) 
leads to the understanding that the reality of Christ’s earthly atoning history (God’s 
salvific action) was already a simultaneous/contemporary event in God, that is revealed 
(repeated) in the sequential reality of this world through the earthly humanity of Christ. 
Until the complete revelation of the reality of the new creation in Christ (the parousia) 
that will replace sequential time by simultaneous time, the ascended 
simultaneous/contemporaneous Christ uses physical instruments as revelatory pointers or 
as a revelatory taste of the new creation to human beings on earth. 
After the description of these principles of reality in the ontological model, I will 
briefly outline below their implications for the understanding of Christ’s priesthood. 
Implications for Christ’s Priesthood 
The principles of reality depicted above indicate that simultaneity (timeless in the 
sense of rejecting sequentiality) is a significant ontological feature of divine reality in the 
ontological model. God “becomes” or “acts” in earthly (sequential) history only 
noetically as an ever present event of self-repetition of what He already is in His 
(simultaneous) eternity, never in an actual real historical sense. This self-repetition may 




minds of human beings) in sequential time.  
The idea of simultaneity also conditions the way this model views the person of 
Christ, who is simultaneously the subject and object of election, the electing God and the 
elected man. As the object of election, He is simultaneously the object of reprobation as 
God and the object of salvation as man. According to the principle of divine simultaneity, 
the ultimate reality of reprobation and salvation, which are eternal non-sequential divine 
actions, does not seem to be found in earthly (sequential) history through the ontological 
instrumentality of Christ’s humanity, but in the eternal (simultaneous) action of God.  
Consequently, in the ontological model, the earthly humanity of Christ seems to 
be a noetic instrument of revelation of the eternal (simultaneous) action, mediating a 
divine self-repetition in the sequentiality of historical time. In fact, the principle of 
simultaneity also characterizes the ascended Christ, who is in the heavenly realm of 
incomprehensible spatiality and is contemporaneous to all times (simultaneous time).  
Furthermore, Christ has in Himself the reality of the new creation of the earthly 
world, including the new humanity of concrete human beings, and this new reality is 
defined by a new (simultaneous) time that will replace the reality of old (sequential) time 
of the fallen world in the complete revelation of the parousia (a full divine self-
repetition). Until this complete revelation, the ascended simultaneous/contemporaneous 
Christ uses physical instruments (church worship: Scripture, preaching, sacraments) as 
revelatory pointers or as a revelatory taste of the new creation to earthly human beings in 
old creation (sequential time). 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the understanding of Christ’s priesthood in the 




existential (non-historical fall) broken relationship between humankind and God existing 
since the beginning of creation, which requires a mediation that propitiates the divine 
wrath and transforms human beings, perfecting the incomplete original creation; (2) as 
the priestly agent, Christ is both the subject and object of the priestly reconciliation, as it 
“takes place” (not as historical sequential acts) in His own being. In this way, His 
priesthood means mainly God’s self-humiliation in Christ in the incarnation and sacrifice. 
Also, in the resurrected human Christ, “took place” the ontological transformation of 
human beings (overcoming or healing of the broken relationship between God and human 
beings existing since creation); (3) Christ’s one person, who is the object of His own 
priestly actions, corresponds to one action, and His single priestly action is the 
substitutionary sacrifice, which includes His whole intercessory life and death. Christ’s 
substitutionary death means the elimination of sin by the destruction of sinful human 
beings in Him, leading to their re-creation in His resurrection (Torrance even sees some 
re-recreation beginning in the incarnation); and (4) the goal of the priesthood is to bring 
God and humankind to communion, which is already a complete reality in Christ, but will 
be fully revealed in the parousia. Until then, human beings on earth can have some kind 
of participation in this reality in the form of an awaking knowledge or liturgical taste of 
the complete reconciliation in Christ, as the ascended Christ (including His earthly life 
and death) is contemporaneous to all times (Barth) and mediates glimpses of the new 
creation in the eucharist (Torrance). 
Before I start to clarify features of the priesthood of Christ through the principles 
of reality in the ontological model, I will concisely highlight what a reading of the 




First, when a priestly propitiation of the divine wrath in Christ’s sacrifice 
followed by the transformation of human beings in His resurrection is seen from the 
perspective that God’s wrath is part of His salvific grace, the potential conclusion of 
universalism seems to be a challenge for the representatives of the model, who do not 
subscribe to this conclusion.353 According to universalism, Christ’s priesthood benefits all 
human beings without exception. This universal scope of salvation would match the 
original incompleteness of creation, as all creation (including all human beings) is 
eschatologically led through His priesthood to its perfect fulfillment for the first time. 
Second, a reading of the need for Christ’s priesthood, without an awareness of the 
principles of reality in the ontological model, gives the impression that the basic 
incompleteness of original creation is the moral rebellion of human beings since the 
beginning.  
Third, the reading on the agent of the priesthood seems to indicate that God 
suffers at the cross, and human beings are transformed in Christ’s resurrection. Such 
reading implies a chronological sequence in which a historical God experiences His self-
humiliation (suffering) at the cross. Likewise, the transformation of human beings takes 
place historically/chronologically in the resurrection. In this sense, Christ is the object of 
His priestly action particularly at those historical moments.  
                                                
353 Barth (see, e.g., CD II/2, 417-418) and Torrance (see, e.g., Atonement, 187-188) reject 
universalism by affirming divine freedom and criticizing formal logic. However, while the salvific actions 
of God cannot be squared in human logic, there is no meaningful theological articulation without 
conclusions and implications, and the criticism of such implications should not be simply dismissed on the 
excuse that the critique employs formal logic. See Williams, “Barth’s Doctrine of the Atonement,” 266-
268. For studies about the debate of universalism in Barth and Torrance, see ’McCormack, “So That He 
May Be Merciful to All,” 227-249; Oliver D. Crisp, “On Barth’s Denial of Universalism,” Themelios 29, 
no. 1 (2003): 18-29; Tom Greggs, “‘Jesus Is Victor’: Passing the Impasse of Barth on Universalism,” 





Fourth, a reading of the actions and goal of the priesthood gives the impression 
that Christ becomes contemporary to every time only at the resurrection/ascension. In 
short, this reading assumes that the priesthood of Christ would not be a reality at all if the 
incarnation, the cross, the resurrection, and the ascension had not taken place in history. 
However, this does not seem to be the ontological view that emerges when one 
reads the ontological model in light of its interpretation of the principles of reality.  
First, with regard to the incompleteness of original creation, a moral rebellion 
against God since the beginning of the world does not seem to be the only important 
problem of creation. Sequential time appears to be a significant problem as well. The 
ontological model strongly emphasizes that a new creation will replace sequential time by 
simultaneous time. The need to eradicate sequential time is implicitly part of the need for 
Christ’s priesthood, in the sense that His priestly work leads creation to completion, and 
this completion includes simultaneous time.  
Second, as far as the priestly work is a salvific divine work and God has a 
simultaneous being (who “becomes” only what He already is, and therefore, does not 
become but eternally exists) and action, the ultimate reality of Christ’s priesthood is not 
historical but eternal/simultaneous. Accordingly, the humanity of Christ allowed a 
historical revelation of the eternal reality of the priesthood, which is repeated in the 
sequentiality of time through the instrumentality of proclamation and sacraments. The 
incarnation, cross, resurrection, and ascension, and their ongoing repetition in 
proclamation and sacrament can be regarded as real for us in sequential time. But the 





ultimate reality behind Christ’s priesthood does not seem to be constituted by these 
historical events. On the contrary, the priestly action of Christ is one because the divine 
action is simultaneously one.  
Third, God does not become the object of Christ’s priesthood for the first time in 
the earthly life and death of the incarnate Christ. And, apparently, the ascension did not 
eternalize the historical life of Christ. This would imply sequentiality in God, a different 
reality before and after the ascension. In His simultaneity this was already an eternal 
reality. Even the salvation of human beings in Christ, which is part of the sequential 
completion of creation in chronological history, was already a reality in the simultaneous 
God at the beginning of creation. Therefore, it is not only the ascended Christ who 
performs a noetic priesthood who reveals a reality accomplished on the cross. Rather, the 
incarnate Christ and all His earthly life and death (even the cross) seem to be a revelation 
of a salvific priesthood that is already a reality in the simultaneous God. In other words, 
the priesthood of the earthly and ascended Christ would be a revelation that repeats a 
divine reality in the sequentiality of time.  
Would the representatives of the ontological model agree with this conclusion? 
This is a difficult question to be answered. What this study attempts to show is that when 
we put together their description of Christ’s priesthood and their view of divinity, 
humanity, and cosmology with reference to Christ, this seems to be the logical outcome. 
Having studied the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality in this model, I will 
conclude this chapter by briefly summarizing and comparing the interpretation of these 





A Brief Comparison of the Models  
The brief summary and comparison outlined here is similar to the one found at the 
end of the previous chapter. I will follow the sequence used in this chapter for the study 
of the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality in each model (God, humanity, 
cosmology, and implications). Moreover, comparative comments (similarities and 
differences) are accompanied by a table summary, and focus on the systematic 
articulation of the ideas and not merely the presence or absence of a specific notion. 
Divinity: Christ and the Concept of Divine Nature 
The models affirm or are logically close to the idea that God, in His perfection, is 
timeless/spaceless in His being (for instance, immutable, simple, impassible, non-
discursive knowledge), and consequently His eternal (timeless/spaceless) action is 
described by His will (predestination). This notion is nuanced in different ways (see 
Table 5). The sacramental model is more explicit on that, the functional model is less 
explicit, and the ontological model is logically close to this in its notion of simultaneity. 
 
Table 5. Divinity (sacramental, functional, and ontological models) 
SACRAMENTAL MODEL FUNCTIONAL MODEL ONTOLOGICAL MODEL 





• God’s eternal action: timeless 
predestination (primary cause) 
 
• God’s historical action: 
historical/chronological 
actualization through spatio-




• The object of God’s salvific 
action: spatio-temporal human 
beings 
• God’s nature: timeless/ 




• God’s eternal action: timeless 
predestination 
 




(secondary causes implied) 
 
 
• The object of God’s salvific 
action: spatio-temporal human 
beings 
• God’s nature: simultaneous temporality 
(logically close to timelessness) and 
incomprehensible spatiality (logically 
close to spacelessness) 
 
• God’s eternal action: simultaneous 
(timeless) action/predestination 
 
• God’s historical action: divine 
historical/chronological self-repetition 
through spatio-temporal instruments 




• The object of God’s salvific action: He 
Himself (spatio-temporal human beings 





The sacramental model argues that His eternal action takes place in history 
through secondary (temporal/material) causes in the spatio-temporal world. The 
functional model does not emphasize secondary causes. However, as long as it highlights 
God’s timeless knowledge and predestination the use of spatio-temporal instruments 
(secondary causes) seems unavoidable for understanding divine action in history. At the 
same time that the ontological model attempts to affirm that God is spatio-temporal, His 
spatiality in this model is incomprehensible and His time is simultaneous, which means 
that space and time are conceptualized equivocally and without a substantial difference 
from the timeless-spaceless view.  
Inasmuch as the similarity with the timeless-spaceless view is established, the 
historical action of God takes place through the use of earthly spatio-temporal 
instruments that repeat the simultaneous divine action into the sequentiality of earthly 
time. Hence, in all models, what is already a timeless or simultaneous reality in God is 
actualized or repeated into sequential time. I use the nuanced distinction between 
actualized and repeated to capture the innovation of the ontological model in comparison 
with the other models.  
While the sacramental and functional models see spatio-temporal human beings 
as the object of God’s salvific (predestinarian) action, and this action is therefore carried 
through spatio-temporal instruments to reach them, His timeless action is actualized in 
this way in the spatio-temporal realm of creation. On the other hand, the ontological 
model stipulates that God is the object of His own salvific action, and human beings are 




actualization of the divine simultaneous action, but simply a spatio-temporal revelatory 
repetition of what is already real in God. 
Humanity: Christ and the Concept of Human Nature 
Obviously, the three models agree that Christ’s humanity is spatio-temporal (see 
Table 6). However, they stipulate different levels of relationships between Christ’s 
humanity and divinity, from the perspective of space-time. In the sacramental model, this 
relationship seems to be consistent with the idea of divine timelessness/spacelessness.  
 
Table 6. Humanity (sacramental, functional, and ontological models) 
SACRAMENTAL MODEL FUNCTIONAL MODEL ONTOLOGICAL MODEL 
• Christ’s human nature: spatio-
temporal  
 
• Instrumentality: secondary cause 








• Central instrumental role: 
passibility (impassible divinity) 
• Christ’s human nature: spatio-
temporal 
 
• Instrumentality: secondary cause 








• Central instrumental role: passibility 
(impassible divinity) 
• Christ’s human nature: spatio-
temporal 
 
• Instrumentality: secondary cause 
(spatio-temporal) of divine 
simultaneity (logically close to 
timelessness/spacelessness) 
 




• Central instrumental role: 
historical revelation of 




The spatio-temporal humanity of Christ is viewed as a secondary cause or 
instrument of the divine action in the world. In principle, the functional model also 
appears to interpret Christ’s humanity as a spatio-temporal instrument of His non-
spatial/timeless divinity. Even Luther’s conception of communication of properties 
assumes the distinction of spatio-temporal humanity and non-spatial/timeless divinity, 




humanity experiences omnipresence through the divinity).  
In the sacramental and functional models, a central instrumental role of Christ’s 
humanity is the experience of passibility in His sacrifice. Christ suffers on the cross 
through His humanity. The ontological model stipulates that that it is God Himself, as the 
object of His own action, who suffers on the cross. In this case, a simultaneous God does 
not experience passibility in the sequentiality of history (cross), but His suffering is 
eternally (simultaneously) constituted. According to this perspective, Christ’s humanity 
would be an instrument that reveals/repeats divine passibility in the sequentiality of 
history. Since Christ is the object of divine election (which includes the 
reprobation/suffering of God and the salvation/transformation of human beings), and not 
human beings per se, there is no need of a historical application of the salvific divine 
action to human beings. In this way, the instrumentality of Christ’s humanity is more 
salvific revelation than salvific actualization. 
Cosmology: Christ, Heaven, and Earth 
All the three models seem to assume that God’s heaven is a timeless/spaceless 
environment while the earth is obviously spatio-temporal (see Table 7).  
As already mentioned, the ontological model does not use this language. Rather, it 
attempts to describe a spatio-temporal heaven, but its spatiality and temporality are 
respectively incomprehensible and simultaneous, which characterizes an equivocal use of 
the terms space and time that is not substantially different from the timeless/spaceless 







Table 7. Cosmology (sacramental, functional, and ontological models) 
SACRAMENTAL MODEL FUNCTIONAL MODEL ONTOLOGICAL MODEL 




• Earth: spatio-temporal 
 
• The ascended Christ acts on 





• Goal of His action on earth: 
partially actualize the reality 
of new creation on earth 
 
 
• Christ: effects new timeless 
creation in the cosmos 




• Earth: spatio-temporal 
 
• The ascended Christ acts on earth 
through spatio-temporal 
instruments/secondary causes 
(proclamation and sacraments) 
 
 
• Goal of His action on earth: 
partially actualize the reality of new 
creation on earth 
 
 
• Christ: effects new timeless 
creation in the cosmos 
• God’s heaven: temporal simultaneity 
(logically timeless)/spatially 
incomprehensible (logically spaceless) 
 
• Earth: spatio-temporal 
 
• The ascended Christ acts on earth 
through spatio-temporal 
instruments/secondary causes 
(proclamation and sacraments) 
 
 
• Goal of His action on earth: partially 




• Christ: is the locus of non-sequential 




In the sacramental model, the ascended Christ is in a timeless/spaceless realm, 
and His presence and activity on earth are mediated by spatio-temporal instruments 
(secondary causes), particularly the sacraments. In principle, the functional model 
appears to hold a similar assumption, especially in its account of the sacraments. In its 
turn, the ontological model strongly emphasizes the existence of two realms of reality, 
one characterized by sequential time (this old creation) and the other by simultaneous 
time (the new creation). This model has a strong emphasis on this point because the new 
creation (including transformed human beings) already exists in Christ, who is a kind of 
micro-cosmos that contains the new creation. In this case, sacraments do not transform 
human beings per se, bringing about sequentially a partial reality of new creation (as in 
the sacramental and functional models) in the midst of old creation, but offers 





Implications for Christ’s Priesthood 
In this brief comparison of the implications of the macro-hermeneutical principles 
of reality for the priesthood of Christ in the three models explored in this research (see 
Table 8), I will comparatively highlight the main implications of these hermeneutical 
presuppositions for each structural component of Christ’s priesthood. 
Need 
With regard to the need for the priesthood, all the three models assume that 
original creation is incomplete. The presupposition that God is timeless/spaceless, shared 
by the three models, implies that this incompleteness is intended by the timeless will of 
God. The ontological model, with its cosmological presupposition that a simultaneous 
new creation will replace the sequentiality of old creation, indicates that, besides the 
human rebellion since the beginning, the incompleteness is characterized by sequential 
time. 
Taking into account in what sense Christ’s priesthood is necessary, the idea of 
ontological healing in human beings advanced by the sacramental model is qualified by 
the instrumentality of spatio-temporal instruments that includes Christ’s humanity and the 
sacraments. The emphasis on divine wrath that requires Christ’s priestly propitiation in 
the functional model seems ontologically problematic when one considers the 
presupposition of divine timelessness. The wrath of a timeless God is eternally 
constituted, and not caused by something external to Himself in chronological history. By 
claiming that God is eternally the agent and the subject of propitiation, the ontological 




wrath and propitiation are found in His simultaneous being, and not in chronological 
history. But that would seem to imply that the conflict between good and evil observed in 
history is ontologically found in the essential being of God. 
 
Table 8. Implications for CP (sacramental, functional, and ontological models) 







• Incomplete creation intended by 




• Main object of CP (main need): 
human beings (their ontological 
healing through spatio-temporal 
instruments [humanity of 
Christ, sacraments]) 
• Incomplete creation intended by the 




• Main object of CP (main need): God 
(the propitiation of His timeless wrath, 
but being timeless this cannot be 
propitiated) 
• Incomplete creation intended by 
the simultaneous (logically 
timeless) will of God 
o Incompleteness: sequential 
time 
• Main object of CP (main need): 
God (the propitiation of His 
wrath, which is eternally 








• Timeless/spaceless God is 
always the main agent 
 
 





• Christ effects a new creation in 
human beings 
• Timeless/spaceless God cannot be the 
historical object of the propitiatory 
action 
 
• Earthly humanity of Christ as a spatio-





• Christ effects a new creation in human 
beings 
• Non-sequential God is the 
subject/object of an eternal 
propitiation 
 
• Earthly humanity of Christ as a 
spatio-temporal instrument to 













• One timeless/spaceless action 
(invisible sacrifice) 
o Sacrifice on the cross: 
spatio-temporal 
expression of the invisible 
sacrifice 
o Sacraments: spatio-
temporal actualization of 
the new creation in human 
beings 
• Multiple/sequential actions: Christ in 
His humanity (spatio-temporal 
instrument) 
o Propitiatory sacrifice on the 
cross as problematic (timeless 
God cannot be historically 
propitiated) 
o Heavenly propitiatory 
intercession as problematic 
(timeless God, timeless heaven) 
o Sacraments: spatio-temporal 
actualization of the new creation 
in human beings 
• One timeless/spaceless action 
(one person as subject/object) 
o Sacrifice on the cross: 
spatio-temporal revelation 
of the eternal 
sacrifice/propitiation 
o God as eternally propitiated 
(includes eternally in His 
sacrifice the destruction of 
sinful human beings and 
their transformation) 
o Sacraments: spatio-
temporal revelation of the 







• Reconciliation: ontologically 
performed by the divine Christ 
through spatio-temporal 
instruments 
o Ontological healing of 
human beings 
o Guides them in their 
teleological movement 
toward God 
o Moral reconciliation as 
part of the ontological 
reconciliation (teleology) 
• Reconciliation: morally performed in 
terms of forgiveness 
o Historical forgiveness as 
problematic (real propitiation on 
the cross and in heavenly 
intercession as problematic) 
o Mediation of divine forgiveness 
and human (ontological) 
transformation through spatio-
temporal instruments 
• Moral reconciliation 
o Eternal forgiveness 
o Already (ontological) 
achieved 
§ Eternal forgiveness 
§ Already achieved 









As far as the agent of the priesthood is concerned, a timeless/spaceless 
presupposition of God’s being and action favors the idea that He is the subject of the 
priesthood, as He cannot be the object of a chronological action performed outside of 
Himself.  
This implication favors the sacramental model, which sees the movement of 
Christ’s priestly activity moving from God to human beings for their healing. In this 
context, the earthly humanity of Christ is a spatio-temporal instrument (secondary cause) 
that historically actualizes the divine timeless action, particularly in terms of passibility. 
While the functional model also shares the human body of Christ as instrumentality for 
passibility, it is difficult for this model to ontologically sustain the view that the actions 
of the human Christ, or even of Him as God the Son, are directed toward the Father. As 
the Son, Christ’s action is timeless. Furthermore, a timeless God cannot be the object of 
the historical actions of the human Christ.  
The ontological model seems to solve this Protestant dilemma by making the 
timeless God the subject and object of His action. He is eternally self-propitiated, and the 
benefits of this propitiation are enjoyed by a transformed humanity in the eternal Christ. 
Furthermore, divine passibility is also eternally constituted in this model, which means 
that Christ’s humanity is the instrument of historical revelation of the divine suffering. 
An ontological consequence of the decision of making God the timeless object of the 
priesthood is that Christ is seen as the timeless locus of new creation (and transformed 
human beings), while the sacramental and functional models have Christ historically and 





In the context of the actions of the priest, the emphasis of the sacramental model 
(one invisible sacrifice) and of the ontological (one person as subject/object) model on 
one action is compatible with the presupposition of a timeless divine action. On the other 
hand, the notion of the functional model that the actions are multiple and sequential is 
incompatible with this presupposition, which means that these actions would be 
performed by Christ in His humanity (as a spatio-temporal instrument), and not in His 
divinity. This interpretation would partially fit the earthly actions of Christ, but it seems 
ontologically problematic for a heavenly propitiatory intercession before a 
timeless/spaceless Father in a timeless/spaceless heaven. However, even the idea that 
Christ’s sacrifice on the cross is propitiatory seems ontologically problematic when 
associated with the presupposition of a timeless/spaceless God, who cannot be 
historically propitiated.  
The sacramental model is ontologically coherent with this presupposition when it 
stipulates that this is a spatio-temporal expression of an invisible sacrifice. The 
ontological model is also ontologically coherent with this presupposition when it assumes 
that the destruction of sinful human beings in the sacrificial self-humiliation of God is 
interpreted as an eternal (non-historical) event. Thus, Christ’s historical sacrifice is a 
revelation (spatio-temporal repetition) of the eternal sacrifice. Likewise, the sacraments 
are a spatio-temporal revelation of the eternal reality of new creation. In the sacramental 
and functional models the sacraments are a spatio-temporal actualization of the new 






Regarding the goal of the priesthood, the sacramental model is ontologically 
consistent with the presuppositions about Divinity, Humanity, and Cosmology. In order to 
achieve the goal of ontological reconciliation, the divine Christ priesthood uses spatio-
temporal instruments to ontologically heal human beings and guide their teleological 
movement toward God.  
The functional model, on the other hand, seems to have a lack of ontological 
coherence between the idea of moral reconciliation, in which divine forgiveness is based 
on the propitiatory work of Christ (earthly sacrifice and heavenly intercession), and the 
presupposition of a timeless God. This God cannot forgive human beings historically (as 
an action that responds to another action). However, the functional model is coherent 
with this presupposition and the presuppositions regarding Cosmology, in the notion that 
divine forgiveness and human transformation are mediated through spatio-temporal 
instruments.  
The ontological model seems to solve the ontological inconsistency related to the 
divine forgiveness of a timeless God by ultimately locating this forgiveness in 
(timeless/simultaneous) eternity, and not by understanding it historically. The ontological 
model is also compatible with its own interpretation of the macro-hermeneutical 
principles of reality when it assumes that the goal of Christ’s priesthood is already 
ontologically achieved, if this is seen eternally and not historically (not through the work 
of the earthly Christ), and that the spatio-temporal instruments mediate a revelation of 
this reality.  
Overall, this comparison of implications seems to indicate that the sacramental 




consistent with their respective interpretations of the principles of reality. From a 
historical perspective, the Reformation (the functional model) represented a reaction to 
Roman Catholicism (the sacramental model in the Thomistic form), while modern 
Protestant theology (where the ontological model is located) attempted to adjust classical 
Protestant theology. It is possible that the functional model formulated an account of 
Christ’s priesthood that represents an alternative to the sacramental model (in the 
Thomistic form), without paying special attention to the interpretation of the principles of 
reality. This would explain the reason why the sacramental and functional models have 
different accounts of Christ’s priesthood, while maintaining a similar interpretation of the 
principles of reality. In fact, the same challenge of ontological coherence faced by the 
sacramental model in the Thomistic form is shared by the functional model, namely, the 
notion of propitiation.  
As I have indicated in this study, the idea of divine propitiation seems 
ontologically incompatible with a non-spatial/timeless interpretation of the principles of 
reality. Either the notion of propitiation is dropped (as in the sacramental model in 
O’Collins’ form) or the principles of reality are revised and adjusted (as in the 
ontological model). In the case of the sacramental model, O’Collins’ rejection of the idea 
of propitiation seems to reveal that this model can be internally coherent without this 
idea. The principles of reality of the sacramental model seem to be built for a notion of 
God as subject of Christ’s priesthood, but not its object. Human beings are the object and, 
thus, the earth is the main realm of this priesthood, not heaven.  
The situation is different for the functional model, as the notion of divine 




affirm that God is the primary object of this priesthood requires not only a different 
ontological interpretation of God, but also a special focus on heaven (God’s realm).354 
Indeed, this move would be probably related to a reinterpretation of the role of Christ’s 
humanity. Interestingly enough, both Luther’s understanding of the incarnation—the 
divinity of Christ becoming able to experience passibility—and Calvin’s understanding 
of the humanity of the ascended Christ being physically/spatially present in heaven, call 
for a more active role of Christ’s humanity in His intercessory work and have ontological 
implications that could be further elaborated toward an alternative (spatio-temporal) 
interpretation of the principles of reality. These could be indicators that the functional 
model should systematically formulate its own interpretation of the principles of 
reality.355 Even the sequentiality of the functions of earthly sacrifice and heavenly 
intercession in the context of divine propitiation appears to imply some kind of 
temporality (at least in terms of sequence) in the divine salvific actions. Since the 
                                                
354 Michael Jones sees in Luther an emphasis on the priesthood of Christ in the heavenly realm, 
and not on the earthly. He writes, “for Luther the dimension of Christ’s priesthood that is most important is 
the heavenly one not the earthly realm.” From a historical perspective, Luther highlights the spiritual 
dimension or “the interior aspect of Christ’s priesthood, possibly in part as an antidote to all the external 
disarray the Augustinian saw in the sixteenth-century church. In fact, his stress on Christ’s heavenly 
intercession, rather than on his priestly activity in the world, has a parallel stress on the interior and 
spiritual dimensions of man over any of his external actions of worship, liturgy and especially sacrifice.” 
Jones, Toward a Christology of Christ the High Priest, 187, 165.  
355 In his discussion of the theology of the Reformers, Canlis indicates that “all theology 
necessarily comes with ontology: the issue is not whether one is ontological or not, but whether one is 
aware of the ontology with which he or she is working.” Canlis, Calvin’s Ladder, 72n82. Some scholars 
attempt to develop the ontological assumptions embedded in the conception of forensic justification in 
Protestant theology. Jenson and Gritsch, for example, emphasize the role of the word and its implications 
for human ontology. For them, “human reality is not a substance given prior to all community. Rather, 
humanity happens in the event of communication, in the speaking and hearing the word.” In a nutshell, 
“what I am is decided by what is said to me.” Eric W. Gritsch and Robert W. Jenson, Lutheranism: The 
Theological Movement and Its Confessional Writings (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), 67-68. Similarly, 
McCormack sees “forensicism (rightly understood!)” as “the basis for an alternative theological ontology to 
the one supposed in Roman and Eastern soteriology.” In his view, “God’s verdict . . . creates the reality it 
declares.” Thus, “the judicial act for God is never merely judicial; it is itself transformative.” McCormack, 




functional model did not seem to work on the reformulation of its ontological 
presuppositions, the only aspect of Christ’s priesthood in this model that seems to find 
ontological support in the principles of reality is the one related with the 
word/sacraments.356 Curiously, this aspect is a point of relative similarity with the 
sacramental model, as it involves an instrumental (spatio-temporal instruments) 
application of grace that has human beings as objects, and does not refer to divine 
propitiation. 
Just as O’Collins’ rejection of the idea of propitiation can be interpreted as a 
modern attempt to give more cohesion to the sacramental model, the ontological model 
could be seen as a modern corrective (from the perspective of those who follow this 
model) of the functional model or classical protestant theology. As mentioned above, the 
ontological model tends to be more internally coherent, pointing to an eternal 
(simultaneous) propitiation. As a result, the coherence achieved by the ontological model 
does not seem to have room for a real (ontological) historical propitiatory intercession of 
the ascended Christ in heaven nor His previous intercessory activities on earth, and this 
seems to be contrary to the intended conception of the functional model, even though the 
principles of reality of the functional model were not adjusted to ontologically support 
this conception. Still, the ontological model did realize the need to formulate a more 
dynamic view of God and His heavenly realm that would be distinct from the timeless-
spaceless paradigm of classical theism. Despite its notion of simultaneity, which arguably 
                                                
356 For McCormack, the notion of “eucharistic feeding” in Protestant theology is an ontological 
“residual Catholic content” that the Reformers inherited, that is not aligned with the implicit ontology 
embedded in the idea of forensic justification. McCormack, “What’s at Stake in Current Debates over 




did not seem to have moved the model far from this classical paradigm, the ontological 
model does offer significant resources for its intended dynamic view, such as the 
monistic conception of humanity and a relational notion of space-time.  
These remarks reveal that a comparison of the theological account of Christ’s 
priesthood with the ontological assumptions related to Christ (macro-hermeneutical 
principles of reality) provides a fruitful hermeneutical reflection on doctrine, especially 
when the work of Christ is put together with the doctrine of God. While the theological 
language about the work of Christ seems to be more aligned with sequentiality 
(temporality), the ontological assumptions that permeate the doctrine of God are closer to 
non-sequentiality (timelessness) in the models. The situation seems ontologically 
problematic particularly when the heavenly work of Christ is considered, as His 
intercessory role takes place in the divine realm and is related to God. This ontological 
difficulty (from a logical standpoint) in a model does not necessarily invalidate the 
positive contribution of the model for our understanding of Christ’s priesthood. However, 
because of this difficulty, the doctrine of this priesthood in such a model tends to lack 
systematic force in Christian theology. 
Taking this ontological difficulty into account, the disagreements observed in the 
models reveal different attempts in which the sequentiality (temporality) implied in the 
language about Christ’s heavenly work is articulated with a non-sequential (timeless) 
view of God, especially when modern logical adjustments in the sacramental (when 
O’Collins is compared with Aquinas) and in the ontological (when compared with the 
functional model) are acknowledged, as indicated in the previous paragraphs. In fact, 




different degrees. In a smaller degree, in the sacramental model, Aquinas’ conception of 
divine propitiation in the theological account of Christ’s priesthood would be a pointer to 
sequentiality in divine ontology, but this was adjusted by O’Collins’s rejection of 
propititiation. In the functional model, pointers to temporality are found both in the 
sequentiality of functions in the theological account of Christ’s priesthood and in the 
ontological assumptions of His divinity becoming able to experience passibility (Luther) 
and of His humanity being physically/spatially present in heaven (Calvin). Lastly, 
pointers toward temporality in the ontological model are somehow evident in the 
intention to reformulate the interpretation of macro-hermeneutical principles of reality 
from a spatio-temporal perspective, which include the doctrine of God, heaven, a 
monistic view of humanity, and a relational conception of space-time.  
This hermeneutical comparison of the sacramental, functional, and ontological 
models seems to warrant a constructive work that learns from the logic of their 
disagreements, reformulations, and implications, and also interprets the pointers toward 
sequentiality (temporality) in these models as a motivation to articulate a more dynamic 
view of the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality, seeking a higher degree of 
ontological coherence between the priestly work in heaven and the doctrine of God. In 
fact, this is the hermeneutical motivation behind the endeavors of the next chapter, in 
which I will attempt to outline an alternative model that intends to be informed by a 
reading of Hebrews (arguably the primary scriptural source for any model of Christ’s 
priesthood in Christian theology) regarding not only the theological account of this 









THE HISTORICAL MODEL: AN ALTERNATIVE 
SYSTEMATIC ARTICULATION OF CHRIST’S 
PRIESTHOOD BASED ON HEBREWS 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I described three theological models of Christ’s 
priesthood (sacramental, functional, and ontological models) from a systematic 
perspective, indicating the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality or ontological 
presuppositions assumed by each model. As far as these three models are concerned, 
chapter 2 focused on the priesthood of Christ (need, agent, actions, and goal), whereas 
chapter 3 concentrated on the priesthood of Christ (divinity, humanity, and cosmology). 
From a systematic and hermeneutical standpoint, these two chapters offered an outline of 
major theological articulations of the doctrine of Christ’s priesthood in Christian 
theology, and demonstrated how ontological assumptions inform them.  
As the next step in this study, I move now from models in Christian theology to a 
systematic interaction with Scripture, more specifically with the epistle to the Hebrews, 
which is the main source for an understanding of Christ’s priesthood.1 I acknowledge, 
however, that the sacramental, functional, and ontological models also interact with 
                                                
1 I have indicated the reasons for selecting Hebrews as the main source of the doctrine of Christ’s 
priesthood in the introduction of the second chapter and also in the explanation of the third step of this 




Hebrews,2 and Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin even have commentaries on this epistle.3 An 
engagement with the reading of Hebrews in each model goes beyond the scope of this 
research, as this dissertation focuses on a systematic articulation of basic conceptual 
components of Christ’s priesthood and its macro-hermeneutical principles of reality. 
Because biblical commentaries are organized textually/verse-by-verse rather than 
thematically/conceptually, chapters 2 and 3 privileged systematic expositions of the 
representatives of each model instead of the biblical commentaries that some of them 
have. In fact, one of the contributions of the present chapter is the systematic focus in the 
reading of Hebrews. 
For the systematic interests of this dissertation, the present chapter heuristically 
benefits from chapters 2 and 3, as they made us aware of key ideas and presuppositions 
employed in Christian theology for a systematic interpretation of Christ’s priesthood. 
Such awareness can assist a theological reflection based on Hebrews in two interrelated 
ways: (1) it helps the researcher not to adopt (as far as possible) ideas or presuppositions 
unconsciously or uncritically in this constructive study of Christ’s priesthood, and (2) it 
triggers important systematic questions that the researcher may bring to the study, 
making this biblical reflection more relevant for a dialogue in Christian theology 
regarding core issues in the systematic understanding of Christ’s priesthood. 
                                                
2 In chapters 2 and 3, I have mentioned references to Hebrews in the theological articulation of the 
sacramental (see pages 47n62, 49n71, 52n85, 55n94, 59n105, 164n85), functional (see pages 77n162-164, 
78n171, 81n183, 182n132), and ontological (see pages 108, 115n299, 236n299, 239n313, 239-240, 
240n318) models. 
3 For helpful introductions to Christology in the commentaries of Hebrews by Aquinas, Luther, 
and Calvin, see Jon C. Laansma and Daniel J. Treier, eds. Christology, Hermeneutics and Hebrews: 




In order to facilitate the comparison with the models outlined in the previous 
chapters, and also to help me systematically organize an alternative/constructive proposal 
of Christ’s priesthood, I will use the same formal structure employed in chapters 2 and 3. 
Therefore, the present chapter begins with a treatment of the priesthood of Christ 
(components: need, agent, actions, and goal) and moves to a description of the macro-
hermeneutical principles of reality, the priesthood of Christ (components: divinity, 
humanity, and cosmology), and their implications for the understanding of His 
priesthood. Considering the systematic interests of this research, the style of the 
discussion of each component mentioned above is not exegetical. This approach does not 
deny the fact that exegesis is essential for a proper theological reflection of Christ’s 
priesthood in Hebrews. Rather, the style attempts to convey a clear and concise 
articulation of the basic ideas of the model. In order to scripturally support this 
conceptual construction, general statements in the text are backed up by exegetical notes 
or references in the footnotes. In the process of my research, these general statements are, 
in fact, conclusions that I have drawn after the exegetical investigation that is 
summarized in the footnotes. Another background information that informed my 
conceptual articulation below is found in the Appendix, where I describe the terminology 
for Christ’s priesthood in the context of the structure of Hebrews.  
For the sake of convenience, I label the constructive proposal of this chapter 
historical model. As it will become evident later, this label highlights a significant aspect 
of Christ’s priesthood in Hebrews, namely, the sequence of events and actions that 
contextualize or characterize His priesthood in heaven.  




components of Christ’s priesthood in this chapter with an account of the need of His 
priesthood. 
The Priesthood of Christ:4                                
Components of His Priesthood  
As it will become evident in the discussion below, the present study 
acknowledges that Hebrews elaborates on Christ’s priesthood focusing on a soteriological 
perspective. According to this focus, His priesthood is basically understood as a 
mediatorial role centered on the resolution of the sin problem.5 Hence, while recognizing 
                                                
4 Two significant studies on the notion of Christ’s priesthood in Hebrews are McKelvey, Pioneer 
and Priest; Vanhoye, Old Testament Priests and the New Priest, 67-238. I will refer to these studies in the 
discussion below in the footnotes. See also Keijo Nissilä, Das Hohepriestermotiv Im Hebräerbrief: Eine 
Exegetische Untersuchung (Helsinki: Oy Liiton Kirjapaino, 1979). For further studies on the priesthood of 
Christ in Hebrews, see footnote 7 in chapter 2. Considering the doctrinal focus of the present research, I 
will concentrate on the teaching of this priesthood as presented in Hebrews. A comparison between this 
motif in Hebrews with conceptual frameworks related to priesthood in the time when the epistle was 
written, as Manson attempts to explore in ‘You Are a Priest Forever,’ is beyond the scope of this research. 
5 A potential argument that could minimize this focus is the contention that in Hebrews Christ is 
(high) priest forever (5:6; 6:20 [high priest]; 7:17, 21, 24), which seems to imply that His priesthood will be 
still in place after the resolution of the sin problem. This implication could mean that Christ’s priesthood is 
not merely soteriological but is an active mediation even in the world without sin. While a full account of 
the mediation of Christ that could adequately evaluate this argument goes beyond the scope of the present 
study, I do not think that this argument is able to minimize the view that Hebrews focuses on a 
soteriological perspective of the priesthood of Christ. My conclusion here is supported by two points 
emphasized in Heb 7, which is the chapter that explains in what sense Christ is priest forever (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα) 
according to the order of Melchizedek, a principle derived from Ps 110:4 and already enunciated in 5:6 and 
6:20. First, the conceptual focus of εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα is on the person of the priest, and not on the performance 
of the priestly role. In other words, the emphasis is not on the fact that Christ performs His priesthood 
forever, but that He is a priest forever. This focus on the person of the priest is spelled out in terms of an 
endless life (7:3, 16, 24). In this sense, Christ is a priest forever because He lives forever. According to this 
line of thought, Christ will not cease to be a priest after the resolution of the sin problem. Second, when 
Hebrews elaborates on the implications of Christ as priest forever for His priestly role, the focus is on the 
results or effects of His priestly activity. This focus is particularly evident in 7:24-25. Building on the 
affirmation of 7:24 that Christ “holds his priesthood permanently since he lives forever” (NET), 7:25 
concludes (ὅθεν) that Christ “is able to save completely” (NET, NIV—qualitative meaning of εἰς τὸ 
παντελὲς) or “forever” (NASB—temporal meaning of παντελὲς). The qualitative and temporal meanings of 
παντελὲς (see BDAG, 754) convey the idea that the permanent priesthood of the priest forever (εἰς τὸν 
αἰῶνα) effects a complete salvation forever. In fact, the adjective αἰώνιος is employed elsewhere in Hebrews 
to describe the endless results of Christ’s priestly work: eternal salvation (5:9), eternal redemption (9:12), 
eternal inheritance (9:15), eternal covenant (13:20). Therefore, the language of Christ as priest forever (5:6; 





that Christ’s mediation is not restricted to soteriology,6 the concept of priesthood 
explored here focuses on the resolution of the sin problem. Perhaps, a canonical7 
investigation of Christ’s priesthood would enlarge the concept of priesthood to His 
mediation in general (not only soteriology), but this is a topic for another study.8 
With this clarification briefly given in advance regarding the focus of this 
                                                
13:20) of His permanent priesthood (7:24). My elaboration of these two points ([1] the conceptual focus of 
εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα is on the person of the priest, and [2] the implications of this conceptual focus for Christ’s 
priestly role emphasize the endless results of His priestly activity) shows that the forever language for the 
priesthood of Christ is compatible with the soteriological perspective of His priesthood, and not against that 
perspective. The elaboration, however, and does not automatically rule out a potential interpretation of a 
non-soteriological mediatorial role of Christ’s priesthood after the resolution of the sin problem, if this 
notion is uncovered by a future canonical study of this theme in connection with the references in Hebrews 
to Christ as (high) priest forever. It is noteworthy that a discussion about the meaning of the eternity of 
Christ’s priesthood is found in the sacramental model (see above The Goal of the Priesthood in The 
Sacramental Model, chapter 2), where Aquinas interprets this eternity in terms of the eternal effects of His 
priesthood and O’Collins construes this eternity in reference to the endless mediation of Christ’s humanity. 
Just as my remarks on Heb 7 in this footnote are not aligned with the ontological contours of what Aquinas 
specifies as the eternal effects of Christ’s priesthood, I am not suggesting that a potential broader 
interpretation of the role of His priesthood (going beyond soteriology) is necessarily aligned with the 
ontological articulation of what O’Collins specifies as the eternal mediation of Christ. 
6 See my remarks on the mediatorial role of Christ in creation, salvation, and revelation in The 
Agent of the Priesthood below. 
7 I have indicated in footnote 3 above why the notion of Christ as priest forever in Hebrews per se 
is not enough to substantiate a broad conception of Christ’s priesthood, in which He would perform a non-
soteriological priestly mediatorial activity after the resolution of the sin problem. Rather, this conception of 
priesthood needs to be grounded elsewhere in Scripture and, then, connected with Christ as priest forever in 
Hebrews. 
8 My openness to this possibility has been motivated by my interaction with Richard Davidson’s 
ideas. I explain in Recommendations for Further Research (chap. 6), the basic canonical notions that might 
have the potential to generate a broad conception of priesthood that is not distinct from all forms of Christ’s 
mediatorial activity, including His mediation in the world before and after sin. While the details are found 
in chap. 6, I outline here the main points: (1) the notion of priesthood seems to be present in the Bible in a 
world before (e.g., priestly language is used for the work assigned to man in Eden) and after (in Revelation, 
the saved will be priests) sin; (2) Prov 8 appears to indicate that Christ was installed as the divine mediator 
between a transcendent God and finite creatures, and a potential parallel between both Prov 8 and Hebrews 
with Ps 2 could suggest that Christ’s royal priestly mediation in Hebrews would constitute not only the 
salvation of human beings but also the full recovery (after the resolution of the sin problem) of Christ’s 
royal mediation at the beginning of creation. These two points, however, are only potential hints of a broad 
conception of Christ’s priesthood. Indeed, the first point is not Christological, but only shows that the 
language of priesthood is not restricted to soteriology. Further research is needed to potentially substantiate 





research on the soteriological perspective of the concept of Christ’s priesthood, as one 
aspect of His broader mediation, I move to the discussion of the first conceptual 
component of His priesthood, namely, the need for Christ’s priesthood. 
The Need for Christ’s Priesthood 
The need for Christ’s priesthood in Hebrews centers on the problem of sin. The 
idea that sin requires priestly work is evident in the first allusion to Christ’s priesthood 
(1:3), where sins demand purification or cleansing (noun καθαρισµός),9 and is more 
explicit in the priestly expiation (verb ἱλάσκοµαι10) of sins (2:17) and the priestly offering 
of sacrifice for sins (5:1).11 Therefore, the notion of cleansing sins12 and the nature of 
sin13 in Hebrews14 are helpful windows for understanding the sin problem and, 
                                                
9 For McKelvey, 1:3 introduces the priesthood of Christ in Hebrews. McKelvey, Pioneer and 
Priest, 35. According to Attridge, “although the terminology of high priest and explicit reference to the 
cross are absent here, an essential feature of Christ’s priestly work is adumbrated in this phrase.” Harold W. 
Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, Hermeneia 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989), 45. See also Luke Timothy Johnson, Hebrews: A Commentary, NTL 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), 71; William L. Lane, Hebrews 1-8, WBC (Dallas: 
Thomas Nelson, 1991), 15. 
10 See BDAG, 473-474. While some translations opt for propitiation (see, e.g., ESV, NASB), NJB 
and RSV render this verb as expiate, and others prefer the term “atonement” (see NIV, NET, NRSV). 
11 See also 7:27; 9:26. 
12 See the idea of purification also in 9:14, 22-23; 10:2, 22. In his remarks of the purification of 
sins in 1:3, Ellingworth indicates that “Hebrews sees sins and their remedy in cultic terms.” Paul 
Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids, MI; 
Carlisle, England: Eerdmans; Paternoster, 1993), 102. Attridge explains that “(καθαρισµός) is relatively rare 
in the New Testament as a designation for Christ’s atoning sacrifice, appearing only here and at 2 Pet 1:9. 
The term is common for cultic purification in the LXX and in the New Testament.” Attridge, The Epistle to 
the Hebrews, 46. 
13 In his discussion of sin in Hebrews, Ellingworth points out that “Hebrews uses ἁµαρτία in the 
singular (3:13; 4:15; 9:26, 28; 10:6, 8 = Ps. 40:8; Heb. 10:18; 11:25; 12:1, 4), but more often in the plural 
(1:3; 2:17; 5:1, 3; 7:27; 8:12 = Je. 31:34; Heb. 10:2, 3, 4, 11, 12, 17 = Je. 31:34; Heb. 10:26), without 
discernible difference of meaning, except that the plural by definition is not used of the fundamental state 
of sin.” Moreover, “Hebrews, like Paul, tends to speak of sin(s) in absolute terms, for example, without a 
possessive pronoun (exceptions 7:27; 8:12 = Je. 31:34; 9:28; 1 Cor. 15:3, 17; Gal. 1:4; Eph. 1:2; 1 Thes. 





consequently, the need for Christ’s priesthood.15 
The sin problem seems to impact (1) the relationship of human beings with God, 
(2) human beings themselves, and (3) creation at a cosmic level (heavenly things).  
The Relationship of Sinful Human  
Beings with God 
The idea that sin breaks the relationship of human beings with God is implied in 
the concept that Christ enables believers to draw near to God in His continuous priestly 
intercession (7:25),16 as this concept assumes that human beings are previously distant 
                                                
(13:4f.), Hebrews says little about individual sins, and contains no list of vices comparable to Rom. 1:29–
31; Gal. 5:19–21; or 1 Pet. 4:3. The fundamental sin for Hebrews is that of unfaithfulness to God, which 
may superficially appear as neglect or lassitude (ἀµελήσαντες, 2:3; νωθροί, 5:11), but which in essence is 
rebellion against God’s will, and more specifically apostasy (2:1–4; 3:7–19; 6:4–6; 10:26–31).” 
Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 102. For a study on sin in Hebrews, see Hermut Löhr, Umkehr 
Und Sünde Im Hebräerbrief, Beihefte Zur Zeitschrift Für Die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft Und Die 
Kunde Der Älteren Kirche (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994), 11-135. See also Udo Schnelle, Theology of the New 
Testament, trans. M. Eugene Boring (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 641-642.  
14 The topic of sin is more emphatically explored in sections of exhortation (2:1-4; 3:7–4:13; 6:4-
8; 10:26-31). Most of these passages are part of the so-called “warning passages in Hebrews (Heb. 2.1-4; 
3.7–4.13; 5.11–6.12; 10.19-39; 12.1-29).” B. J. Oropeza, “The Warning Passages in Hebrews: Revised 
Theologies and New Methods of Interpretation,” Currents in Biblical Research 10, no. 1 (2011): 81.  
15 Hebrews strongly emphasizes that the sin problem is not adequately solved by the Aaronic 
priesthood. The exposition of the superior appointment and offering of the Son as high priest (5:1-10; 7:1-
28; 8:3–10:18) highlights the limitations of the Aaronic priesthood. An important limitation was that the 
animal sacrifices offered by these priests could not take away the sins of the people (10:4, 11). This 
explains why they were constantly repeated (10:2, 3, 11). The multiplicity of sacrifices attests the 
ineffectiveness of the Aaronic priesthood. In this way, this priesthood could not bring perfection (τελείωσις, 
τελειόω) (7:11, 19; 9:9; 10:1) to the people. Due to “its weakness (ἀσθενής) and uselessness” (7:18), that 
priesthood needs to be replaced by a new priesthood (see 7:12, 18; 8:7). The underlying assumption of this 
argument of replacement is that the Aaronic priesthood does not constitute the reality of the priestly work. 
It has a shadow (σκιά) of the good things to be done by the real priesthood, but it is not the form of these 
things (τὴν εἰκόνα τῶν πραγµάτων) (10:1). The earthly sanctuary, and by implication its priesthood, is an 
antitype (ἀντίτυπος) (9:24), a sketch (ὑπόδειγµα) of the heavenly realities (τῶν ἐπουρανίων) (8:5). Hence, 
the Aaronic priesthood does not need to be replaced because it is a fallacy. Rather, the earthly sanctuary, 
and by implication its priesthood, was intended by God (see 8:5). As a shadow, the Aaronic priesthood was 
a limited anticipation of the coming reality of Christ’s priesthood. It is the reality of His priesthood that 
puts away sin on the basis of His sacrifice (9:26), as Christ bore (verb ἀναφέρω) the sins of many (9:28). 
Therefore, the reality of His priesthood sanctifies and perfects (verb τελειόω) believers (10:14). 





from God.17 The negative impact of sin on this relationship is described in terms of a 
broken covenant. Christ’s mediation of a new/better covenant (8:6; 9:15; 12:24; see also 
7:22; 10:29; 13:20) is necessary because a previous covenant was broken (8:9; 9:15),18 
which implies a transgression of the divine law19 as expressed formally in the 
Decalogue.20 As a matter of fact, the ark of the covenant in the Most Holy Place of the 
                                                
(expressed by δι’ αὐτοῦ), draw near (verb προσέρχοµαι), intercession (described by the verb ἐντυγχάνω). See 
the idea of drawing near also in 7:19 (verb ἐγγίζω); 10:22 (verb προσέρχοµαι). 
17 The sins of the people are mentioned in 7:27, which are the reason of Christ’s once for all 
offering. 
18 While in 8:9 the breaking of the covenant is depicted as someone not continuing in it, 9:15 
speaks of “transgressions (παραβάσεων) commited under the first covenant.” Unless otherwise indicated, all 
Bible references in English are from ESV. 
19 There are at least four arguments for the interpretation of these transgressions as the breaking of 
the divine law: (1) elsewhere in the NT, the term παράβασις is explicitly used for breaking the law (see 
Rom 2:23; 4:15); (2) in the promise of the new covenant in Heb 10:16-17, the sins of the first covenant are 
described as “lawless deeds” (ἀνοµιῶν), and 1 John 3:4 employs ἀνοµία to define sin: “sin is lawlessness” (ἡ 
ἁµαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνοµία); (3) the reference to the inauguration (expressed by the verb ἐγκαινίζω, which 
conveys in this context the meaning of “ratify, inaugurate, dedicate,” BDAG, 272) of the first covenant 
included Moses’ proclamation of “every commandment of the law” (πάσης ἐντολῆς κατὰ τὸν νόµον) (9:18-
19); and (4) in the sanctuary of the first covenant, the ark of the covenant in the Most Holy Place contained 
the tablets of the covenant (9:1, 3-4), which gives to the Decalogue a special place in the context of the 
priestly work in the sanctuary. Regarding point 3, scholars agree that this is a reference to Exod 24:3-8 
(especially vv. 3 and 7). See Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 257; Gareth Lee Cockerill, The Epistle 
to the Hebrews, NICNT (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, U.K.: Eerdmans, 2012), 408; Ellingworth, The 
Epistle to the Hebrews, 467; Johnson, Hebrews, 241; Craig R. Koester, Hebrews: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary, AB 36 (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2001), 426; Lane, Hebrews 
9-13, 244. Assuming that Exod 24 “rounds out the literary complex that began with chapter 19,” Nahum 
Sarna argues that chap. 24 describes initially “an elaborate rite of ratification . . . after which Moses is 
called upon to ascend Mount Sinai in order to receive the tangible, permanent symbol of the covenant: the 
two stone tablets into which the Decalogue is incised.” Nahum M. Sarna, Exodus: The Traditional Hebrew 
Text with the New JPS Translation, The JPS Torah Commentary (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication 
Society, 1991), 150. 
20 The reference to commandment in 7:18 does not diminish the importance of the Decalogue. 
Even though the noun qualified by the adjectives ἀσθενὲς and ἀνωφελές (uselessness) is ἐντολή 
(commandment) in 7:18, this is a reference to the Aaronic priesthood. In chapter 7, ἐντολή and νόµος 
(law)—which are associated in vv. 5, 16—are the entity that establishes and regulates the Aaronic 
priesthood (7:5, 12, 16, 19, 28; see also 8:4; 9:22; 10:1, 8). In fact, the law appoints high priests (7:28) and 
a change of priesthood implies a change of the law (7:12). Therefore, the use of ἐντολή and νόµος in this 
context refer to the Aaronic priesthood. In his remarks about the law in Hebrews, Schenck stipulates that 
“the principal concern of the author so far as the Law is concerned is its sacrificial system and its priests.” 





earthly sanctuary contained the tablets of the covenant (9:1, 3-4). This seems to indicate 
that the priestly work is performed with reference to the Decalogue, in the sense that the 
priestly activities amend the broken relationship between human beings and God caused 
by the human transgressions of His law. 
This picture of transgression explains the human need for forgiveness. In the 
promise of a new covenant, God reveals His willingness to forgive (ἄφεσις21) and not 
remember the sins and lawlesness (10:16-18).22 In both occurrences of ἄφεσις in 
Hebrews, forgiveness takes place in the priestly context of sacrificial offering (see 10:18; 
                                                
of διαθήκη (covenant) refers to priesthood in 8:6-7 and also in 7:22; 9:4, 15. In chapter 9, the first covenant 
is described by the earthly sanctuary (9:1-5) and the service of Aaronic priests (9:6-10). On the other hand, 
the better and new covenant has Christ as its mediator (7:22; 8:6; 9:15). In these three references to the 
better/new covenant, the context of this mediation is His priesthood (see 7:21; 8:1-2, 4; 9:11-14). In this 
sense, the idea of a replacement of covenants (8:7) means a replacement of priesthood. 
21 BDAG presents a twofold meaning of this word: (1) “the act of freeing and liberating from 
someth. that confines, release fr. captivity” and (2) “the act of freeing from an obligation, guilt, or 
punishment, pardon, cancellation.” The occurrences of this term in Heb 9:22; 10:18 appear under the 
second meaning. BDAG, 155. According to Louw and Nida, “the focus of the meaning” of this word “is 
upon the guilt of the wrongdoer and not upon the wrongdoing itself. The event of wrongdoing is not 
undone, but the guilt resulting from such an event is pardoned. To forgive, therefore, means essentially to 
remove the guilt resulting from wrongdoing.” L&N §40.8. William Johnsson provides a helpful discussion 
about the meaning of ἄφεσις in Hebrews. Concisely, he argues that ἄφεσις describes a “‘definite putting 
away’ or ‘decisive purgation.’” Given the association of ἄφεσις with καθαρίζω in 9:22-23, Johnsson 
compares these two terms by indicating that the latter refers more generally to purgation, while the former 
is a more specific reference to purgation, namely, “a purgation with finality.” He points out that the 
argument of 9:22 is the following: “‘Whereas, according to the law, almost everything was purged in blood 
[but not everything; there were exceptions], for definitive putting away of defilement there must be blood 
applied.’” Furthermore, Johnsson compares ἄφεσις with τελείωσις, affirming that while the latter 
“(‘perfection,’ incorporation) has the ‘subjetive’ benefits of Christ’s blood in view (access to God with the 
συνείδησις purged once for all), ἄφεσις is a broader term, encompassing as well the ‘objective’ benefits of 
that blood. Thus, the following verse” (9:23) “proceeds with οὖν—‘therefore’—to talk about the purgation 
of the heavenly things.” William G. Johnsson, “Defilement and Purgation in the Book of Hebrews,” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1973), 326, 328. Whereas I find all this discussion of ἄφεσις in 
Hebrews very helpful, it is unclear to me why Johnsson rejects a conceptual association of ἄφεσις, and even 
of the work of Christ as whole in Hebrews, with the notion of sin as a broken relationship between human 
beings and God (see ibid., 325). 
22 I indicate here the Greek language in 10:16-18 for the following concepts in this statement: not 




9:22), which seems to indicate that priestly mediation is necessary for divine forgiveness.  
Conversely, when there is no divine forgiveness, the end result is divine judgment 
and punishment of sinful human beings. For example, in the exhortations of Hebrews, 
there are at least three instances where this result is indicated (2:1-423; 3:7-4:1324; 10:26-
3125). The general picture of sin as apostasy in these exhortations depicts a refusal of 
salvation (2:3) and of the sacrificial blood of Christ by people who had already been 
benefited by it (10:29). Thus, His priesthood does not solve the sin problem of those who 
                                                
23 This exhortation assumes that transgression (παράβασις) and disobedience (παρακοή) receive a 
just divine retribution or punishment (noun µισθαποδοσία) (2:2). In opposition to this attitude of refusal, the 
author of Hebrews exhorts the audience to not neglect (verb ἀµελέω) the salvation spoken by the Lord (2:3; 
see also 2:1; 12:25). 
24 This exhortation warns against a hardening of the heart when the divine voice is heard (Heb 3:7-
8, 15; 4:7). On the basis of Ps 95:7-11, in light of the rebellion of Num 13-14, this hardening takes the form 
of the following attitudes against God: rebellion (παραπικρασµός, verb παραπικραίνω) (3:8, 15-16), testing 
(verb πειράζω, δοκιµασία) (3:8-9), always going astray (verb πλανάω) in the heart or being deluded (3:10) 
having an evil heart of unbelief (ἀπιστία) (3:12; see also 3:19), and disobedience (verb ἀπειθέω, ἀπείθεια) 
(3:18; 4:11). Because of that, God is provoked or offended (verb προσοχθίζω) (3:10, 17). In His wrath 
(ὀργή), God gives a retribution or punishment for this sinful condition and action (3:11; 4:3). With this idea 
of divine judgment in view, we must render an account of ourselves to God (4:13), an account that includes 
even “the thoughts and intentions of the heart” (4:12). For a more nuanced interpretation of 4:13, 
conveying the idea of “a word we must give in response to the word heard,” see Gene R. Smillie, “‘The 
Other Λογος’ at the End of Heb 4:13,” Novum Testamentum 47, no. 1 (2005): 23. For the use of Ps 95:7-11 
in light of the rebellion of Num 13-14, see Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 114; Ellingworth, The 
Epistle to the Hebrews, 212-214; Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 153; Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 84. 
25 Intensifying the discussion on the neglect of salvation and the divine judgment (see also 6:4-8), 
the exhortation of 10:26-31 focuses on a situation of continuous deliberate (ἑκουσίως) sin (10:26), where a 
former informed (10:26, “after receiving the knowledge of the truth”) and sanctified believer rejects Christ 
and His sacrificial blood (10:29). In 10:26, “Ἁµαρτανόντων ἡµῶν: the present participle suggests continuous 
sin.” Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 532. “The present tense of the participle [ἁµαρτανόντων] 
suggests that the sin involved is not a single act, but a continuing rejection of Christ.” Attridge, The Epistle 
to the Hebrews, 292. The language of continuous sinning appears in ESV, NASB, NIV, NET, and NRSV. 
Furthermore, Attridge indicates that the “the adverb ‘willingly’ (ἑκουσίως) appears emphatically as the 
opening word.” He suggests that this “language derives from the Pentateuchal distinction between willful 
or high-handed and inadvertent sins that was widely recognized in post-biblical Judaism. As the sequel 
indicates, our author has in mind a specific willful sin, that of apostasy.” Ibid. See also Ellingworth, The 
Epistle to the Hebrews, 592. The exhortation of 10:26-27 concludes that, in this situation, “there no longer 
remains a sacrifice for sins, but a fearful expectation of judgment” (κρίσις). Such judgment is described as 
punishment (τιµωρία) (10:29), a divine vengeance (ἐκδίκησις) (10:30) or fiery zeal (ζῆλος) (10:27) that 




eventually reject Him, even though the benefits of this priesthood were initially effective 
in their life. When this is the case, it is God’s judgment that solves the sin problem by 
destroying that people.26 Therefore, in the context of the broken relationship of human 
beings with God, either the priesthood of Christ solves the sin problem by mediating 
divine forgiveness for repented human beings or they will face God’s destructive 
judgment.27  
Sin and Human Beings 
The second aspect impacted by the sin problem are the human beings themselves. 
In this case, Christ’s priesthood is necessary to deal with their guilty conscience and their 
weakness with temptation/trial. While the guilty conscience appears to be related to the 
broken relationship with God, described by the breaking of His law, the weakness seems 
to refer to the ontological or moral28 constitution of sinful human beings.29 Regarding the 
                                                
26 The idea of real apostasy seems to invalidate the notion of universalism (everyone is benefited 
by Christ’s salvific priesthood) and the classical concept of predestination (those predestined to damnation 
cannot be benefited by Christ’s salvific priesthood at all). The concept of apostasy in Hebrews is debated 
among Calvinists (“the ones who are in danger of apostasy in Hebrews are not elect or ‘genuine’ 
believers”) and Arminians (there is “a real possibility that believers can abandon salvation”). For a helpful 
overview of different contemporary interpretations of the warning passages in Hebrews, see Oropeza, “The 
Warning Passages in Hebrews,” 81-100. For a history of the interpretation of these passages, see C. Adrian 
Thomas, A Case for Mixed-Audience with Reference to the Warning Passages in the Book of Hebrews 
(New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 25-96. While I agree with Oropeza that Calvinist-Arminian debates were 
not part of the immediate audience of Hebrews (see Oropeza, “The Warning Passages in Hebrews,” 83.), I 
would argue that Hebrews must be studied to inform this debate. In the Calvinist-Arminian debate, three 
basic positions may be outlined: (1) believers can really apostatize (Arminian view), (2) apostates were 
never genuine believers (Reformed view), and (3) Hebrews warns about physical punishment and not 
absolute apostasy (Moderate Reformed view). See Herbert W. Bateman, Four Views on the Warning 
Passages in Hebrews (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2007). The prominent place of apostasy in Hebrews is 
highlighted by George Rice, who suggests that this concept is fundamental for the structure of the epistle. 
See George E. Rice, “Apostasy as a Motif and Its Effect on the Structure of Hebrews,” AUSS 23, no. 1 
(1985): 29-35. 
27 As explained above, God’s destructive judgment is preceded by His call to salvation. Only when 
this call is rejected, people put themselves in a position to face God’s destructive judgment. 





guilty conscience, the connection between divine forgiveness and the human conscience 
is established by the association of forgiveness and purification/cleansing (9:22),30 and 
the conception of purification as eliminating the consciousness of sins (10:2). The 
consciousness of believers needs to be perfected (9:9), purified/cleansed from dead works 
(9:14), and the heart sprinkled/cleansed from an evil consicence (10:22).31 This language 
of consciousness appears to imply a feeling of guilt.32 According to this perspective, the 
purification of sins involves the elimination of a guilty conscience that was aware of the 
breaking of the divine law.  
                                                
them synonymously, in a general way. 
29 Even though I looked for potential hints in Hebrews to identify an OT background that could 
further substantiate this point in light of LXX language, this conclusion about the concept of weakness 
derives from my reflection of Hebrews itself, as exposed below. However, from a canonical perspective, 
the citation of Isa 53:4 in Matt 8:17 is significant. While ἀσθένεια (weakness, illness) is used in Matthew to 
describe the Christological fulfillment of Isa 53 (“He took our illnesses and bore our diseases,” italics 
mine), this Greek term is not employed in the LXX. Rather, the language of Matthew is closer to the MT, 
focusing on the idea of sickness (ֳחִלי). See Craig L. Blomberg, “Matthew,” in Commentary on the New 
Testament Use of the Old Testament, ed. G. K. Beale and D. A. Carson (Grand Rapids, MI; Nottingham: 
Baker Academic; Apollos, 2007), 32. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the word in the LXX is ἁµαρτία. In 
fact, Isa 53:4-5 MT associates the concepts of sickness (v. 4) and sins (v. 5), as v. 5 employs the 
terminology of sin (ֶּפַׁשע and ָעֹון). This association is also evident when we compare ἁµαρτία in Isa 53:4 
LXX with ἀσθένεια in the citation of the MT version in Matt 8:17. 
30 I indicate here the Greek language in 9:22 for the following concepts in this statement: 
forgiveness (ἄφεσις), purification (καθαρίζω). 
31 I indicate here the Greek language in 9:9, 14 and 10:22 for the following concepts in this 
statement: perfected (verb τελειόω), purified/cleansed (verb καθαρίζω), sprinkled/cleansed (verb ῥαντίζω), 
evil consicence (συνειδήσεως πονηρᾶς). 
32 This idea is reflected in the NIV rendition of 10:2 (“felt guilty”) and 22 (“guilty consicence”). In 
his remarks on 10:22, Lane translates συνειδήσεως πονηρᾶς as “burdened conscience,” in the sense of a 
“barrier of a smiting conscience” or a “burdened heart.” Lane, Hebrews 9-13, 286. BDAG renders πονηρᾶς 
in this passage as evil or guilty, conveying the idea that “the conscience is not itself intrinsically bad, but 
evil deeds load it with a bad content.” BDAG, 851. For studies on the human conscience in the NT, see C. 
A. Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament (London: SCM Press, 1955); J. Stelzenberger, Syneidesis Im 
Neuen Testament (Paderbron: Schoningh, 1961). While συνείδησις is not a prominent term in the LXX (cf. 
Eccl 10:20; Wis 17:10), the concept of feeling guilty can be observed in several occurrences of the verb 
 in the Torah (Lev 4:13, 22, 27; 5:2-5, 17, 23; Num 5:6; see also Hos 5:15), rendered in these instances אׁשם




With regard to the weakness of sinful human beings, they need mercy (2:17; 
4:16),33 help (2:18), sympathy (4:15), and gentle dealing (5:2), because of their condition 
of sin (2:17), test/temptation (2:18), and weakness (4:15).34 In contrast to Christ, the 
human experience of test/temptation is normally followed by sin (4:15), and this 
weakness requires sacrifice for sins (5:2-3; 7:27-28).35 It seems that this language of 
weakness describes the sinful ontological or moral constitution of human beings in the 
fallen world36 and, assuming that the human experience of test/temptation in this weak 
                                                
33 The term ἐλεήµων (2:17) is a derivative of the vocable ἔλεος (4:16). L&N §88.76-77. 
34 Hebrews also indicates that human beings in need of priesthood are characterized by ignorance 
(5:2; 9:7), which is defined in terms of unintentional sin. Both the vocables ἀγνοέω (5:2) and ἀγνόηµα (9:7) 
describe unintentional sins or sins of ignorance in these passages. BDAG, 13. The reason I have not 
included this point in the list of needs is that it is not clearly connected with the priesthood of Christ, but is 
associated with the Aaronic priesthood. It is possible that Hebrews establishes a contrast between 
unintentional sins (5:2; 9:7) and the deliberate continuous sin that rejects the salvific and sacrificial blood 
of Christ (10:26, 29), with the implication that His priesthood targets only unintentional sins. However, in 
the absence of arguments and passages in Hebrews that confirm this contrast and implication, I am not 
convinced that this is necessarily the case. For helpful information regarding the scholarly debate about the 
distinction of unintentional and intentional sins in the context of the Aaronic priesthood, see Roy Gane, 
Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy (Winona Lake, IN: 
Eisenbrauns, 2005), 202-213; Richard M. Davidson, Song for the Sanctuary: A Graduate Textbook on the 
Biblical Doctrine of the Sanctuary (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, Forthcoming), chap. 
12 (The kind of sin involved). The main difference between Gane and Davidson in their respective 
evaluative dialogues with the literature can be summarized as follows. In Gane’s view, Num 15:22-31 
outlines two extreme categories of sins, namely, (1) unintentional/non-defiant (vv. 24-29) and (2) 
intentional/defiant (vv. 30-31). The former can be expiated, the latter cannot. While the unintentional 
category is mentioned in the purification offering of Lev 4 (vv. 4:2, 22, 27; cf. also 5:15, 18), Lev 5 (vv. 1, 
5-6, 20-26 MT [6:1-6 ESV]) points to an intermediate category of intentional/non-defiant sin, which can be 
expiated. Conversely, in Davidson’s perspective, the roots ׁשגה/ׁשגג, from where the traditional translation 
unintentional sins comes from, convey a broader meaning that describes all non-rebellious sins, both 
intentional and unintentional. Hence, Lev 4 and Num 15 include intentional/non-defiant sins. In short, 
Gane’s position implies two major categories of sin, with a third intermediary category between them: 
unintentional, intentional/non-defiant, and intentional/defiant. On the other hand, Davidson’s view implies 
two categories of sin, where the first one includes two subcategories: non-defiant (intentional and 
unintentional) and defiant. How would these two positions impact the reading of ἀγνοέω (5:2) and ἀγνόηµα 
(9:7) in Hebrews, if the interpretation is informed by the OT background? On the basis of Gane’s position, 
these Greek terms would refer literally to unintentional sins in Hebrew. Conversely, if Davidson’s view is 
assumed, the terms would correspond more broadly to non-defiant (including intentional and unintentional) 
sins in Hebrew. 
35 The language of weakness (ἀσθένεια) in Hebrews appears in 4:15; 5:2; 7:28 and 11:34. 





condition is normally followed by sin, they need expiation. In contrast, the language of 
weakness is not applied to Christ in Hebrews.37 Rather, He was qualified by the 
experience of suffering and test/temptation, meaning that He is able to mercifully help38 
those being tested/tempted in their weaknesses (2:18; 4:15).39 Whereas Hebrews does not 
seem to specify how He helps those being tempted, in light of the general principle taught 
in 1 Cor 10:13 (God provides a way to endure temptation), a canonical interpretation of 
this point would seem to suggest that Christ helps people being tempted by assiting them 
                                                
physical illness conveyed by the vocable ἀσθένεια (see Matt 8:17; Luke 5:15; 8:2; 13:11-12; John 5:5; 11:4; 
Acts 28:9; 1 Tim 5:23) seem to support the idea that human weakness in Hebrews describes the ontological 
constitution of human beings in the fallen world. However, physical illness is not the only meaning of 
ἀσθένεια. BDAG presents three types of meaning conveyed by this Greek term: (1) “a state of debilitating 
illness, sickness, disease”; (2) “incapacity for someth. or experience of limitation, weakness”; (3) “lack of 
confidence or feeling of inadequacy, weakness.” BDAG, 142. The second and the third meanings do not 
necessarily imply ontological limitation. The following passages employ ἀσθένεια to highlight the idea of 
human limitation, but they do seem to imply an ontological sinful constitution of human beings: Rom 6:19; 
8:26; 1 Cor 2:3; 15:43; 2 Cor 11:30; 12:5, 9, 10; 13:4; Gal 4:13. 
37 For instance, 7:28 establishes a contrast between the weakness (ἀσθένεια) of earthly high priests 
and the perfection (expressed by the verb τελειόω) of the Son. 
38 The verb ἐπιλαµβάνοµαι appears in 2:16 and βοηθέω in 2:18. The word group for Help in Louw 
and Nida includes these two verbs. The authors acknowledge that these terms may “possess certain 
contrastive features of meaning, at least of a connotative type, but there is no specific evidence of this in 
NT usage.” L&N §35.1 (see note 2). 
39 I indicate here the Greek language in 2:18 and 4:15 for the following concepts in this statement: 
suffering (πάσχω), test/temptation (πειράζω), able (δύναµαι), weaknesses (ἀσθένεια). With regard to 
πειράζω, BDAG assigns both meanings (test and temptation) to the occurrences of this Greek word in Heb 
2:18. See BDAG, 793. NJB and NRSV opt for test while other translations prefer temptation (see, e.g., 
ESV, NASB, NT, NIV). The concept of Christ’s priestly mercy and sympathy in 2:17 and 4:15 is 
compatible with the general presupposition that high priests are able (δύναµαι) to deal gently (µετριοπαθέω) 
with those who are “ignorant and wayward” (5:2). While Christ shares with earthly (high) priests this 
capability (expressed by the verb δύναµαι) of dealing gently (with mercy and sympathy) with weak human 
beings, the reasons that justify this capability are not the same. The reason for Christ’s capability is His 
experience with test/temptation (πειράζω), which is an experience that He shares with all human beings 
(2:18; 4:14). On the other hand, the reason for the capability of earthly (high) priests is their condition of 
weakness (ἀσθένεια) (5:2; 7:28). This condition seems to involve sin, as 5:3 elaborates on 5:2 by indicating 
that sacrifices for sins are required for both the high priest and the people. On this point, the disparity 
between earthly high priests and Christ is clear. His experience with test/temptation did not involve sin 
(4:15). Furthermore, 7:28 establishes a contrast between the weakness (ἀσθένεια) of earthly high priests and 




to resist temptation. This help, however, does not eliminate the personal struggle against 
sin/unbelief that is expected from a believer (Heb 10:32, 35, 36; 12:1, 4).40 From an 
anthropological reflection based on Heb 4:15; Matt 26:41 and Rom 8:5-7,41 the 
ontological weakness of believers who experience temptation could be described as a 
condition where the mind is unable to sustain a course of action or an attitude in 
accordance to the divine law. This inability is not a result of an evil body hindering the 
guidance of a virtuous mind, but of a struggle between the mind being willing to do the 
will of God (His law) and the lack of fortitude or strength to perform acts in accordance 
with this desire of the mind. According to this view, the idea that Christ helps people to 
resist temptation implies that He is able to give to the human will the necessary strength 
to carry out a course of action or an attitude in accordance to the divine law.  
In short, in a world characterized by the sin problem, human beings have a guilty 
conscience because of the transgressions through which they break their relationship with 
God. Because of their past experience of sinning, they are ontologically weak or prone to 
fall into temptation. The priesthood of Christ is needed in both cases, as it provides 
                                                
40 In Heb 10, the exhortation emphasizes endurance against unbelief (10:35-36, 39). In chap. 12, 
endurance is explicitly opposed to sin (12:1, 4). 
41 While Heb 4:15 establishes the connection between weakness (ἀσθένεια) and temptation 
(expressed by the verb πειράζω), Matt 26:41 (see also Mark 14:38) provides a helpful link between these 
concepts and the notion of flesh (σὰρξ ἀσθενής). In the context of Jesus’ sorrow at Gethsemane, He warns 
His sleepy disciples (including Peter, Matt 26:37) that they should “watch and pray” to “not enter into 
temptation. The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak” (Matt 26:41). The narrative indicates that, 
instead of opposing immaterial (spirit) and material (flesh) anthropological entities in one person, Jesus 
seems to suggest that the mind is conflicted, thinking in two opposing directions. Without divine help, 
conceptualized here in terms of prayer, weak human beings are not able to follow God’s will, even when 
they have good intentions. The experience of Peter illustrates this principle. While he strongly affirmed his 
loyalty to Jesus (vv. 33, 35), his words did not confirm this loyalty when he was tested (vv. 69-75). The 
notion that the anthropological conflict takes place in the mind is highlighted by Jesus’ warning about the 
necessity of watching and praying, as these are primarily mental actions by which believers attempt to 





forgiveness/purification of sins and also assists believers to resist temptation. 
Sin and Creation at a Cosmic Level 
The last point regarding the impact of the sin problem refers to creation at a 
cosmic level—heavenly things (τὰ ἐπουράνια) (9:23). In the sections below, I will explore 
the ontological meaning of heavenly things (section on Cosmology) and what their 
purification probably means (section The Goal of the Priesthood). For now it will suffice 
to say that according to my conclusions in these two sections the heavenly things describe 
the existence of a sanctuary in heaven and that this sanctuary where Christ ministers for 
our salvation needs to be purified from sin.42 As far as the need for Christ’s priesthood is 
                                                
to the flesh and the life according to the spirit in terms of setting the mind (φρονέω) and mindset (φρόνηµα). 
42 Ellingworth summarizes the scholarly debate regardind the meaning of the purification of the 
heavenly things in Heb 9:23 in eight main interpretations: “(1) A sacrifice is offered in advance, as a kind 
of ‘immunisation’ (Spicq), to prevent the heavenly sanctuary from becoming defiled when sinners enter it 
(Riggenbach). (2) The fall has contaminated even the heavenly sanctuary. Spicq describes this view as 
‘nonsense’; it is, however, defended by Lane. It certainly has no point of contact with the context, though, 
as Michel remarks, the author may have known more than he expressed. (3) The heavenly sanctuary 
requires to be purified by the destruction of Satan, or more generally of supernatural powers of evil 
(Aquinas; tentatively Bleek; Héring; Michel). This is different from the picture in 2:14, and still more in 
Col. 1:20, which speaks of the reconciliation of supernatural powers. (4) The idea that ‘the heavenlies’ are 
the people of God or the Church militant (Luther, F. F. Bruce, Montefiore) has little contact with the 
context (except possibly ὑπὲρ ἡµῶν, v. 24), is difficult also in 8:5, and is often supported by reference to 
texts outside Hebrews, such as Eph. 2:22; 1 Pet. 2:5. It is true that Hebrews speaks of Christians as ‘God’s 
house’ (3:6), and represents believers as sharing already in the worship of heaven (12:22–24), but that is 
not the same as identifying them with τὰ ἐπουράνια, especially without explanation. (5) Even more difficult 
is a development of (4) which identifies τὰ ἐπουράνια with Christ’s representative humanity (Sabourin 
1968.248–255). (6) Attridge develops (4) differently, to suggest that ‘the heavenly or ideal realities 
cleansed by Christ’s sacrifice are none other than the consciences of the members of the new covenant. . . . 
In Hebrews . . . [the] language of cosmic transcendence is ultimately a way of speaking about human 
interiority (262). At the less than ‘ultimate’ level, however, the significance of the transcendent language 
remains unexplained. (7) From Luther onwards, it has been suggested from time to time that καθαρίζεσθαι 
should not be understood in v. 23b; but this is unnatural in itself, and leaves entirely open the question of 
what v. 23b does mean. (8) The explanation which best accords with the context is well expressed in the 
NJB note: ‘The ‘purification’ of the sanctuary, whether the earthly or the heavenly one, does not 
necessarily imply any previous ‘impurity’: it is a consecratory and inaugural rite’ (so Bleek, Spicq, P. E. 
Hughes; cf. Ex. 29:36; Lv. 8:15; and especially 1 Macc. 4:36–59, where καθαρίσαι τὰ ἅγια [v. 36] is used in 
conjunction with ἐγκαινίσαι [v. 36; cf. vv. 54, 57; ἐγκαινισµός, vv. 56, 59] and ἡγίασαι [v. 48]). The author 





concerned, it is important to explore the plausibility of the implied idea that the sin 
problem reaches heaven, a cosmic level of God’s creation, and that this realm also 
requires priestly purification. Even though some scholars are uneasy with the idea of sin 
contaminating heaven,43 others affirm the conception of cosmic contamination involving 
the heavenly sanctuary.44  
From a canonical perspective, the idea that the sin problem impacts all creation, 
including the heavenly realm, is quite plausible. On the basis of a typological-cosmic 
reading of the allusions to Lucifer in Ezek 28:11-19 and Isa 14:12-15,45 the sin problem is 
                                                
10:1ff.” Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 477. As I will elaborate in The Goal of the Priesthood 
below, the interpretation of inauguration does not exclude the idea of previous impurity or a sin that needs 
to be purified, as the last interpretation described by Ellingworth seems to indicate. 
43 Spicq qualifies this idea as “nonsense.” Ceslas Spicq, L’Épitre Aux Hébreux, 2 vols. (Paris: 
Libraire Lecoffre, 1952-1953), 2:266-267.” Attridge regards the “notion that heaven is in need of 
cleansing” paradoxical, and he decides not to follow this interpretation. Attridge, The Epistle to the 
Hebrews, 262. For Bruce, a conception of the cleansing of “the heavenly dwelling-place of God in 
something like material terms,” going beyond the interpretation of a defiled human conscience, is far from 
the intentions of the author of Hebrews. F. F. Bruce, The Epistle to the Hebrews, NICNT (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1964), 218-219. 
44 See Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 416-417; Koester, Hebrews, 421; Lane, Hebrews 9-
13, 247. Touching on the issue of the intellectual background of Hebrews, Cockerill argues that “those who 
contend that Hebrews is dependent on the radical heavenly/earthly dichotomy characteristic of Platonic 
dualism have the most difficulty explaining how the heavenly world required cleansing.” Cockerill, The 
Epistle to the Hebrews, 416. For Koester, “sin affects all creation,” and the geographical distance between 
earthly sinners and heaven is not a problem for the understanding of contamination. According to the 
picture of the OT, “although people were not understood to sin within the Tabernacle, the sanctuary was 
threatened by defilement from people’s sins. In the same way, one need not envision heavenly beings 
committing sins to think that purification of heaven would be appropriate.” Koester, Hebrews, 421. 
Likewise, Lane affirms that Heb 9:23, “informed by the Levitical conception of the necessity for expiatory 
purification,” assumes that “the heavenly sanctuary had . . . become defiled by the sin of the people.” Lane, 
Hebrews 9-13, 247. 
45 I am aware of warnings that these passages should not be applied to Satan, as many church 
fathers did, because this would detach the passages from their literary setting. See Leslie C. Allen, Ezekiel 
20-48, WBC (Dallas: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 95. However, there are substantial studies that indicate that 
these texts point to a cosmic figure also, and not simply to an earthly monarch only. See Lamar Eugene 
Cooper, Ezekiel, NAC (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1998), 264-270; Richard M. Davidson, “Ezekiel 
28:11-19 and the Rise of the Cosmic Conflict,” in The Great Controversy and the End of Evil: Biblical and 
Theological Studies in Honor of Ángel Manuel Rodríguez in Celebration of His Seventieth Birthday, ed. 
Gerhard Pfandl (Silver Spring, MD; Nampa, ID: Review and Herald, Biblical Research Institute; Pacific 





depicted as taking place in heaven.46 According to Souza’s investigation of these 
passages, the setting in heaven where the sinful activity of the cosmic figure (Lucifer) 
took place was actually the heavenly sanctuary.47 If this cosmic figure could sin there, it 
is logically plausible that human sins could impact (pollute) the heavenly sanctuary for a 
certain period of time (until its purification, Heb 9:23). Since Heb 9:23 seems to establish 
a typological principle of purification, where the cleansing of the earthly sanctuary points 
to the purification of the heavenly sanctuary,48 the implied pollution of the heavenly 
sanctuary appears to be informed by the principle of defilement of the earthly sanctuary 
depicted in the Hebrew Bible, defined by a transference of sins to the sanctuary.49 The 
contamination of the sanctuary through purification offerings meant the removal of sins 
                                                
Understand the Scriptures: Essays in Honor of William H. Shea, ed. David Merling (Berrien Springs, MI: 
Siegfried H. Horn Archaeological Museum, 1997), 87; Jose M. Bertoluci, “The Son of the Morning and the 
Guardian Cherub in the Context of the Controversy between Good and Evil,” (Th.D. Dissertation, Andrews 
University, 1985); Henry van Dyke Parunak, “Structural Studies in Ezekiel,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard 
University, 1978), 372-373; Elias Brasil de Souza, “The Heavenly Sanctuary/Temple Motif in the Hebrew 
Bible: Function and Relationship to the Earthly Counterparts,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Andrews University, 
2005), 245-265, 278-292. 
46 Ezekiel 28 speaks of the “anointed guardian cherub . . . on the holy mountain of God.” (v. 14). 
However, at some point “unrighteousness was found in” him (v. 15). As Isa 14:12-15 highlights, he fell 
from heaven because of his sinful desire to be greater than God. 
47 See de Souza, “The Heavenly Sanctuary/Temple Motif in the Hebrew Bible,” 245-265, 278-
292. On the basis of a typological-cosmic reading of Ezek 28:11-19 and Isa 14:12-15, which does not 
diminish the explicit references to the kings of Tyre (Ezek 28:12) and Babylon (Isa 14:4), it is possible to 
postulate that the sin problem impacts the heavenly realm in some way. 
48 Especially indicated by the language of necessity (ἀνάγκη). For further information about the 
typological use of the language of necessity in Hebrews, see Richard M. Davidson, “Typology in the Book 
of Hebrews,” in Issues in the Book of Hebrews, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical 
Research Institute, 1989), 170.  
49 For helpful information regarding the pollution of the sanctuary, see Gane, Cult and Character, 
144, 148, 162-164, 177; Angel M. Rodríguez, “Transfer of Sin in Leviticus,” in The Seventy Weeks, 
Leviticus, and the Nature of Prophecy, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research 
Institute, 1986), 169-197; Alberto R. Treiyer, “The Day of Atonement as Related to the Contamination and 
Purification of the Sanctuary,” in The Seventy Weeks, Leviticus, and the Nature of Prophecy, ed. Frank B. 




from the offerer.50 This transference or contamination throughout the year made the 
sanctuary polluted, requiring its purification in the ritual of the Day of Atonement. It is 
precisely in the description of this ritual that the idea of transference of expiable sins is 
implied, as the sanctuary is purged of the sins of the Israelites (see Lev 16:16, 19-20, 33-
34).51 On the basis of this general principle of contamination of the earthly sanctuary, the 
reference to the purification of the heavenly sanctuary in Heb 9:23 appears to assume that 
the sins of repented human beings defile as they are transferred to the real sanctuary in 
heaven by the ministration of Jesus Christ. This contamination requires a purification 
performed by Christ’s priesthood. 
Summary 
In summary, according to the historical model, the priesthood of Christ is needed 
to solve the sin problem. This problem impacts (1) the relationship of human beings with 
God, (2) human beings themselves, and (3) creation at a cosmic level (heavenly things). 
First, there is a broken covenantal relationship between human beings and God, described 
                                                
50 The contamination of the sanctuary is mentioned or implied in two groups of passages in the 
Pentateuch. The first group refers to sins that defile the sanctuary and are not expiable, as far as the sinner 
is concerned (see Lev 20:3; 15:31; Num 19:13, 20). The other group describes sins that are transferred from 
the offerer to the sanctuary “through outer-altar and outer-sanctum purification offerings performed at the 
sanctuary,” that is, through regular purification offering rituals throughout the year (not the Day of 
Atonement). Gane, Cult and Character, 177. Regarding the first group, there are two basic situations when 
these sins take place, namely, the offering of children to Molech (Lev 20:3) and when someone touches a 
corpse and does not cleanse himself/herself (Num 19:13, 20). According to Gane, this type of 
contamination has two crucial characteristics: (1) the sins “pollute the sanctuary from a distance when they 
are committed”; (2) sinners are cut off from Israel. Ibid., 144, 148, 162. Conversely, Rodríguez has a 
different view regarding point 1. Instead of an immediate contamination of sins, as indicated by Gane, 
Rodríguez stipulates on the basis of Ezek 23:38-39 that the contamination of the sanctuary takes place 
when the sinner comes to the sanctuary in the state of impurity. See Rodríguez, “Transfer of Sin in 
Leviticus,” 175. 
51 According to Gane, the contamination of the sanctuary with expiable sins “do not pollute the 
sanctuary at the time when they occur,” but subsequentely through the regular purification offering ritual. 




especially by the transgression of the divine law. In this context, a priestly mediation is 
necessary for divine forgiveness and thereby restores unity between God and human 
beings. This forgiveness negatively means that forgiven human beings will not face 
God’s destructive judgment, and positively means that the covenantal relationship 
between forgiven human beings and God is restored. Second, human beings themselves 
have at least two basic problems because of sin, namely, a guilty conscience and 
weakeness in temptation. A guilty conscience results from the awareness of the 
transgression of the divine law and the broken covenantal relationship with God. In this 
way, the priesthood of Christ is necessary to purify or eliminate this guilt in the mind of 
human beings on the basis of the divine forgiveness mediated by His priesthood. 
Regarding human weakness in facing temptation, which relates to the fallen ontological 
and moral constitution of human beings, the priesthood of Christ is necessary to help 
believers endure temptation and sin and thereby live victorious godly lives. Third, the sin 
problem impacts creation at a cosmic level, meaning that the heavenly realm, and more 
specifically the heavenly sanctuary, is somehow affected by sin. In light of the rituals of 
the earthly sanctuary, the sins of repented human beings defile the heavenly sanctuary 
and require a priestly purification. 
The summary above provides the context for the discussion of the next 
component of the priesthood of Christ, namely, the agent of this priesthood. 
The Agent of the Priesthood 
The picture of Christ as the agent of the priesthood in Hebrews is informed by His 
divinity and humanity. While the focus of the priestly agency is on His humanity, He 




eschatological divine-human intermediary agent of divine revelation. I will begin this 
section with the elaboration of the broad notion of intermediary agency, which enriches 
our perspective of the more specific notion of His priesthood, and then move to the 
importance of Christ’s humanity for His priesthood itself, namely, His preparation for 
this role and His appointment as (high) priest. 
The Notion of Intermediary Agency 
Before the description of the appointment of Chris as (high) priest (5:1-10; 7:1-
28), Hebrews presents a rich Christology.52 In 1:1-14, the Son53 is an eschatological54 
divine messenger (“God has spoken to us in a Son,”55 1:2), the divine appointed heir of 
                                                
52 For surveys on the history of interpretation of Christology in Hebrews, see Helmut Feld, Der 
Hebräerbrief (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1985), 65-82; Andreas Stadelmann, “Zur 
Christologie Des Hebräerbriefes in Der Neueren Diskussion,” in Theologische Berichte 2: Zur Neueren 
Christologischen Diskussion (Zürich: Benziger Verlag, 1973), 135-221; Erich Grässer, “Der Hebräerbrief 
1938-1963,” Theologische Rundschau 30, no. 2-3 (1964): 214-223. A recent overview of methodological 
approaches to the study of the Christology of Hebrews is found in Brian C. Small, The Characterization of 
Jesus in the Book of Hebrews, Biblical Interpretation Series (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2014), 2-14. Studies on 
the Christology of Hebrews include: Friedrich Büchsel, Die Christologie Des Hebräerbriefs (Gütersloh: C. 
Bertelsmann, 1922); Franz Laub, Bekenntnis Und Auslegung: Die Paränetische Funktion Der Christologie 
Im Hebräerbrief (Regensburg: Pustet, 1980); William R. G. Loader, Sohn Und Hoherpriester: Eine 
Traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung Zur Christologie Des Hebräerbriefes (Neukirchen-Vluyn: 
Neukirchener, 1981); Harris L. MacNeill, The Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1914); Kevin B. McCruden, Solidarity Perfected: Beneficent Christology in 
the Epistle to the Hebrews (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008); Harm H. Meeter, The Heavenly High Priesthood of 
Christ: An Exegetico-Dogmatic Study (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans-Sevensma, 1916); Alexander Nairne, 
The Epistle of Priesthood: Studies in the Epistle to the Hebrews, 2 ed. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1915); 
Angela Rascher, Schriftauslegung Und Christologie Im Hebräerbrief (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 
101-202; Mathias Rissi, Die Theologie Des Hebräerbriefs: Ihre Verankerung in Der Situation Des 
Verfassers Und Seiner Leser (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1987), 45-91; von Joseph Ungeheuer, Der Grosse 
Priester Über Dem Hause Gottes, Die Christologie Des Hebräerbriefes (Würzburg: H. Stürtz, 1939); 
Heinrich Zimmermann, Die Hohepriester: Christologie Des Hebräerbriefes (Paderborn: Ferdinand 
Schöningh, 1964). 
53 In chap. 1, Christ is referred as Son (see vv. 2, 5, 8). 
54 The eschatological language is found in the expression “in these last days” (ἐπ’ ἐσχάτου τῶν 
ἡµερῶν τούτων) (1:2). 
55 This is Guthrie’s label for the whole introduction of Hebrews. See George H. Guthrie, “The 





all things (πάντων) (1:2), the intermediary agent (δι’ οὗ) of the creation of the world 
(αἰῶνας56) (1:2; See also v. 10), the sustainer (verb φέρω57) of everything (τὰ πάντα) 
(1:3). Furthermore, He as the Son is God (1:8-9; See also v. 3) and co-regent king (1:3, 8-
9, 13; See also v. 5). As mentioned previously, the priesthood is alluded to in the 
purification of sins performed by the Son (1:3). In this way, Christ’s intermediary role 
includes soteriology (dealing with sins), protology (creation), and eschatological divine 
revelation. In Hebrews,58 His priesthood is more related to the intermediary role of 
dealing with sins, and this role necessarily requires His human incarnation, a topic to be 
discussed below.  
Because the present chapter investigates Christ’s priesthood on the basis of the 
book of Hebrews, I tend to use the concept of mediation to refer to His intermediary role 
in general (protology, soteriology, and revelation), and the concept of priesthood to refer 
to the more specific intermediary role in soteriology. However, I am aware that a 
canonical investigation of Christ’s priesthood can potentially enlarge the concept of 
priesthood to what I currently call mediation. I offer more details about this possibility in 
                                                
Literature, Washington, DC, 2006), https://hebrews.unibas.ch/documents/2006GuthrieH.pdf (accessed 28 
December, 2016), 2 (Figure 2: the Structure of the Book of Hebrews). For information about the priesthood 
of Christ in the structure of Hebrews, see the Appendix. 
56 According to BDAG, this term has four meanings: (1) “a long period of time, without ref. to 
beginning or end”; (2) “a segment of time as a particular unit of history, age”; (3) “the world as a spatial 
concept, the world”; (4) “the Aeon as a person, the Aeon.” The third meaning is assigned to αἰῶνας in Heb 
1:2. BDAG, 32-33. NJB translates it as ages and NIV as universe. 
57 This verb appears in the participle form (“sustaining,” NIV, NJB). For further information 
regarding the meaning of this verb, see BDAG, 1052. 
58 As mentioned in chap. 6, in recommendations for further studies, it is possible that elsewhere in 
Scripture the scope of Christ’s priesthood includes priestly actions in a world without sin, before and after 




the conclusion of this dissertation, when I suggest topics for further research. For now, 
with the distinction employed in the present study between mediation and priesthood (the 
latter is part of the former) in mind, I move to the discussion of Christ’s humanity as a 
pre-requisite for His soteriological priesthood.  
Christ’s Humanity as a Pre-requisite 
With regard to the importance of Christ’s humanity for His priesthood, Heb 1:5-
2:1859 moves from an emphasis on His divinity to a stress on His humanity, with a 
special focus on His suffering death (πάθηµα τοῦ θανάτου, 2:9).60 This suffering is 
qualified by the idea of test/temptation (verb πειράζω),61 which enables (verb δύναµαι, 
2:18) Jesus as high priest (2:17) to help (verb βοηθέω) human beings in their 
trials/temptations (2:18). This help seems to spell out the notion that Jesus is a merciful 
                                                
59 Guthrie labels each part of exposition I (“The Position of the Son, Our Messenger, in Relation to 
the Angels”—1:5–2:18) in the following way: (A) “The Son Superior to the Angels (1:5-14)”; Exhortation 
(2:1-4); (transition AB) “The Superior Son, to Whom all things are Submitted, for a Time Became Lower 
than the Angels (2:5-9)”; (B) “The Son Lower than Angels (i.e., among humans) to Suffer for the ‘sons’ 
(i.e., heirs) (2:10-18).” Guthrie, “The Structure of Hebrews Revisited,” 
https://hebrews.unibas.ch/documents/2006GuthrieH.pdf (accessed 28 December, 2016), 2 (Figure 2: the 
Structure of the Book of Hebrews). For information about the priesthood of Christ in the structure of 
Hebrews, see the Appendix. 
60 While in the introduction and the first part of exposition I the Son is divine, in the transition 
(2:5-9) to the second part of this exposition and the second part itself (2:10-18) the divine Son becomes and 
exists as a human being. His incarnation is crucial because of the necessity of His death (2:9, 14). Jesus 
(2:9) is the founder (ἀρχηγός) of salvation (2:10), high priest (ἀρχιερεὺς) (2:17), and brother (2:11-12, 17) of 
human beings (the seed of Abraham, 2:16). 
61 In his remarks on 2:18, Attridge indicates that “the testing in view is not located in the 
temptations of Jesus, but in his suffering.” Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 96. Lane explains that the 
suffering of death was the climax of Christ’s fidelity to God, that is, this was the “extreme test” by which 
He proved to be faithful. Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 66. The possibility of different renditions of the relationship 
between the relative clause ἐν ᾧ γὰρ πέπονθεν and the participle πειρασθείς—as exemplified by NRSV 
(“because he himself was tested by what he suffered”) and ESV (“because he himself has suffered when 
tempted”), and explained by Cockerill (NRSV translates “the participle as causal and the relative as 
instrumental,” while ESV construes “the relative as causal and the participle as temporal.” Cockerill, The 
Epistle to the Hebrews, 152n129.)—does not impact my point here. I simply assume that Christ’s death 




high priest (2:17).62 The connection of suffering and high priesthood explains why Jesus 
needed to become a human person in order to be this high priest (see 2:17-18). More 
precisely, “He had (verb ὀφείλω) to be made like His brethren in all things, so that He 
might become (verb γίνοµαι) a merciful and faithful high priest” (2:17 NASB; italics 
mine).63 Overall, Christ’s incarnation, temptation, suffering, and death are seen as 
preparatory for His role as (high) priest, especially considering His priestly mercy and 
help on behalf of human beings. 
The language of necessity (had to be made) and of becoming high priest 
intertwines two concepts that are significant for the understanding of Christ as priestly 
agent, namely, (1) His preparation for this role and (2) His appointment as high priest. I 
will make some remarks about the notion of priestly appointment below. 
The Notion of Priestly Appointment  
The idea of appointment is at the center of the general definition of a high priest 
provided in Hebrews: A high priest is someone “appointed (verb καθίστηµι64) on behalf 
of men in things pertaining to God, in order to offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins” (5:1 
NASB; italics mine). Whereas the second part of this definition specifies the action of the 
priest elaborated in the section on Christ’s priestly offering (8:3–10:18),65 the exposition 
                                                
62 As Lane points out, Christ’s help (2:18) proves that He is a compassionate or merciful high 
priest (2:17). Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 66. 
63 Hebrews 4:15 specifies that this similarity between the incarnate Christ and human beings 
excludes the idea of sin. 
64 This verb is in the passive form in 5:1. For information regarding its meaning, see BDAG, 492. 
65 Hebrews 8:3 introduces this section by reaffirming the definition of 5:1, but emphasizes the 
priestly offering. Guthrie, “The Structure of Hebrews Revisited,” 




of the priestly appointment of the Son (5:1-10; 7:1-28) clarifies the nature of this 
appointment (centered on the idea of divine calling) and the meaning of an appointment 
on behalf of human beings (centered on the idea of priestly compassion).  
As far as the appointment on behalf of human beings, Christ’s priestly 
compassion (2:17; 4:15) is not based on the fact that He shared the weaknesses of human 
beings,66 but that He shared the experience of test/temptation (2:18; 4:15).67 While 
Aaronic high priests were appointed in their weaknesses, the appointment of the Son is 
related to His perfection (7:28). Instead of using the language of weakness in reference to 
Christ, Hebrews emphasizes that He was perfected (2:10; 5:9; 7:28) through suffering 
(2:1068; 5:8-9),69 where suffering is associated with the notion of learned obedience (5:8-
9). Thus, the idea that Christ was made perfect does not presuppose previous moral 
imperfection (see 7:26-28), but a learning experience, which involved deep emotional 
(“loud cries and tears”) “prayers and supplications” in the face of death (5:7).70 
                                                
66 In 4:15 our weaknesses are contrasted with His test/temptation without sin. See also 7:26-27. 
67 Similar to the Aaronic priesthood, Christ is called by God and sympathizes with human beings. 
However, the nature of His calling is different from the calling of that priesthood, and the basis of His 
compassion for human beings is distinct from that of the Aaronic priesthood. While priests “deal gently” 
with weak human beings because these priests are also characterized by weaknesses (which requires 
sacrifices for sins for both the priests and the people) (5:2-3; 7:27-28), Christ is merciful (2:17) and 
sympathetic (4:15) to weak human beings because He was tested/tempted as they are (2:18; 4:15). 
68 In 2:10, God made the founder of salvation perfect (verb τελειόω) through sufferings. BDAG 
defines perfection in Heb 2:10 as overcoming “an imperfect state of things by one that is free fr. objection, 
bring to an end, bring to its goal/accomplishment.” In this sense, “the completion and perfection of Jesus” 
may be understood as “the overcoming of earthly limitations.” At the same time, BDAG is open to the 
possibility that τελειόω in this verse implies “a consecration of Jesus.” BDAG, 996. 
69 Although being “a son, he learned obedience through what he suffered. And being made perfect 
(verb τελειόω), he became (verb γίνοµαι) the source (or cause, αἴτιος) of eternal salvation to all who obey 
him” (5:8-9; italics mine). For the meaning of αἴτιος, see BDAG, 31. 
70 In contrast to high priests who offered (προσφέρω) for themselves sacrifices because of their 





With regard to the nature of the priestly appointment, there are at least three basic 
ideas to be explained: (1) the divine plan or call; (2) the ontological basis of the reality of 
the priesthood; and (3) the functional description of the appointment. First, a high priest 
cannot be self-appointed, but must be appointed or called by God.71 Christ was 
designated (προσαγορεύω, 5:10) or appointed high priest by God’s oath (ὁρκωµοσία, 7:20-
21, 28), whose content is essentially the affirmation that Christ is a priest forever (Σὺ 
ἱερεὺς εἰς τὸν αἰῶν),72 declared in Ps 110:4 (109:4 LXX; Quoted in Heb 5:6; 7:17, 2173 
and alluded to in Heb 5:10; 6:20; 7:11, 15).74 This divine appointment seems to raise at 
                                                
own death (5:7). BDAG indicates that the verb προσφέρω in these two passages is used literally (5:3) and 
figuratively (5:7). BDAG, 886. 
71 According to 5:4, a priest needs to be called (καλέω) by God, that is, he does not take the honor 
of the priesthood for himself. This was the case of Aaron, who was called by God. Aaron received the 
calling (5:4) according to the law (νόµος) that extended genealogically his priesthood to the tribe of Levi 
(7:5, 11, 28). For instances of νόµος appointing or regulating the Aaronic priesthood in Hebrews, see 7:5, 
12, 16, 19, 28; 8:4. 
72 Hebrews 5:5 points out that Christ “did not glorified Himself so as to become a high priest” 
(NASB), but God said something to Him. This verse seems to imply that God called Christ to the 
priesthood. The content of what God said to Christ is the quotations of Ps 2:7 and 110:4 in Heb 5:5-6. 
Arguably, these quotations provide the content of the divine priestly calling of Christ. 
73 The basic difference between the quotation in Heb 7:21 in comparison with 5:5 and 7:17 is that 
the quotation ends with this affirmation, while the others start with it (I am following here the text of UBS5, 
which does not mention Melchizedek in 7:21). This difference seems to be at least partially explained by 
the fact that the author of Hebrews wishes to emphasize the idea of oath in 7:20-21. From the three 
occurrences of ὁρκωµοσία (7:20-21, 28) in Hebrews, two are found in 7:20-21 on the basis of Ps 110:4. The 
theme of oath is introduced negatively in the exhortation of 3:1–4:13 and positively in the exhortation of 
5:11–6:20. In the first exhortation, the divine act of swearing or taking an oath (ὀµνύω) is associated with 
God’s wrath (3:11, 18; 4:3), whereas the verb ὀµνύω and the noun ὅρκος (oath) in the second exhortation are 
used in the context of divine promise (6:13, 16-17). According to BDAG, ὀµνύω means to swear, take an 
oath (BDAG, 705-706), and ὅρκος conveys the meaning of oath (BDAG, 723). The beginning of Ps 110:4 
(109:4 LXX) stipulates that the statement Σὺ εἶ ἱερεὺς εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα (“You are a priest forever”) was sworn 
(aorist form of ὀµνύω) by the Lord, and this oath will not change. The expression καὶ οὐ µεταµεληθήσεται 
indicates that the Lord will not change His mind or have second thoughts about His oath. See this meaning 
of µεταµέλοµαι (change one’s mind, have second thoughts) in BDAG, 639. In this way, Heb 7:21 includes 
the specification Ὤµοσεν κύριος, καὶ οὐ µεταµεληθήσεται (“The Lord has sworn and will not change his 
mind”) that precedes Σὺ ἱερεὺς εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. 





least two implications for the understanding of Christ as (high) priest: (a) considering that 
the book of Psalms predates the incarnation of Christ, His appointment as priest was 
intended, expressed, and revealed by God long before the Christological events narrated 
and explained in the NT; and (b) the unchangeability of God’s oath (see Heb 7:2175) lays 
the theoretical ground for the idea that Christ’s priesthood will be forever (εἰς τὸν 
αἰῶνα).76 
Second, while the intention of an eternal priesthood is observed in God’s oath, 
Christ’s endless life (7:16), which probably refers to His divine/human resurrected life,77 
provides the ontological basis to the eternal reality of His priesthood (7:17). The use of Ps 
110:4 in Heb 7:17 is introduced by the idea that Christ “has become78 (verb γίνοµαι, 
perfect tense) a priest79 . . . by the power of an indestructible (ἀκατάλυτος80) life” (7:16). 
                                                
that the latter omits the verb εἶ. 
75 Hebrews 7:21 includes the specification Ὤµοσεν κύριος, καὶ οὐ µεταµεληθήσεται (“The Lord has 
sworn and will not change his mind”) that precedes Σὺ ἱερεὺς εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. 
76 I have elaborated in footnote 3 above on the basic meaning of Christ as priest forever in 
Hebrews. This elaboration can be outlined in two points: (1) the conceptual focus of εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα is on the 
person of the priest; and (2) the implications of this conceptual focus for Christ’s priestly role emphasize 
the endless results of His priestly activity. According to these two points, the forever language for the 
priesthood of Christ is compatible with the soteriological perspective of His priesthood in Hebrews. 
77 See Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 66; Koester, Hebrews, 355, 361. On the other hand, Cockerill assumes 
that the power of indestructible life describes the life of the Son since eternity. Cockerill, The Epistle to the 
Hebrews, 323-324. Attridge correctly emphasizes that “Hebrews does not specify whether this ‘power’ is a 
function of Christ’s eternal nature or of the event of his exaltation. This is a problem related to the question 
of when Christ became High Priest.” Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 203. 
78 The language of becoming priest is present not only in the rendition of ESV, but also in NASB, 
NET, NIV, NRSV, and RSV.  
79 Even though the Greek term for priest is not present in v. 16, this verse refers to the term ἱερεὺς 
in v. 15. 
80 A hapax legomena in the NT, the adjective ἀκατάλυτος conveys the meaning of “being 




Therefore, the reality of His priesthood is ontologically grounded in Christ’s eternal 
(divine) resurrected (human) life.81 
Third, the functional description of the appointment associates the concepts of 
priesthood and kingship. Whereas in the section below, The Actions of the Priest, I will 
delineate the specific functions of Christ as (high) priest, I highlight here that His 
function as (high) priest cannot be seen in isolation from His role as co-regent king.82 The 
use of Ps 2:7 (emphasizing kingship) along with Ps 110:4 (emphasizing priesthood) in the 
context of Christ’s divine calling to the priesthood (Heb 5:5-683) indicates that His royal 
                                                
81 This ontological basis is distinct from the reality of Aaronic priests, who were prevented from 
continuing their work because of their finite or mortal life, making their priesthood changeable and 
constituted by multiple priests in succession (see 7:23-24). In contrast to the mortal Aaronic priests 
described in 7:23, the eternal Christ has a permanent or unchangeable (ἀπαράβατος) priesthood (ἱερωσύνη) 
(7:24). A hapax legomena in the NT, the adjective ἀπαράβατος conveys the meaning of “permanent, 
unchangeable.” BDAG, 97. 
82 See Felix H. Cortez, “‘The Anchor of the Soul That Enters within the Veil’: The Ascension of 
the ‘Son’ in the Letter to the Hebrews,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Andrews University, 2008), 259, 273, 443-
445, 457-458, 460. 
83 The use of Ps 110:4 in Heb 5:6 takes place in the context of the first description of Christ’s 
divine calling to the priesthood in Hebrews (see 5:4-5). What is striking in 5:5-6 is that the calling of Ps 
110:4 in Heb 5:6 is preceded by another quotation from Ps 2:7 in Heb 5:5b, and both quotations in Heb 5:5-
6 seem to be the content of the divine priestly calling declared to Christ that is announced in 5:5a and then 
initiated in 5:5b. In fact, Ps 2:7 (“You are my Son, today I have begotten you”) was already cited in Heb 
1:5 as the first quotation of a catena of quotations from the OT (see Heb 1:5-13, in the light of the last part 
of 1:3) through which Hebrews emphasizes that Christ was enthroned as a Davidic king. The context of Ps 
2:7 is clearly royal (see, e.g., 2:6-8). In Heb 1:5, the quotation of Ps 2:7 is followed by the citation of 2 Sam 
7:14, which speaks of the eschatological Davidic king who would be God’s Son and who would have an 
everlasting kingdom (see 2 Sam 7:12-16). The reference to firstborn (πρωτότοκος) (Heb 1:6) is also royal 
language (see Ps 89:27—88:28 LXX). In addition, the quotations of Pss 45:6-7 and 110:1 in Heb 1:8-9 and 
13 respectively are explicit royal language. For an interpretation of 1:5-14 as a catena that largely refers to 
Christ’s exaltation or session, see Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 50, 53; Cockerill, The Epistle to the 
Hebrews, 102; Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 108; Koester, Hebrews, 197, 199; Lane, Hebrews 
1-8, 24; Kenneth L. Schenck, “The Celebration of the Enthroned Son: The Catena of Hebrews 1:5–14,” 
Journal of Biblical Literature 120 (2006): 469-485. Ellingworth even seems to assume that the catena 
corresponds to “three stages of a coronation liturgy” found “in the OT and other ancient Near Easter texts, 
especially in Egypt.” He explains that “the three stages of such a liturgy are typically (a) a declaration by 
God that he has adopted the king as his son (cf. v. 5); (b) the presentation of the king to his people, and his 
proclamation as king (cf. vv. 6–12); (c) the enthronement proper (cf. v. 13).” Ellingworth, The Epistle to 
the Hebrews, 108. It is noteworthy that the last quotation of this series (Heb 1:13) is from Ps 110:1, which 





enthronement is construed as a divine priestly appointment.84 
In short, the understanding of the priestly appointment of Christ derived from the 
quotations of Ps 110:4 in Hebrews can be stated in the following way: (1) this 
appointment was intended, expressed, and revealed by God long before His incarnation; 
(2) the unchangeability of God’s oath lays the theoretical ground for Christ’s everlasting 
priesthood; (3) Christ’s resurrected endless life is the ontological basis of His everlasting 
priesthood; and (4) the appointment includes His royal enthronement. 
The Beginning of the Priestly Appointment 
The idea of priestly appointment and the language that Christ became (verb 
γίνοµαι) (high) priest (2:17; 5:5; 6:20; 7:16)85 raise the question about when this 
appointment actually took place. To put it more sharply, when did Christ become a (high) 
priest? Scholars have provided different answers to this question: incarnation,86 cross,87 
                                                
presents Christ’s priesthood as related to His kingship. For studies on Psalm 110 in Hebrews, see David R. 
Anderson, The King-Priest of Psalm 110 in Hebrews, Studies in Biblical Literature (New York: Peter Lang, 
2001); Jared Compton, Psalm 110 and the Logic of Hebrews, Library of New Testament Studies (New 
York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015); James Kurianal, Jesus Our High Priest: Ps 110,4 and the 
Substructure of Heb 5,1–7,28 (Frankfort am Main: Peter Lang, 2000). 
84 The textual sequence of kingship and priesthood does not only characterize the priestly 
appointment pronounced by God in 5:5-6 but also the description of Christ as high priest in 8:1-2, namely, 
one “who has taken His seat at the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens, a minister in the 
sanctuary and in the true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched, not man” (NASB). Overall, both the key ideas 
of endless life (associated with the quotation in 7:17) and royal priesthood (related to the quotation in 5:6) 
find parallel with the description of Melchizedek in 7:1-3, who is also king-priest and does not have a 
genealogical record marking the beginning and end of his life. 
85 There are other instances in Hebrews that use the language of becoming (γίνοµαι) in reference to 
Christ, without employing explicit priestly terminology (which does not mean that these instances are 
unrelated to His priesthood). In these instances, He became: better than angels (1:4), the source of eternal 
salvation (5:9), the guarantee of a better covenant (7:22), and higher than the heavens (7:26). I am aware 
that become is only one of the meanings conveyed by the term γίνοµαι, but I am in agreement with most 
English translations by attributing this meaning to γίνοµαι in the passages I have mentioned here. For other 
meanings of γίνοµαι, see BDAG, 196-199. 





ascension.88 In my estimation, by declaring that Christ would not be a priest “if he were 
on earth,” 8:4 appears to indicate that He began His priesthood officially in heaven.89  
It is noteworthy that the becoming passages mentioned above (2:17; 5:5; 6:20; 
7:16) seem to agree with this perspective and are consistent with what was explained in 
the subsections above. First, according to the ontological basis of Christ’s priesthood, His 
human life is a pre-requisite for Him to become a merciful and faithful high priest 
                                                
Achievement of Salvation in the Epistle’s Perspectives (St. Meinrad, IN: Grail Publications, 1960), 97; 
Scholer, Proleptic Priests, 193; Spicq, L’Épitre aux Hébreux, 2:111. Spicq affirms this in his interpretation 
of 5:5-6. 
87 See Ernst Käsemann, The Wandering People of God: An Investigation of the Letter to the 
Hebrews, trans. Roy A. Harrisville and Irving L. Sandberg (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984), 223. Käsemann 
seems to assume that Christ’s death and ascension are one event: “Hebrews no longer regards Golgotha as 
an essentially earthly fact, but as the beginning of Jesus’ ascension. For this reason alone the sacrificial 
death is already a component of the heavenly high priesthood.” Ibid., 231. McKelvey appears to follow this 
perspective as he sees the cross and the ascension as one event. McKelvey, Pioneer and Priest, 36. For 
other scholars who see the cross as the beginning of the priesthood of Christ, see David Peterson, Hebrews 
and Perfection: An Examination of the Concept of Perfection in the “Epistle to the Hebrews”, Society for 
New Testament Studies Monograph Series (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
193-194; Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 185. 
88 See Ulrich Luck, “Himmlisches Und Irdisches Geschehen Im Hebräerbrief: Ein Beitrag Zum 
Problem Des Historischen Jesus Im Urchristentum,” Novum Testamentum 6, no. 2-3 (1963): 205. Westcott 
seems to follow this position at least partially, with the caveat that he views the cross as a priestly act. In his 
words, “the offering of Christ upon the Cross was a High-priestly act, though Christ did not become ‘High-
priest after the order of Melchizedek,’ that is, royal High-priest, till the Ascension.” Brooke Foss Westcott, 
The Epistle to the Hebrews the Greek Text with Notes and Essays, Classic Commentaries on the Greek 
New Testament (London: Macmillan, 1903), 199. See also John H. Davies, “The Heavenly Work of Christ 
in Hebrews,” in Studia Evangelica IV, ed. F. L. Cross (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1968), 386-387; Rafael 
Gyllenberg, “Die Christologie Des Hebräerbriefes,” Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie 11 (1934): 689. 
The view that Christ’s priesthood began only at his ascension is historically associated with Socinianism. 
Peterson, Hebrews and Perfection, 191; Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 146n120. For information 
regarding the Socinian view on Christ’s priesthood, Bruce A. Demarest, A History of Interpretation of 
Hebrews VII. 1–10 from the Reformation to the Present (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck: 1976), 22; F. Socinus, 
De Jesu Christi Filii Dei Natura Sive Essentia Adversus Volarum (Amsterdam: Bibliotheca Fratrum 
Putanorum, 1656), 2:391–393. 
89 I do not follow the assumption affirmed by Attridge and Loader that the priesthood of Christ in 
Hebrews is an unsystematic concept derived from two divergent traditions that respectively refer to the 
passion of Christ on earth (9:14, 26) and His heavenly intercession (2:17; 4:14-16; 6:20). See Attridge, The 




(2:17),90 and He “has become a priest . . . by the power of” His resurrected “indestructible 
life.”91 Second, the becoming is closely associated with the ascension (6:20). Hebrews 
related Christ’s priesthood with His ascension (“high priest who has passed through the 
heavens,” 4:14)92 and stipulates that He became (verb γίνοµαι) a high priest officially 
when He entered “behind the curtain” into the heavenly presence of God (6:19-20; cf. 
9:24).93 Third, in the context of the functional description of the royal-priestly 
appointment,94 the divine appointment in 5:5-7 combines Christ becoming priest with His 
enthronement as co-regent king in heaven (cf. 1:3-13; 5:5-6; 8:1-2; 10:12-13; 12:2).95 
Therefore, taking into accout that Christ’s priestly becoming is particularly related to His 
resurrected life, His ascension and heavenly enthronement, it is plausible to affirm that it 
                                                
90 See subsection above Christ’s Humanity as a Pre-requisite. 
91 See the notion of the ontological basis of the reality Christ’s priesthood in the subsection above 
The Notion of Priestly Appointment. 
92 Commentators see in this passage an implied affirmation of Christ entering the heavenly 
sanctuary as a priest. Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 224; Koester, Hebrews, 282; Lane, Hebrews 1-
8, 103.  
93 In his remarks on the verb γίνοµαι in 6:20, Ellingworth argues that Christ’s “entry into the 
heavenly sanctuary, and his appointment as high priest, are one.” Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 
349. For Davies, Christ’s entry into heaven in 6:20 “appears to come after his becoming High Priest, but 
the aorist γενόµενος need not to be taken to indicate chronological priority to εἰσῆλθεν. The natural sequence 
would be, first the Entry, then the Investiture.” Davies, “The Heavenly Work of Christ in Hebrews,” 386. 
According to a temporal understanding of the aorist participle (antecedent or contemporaneous), γενόµενος 
is antecedent or contemporaneous of εἰσῆλθεν. Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An 
Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996), 614. From this linguistic 
perspective, Peterson indicates that the participle γενόµενος could “mean that he was invested with his 
priesthood prior to, or simultaneously with, his entrance into the heavenly sanctuary.” Peterson, Hebrews 
and Perfection, 192. In this context, my reading of γενόµενος in this verse tends toward a simultaneous 
interpretation of this participle and εἰσῆλθεν. 
94 See this concept in the subsection above The Notion of Priestly Appointment. 
95 Almost all these passages are explored by Felix Cortez in his study of Christ’s ascension as the 
inauguration of His heavenly eschatological kingship in Hebrews. See Cortez, “‘The Anchor of the Soul 





is the ascended Christ who officially became high priest. 
Indeed, if Christ became high priest officially at the ascension, as I have already 
emphasized above,96 His incarnation and test/temptation (see 2:17-18), His obedience and 
perfection (see 5:7-10), and His resurrection (see 7:24-25) are related to His priestly 
appointment, but as pre-requisites for His official priesthood.97 I employ the term 
official98 to describe the beginning of Christ’s priesthood at the ascension because I 
acknowledge that He seems to be proleptically referred to as priest before the ascension. 
For instance, the technical language προσφέρω, which is used for the (high) priest 
                                                
96 In the subsection Christ’s Humanity as a Pre-requisite above, I have emphasized that His 
incarnation, temptation, suffering, and death are preparatory for His role as (high) priest. 
97 The meaning of Christ being made perfect (expressed by the verb τελειόω in 2:10; 5:9; 7:28) in 
Hebrews has been debated in the literature. Overall, the principal meanings suggested are: (1) moral: “full 
moral perfection of His humanity” (Westcott) or “going through the various stages of” His “human life” 
(Cullmann), learned obedience in a fuller degree (McKelvey); (2) vocational: qualification to the 
priesthood (Peterson, Attridge), particularly expressed in the ability to sympathize (McKelvey); (3) cultic: 
consecration of a priest, as indicated in the LXX (see, e.g., Exod 29:9, 29, 33, 35; Lev 21:10) by the use of 
τελειόω in the Pentateuch (Vanhoye, Silva), which would be ontologically interpreted as the 
transformation/glorification of Christ’s humanity (Vanhoye); (4) eschatological: the fulfillment of 
glorification/exaltation (Silva); (5) theological: “unimpeded access to God” (Bruce, Sabourin, Scholer). See 
Bruce, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 44; McKelvey, Pioneer and Priest, 26-33; Peterson, Hebrews and 
Perfection, 66-73, 118; Sabourin, Priesthood, 183; Scholer, Proleptic Priests, 185-200; Vanhoye, Old 
Testament Priests and the New Priest, 83, 157, 165-168; Moises Silva, “Perfection and Eschatology in 
Hebrews,” Westminster Theological Journal 39, no. 1 (1976): 61, 65, 68; Attridge, The Epistle to the 
Hebrews, 83-87; Cullmann, The Christology of the New Testament, 93; Westcott, The Epistle to the 
Hebrews, 49. This cursory overview of suggestions hardly makes justice to the nuanced treatment offered 
by each author. Furthermore, there may be an overlap among these positions (see McKelvey). As long as 
2:17 and 5:9 (read in light of 5:8) indicate that Christ was made perfect through suffering, this earthly 
experience describes my idea of prerequisite for His heavenly priestly appointment. Such idea of perfection 
is basically vocational, and may include moral traces of stages of human experience and obedience in a 
fuller degree. If 7:28 reads Christ “made perfect forever” in connection with His exaltation (7:26), then, in 
light of 2:17 and 5:9, there is an emphasis on the result of Him made perfect, which could be described in 
terms of the cultic, eschatological, and the theological views. 
98 In his remarks on Heb 5:5-6, Cockerill emphasizes that “the association of Ps 110:4 with Ps 2:7 
and Ps 110:1 suggests that God proclaimed him [Christ] High Priest at his exaltation. Although he may 
have been High Priest during his earthly life, he did not enter into the full exercise of that office until ‘he 
sat down at the right hand of the Majesty in heaven’ (8:1; cf. 1:3).” Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 
239. My use of the term official attempts to capture this idea that the full exercise of Christ’s priesthood 




offering sacrifices (cf. 5:1, 3; 8:3-4; 9:7, 9, 25; 10:1-2, 8, 11),99 is employed to refer to the 
earthly Christ offering up prayers and supplications (5:7; cf. John 17).100 Nevertheless, 
the language of priestly offering is also used for Christ’s sacrifice (Heb 7:27; 8:3; 9:14, 
25, 28; 10:10, 12, 14),101 as He offered Himself (7:27; 9:14, 28) “to bear the sins of 
many” (9:28). When this information is put together with the idea that Christ’s priesthood 
officially began at His ascension, a significant question is raised: Is the sacrifice on the 
cross102 (1) a mere preparation for His priesthood, (2) a proleptic reference to His official 
priesthood, or (3) part of His official priesthood? If properly articulated, concepts from 
these three options can be combined in the formulation of the answer. This means that the 
sacrifice on the cross is not merely a preparation for the priesthood, but it is also a crucial 
                                                
99 See also the priestly use of the cognate term ἀναφέρω in 7:27 and 13:15. 
100 The identification of this priestly language being used for Christ’s prayers is mentioned, for 
example, by Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 241-242; Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 287; 
Koester, Hebrews, 288. 
101 The verb ἀναφέρω is used in 7:27, while προσφέρω is employed in 8:3; 9:14, 25, 28, and 10:12. 
The noun προσφορά is used in 10:10, 14. 
102 The use of ἀναφέρω in Heb 9:28 (to bear the sins of many) is similar to its employment in 1 Pet 
2:24 (He himself bore our sins in his body [σώµατι] on the tree). The use of σῶµα in the latter passage can 
be associated with the reference in Heb 10:10 to the “offering of the body (τῆς προσφορᾶς τοῦ σώµατος) of 
Jesus Christ.” When these parallels are taken into account, and these Hebrews passages are read in light of 
1 Pet 2:24, the offering of Christ is identified as the sacrifice on the cross. In fact, the expression εἰς τὸ 
πολλῶν ἀνενεγκεῖν ἁµαρτίας in Heb 9:28 alludes to Isa 53:12 LXX (αὐτὸς ἁµαρτίας πολλῶν ἀνήνεγκεν). In 
the Hebrew Bible, the verb that corresponds to ἀναφέρω in Isa 53:12 is נׂשא. It is noteworthy that in 
passages related to the priesthood in the Torah, נׂשא is used to describe priestly bearing. In Exod 28, this 
bearing is related to the priestly garments. Aaron would bear the names of the people of Israel in the 
shoulder pieces of the ephod (Exod 28:12) and in the breastpiece of judgment (Exod 28:19) regularly 
before the Lord. As the breastpiece would have the Urim and the Thummim, Aaron would “bear the 
judgment of the people of Israel on his heart before the Lord regularly” (Exod 28:30). Furthermore, with 
his turban on the forehead, Aaron would “bear any guilt from the holy things that the people of Isarel 
consecrate as their holy gifts. It shall regularly be on his forehead, that they may be accepted before the 
Lord” (Exod 28:38). In its turn, the priestly bearing described by נׂשא in Lev 10:17 related to the sacrificial 
system. According to this passage, the priests had to eat the sin offering, when “its blood is not brought into 
the inner part of the sanctuary” (Lev 10:18; cf. 6:26, 29-30), to “bear the iniquity of the congregation, to 




form of preparation. As already mentioned in the subsections above,103 Christ was 
perfected or made fit to become the originator (ἀρχηγός, 2:10) or cause/source (αἴτιος, 
5:9) of salvation. This becoming is spelled out in terms of “being designated by God a 
high priest after the order of Melchizedek” (5:10; cf. 7:28). It is noteworthy that this 
process of being perfected centers on the experience of suffering (2:10; 5:8-9; cf. 2:18), 
particularly the “suffering of death” (2:9; cf. 5:7-8). From this standpoint, His death on 
the cross was the climax of Christ’s preparation for the priestly office to be performed 
officially in His resurrected ascended state. However, the cross can be interpreted also as 
a proleptic reference to His official priesthood and even as part of it. But this 
interpretation will be explored below in the section The Actions of the Priest. 
Summary 
In summary, Christ as the agent of the priesthood is divine and co-regent king. He 
is not only a priestly intermediary agent, but also the protological intermediary agent of 
creation and the eschatological intermediary agent of divine revelation. The fact that He 
became a human being is essential for His priesthood, as it enabled Him to experience 
suffering and death. As the author of salvation, Christ was perfected by God through 
deadly suffering. This situation in the face of death was an experience of learned 
obedience to God. In addition, this situation of test/temptation enabled Him to become a 
merciful high priest who can help human beings in their trials/temptations. With regard to 
the nature of Christ’s priestly appointment, He was appointed by God’s oath, who 
appoints Him as everlasting priest. This appointment was intended, expressed, and 
                                                




revealed by God long before Christ’s incarnation. His everlasting priesthood is based on 
the unchangeability of God’s oath and on His resurrected endless life. Also, the priestly 
appointment includes Christ’s royal enthronement. The priestly appointment, by which 
Christ became (high) priest, became officially effective since the ascension. 
Having described the agent of the priesthood, I will explore His priestly actions. 
The Actions of the Priest 
The account of Christ’s priestly actions in Hebrews can be organized in three 
parts that refer to past, present, and future actions.104 This organization is similar to 
Cullmann’s tripartite conception of Christ’s priesthood in Hebrews, mentioned in the 
introduction of this dissertation.105 The main difference derives from the idea advanced in 
the section above (The Agent of the Priesthood) that Christ’s priesthood officially began 
at His ascension. Thus, while Cullmann speaks of the first part of the priesthood as 
Christ’s past work on earth (His sacrifice on the cross), this dissertation suggests a more 
nuanced view of Christ’s past priestly work, spelled out in terms of a complex notion of 
sacrificial offering that includes the sacrifice on the cross (see 9:28; 10:12; 13:10-12) and 
its official heavenly presentation to the Father at the ascension. Whereas the first part of 
Christ’s official priestly actions centers on the heavenly presentation of His sacrifice, the 
second part describes His present ongoing intercession on behalf of believers, and the 
third part concerns the eschatological judgment and the final salvation at His second 
                                                
104 Regarding the location of references to Christ’s priestly actions in Hebrews, before the specific 
section on Christ’s priestly offering (8:3–10:18), there are at least three references (1:3; 2:17; 7:25) to His 
priestly actions. 




coming. Obviously, the second (intercession) and the third (judgment/salvation) parts are 
performed on the basis of the first part (the offering of His sacrifice). In short, I refer to 
the three types of Christ’s priestly actions as (1) the heavenly offering of His earthly 
sacrifice; (2) ongoing intercession; and (3) eschatological judgment and salvation.  
The Heavenly Offering of His Earthly Sacrifice 
In this subsection I will discuss the complex notion of sacrificial offering. As part 
of this discussion, I will explore an interpretation mentioned at the end of the last section 
(The Agent of the Priesthood), namely, that the cross can be seen as a proleptic reference 
to Christ’s official priesthood and even as part of it. 
Based on a cursory reading of Christ’s sacrificial offering in Hebrews,106 one may 
conclude (in agreement with Cullmann) that this offering simply refers to His death on 
the cross. But a close reading of Hebrews reveals a more complex notion of sacrificial 
offering. At least three lines of evidence can be observed regarding this complex notion, 
two in Hebrews itself and the third in the background of the Hebrew Bible. 
The first line of evidence implies a priestly offering in heaven. According to 
Hebrews, the sacrificial offering is central for the priestly work. The introduction of the 
discussion on Christ’s priestly appointment (5:1-10; 7:1-28) highlights that a high priest 
is appointed “to offer (verb προσφέρω)107 gifts and sacrifices for sins” (5:1). This formula 
                                                
106 There are several references to Christ’s offering in Hebrews. 7:27 (verb ἀναφέρω) and 9:14 
(verb προσφέρω) indicate that Christ sacrificially offered Himself. The offering in 7:27 is preceded by a 
reference to Christ as a high priest who became higher than heavens (ὑψηλότερος τῶν οὐρανῶν γενόµενος) in 
v. 26. In its turn, 9:14 specifies that His offering is related to His blood, and was directed to God. In 10:10, 
the author mentions “the offering (προσφορᾶς) of the body of Jesus Christ.” The offering in both 7:27 and 
10:10 is qualified by the adverb ἐφάπαξ (once for all). Heb 10:12-14 also refer to the offering of Christ. 





is repeated in the introduction (8:3) of the discussion on Christ’s offering (Heb 8:3–
10:18).108 Therefore, Christ has something to offer as a high priest (8:3b). But the 
surprising information is that the emphasis of His offering seems to be in heaven, not on 
earth. Christ would not be a priest if He were on earth (8:4),109 because priests offer 
sacrifices in the earthly sanctuary (8:4-5). Indeed, the priestly service is described in 
terms of offerings in the sanctuary setting. While Aaronic priests offer gifts/sacrifices 
(8:4) in their service in the earthly sanctuary (8:5), Christ is the high priest ministering in 
the true sanctuary in heaven (8:1-2), which is the pattern (τύπος) of the sketch and 
shadow, the earthly sanctuary (8:5).110 Hence, in this discussion of Christ’s priestly 
                                                
terms προσφέρω (5:1, 3, 7; 8:3, 4; 9:7, 9, 14, 25, 28; 10:1, 2, 8, 11, 12; 11:4, 17; 12:7), προσφορά (10:5, 8, 
10, 14, 18), and ἀναφέρω (7:27; 9:28; 13:15). For their lexical meaning, see BDAG, 75, 886-887; L&N 
§53.16-17. 
108 While the sections on Christ priestly appointment (5:1-10; 7:1-28) and on Christ’s priestly 
offering (Heb 8:3–10:18) begin with the same formula (compare 5:1 and 8:3), the focus of the discussion 
introduced by 5:1 is on the appointment of the priest to perform sacrificial offering, and the focus of the 
discussion introduced by 8:3 is on the sacrificial offering that is performed by the appointed priest. 
109 Grammatically speaking, εἰ µὲν οὖν ἦν ἐπὶ γῆς, οὐδ’ ἂν ἦν ἱερεύς is a condition contrary to fact or 
a second clause condition. A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of 
Historical Research (Bellingham, WA: Logos Bible Software, 2006), 1015; Wallace, Greek Grammar 
Beyond the Basics, 696. As Koester explains, this condition has the following effect in terms of meaning: 
“If he were on earth (but he is not), he would not be a priest (although in fact he is a priest).” Koester, 
Hebrews, 377. Theologically speaking, Ellingworth argues that to take this verse to mean that “Jesus had 
never ‘been on earth’” is a misunderstanding. Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 405. Conversely, 
Moffitt maintains that “8:4 clearly locates Jesus’ priestly ministry in heaven, after his life and death on 
earth.” In this way, “when he claims that Jesus was not a priest—let alone a high priest—on earth (8:4), and 
goes on to stress that Jesus made his atoning offering before God in the heavenly tabernacle, his belief in 
Jesus’ bodily resurrection suggests that he means exactly what he says. Jesus was only qualified to become 
high priest after his resurrection. Only after this event was he further able to enter into God’s presence in 
heaven to offer his atoning sacrifice there.” David M. Moffitt, Atonement and the Logic of Resurrection in 
the Epistle to the Hebrews, Supplements to Novum Testamentum (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2011), 198, 228. 
My argument of Christ being a high priest officialy in heaven in 8:4 is close to Moffitt’s position and 
different from Ellingworth’ view. 
110 I indicate here the Greek language in 8:5 for sketch (ὑποδείγµατι) and shadow (σκιᾷ). The term 
ὑποδείγµατι appears in 4:11; 8:25; 9:23 and conveys two basic meanings: (1) “an example of behavior used 
for purposes of moral instruction, example, model, pattern”; (2) “an indication of someth. that appears at a 
subsequent time, outline, sketch, symbol.” The first meaning appears in 4:11, while the second is found in 




offering, the emphasis is on heaven. 
The second line of evidence specifies in what sense the priestly offering is related 
to the sanctuary setting. In 9:24-25 there are two basic contrasts, one regarding the 
heavenly and the earthly sanctuaries and the other about Christ’s offering and the 
offerings of Aaronic high priests. The first contrast is between the true and heavenly 
sanctuary, where Christ entered, and the earthly human-made antitype of the true 
sanctuary (9:24). Then, there is the contrast of Christ’s one offering (expressed by the 
verb προσφέρω) and the offerings of Aaronic high priests performed every year (9:25). 
The interesting point is how the comparison of the offerings is delineated. The offering of 
Christ, who entered the heavenly sanctuary (9:24) by means of His own blood (9:12), is 
contrasted with the multiple times that the high priest entered the earthly sanctuary with 
blood that is not his own (9:25).111 Thus, the point here is that the priestly offering is 
performed, not by killing the victim on the outer altar, but by entering into the sanctuary 
with112 its blood. Therefore, in this context, the focus of Christ’s priestly offering is in 
His entrance into the heavenly sanctuary. However, this priestly entrance into the 
sanctuary cannot be seen in isolation from the sacrifice of the victim on the outer altar, as 
                                                
111 In 9:24, the author of Hebrews depicts Christ’s entrance (expressed by the verb εἰσέρχοµαι in 
the aorist form—see also 6:19-20; 9:12) into the heavenly holy places (ἅγιος) “to appear in the presence of 
God on our behalf.” What is noteworthy in v. 25 is the emphasis that Christ did not enter “to offer (verb 
προσφέρω) himself repeatedly, as the high priest enters the holy places (τὰ ἅγια) every year with blood not 
his own” (italics mine). 
112 While I use this language here, in contrast to Thompson and Brooks, I do not assume that 
Christ manipulated blood or that his sacrifice took place (even metaphorically) in the heavenly sanctuary, 
because I understand that He went to the heavenly sanctuary after His resurrection, and not right after His 
bloody death (this point will be further elaborated below in the discussion of the macro-hermeneutical 
principles of reality). For their interpretation on Christ’s blood in heaven, see James W. Thompson, The 
Beginnings of Christian Philosophy: The Epistle to the Hebrews (Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical 
Association of America, 1982), 108; Walter Edward Brooks, “Perpetuity of Christ’s Sacrifice in the Epistle 




the entrance is with its blood. From the typological perspective of the Aaronic priesthood, 
this entrance with sacrificial blood was directly dependent on the suffering (verb πάσχω) 
of the sacrificial victim,113 since the high priest carries the blood of the sacrifice into the 
sanctuary. In this sense, if Christ had to offer Himself often by repeatedly entering the 
sanctuary, as the Aaronic high priests did (9:25), He “would have had to suffer 
repeatedly” as well (9:26). In contrast to this situation of repetition, Christ’s one entrance 
(9:12) follows His one sacrifice (10:10).  
The third line of evidence clarifies, from the perspective of the OT background, 
this complex notion of sacrificial offering that includes the killing of the victim on the 
outer altar and the priestly entrance into the sanctuary with its blood. A conceptual 
distinction regarding the reality of an offering may be helpful in this clarification. An 
account of sacrificial offering could emphasize, for example, what (the sacrifice) is being 
offered or to whom (the recipient) it is being offered. The heavenly offering focuses on 
Christ presenting the sacrifice on the cross to God the Father, who receives/accepts the 
offering. This idea is supported by the priestly offerings described in the Hebrew Bible. 
In Leviticus, sacrificial offerings were not complete without a final movement toward 
God, expressed either vertically or horizontally.114 For instance, the vertical movement is 
seen in the smoke of sacrifices going “up toward the deity in heaven (cf. Ps 11:4)”115 in 
                                                
113 My interpretation here assumes that Christ’s action of entering in the heavenly sanctuary is 
subsequent to His sacrificial death on the cross, as these two actions are necessarily connected by His 
resurrection. This interpretation is clearly different from Attridge’s idea of only one action, which tends to 
suppress His resurrection—“Christ’s sacrificial death is not an act distinct from his entry into God’s 
presence.” Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 264.  
114 I am indebted to Dr. Roy Gane for this insight, as it will become evident in the footnotes below. 




the burnt offerings, grain offerings, and peace offerings, as they are called “an offering by 
fire of a soothing aroma to the Lord” (Lev 1:13, 17; 2:2, 9; 3:5 NASB).116 Indeed, the 
root of the Hebrew term for burnt offering (עָֹלה) is עלה, which literally means ascending, 
going up.117 In its turn, the horizontal movement is observed when the high priest had to 
bring sacrificial blood into the sanctuary (“before the Lord,” Lev 4:6, 17) in the 
purification offering for the sins of the anointed priest (Lev 4:3, 5-7) and of the whole 
congregation of Israel (Lev 4:13, 16-18), and even bring sacrificial blood into the Most 
Holy Place (“before the Lord,” Lev 16:12-13) on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16:14-
15).118 In Hebrews, these two movements (going up and going into the sanctuary) are 
achieved by Christ’s ascension, as He went up to heaven (Heb 4:14) in order to enter into 
the heavenly sanctuary (Heb 6:20; 9:12, 24-25) to offer His sacrifice (that took place on 
the cross) to God for us (Heb 9:24-25).119 According to the OT background, the 
slaughtering of the victim (death), was absolutely necessary, but was not a defining 
                                                
116 The expression “offering by fire” translates the Hebrew word ִאֶּׁשה, which means “offering 
made by fire.” HALOT, 93. 
117 See HALOT, 828, 830-831. See Roy Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, The NIV Application 
Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2004), 69. 
118 Gane even detects a vertical movement in the priestly manipulation of blood in the purification 
offering. In his words, the “blood of purification offering is applied to the horns of an altar, whether the 
outer altar in the case of an outer-altar offering (4:25, 30, 34), the incense altar in the outer-sanctum 
offering (vv. 7, 18), or both in the inner-sanctum offering (16:16b, 18). Since the horns are the highest parts 
of an altar, applying blood prominent in a vertical direction, in which smoke of sacrifices or incense goes 
up toward the deity in heaven (cf. Ps 11:4).” Gane, Cult and Character, 62. In this way, “blood was 
extended toward God in two directions: vertically toward his heavenly dwelling (Ps 11:4) and horizontally 
toward his Presence enthroned above the ark in the earthly Most Holy Place (Ex. 25:22; Num. 7:89; 1 Sam. 
4:4; 6:2; 2 Kings 19:15).” Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 107-108. 
119 Gane compares this sacrificial background in Leviticus with the fact that “after his death on the 
cross, Christ ascended to heaven (cf. Judg. 13:20). When he appeared to Mary Magdalene just after his 
resurrection, he said to her: ‘Do not hold on to me, because I have not yet ascended to the Father’ (John 
20:17, NRSV). This verse suggests that after appearing to Mary, Jesus ascended to heaven that day, after 
which he returned to earth and appeared to his other disciples for several weeks before permanently 




priestly attribution. While others could do the slaughtering in non-calendric sacrifices,120 
the exclusive priestly attribution was to initiate the movement of the sacrifice toward God 
after the slaughtering, either by burning the victim on the altar of sacrifice (offerings by 
fire)121 or by taking its blood into the sanctuary (purification offering).122 This 
background provides additional support to the idea that Christ begins His priesthood 
officially at the ascension in His movement to the heavenly sanctuary.  
What these three lines of evidence have shown is that Christ’s priestly offering 
does not simply refer to His death on the cross but, according to a more complex notion 
of sacrificial offering, it emphasizes the entrance of the resurrected ascended Christ in the 
heavenly sanctuary to officially present His earthly sacrifice to the Father. To be sure, the 
cross can be seen typologically as the outer altar where Christ’s sacrificial offering took 
place on earth (cf. 13:10-12), but that sacrifice needed to be subsequently presented in the 
sanctuary in heaven.123 According to this standpoint, in what sense is the cross a proleptic 
                                                
120 See Lev 1:5; 3:2, 8, 13; 4:15, 24, 29, 33. In calendric sacrifices, the priests slaughtered the 
animals for the community (see Num 28-29, which includes the Day of Atonement in 29:7-11). This 
priestly activity for the community is explicit in the description of the Day of Atonement in Lev 16:15. I 
am indebted to Dr. Roy Gane for this insight. 
121 See Lev 1:9, 13, 17; 2:2, 9, 16; 3:5, 11, 16. This was the vertical movement mentioned above. 
122 See Lev 4:5-7, 16-18; 16:14-15. This was the horizontal movement indicated above. As 
mentioned in footnote 157, in cases when the priests applied sacrificial blood on the horns of the altar of 
burnt offering (4:25, 30, 34), there is an idea of vertical movement toward God. 
123 As it will become evident in my discussion below, I am not following here the Socinian theory 
of atonement, nor even a recent similar view expounded by Moffitt. The similarity of Moffitt’s proposal 
with Socinianism is acknowledged by Moffitt himself and highlighted by Kibbe. See Moffitt, Atonement 
and the Logic of Resurrection in the Epistle to the Hebrews, 199n130, 257n76; Michael Kibbe, “Is It 
Finished? When Did It Start? Hebrews, Priesthood, and Atonement in Biblical, Systematic, and Historical 
Perspective,” The Journal of Theological Studies 65, no. 1 (2014): 25-26. While I agree with these theories 
as far as I affirm that the priesthood of Chris takes place officially in heaven, it seems to me that they 
provide a narrow account of the sacrifice on the cross. According to the Socinian view, “Jesus’ death was 
neither propitiatory nor satisfactory nor substitutionary,” but it was a preparation for His offering in heaven. 
In this way, the “‘expiatory sacrifice’ takes place as Jesus continually offers himself for our sins in the 





reference to Christ’s official priesthood and even part of it? The answer will depend on 
how the complex notion of sacrificial offering is observed. If the complex notion is 
viewed from the perspective of two distinct sequential moments (earthly sacrifice and 
heavenly entrance), the emphasis on the heavenly entrance as the official priesthood 
implies that the sacrifice on the cross is a proleptic reference to Christ’s official 
priesthood in heaven. On the other hand, if the complex notion is viewed from the 
perspective of the unity of two inseparable moments, the emphasis on the heavenly 
entrance as the official priesthood implies that the sacrifice on the cross necessarily 
presupposes that this earthly sacrifice will be officially presented in heaven. From the 
perspective of this necessary presupposition, the cross is already part of Christ’s official 
priesthood. 
So far I have explained the contours of the complex notion of Christ’s priestly 
offering. Before I move to the next subsection, I need to explore briefly the soteriological 
                                                
in which way the cross was preparatory for the atoning priesthood in heaven. Drawing on studies on the OT 
sacrifical ritual, Moffitt believes that the key to the understanding of the OT sacrifices is the manipulation 
of blood, and that blood signifies life, not death (this is his reading of Lev 17:11). According to this 
background, Christ’s offering is the offering of His resurrected life in heaven, and not of His death on earth. 
The cross is a preparation for His heavenly offering because sacrifices in the OT were necessary for the 
obtention of blood, which was then presented by the priest to God as life, not death. In other words, the 
priestly entrance with blood in the sanctuary is equivalent to Christ’s presentation of His life to God in the 
heavenly sanctuary. See Moffitt, Atonement and the Logic of Resurrection in the Epistle to the Hebrews, 
218-219, 257-258, 271-272, 285. Whereas I find the Socinian theory of an expiatory sacrifice in heaven 
problematic, I also disagree with Moffitt’s notion that sacrifical blood does not signify death. In fact, I 
concur with Compton that Lev 17:11 “emphasizes death—life given in the place of another’s life—rather 
than life released.” Jared Compton, review of Atonement and the Logic of Resurrection in the Epistle to the 
Hebrews, by David Moffitt, Trinity Journal 36, no. 1 (January 2015): 134. For a helpful study of blood in 
Hebrews, which among other aspects outlines basic interpretations of sacrifical blood (including the view 
of blood as life in Milligan and Westcott) and concludes that the concept of blood in Hebrews is 
ambivalent, meaning both life and death, see Hermann V. A. Kuma, The Centrality of Αἷµα (Blood) in the 
Theology of the Epistle to the Hebrews: An Exegetical and Philological Study (Lewiston, NY: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 2013). A Socinian/Moffittian approach that locates Christ’s priesthood exclusively in heaven 
also locates atonement exclusively in heaven, considering the cross as merely preparatory for the 
atonement. Conversely, my suggestion is that the cross is the atoning sacrifice and the heavenly priesthood 




meaning of this priestly offering. In fact, Hebrews seems to indicate that the heavenly 
offering to God, performed124 by Christ at His ascension, resulted in a “purification 
(καθαρισµός)125 of sins,” which shortly preceded126 His heavenly enthronement as co-
regent king (1:3).127 In light of 9:15, this purification probably refers to the 
                                                
124 The use of the middle voice in the participle aorist ποιησάµενος emphasizes more the subject of 
the action than the action itself. While “the active voice emphasizes the action of the verb; the middle 
emphasizes the actor [subject] of the verb.” Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, 415. Wallace 
indicates that the direct middle, where “the subject acts on himself or herself,” in the NT “is quite rare,” 
since “the Hellenistic tendency toward explicitness” led to an increasing replacement of the use of direct 
middle by the employment of the reflexive active. Ibid., 416. According to this perspective, I classify the 
middle voice that describes Christ making (ποιησάµενος) purification in Heb 1:3 as an intensive middle 
(conveying the idea that He acts by himself), which is defined as “focusing attention in the subject, as if the 
intensive pronoun (αὐτός) had been used with the subject.” Ibid., 420. This emphasis on Christ as the 
subject of the action is consistent with Heb 1:1-4, which is a passage that focuses on who the Son is, what 
He did, and what happened to Him. 
125 In several instances of the word group to which the adjective καθαρισµός belongs (that includes 
καθαρότης, καθαρός, καθαρίζω), there is the assumption that purification/cleansing is done by means of 
sacrificial blood (see 9:13-14, 22-23; 10:1-2, 4). 
126 This statement takes into consideration the syntactical relationship between the participle aorist 
ποιησάµενος and the main verb ἐκάθισεν (also aorist). Wallace indicates that “the aorist participle . . . 
usually denotes antecedent time to that of the controlling verb. But if the main verb is also aorist, this 
participle may indicate contemporaneous time.” Ibid, 614; see also Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek 
New Testament in the Light of Historical Research, 860. Therefore, if ποιησάµενος is taken in a temporal 
sense (as a temporal adverbial participle), the action of Christ making purification anteceded or was 
contemporaneous to His sitting (ἐκάθισεν), since the main verb (ἐκάθισεν) is also aorist. Wallace also points 
out that “if a particular adverbial participle is to be labeled as temporal, this should be the primary element 
the author wishes to stress (because almost all participles, whether adverbial or not, are temporal in at least 
a secondary sense).” Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, 624. He indicates that ποιησάµενος in 
Heb 1:3 “is both temporal and causal,” meaning that Christ sat down when He made purification of sins 
(temporal sense) and because He made purification of sins (causal sense). Ibid., 624n30. If this causal sense 
is implied in Heb 1:3, then ποιησάµενος temporally antecedes ἐκάθισεν, as the cause precedes the effect. 
Wallace indicates that “the antecedent participle should be translated after doing, after he did, or if very 
close to the time of the main verb, when.” Daniel B. Wallace, The Basics of New Testament Syntax: An 
Intermediate Greek Grammar (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), 272. Taking this information into 
account, the translation of ποιησάµενος as “when He made purification,” suggests a short temporal 
precedence. Assuming that the priesthood of Christ began at His ascension, His priestly purification of sins 
shortly preceded His enthronement and, thus, I opt for the rendition “when He made purification” (see 
NASB, NRSV, NET) instead of “after He made purification” (see ESV, NIV). 
127 In 10:12, His sitting at the right hand of God appears to be shortly preceded by His sacrificial 
offering for sins. Likewise the relationship between ποιησάµενος and ἐκάθισεν in 1:3, the aorist participle 
προσενέγκας seems to be an adverbial temporal antecedent of the verb ἐκάθισεν, which implies that the 
sitting took place shorly after the offering. Assuming that the priesthood of Christ began at the ascension, 





redemption/forgiveness of sins or “transgressions under the first covenant.” In other 
words, the official beginning of Christ’s priesthood at His ascension meant the 
forgiveness of the sins of God’s covenantal people committed before the beginning of 
this priesthood.  
However, this purification or forgiveness does not mean the final resolution of the 
sin problem. This statement is particularly true when the priestly action of ongoing 
intercession is considered. 
Ongoing Salvific Mediation 
The ongoing priestly activity of salvific mediation includes Christ’s intercession 
for forgiveness before the Father and the action of empowering believers through the 
Holy Spirit. I will outline the meaning of these two types of action below. 
Intercession for forgiveness 
The priestly activity of Christ’s ongoing intercession is emphasized in 7:25.128 
                                                
shortly before the enthronement. In his remarks on 1:3, David Moffitt argues that “the Son’s assumption of 
the throne at God’s right hand” takes “place after he had performed some activity that effected purification 
for sin.” Moffitt, Atonement and the Logic of Resurrection in the Epistle to the Hebrews, 48. In Heb 12:2, 
there is the sequence of the cross and the sitting at the right hand of God. However, the context of this 
passage indicates that its emphasis is not on Christ dealing with sin before His kingly sitting, as in 1:3 and 
10:12, but on the endurance that Christ showed on the shameful cross before His exalted kingly sitting. The 
focus on endurance is evidenced by the occurrences of the noun ὑποµονή in 12:1 and the verb ὑποµένω in 
12: 2, 3, and 7. Furthermore, from a linguistic standpoint, the verbs for endurance (ὑποµένω) and sitting 
(καθίζω) in 12:2 respectively appear in the aorist and perfect tenses in the indicative mood. This contrasts 
with the linguistic construction found of 1:3 and 10:12, where an aorist participle (ποιησάµενος and 
προσενέγκας, respectively) describes Christ’s dealing with sin and is associated with the aorist indicative 
form ἐκάθισεν. 
128 The context emphasizes that Christ’s continuous (resurrected) life guarantees a permanent 
priesthood (v. 24), not prevented by death (see v. 23) characterized by continual intercession. In the Greek 
text, Christ remains (expressed by the verb µένω, which conveys the meaning of continuing to live in this 
passage, see BDAG, 631) forever (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα). In Hebrews, the expression εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα appears in 1:8; 
5:6; 6:20; 7:17, 21, 28; 13:8, 21. Four (5:6; 6:20; 7:17, 21) of these eight occurrences refer explicitly to the 





This intercession is indeed salvific, as it provides129 complete/eternal salvation130 for 
those who come to God through Him.131 Hence, salvation and intercession are associated 
with access to God, which is made possible through Christ. While the sacrificial or 
priestly offering was once for all (7:27; 9:12; 9:26, 28; 10:10), the salvific intercession is 
continual. This point implies that Christ’s ongoing intercession is not accompanied by a 
new or continual offering, but it is performed on the basis of the once-for-all offering. 
The language of a way to God made available through Christ’s intercession 
assumes that human beings are distant or have no access to God by themselves. However, 
with reference to God, what is the nature of this intercession? Why does He need an 
intercessor to receive fallen human beings? Does God have to be convinced by this 
intercessor to be merciful toward believers? Taking into account that He is the one who 
appointed Christ as high priest (see section above The Agent of the Priesthood) for this 
intercession, the answer to the last question is negative. With regard to the first question, 
                                                
of Melchizedek. Taking these occurrences into account, the idea of Christ’s continuous intercession in Heb 
7:25 seems to specify what the eternity of His priesthood means. In 7:24, the eternal priesthood is described 
as permanent or unchangeable, which describe the meaning of ἀπαράβατον, the adjective that qualifies 
Christ’s priesthood (ἱερωσύνην).  
129 The language used in Hebrews is that Christ is able (verb δύναµαι) to save. This language is 
also used in the context of His priesthood in Heb 2:18; 4:15. I take the idea indicated by Lane that “the 
conjunctive participial phrase in v 25b, πάντοτε ζῶν εἰς τὸ ἐντυγχάνειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, “he continually lives in 
order to intercede for them,” is causal, “supplying a further reason for the ability of the exalted priest to 
save absolutely.” Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 190. 
130 Indicated by the expression σῴζειν εἰς τὸ παντελὲς. The term παντελής conveys both the 
meaning of “a very high standard of quality or completeness” and of an “unlimited duration of time.” 
Therefore, it can be translated as completely or forever. BDAG, 755. Elsewhere in the NT, this term occurs 
in Luke 13:11, probably with the meaning of quality or completeness. Besides the occurrence of σῴζειν in 
7:25, the language of salvation appears in Hebrews in 1:14; 2:3, 10; 5:7, 9; 6:9; 9:28; 11:7. In 2:10; 5:9; 
9:28, Christ is somehow portrayed as the agent of salvation. 
131 Literally, τοὺς προσερχοµένους δι’ αὐτοῦ τῷ θεῷ. In Hebrews, the verb προσέρχοµαι is used in 





the use of verb ἐντυγχάνω132 in the NT seems to imply that in its occurrence in Heb 
7:25133 (read along with 9:24)134 God is the authority before whom the intercessor 
presents a case to save believers.135 This picture emphasizes a legal notion of 
intercession, where God is conducting the salvation of believers in a righteous way, 
instead of a merely personal conception of intercession that would describe Christ 
attempting to appease or change God’s mind on behalf of human beings. In fact, the 
                                                
132 ἐντυγχάνω appears elsewhere in the NT in Acts 25:24; Rom 8:27, 34; 11:2, and describes the 
action of intercession or appeal (see BDAG, 341; L&N §33.347). The idea of continual intercession in 7:25 
is underlined by the statement that Christ “always lives to make intercession” (πάντοτε ζῶν εἰς τὸ 
ἐντυγχάνειν). The participle ζῶν (lit. living) is preceeded by the adverb of time πάντοτε, which means 
always or at all times. See BDAG, 755. The NT occurrences of ἐντυγχάνω are used either negatively (Acts 
25:24; Rom 11:2), in the sense that an appeal is done against a person (Acts 25:24) or a people (Rom 11:2), 
or positively (Rom 8:24, 34; Heb 7:25), as it describes an appeal or intercession for a people, expressed by 
the genetive form of ὑπὲρ. 
133 Lane points out that “the verb ἐντυγχάνειν with ὑπὲρ followed by the genitive means ‘to 
approach on behalf of someone’; when the one approached is God the expression frequently comes to mean 
‘pray’ (cf. Wis 8:21; 16:28; Philo, Moses 1.173).” Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 190. Following a similar 
perspective, Koester argues that “Christ’s intercession first means requesting help for those who are being 
tested, and second it involves petitions for forgiveness, which extend the benefits of Christ’s once-for-all 
sacrifice to particular sins.” For him, “the strongest reasons for assuming that intercession in Hebrews 
involves petitions for forgiveness are that Heb 7:26-27 mentions human sin, that Christ’s priestly work 
involves making atonement (2:17), and that the new covenant brings forgiveness (Heb 8:12; 10:17).” 
Koester, Hebrews, 371, 366. On the other hand, Cockerill does not seem to believe that this intercession is 
a present actual petition to God because Christ’s “sacrifice has been accepted.” Cockerill, The Epistle to the 
Hebrews, 336-337. In his turn, Ellingworth maintains that the language of intercession in Heb 7:25 “is too 
general to determine whether prayer for help or for forgiveness is intended. Such partial parallels as 2:18; 
4:15; 5:2, 7 suggest the more inclusive meaning ‘help.’ Where the forgiveness of sins is specifically 
mentioned, as in 9:22; 10:18, it is linked with Christ’s one sacrifice rather than with his continuing 
intercession.” Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 392. In my view, the positions advanced by 
Cockerill and Ellingworth are too narrow when compared with the interpretations offered by Lane and 
Koester.  
134 Hebrews 9:24 reads, “For Christ has entered, not into holy places made with hands, which are 
copies of the true things, but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God on our behalf” (italics 
mine). Scholars associate the last line of 9:24 with Christ’s present intercession in 7:25. See Attridge, The 
Epistle to the Hebrews, 264; Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 479; Johnson, Hebrews, 243-244; 
Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 418; Koester, Hebrews, 422. 
135 While the passages where the NT occurrences of ἐντυγχάνω are found do not explicitly mention 
a courtroom scenario, many of them assume that there is a formal or divine authority to whom a petition is 




intercession of Christ in Rom 8:34136 is part of the explanation of why there is no 
condemnation against God’s elect and it is associated with the idea that God justifies 
them.137 The language of condemnation and justification is clearly judicial.  
A canonical indication of the association of legal intercession and cultic expiation 
is found in 1 John 2:1-2.138 The intercessory role of Christ as our advocate 
(παράκλητον)139 with the Father, if140 we sin, is directly141 related to the fact that Jesus is 
                                                
136 Romans 8:34 emphasizes that Christ intercedes for us as ascended co-regent king. He “is the 
one who died—more than that, who was raised—who is at the right hand of God, who indeed is interceding 
for us.” The language of Christ’s intercession at “the right hand of God” in Rom 8:34 is compatible with 
the information in Heb 8:1 that Christ, the “high priest,” “is seated at the right hand of the throne of the 
Majesty in heaven.” Furthermore, the idea of divine justification in Rom 8:33-34 seems to be conceptually 
similar to the salvation mentioned in Heb 7:25, and the notion of no condemnation in Rom 8:33-34 appears 
to be consistent with the access of God through Christ in Heb 7:25. 
137 The emphasis that there is no “condemnation (κατάκριµα) to those who are in Christ” (Rom 
8:1) is the very first idea of chapter 1. The notion of no condemnation reappears in vv. 33-34: “Who shall 
bring any charge (ἐγκαλέσει) against God’s elect? It is God who justifies (δικαιῶν). Who is to condemn 
(κατακρινῶν)? Christ Jesus is the one who died—more than that, who was raised—who is at the right hand 
of God, who indeed is interceding for us.” Arguably, there is a parallel between the two questions in vv. 33-
34. While the verb ἐγκαλέω conveys the meaning of accusing (BDAG, 273), the verb κατακρινῶ conveys 
the idea of pronouncing a sentence (BDAG, 519). The first answer explains that God’s justification 
eliminates the possibility of accusation. Similarly, the second answer stipulates that Christ’s death, 
resurrection, and royal heavenly intercession excludes the possibility of condemnation. The parallel 
between accusation and condemnation in the questions suggests that there is a parallel between the 
answers, namely, that God’s justification is associated with Christ’s death, resurrection, and intercession. 
Probably, this justification is based on His death/resurrection/intercession. It is noteworthy that the contrast 
between condemnation (κατάκριµα) and justification (δικαίωµα) was already emphasized in Rom 5:16, 18. 
138 Scholars tend to associate John 2:1 with the intercession of Heb 7:25. See Daniel L. Akin, 1, 2, 
3 John, NAC (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 81; Rudolf Schnackenburg, The Johannine Epistles: 
A Commentary, trans. Reginald and Ilse Fuller (New York: Crossroad, 1992), 87; Stephen S. Smalley, 1, 2, 
3 John, WBC (Dallas: Thomas Nelson, 1984), 36.  
139 παράκλητος depicts “one who appears in another’s behalf, mediator, intercessor, helper.” 
BDAG, 766. For the legal meaning of παράκλητος in Greek writings, see Kenneth Grayston, “The Meaning 
of Parakletos,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 13 (1981): 67-82. The basic idea is of a sponsor 
or patron “who speaks on behalf of the accused.” Colin G. Kruse, The Letters of John, PNTC (Grand 
Rapids, MI; Nottingham, England: Eerdmans; Apollos, 2000), 72. In the NT, the noun παράκλητος occurs 
only in Johannine literature (John 14:16, 26; 15:26; 16:7; 1 John 2:1). While in the Gospel of John this 
noun is applied to the Holy Spirit, παράκλητος describes Christ in 1 John. Just as the verb ἐντυγχάνω is used 
in Rom 8 both for the Spirit (8:27; see also ὑπερεντυγχάνω in 8:26) and for Christ (8:34), παράκλητος 
describes both the Spirit and Christ in the Johannine writings. 





the expiation (ἱλασµός)142 for human sins (2:2). In light of the context of the passage,143 
this expiatory intercession is associated with purification/cleansing from sin by means of 
Jesus’ blood (1:7) and with God’s forgiveness of sins, cleansing believers from 
unrighteousness if they confess their sins (1:9). In this scenario, both the Son who 
intercedes (2:1) and the Father who forgives (1:9) are righteous (δίκαιος). A systematic 
explanation of this picture could be delineated as follows: when a believer confesses 
his/her sins in prayer,144 Christ intercedes for him/her before the Father on the basis of 
His sacrifice on the cross that was presented to the Father at the ascension. As the legal 
authority to whom this case is presented, the Father forgives the believer. With this 
process in view, God’s forgiving action is righteous. It is noteworthy that in Rom 3:25-
                                                
happens (cause), then the Paraclete (Jesus) is there with the Father for us (effect).” Akin, 1, 2, 3 John, 78. 
141 In his reading of 1 John 2:1-2, Kruse suggests that the idea conveyed by ἱλασµός in 2:2 
juxtaposes the idea conveyed by παράκλητος in 2:1. In 2:1 Christ “appears as an advocate in court,” and in 
2:2 “as a sacrificing priest in the temple.” Kruse, The Letters of John, 73. 
142 While I follow here the translation for ἱλασµός adopted by RSV, I am aware that most versions 
opt either for propitiation (ESV, NASB, YLT) or atoning sacrifice (NIV, NRSV, NET). Considering that 
the debate about the language of propitiation and/or expiation is related especially with the decision to 
interpret God as the subject or the object of the sacrificial offering, I will briefly address this point below. 
143 As Stephen Smalley indicates, 2:1-2 is the third time (cf. 1:7, 9) that the author comes to the 
question of forgiveness of sins using the adversative ἐὰν. Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 35. 
144 Arguably, prayer is implicit in the idea of confession (1 John 1:9). Interestingly, the verb 
ἱλάσκοµαι (part of the word group ἱλασµός, ἱλαστήριος) is used in the tax collector’s prayer in Luke 18:13, 
where he begs for divine forgiveness: “God, be merciful (ἱλάσθητί) to me, a sinner!” The imperative 
passive form ἱλάσθητί indicates that God is to be the subject of the ἱλάσκοµαι action, and not the tax 
collector in prayer. In the LXX, ἱλάσκοµαι is used in prayers or requests for divine forgiveness (2 Kgs 5:18; 
2 Chr 6:30; Pss 24:11 [25:11 MT]; 78:9 [79:9 MT]). Except Ps 79:9 MT, in these passages, ἱλάσκοµαι 
corresponds to the qal form of סלח (to forgive, see HALOT, 757) in the MT. In Ps 79:9 MT, ἱλάσκοµαι 
corresponds to the piel form of כפר (to cover, atone, forgive, see HALOT, 494-495). Furthermore, ἱλάσκοµαι 
is used in the LXX to describe God’s decision to forgive (Exod 32:14; Pss 64:4 LXX [65:4 MT; 65:3 ESV]; 
77:38 LXX [78:38 MT]) or not to forgive (2 Kgs 24:4; Lam 3:42). In these passages, ἱλάσκοµαι 
corresponds to three verbs in the MT: the qal form of 2) סלח Kgs 24:4; Lam 3:42), the piel form of כפר (Pss 
64:4; 77:38), and the niphal form of נחם (Exod 32:14—this verb in the niphal conveys the idea of being 




26, which uses a cognate of ἱλασµός, God put forward Jesus as mercy-seat/expiation 
(ἱλαστήριον)145 “by His blood, to be received by faith,” to show that God is righteous in 
justifying those who have faith in Jesus.146 The importance of showing this divine 
righteous procedure could be further enlightened by the canonical information that Satan 
constantly accuses God’s people (Rev 12:10), either because of their 
defilement/unworthiness (Zech 3:1) or by questioning their intentions (Job 1:9). 
All this canonical reading is relevant for the understanding of the priestly action 
by which Christ makes “expiation (verb ἱλάσκοµαι)147 for the sins of the people” (Heb 
2:17 RSV). The explanation of this priestly action, however, requires clarification 
regarding scholarly debates on the interpretation of ἱλάσκοµαι. For the systematic 
purposes of this research, I will summarize these debates in two basic questions: (1) 
When does Christ perform this action?148 (2) Is the Father addressed somewhat by this 
                                                
145 See BDAG, 474. The other NT occurrence of this term is in Heb 9:5, where it is translated as 
mercy seat (ESV, NASB, RSV, NRSV, YLT, NET). NET and YLT also translate it in Rom 3:25 as mercy 
seat. Compare the idea expressed in Rom 3:25 (using ἱλαστήριον) with the statement of 1 John 4:10 that 
God “loved us and sent His Son to be the expiation (ἱλασµὸν) for our sins” (RSV). For helpful information 
regarding ἱλαστήριον in Rom 3:25, see Valentin Zywietz, “Representing the Government of God: Christ as 
the hilasterion in Romans 3:25,” (M.A. thesis, Andrews University, 2016). 
146 The passage literally reads, “so that he might be just (δίκαιον) and the justifier (δικαιοῦντα) of 
the one who has faith in Jesus” (Rom 3:26). The righteousness of God in this act of justification centers on 
the fact that, in His “forbearance, He had passed over former sins” (Rom 3:25). Therefore, without the 
sacrifice of Christ, this merciful forbearance would be unrighteous or unjust. While the focus of this 
passage seems to be on sins committed before the cross, the principle that God’s mercy is righteous also 
applies to sins committed after the cross. The only difference is that His righteous mercy toward repented 
sinners before the cross required a further action (the sacrifice of Christ), whereas His righteous mercy 
toward repented sinners after the cross is already based on the sacrifice of Christ. 
147 In the context of the NT occurrences of the word group ἱλάσκοµαι (Luke 18:13; Heb 2:17), 
ἱλασµός (1 John 2:2; 4:10), ἱλαστήριος (Rom 3:25; Heb 9:5), ἵλεως (Matt 16:22; Heb 8:12), only in Heb 2:17 
Christ makes expiation, which is indicated by the verbal form ἱλάσκοµαι. When the noun forms ἱλασµός and 
ἱλαστήριος are used, Christ is the propitiation/expiation (1 John 2:2; 4:10) or the mercy-seat/propitiatory 
(Rom 3:25) respectively. For the meanings of these Greek words, see BDAG, 473-474. 





action?149 With regard to the first question, the infinitive present form ἱλάσκεσθαι in Heb 
2:17 does not specify the temporal moment of the priestly action. Assuming that Christ’s 
priesthood began at His ascension, ἱλάσκοµαι in this passage may refer to the action 
described in the subsection above (The Heavenly Offering of His Earthly Sacrifice) that 
involved the purification of sins (1:3) or transgressions committed under the first 
covenant (9:15). In this context, the offering of Christ’s sacrifice to the Father at the 
                                                
(present action) could be taken as three different answers to this question. Attridge argues that this 
expiation (ἱλάσκεσθαι) “is not through Christ’s continual intercession for his followers, but through his 
singular sacrificial death” (past action). Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 96. Cockerill seems to agree 
with Attridge, but he is also open to the possibility of a present activity: the author of Hebrews “probably 
has Christ’s ‘once-for-all’ sacrifice in view, though the present tense of his infinitive leaves room for the 
continuing application of the benefits of that sacrifice to God’s people.” Cockerill, The Epistle to the 
Hebrews, 150. For Ellingworth, “the present ἱλάσκεσθαι denotes continuous activity by one who remains a 
priest εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα (5:6 = Ps. 110[LXX109]:4) following his exaltation.” Ellingworth, The Epistle to the 
Hebrews, 188. 
149 This question refers to the debate of the group word that ἱλάσκοµαι belongs as expiation 
(subjective view) or propitiation (objective view). As Akin helpfully summarizes, “On the ‘subjective’ 
view, God is the subject of the action. He removes the defilement of sin by causing it to be covered. This is 
what is meant by ‘expiation.’ Often proponents of this view minimize or deny the presence of personal 
wrath on God’s part toward the sinner. On the objective view, God is the object of an offering of sin, that 
is, God’s wrath is placated. This is what is meant by ‘propitiation.’ Proponents of this view often include 
both propitiation and expiation as two aspects of the same atoning sacrifice of Jesus.” Akin, 1, 2, 3 John, 
82-83. See also Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 39-40. With regard to ἱλάσκοµαι in Heb 2:17, Attridge argues for the 
concept of expiation. In his words, “In Hebrews, Christ’s sacrifice is always directed at removing sin and 
its effects, not at propitiating God.” Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 96n192. See also Ellingworth, 
The Epistle to the Hebrews, 189. In a mediate position, Cockerill and Koester affirm the meanings of both 
expiation (removal of sin from the sinner) and propitiation (God’s wrath). Cockerill, The Epistle to the 
Hebrews, 151; Koester, Hebrews, 241. In their turn, Lane and Morris affirm the meaning of propitiation, 
and not merely expiation. Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 66; Leon Morris, The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross, 3 ed. 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1965), 202-204. For a sample of Bible translations, RSV and NJB have 
expiation, ESV and NASB opt of propitiation, and NIV, NRSV, and NET prefer atonement. In a recent 
article, James Allman points out that C. H. Dodd’s article “ΙΛΑΣΚΕΣΘΑΙ, Its Cognates, Derivatives, and 
Synonyms, in the Septuagint” (Journal of Theological Studies 32 [1931], 352-360) and its argument against 
the notion of ίλασκοµαι as propitiation in the Bible exercised a major influence in NT scholarship. Among 
the evangelical reactions to this argument, Morris’ book stands out as a strong affirmation of the concept of 
propitiation, which is not related to the capricious anger of pagan deities. Similar to Cockerill and Koester, 
Allman’s reassessment of the biblical references of ίλασκοµαι basically indicates that this term does not 
separate the meanings of propitiation and expiation. James E. Allman, “Ι͑Λάσκεσθαι: To Propitiate or to 




ascension implied His intercession to effectively150 forgive the sins committed by 
repented believers in the time of the AT or in the time before Christ’s sacrifice and 
ascension. Only with Christ’s work this forgiveness became a reality (see Heb 10:1-4) 
and a legal/righteous procedure on the part of God (see Rom 3:25-26). Furthermore, 
considering that sin is still a problem for believers living after the time of Christ’s 
ascension (see, e.g., Heb 2:18; 3:13; 4:15-16; 7:25; 10:26; 12:1, 4; 1 John 1:7, 9; 2:1-2), 
and that their confession (cf. 1 John 1:9) and faith (cf. Rom 3:25) are necessary for the 
expiation/forgiveness of their sins, it could be said that Christ continues to expiate sins by 
means of His ongoing intercession before the Father in heaven on the basis of His once 
for all sacrifice on earth. In this sense, believers who live after the ascension of Jesus are 
invited to come to God in prayer,151 by means of Christ’s priesthood, to find mercy (cf. 
Heb 4:14-16; 7:25; 10:19-22).  
According to this conception, there is no room for the idea that Christ already 
finished His salvific work in heaven and that salvation is merely applied to the believer 
by the Holy Spirit on earth, as if the Spirit were a deliverer on earth of what is already 
done in heaven even before the confession of sins uttered by a repented believer in 
                                                
150 In this sense, ἱλάσκοµαι in Heb 2:17 depicts the expiation or forgiveness of sins to which God 
had mercifully “passed over” (Rom 3:25) before Christ’s salvific work, but that were effectively expiated 
(and, therefore, righteously forgiven, see Rom 3:26) by means of His sacrifice and priesthood. Obviously, I 
do not deny the fact that divine forgiveness was available to these believers before Christ’s salvific work. 
However, in light of Hebrews (see, e.g., 10:1-4), this forgiveness assumed or pointed (by means of the 
offering of sarifices that were a shadow of the Christological reality) to the future work fulfilled in Christ. 
151 Peterson suggests that believers draw near to God in Hebrews “through worship and prayer.” 
Peterson, Hebrews and Perfection, 199. According to Nils Dahl, the idea of drawing near to God in 
Hebrews is not about a mystical experience of ascending to heaven, but means prayer. Nils Alstrup Dahl, 





prayer.152 Rather, Christ’s intercessory work in heaven is an active mediation of divine 
forgiveness for repented believers who confess their sins and pray for God’s mercy. 
Therefore, prayer is not merely a human response or acceptance of God’s forgiveness. To 
be sure, God was already willing to forgive even before prayer. But there is real 
forgiveness on His part at the moment of prayer, mediated by the intercession of Christ. 
Hence, the present earthly work of the Holy Spirit with human beings parallels the 
present heavenly work of Christ before the Father.153  
The preceding comments already indicated the positive answer to the second 
                                                
152 This affirmation resists unqualified statements of works of systematic theology, such as the 
following: “God applies Christ’s objective work on the cross progressively by the Spirit through a series of 
movements.” While “Christ the Son provided complete redemption through his obedient life and atoning 
death,” “the Holy Spirit applies, makes effective, and preserves the redemption Christ bought to those who 
believe.” Bruce A. Demarest, The Cross and Salvation: The Doctrine of Salvation, Foundations of 
Evangelical Theology (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2006), 36, 44. In light of the “completed work of Christ as 
mediator of redemption,” “the work of salvation, wrought in Christ, is subjectively realized in the hearts 
and lives of sinners.” Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 415-416. “We do not experience God’s amazing 
salvation—planned by the Father in eternity past and accomplished by Jesus in the first century—until the 
Holy Spirit applies that salvation to our lives.” Robert A. Peterson, Salvation Applied by the Spirit: Union 
with Christ (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2015), 13. I am aware that these statements may be nuanced to fit 
with the intercessory work of Christ in heaven, since these scholars affirm this intercessory activity as 
salvific. However, they tend to interperet the ongoing salvific activity of Christ in heaven in terms of a 
movement from heaven to earth by which salvation is subjectively applied to the believer through the Holy 
Spirit. See Demarest, The Cross and Salvation, 446; Robert A. Peterson, Salvation Accomplished by the 
Son: The Work of Christ (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2012), 228, 237, 242-243, 247; Berkhof, Systematic 
Theology, 352-353, 424. When Demarest and Peterson elaborate on the work of Christ before the Father, 
they speak of Christ praying to the Father for the preservation of the saints until final salvation, and 
Peterson interprets this in light of Jesus’ prayer for Peter in Luke 22:31-32. Demarest, The Cross and 
Salvation, 446; Peterson, Salvation Accomplished by the Son, 228, 244, 249. According to Peterson, 
Christ’s ongoing “intercession saves . . . because it is one means by which God enables his people to 
continue in faith and obedience.” While Christ’s life, death, resurrection, session, and His sending of the 
Spirit are necessary for the justification of believers, His intercession is necessary for their perseverance. 
Peterson, Salvation Accomplished by the Son, 248. What is missing from this picture is the explicit 
affirmation that intercession provides divine forgiveness, that is, cleansing from sins (1 John 1:7, 9; 2:1-2). 
Notice that Peterson does not even mention the words forgiveness or purification from sins in his remarks 
on 1 John 2:1-2. See ibid., 245-247. In short, my point here is the following: Without a clear emphasis on 
the reality of divine forgiveness and purification from sins in the context of the intercessory activity of 
Christ for prayers from repented believers, the idea that salvation was already completely accomplished in 
the first century is affirmed. What remains for Christ’s intercession is only a conservation of what was 
already done. Accordingly, the new and distinctive feature of salvation after the first century is the 
subjective application of salvation performed by the Holy Spirit. 




question highlighted above: The Father is addressed by Christ’s ἱλάσκοµαι action, but this 
answer is different from the debate of ἱλάσκοµαι as expiation (subjective view) or 
propitiation (objective view).154 Overall, the debate does not question the fact that God is 
the subject of the ἱλάσκοµαι action, as He cleanses human beings from sin. The main 
point of the discussion is whether God (the Father) is firstly the object of Christ’s 
ἱλάσκοµαι action. While I agree with the positive answer of the objective view,155 I do not 
                                                
154 It is noteworthy that the noun παράκλητος and the verb ἐντυγχάνω are used in the NT to refer to 
the present work of both the Holy Spirit and Christ. As a παράκλητος on earth, the Spirit teaches the 
disciples of Christ and bring to their remembrance the teaching of Jesus (John 14:26), while Christ as a 
παράκλητος intercedes for them in heaven before the Father (1 John 2:1). In His intercession “with 
groanings too deep for words” on earth, the Spirit seems to vocalize a prayer that amends the improper 
prayers of believers (Rom 8:26). The intercession by groaning suggests that His intercession takes place in 
the context of “the sufferings of the present time” (Rom 8:18), “the bondage to corruption” (Rom 8:21), in 
which there is an expectation of “the redemption of our bodies” (Rom 8:23). Thus, the intercession of the 
Spirit is actually a participation in the human expectation of redemption that constitutes an intercessory 
prayer, in our place, according to the will of God (Rom 8:27). Whereas the intercession of the Spirit is 
more related to the human/earthly level of expectation (redemption) and prayer, the intercession of Christ 
(cf. Rom 8:34) is more related to the divine/heavenly level of justification (no condemnation). It could be 
argued that Christ’s heavenly intercession is the foundation for the earthly intercession of the Spirit, since 
there would be no expectation of redemption if the saints were under condemnation. 
155 It is instructive to observe the OT background provided by the use of the verb ἐξιλάσκοµαι, 
which is related to and more commonly employed in the LXX than ἱλάσκοµαι (Friedrich Büchsel, 
“ἱλάσκοµαι, ἱλασµός,” TDNT, 3:315). Concisely, the information indicated in this footnote highligths the 
idea that God is the authority before whom the ἐξιλάσκοµαι activity is performed for the forgiveness of sins. 
From the 106 occurrences of this verb in the LXX, 49 appear in the book of Leviticus, which highlights the 
predominant cultic connotation of the term in the LXX. In many occurrences, ἐξιλάσκοµαι describes or is 
related to an atoning activity performed by a priest for the forgiveness (expressed by ἀφίηµι) of sins (see, 
e.g., Lev 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:6, 10, 16, 18, 26 [ESV 6:7]; 19:22). Except in Lev 5:6, where there is no 
explicit term for forgiveness in the MT, the verb ἀφίηµι (LXX) corresponds to the verb סלח (MT). It is 
noteworthy that this activity (ἐξιλάσκοµαι) is related to God, as the offering is “to the Lord” (κυρίῳ, Lev 
4:31), “of the Lord” (κυρίου, Lev 4:35), or for the offense “against the Lord” (κυρίῳ, Lev 5:6). I am 
following the English translations of the LXX provided by Lancelot Charles Lee Brenton, The Septuagint 
Version of the Old Testament: English Translation (London: Samuel Bagster and Sons, 1870) and Rick 
Brannan, Ken M. Penner, et al., eds., The Lexham English Septuagint (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 
2012). In the MT, ַליהָוה is the term used in 4:31 and 5:6, and ה  in 4:35. While in the LXX the offering is יְהָו֑
for the offense (expressed by the verb πληµµελέω) against the Lord in 5:6, the word ָאָׁשם in the MT conveys 
the meanings of guilt and guilt-offering (see HALOT, 96). The sentence of the Hebrew text seems to 
indicate that ָאָׁשם refers to a guilt-offering to the Lord, as it reads in ESV, NASB, NIV, RSV. Furthermore, 
the priestly atoning activity (ξιλάσκοµαι) is done “before the Lord” (ἔναντι κυρίου, see Lev 5:26 [ESV 6:7]; 
10:17; 16:30; 19:22; 23:28; Num 15:25, 28). As LEH indicates, ἔναντι can also be translated as in the 




follow the explanation of a personal propitiation, where God’s wrath is placated by 
Christ’s sacrifice. This explanation tends to depict a God attempting to deal with His 
mixed feelings of love and anger. To be sure, the language of God’s wrath against sinners 
is biblical, as it stresses His revulsion of evil. However, for the purposes of this research 
on Christ’s priesthood, this language is basically an expression of God’s justice156 and 
refers particularly to His eschatological judgment.157 In Hebrews, the references to the 
wrath of God (3:11; 4:3) or His judgment (4:13; 10:25-31; 12:23, 25-26, 29; 13:4) mostly 
warn against the eschatological danger of rejecting the salvation mediated by Christ.158 
                                                
156 Romans 1:18; 2:8; 3:5 emphasize that God’s wrath (ὀργή) is against unrighteousness or 
injustice (ἀδικία). Rom 4:15 implies that the wrath is a consequence of the transgression of the law. In his 
account of God’s wrath as judgment, Norman Gulley speaks of “God’s holy love.” See Norman R. Gulley, 
Systematic Theology: God as Trinity (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 2011), 46-48. For a 
helpful overview of God’ wrath in the Bible, including its basic terminology in the Hebrew Bible and in the 
NT, see Jim West, “Divine Wrath,” Lexham Theological Wordbook, ed. Douglas Mangum et al. 
(Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2014). West properly points out that “the biblical notion of divine wrath 
is closely associated with God’s holiness, judgment, and compassion.” Ibid. 
157 Romans 2:5 mentions “the day of wrath when God’s righteous judgment will be revealed.” See 
also Rom 2:8; Col 3:6; 1 Thess 1:10; Rev 6:16, 17; 11:18; 14:10; 16:19; 19:15. 
158 The two references to the wrath (ὀργή) of God in Hebrews (3:11; 4:3) appear in a section of 
exhortations (3:1-4:16) that begins and ends with the importance of Christ’s priesthood. In 3:1, the author 
invites the audience to consider “Jesus, the apostle and high priest of our confession.” His basic concern is 
that the audience needs to “hold fast our confidence” (3:6; cf. v. 14), and not be hardened by “an 
unbelieving heart” (3:12; cf. v. 8, 10) as the desert generation mentioned in Ps 95:7-11 LXX (3:7-11). It is 
precisely in quotations from Ps 95:11 that the two occurrences of ὀργή appear in Heb 3:11; 4:3. The attitude 
of unbelief on the part of the desert generation was followed by God’s judgment or wrath: This generation 
did not enter His rest (the promised land) with Joshua (cf. 3:17; 4:6, 8). Taking into account this negative 
example of the desert generation (4:11), the audience is warned about a future judgment (4:13). In order to 
avoid the same outcome of that generation, the audience of Hebrews is urged to “hold fast our confession,” 
since “we have a great high priest who has passed through the heavens, Jesus, the Son of God” (4:14). 
Because of His sympathy for us in our weakenssess (4:15), we may “with confidence draw near to the 
throne of grace” and find “mercy and grace” (4:16). In summary, while the audience of Hebrews is urged to 
“hold fast” and take advantage of having Jesus as high priest, the opposite attitude of giving up that implies 
a disregard or rejection of Christ’s priesthood leads to a situation similar to the end of the desert generation, 
that is, the person will face God’s wrath in His eschatological judgment. This teaching is clearly expressed 
in 10:19-31. It is noteworthy that 4:14-16 and 10:19-25 form an inclusio (see the Appendix). While the 
verses that precede the beginning of the inclusio in 4:14-16 emphasize the reality of God’s judgment (see, 
e.g., 4:11-13), the same emphasis occurs with the verses (see 10:26-31) that follow the end of the inclusio 
in 10:19-25. Similar to 4:14-16, 10:19-23 urges the audience to take advantage of Christ’s priesthood and 





Therefore, the Father is addressed by Christ’s ἱλάσκοµαι action, not to have His personal 
anger against sinners placated (propitiation), but to be the legal authority to righteously 
forgive repented sinners on the basis of Christ’s past sacrifice and present priestly 
intercession, especially in light of the eschatological judgment. It is in this sense of 
forgiveness that I translate ἱλάσκοµαι as expiation. 
Empowerment of believers 
The activity of mediating forgiveness is accompanied by the action of 
strengthening believers, as Christ “is able to help those who are being tempted” (Heb 
2:18). This action seems to take place especially in situations where believers are tempted 
to abandon their commitment to God when they are challenged to face suffering.159 
Besides this emphasis on the temptation that involves suffering, Christ’s merciful help is 
also available in the context of other types of temptation experienced by believers in their 
weaknesses (4:14).160 Indeed, Christ not only helps believers to remain faithful to God by 
                                                
eschatological divine judgment spelled out in 10:27-31, the author alerts believers about the danger of a life 
that continues on sinning deliberately (10:26), which includes in its description treating Christ the mediator 
with disdain (10:29). Hence, a rejection of Christ’s priesthood results in facing divine judgment. In light of 
God’s eschatological judgment, the author of Hebrews urges the audience to not reject salvation (2:1-3; 
12:25-26). 
159 This statement has in view the following points in Hebrews: (1) temptation seems to be 
particularly associated with suffering (πάσχω). Hebrews 2:18 explains that Christ “is able to help those 
being tempted” “because He himself has suffered (πέπονθεν) when tempted.” In 5:7-8, His suffering 
appears to be described in terms of His struggles with the threat of death (cf. 13:12); (2) victory over 
temptation means faithfulness to the will God in the form of endurance, no matter the difficulties or 
challenges being faced. In the midst of His struggles with the threat of death, Christ was obedient (5:8) or 
faithful (cf. 2:17; 3:2) to the will of God (10:7, 9-10). In his suffering, Christ endured (12:2-3); and (3) the 
exhortations of Hebrews imply that the audience is being tempted to give up the Christian faith (cf. 3:6, 14; 
4:14; 10:23-25; 35-36, 38-39; 12:1), as believers face difficulties (cf. 10:32-34; 12:3-4; 13:13-14). 
Therefore, in the context of temptation, Christ is not only the example to be followed by believers (cf. 12:2-
4; 13:12-13), but He is their merciful helper as high priest (2:17-18; 4:15). 
160 While Christ’s priestly help in 2:18 is based on His temptation in suffering, His priestly mercy 





strengthening them to endure temptation, but He enables believers to faithfully serve God 
as priests as well. To be more precise, by means of Christ’s priesthood, believers are to 
spiritually enter161 the heavenly sanctuary in prayer (10:19-22) and continually offer 
sacrifices162 of praise163 to God and of altruistic actions toward others164 (13:15-16), 
                                                
into account the transition devices in the structure of Hebrews, there is an overlap of keywords and 
concepts in 2:17-18 and 4:14-16, as the latter builds on the former. For this reason, I read the information in 
4:14-16 as a continuation of what was presented in 2:17-18. In his explanation of transition techniques used 
in Hebrews, Guthrie identifies the presence of “hook words”—“a transition technique by which the end of 
one unit and the beginning of the next were stitched together by the use of a repeated term or terms”—in 
2:17-18 and 4:14-16, which indicates “a dynamic transition from 2:10-18 to the point at which the author 
resumes his Christological exposition at 4:14 and following.” Guthrie, “The Structure of Hebrews 
Revisited,” https://hebrews.unibas.ch/documents/2006Guthrie.pdf (accessed 28 December, 2016), 14-15, 
18. 
161 It is clear in 10:19-21 that they can enter the heavenly sanctuary (τῶν ἁγίων) because of Christ: 
(1) this entrance is by means of His blood and flesh (vv. 19-20), which seems to refer to Christ’s sacrifice; 
(2) this new access or way was opened/inaugurated (verb ἐγκαινίζω—the other NT occurrence of this verb 
is in Heb 9:18, which refers to the inauguration of the first covenant. In the LXX, this verb is used for the 
dedication of Solomon’s temple [see 1 Kgs 8:63; 2 Chr 7:5]. Overall, ἐγκαινίζω conveys the meaning of 
renew or ratify, inaugurate, dedicate. BDAG, 272) by Him (v. 20). If this verse is read along with 6:19-20, 
Christ opens/inaugurates this way for believers by being the forerunner (πρόδροµος, 6:20), the one who 
enters (verb εἰσέρχοµαι, 6:20) first, who is followed by believers, as their hope “enters (verb εἰσέρχοµαι) 
into the inner place behind the curtain” (6:19); (3) believers can draw near (verb προσέρχοµαι—in Hebrews, 
this verb appears in 4:16; 7:25; 10:1, 22; 11:6; 12:18, 22) because Christ is a great/high “priest over the 
house of God” (10:21). In 7:25, believers draw near (verb προσέρχοµαι) to God through Christ, and this is 
related to His heavenly intercession for them. In short, it could be said that believers are invited to perform 
the priestly action of entering the heavenly sanctuary on the basis of (a) Christ’s sacrifice, (b) His entrance 
into the sanctuary, and (c) His continual intercession for them. Hence, believers implicitly become priests 
in terms of having access to God on the basis of Christ’s priestly actions. His sacrifice is considered here a 
priestly action in the sense that the earthly sacrifice is offered in heaven, which would constitute the 
meaning of His entrance into the heavenly sanctuary. 
162 Believers are invited to perform the priestly action of continually (διὰ παντὸς) offering up a 
sacrifice (ἀναφέρωµεν θυσίαν) through the implicit priesthood of Christ (δι’ αὐτοῦ) in 13:15. The other 
occurrence of the expression δι’ αὐτοῦ in Hebrews is found in 7:25, where believers draw near to God 
through Christ (δι’ αὐτοῦ), and this is related to His heavenly intercession for them. Therefore, it could be 
said that believers act as priests on earth, offering sacrifices to God (praise, altruism), on the basis of 
Christ’s heavenly intercession. Regarding the expression διὰ παντὸς in the LXX, it describes the continuous 
fire on the altar of burnt offerings (Lev 6:6 LXX; 6:13 ESV), and even the continuous burnt offering (Num 
28:10, 15, 23, 24, 31; 29:6, 11, 16, 19, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34, 38) itself. 
163 This sacrifice is described as “sacrifice of praise” (θυσία αἰνέσεως) to God, which takes place in 
the oral acknowledgment of His name (13:15). In the LXX, θυσία αἰνέσεως refers to a type of peace or well-
being offering, the offering for thanksgiving (e.g., Lev 7:12, 13, 15). 





which are activities (entering the sanctuary and offering sacrifices) proper to priests.165 
The implicit166 priesthood of believers in Hebrews is consistent with explicit references to 
their priesthood elsewhere in the NT (1 Pet 2:5, 9; Rev 1:6; 5:10; 20:6; cf. Exod 19:6).167 
In fact, the reference of 1 Peter seems to add proclamation of the Savior (2:9) as a type of 
spiritual sacrifice (2:5). These priestly actions of Christ in favor of believers, both in 
helping them to remain faithful to God by strengthening them to endure temptation and in 
enabling believers to faithfully serve God as priests, seem to be performed in conjunction 
with the work of the Spirit. In Hebrews, the Spirit speaks168 to believers about a divine 
voice (3:7-8; 4:7) that attempts to lead them to obedience or faithfulness to God (4:11).169 
                                                
εὐποιΐα, κοινωνία conveys the idea of generosity, altruism [BDAG, 552]) are sacrifices that please God. 
165 For studies on the priesthood of believers in Hebrews, see Lambertus Floor, “The General 
Priesthood of Believers in the Epistle to the Hebrews,” in Ad Hebraeos: Essays on the Epistle to the 
Hebrews (Pretoria: Die Nuwe-Testamentiese Werkgemeenskap van Suid-Afrika, 1971), 72-82; Scholer, 
Proleptic Priests. 
166 While believers act as priests (entering the sanctuary and offering sacrifices), as indicated 
above, they are not explicitly identified in Hebrews as priests. 
167 Like Hebrews, 1 Peter highlights that believers are to offer “spiritual sacrifices acceptable to 
God through Jesus Christ” (2:5). In Revelation, Christ’s salvation makes believers priests to God (1:6; 5:10; 
20:6). Arguably this point is associated with Hebrews’ emphasis that believers have access to God and 
enter the sanctuary through Christ. Hence, they are to serve God as priests. Indeed, Rev 7:14-15 
eschatologically describes the multitude of saved, “before the throne of God,” serving (verb λατρεύω, 
which has a priestly connotation in Heb 8:5; 13:10) “him day and night in his temple.” This service appears 
to be spelled out in terms of praise in the context of worship (see Rev 7:11), as the saved cry out “with a 
loud voice, ‘Salvation belongs to our God who sits on the throne, and to the Lamb’” (Rev 7:10). For studies 
on the priesthood of believers in the NT, see Nelson, Raising up a Faithful Priest, 141-168; Vanhoye, Old 
Testament Priests and the New Priest, 243-318. 
168 While the author of Hebrews is quoting the words spoken by the Spirit (3:7) in 3:7-11 from Ps 
95:7-11 LXX, he seems to emphasize that these words are spoken to believers “today.” First, the autor 
states that the Holy Spirit “says” (λέγει, 3:7). Second, after quoting this Psalm he intentionally repeats the 
verse that contains the term “today” (σήµερον) twice (see 3:7, 15; 4:7). Third, he elaborates on the term 
“today” twice (see 3:13; 4:7), applying it to the present condition of believers. 
169 The exhortation of 3:1-4:13 begins with an emphasis on the faithfulness of Jesus and Moses 
with regard to God (3:2, 5). However, the author questions whether believers will remain faithful (see 3:6). 
The quotation from Ps 95:7-11 LXX in Heb 3:7-11 reveals that the desert generation under Moses’ 





Furthermore, the salvation experienced by believers before the second coming of Christ 
is described, among other things,170 as sharing (µετόχους171) “in the Holy Spirit” (6:4). 
Therefore, it could be said that, as Christ helps believers to endure temptation, the Spirit 
speaks to form in them a faithful heart to God. As Christ empowers belivers to serve God 
with praises, altruism, and proclamation, the Spirit is with them, probably through the 
distribution of gifts (2:4).172  
In short, the ongoing salvific mediation of Christ is particularly characterized by 
His intercession for forgiveness before the Father and His empowering of believers to 
faithfully serve God. The last point to be considered in this account of the priestly actions 
of Christ is the eschatological judgment and final salvation, which is briefly covered 
below. 
Eschatological Judgment and Salvation  
The third aspect of Christ’s priestly actions, namely, the eschatological judgment 
                                                
leadership (NT believers) should not follow the example of disobedience of the desert generation (4:11). In 
both cases, the desert generation and NT believers, the voice of the Spirit attempts to produce a faithful 
human heart obedient to God. 
170 In 6:4-5, the list contains: “been enlightnened,” “have tasted the heavenly gift,” “have tasted 
the goodness of the word of God and the powers of the age to come.” 
171 As an adjective associated with persons, in Heb 3:14, believers share (µέτοχοι) in Christ, if they 
hold their “original confidence firm to the end.” The plural form of the noun µέτοχος is translated as 
partners (Luke 5:7) and companions (Heb 1:9). 
172 The Greek text (πνεύµατος ἁγίου µερισµοῖς) does not include a word for gifts, but has only 
distributions (µερισµοῖς). However, overall, translators have interpreted µερισµοῖς as a reference to spiritual 
gifts (see, e.g., ESV, NASB, NIV, NRSV, RSV, NET). In the context of 2:3-4, these gifts are a testimony 
(expressed by the verb συνεπιµαρτυρέω) or confirmation of the salvation announced by Christ and by His 
disciples. From a NT canonical perspective, it is noteworthy that in 1 Cor 12:3-11 the gifts are distributed 
by the Spirit, while in Eph 4:7-12 the ascended Christ is the one who gives the gifts. Therefore, the work of 
Christ and of the Spirit are interrelated. In light of the information that the asended Christ sent the Spirit 




and salvation, is not substantially elaborated in Hebrews. To use Cullmann’s words, it “is 
only mentioned” in 9:27-28 “and not fully developed.”173 The idea indicated by 9:27-28 
is that, in a brief overview between the first and second comings of Christ, His death and 
sacrificial offering is followed by eschatological judgment and the final salvation of 
believers.174 The basic distinction between these two phases (sacrificial offering and 
eschatological judgment/salvation) is that the former aims at the removal of sins from 
believers, while the latter does not deal with sin anymore (9:28).175 Therefore, the 
eschatological judgment and salvation belong to the resolution of the sin problem. 
The language of divine judgment occurs in several places in Hebrews (see 4:12; 
6:2; 9:27; 10:27, 30; 12:23; 13:4).176 When this language is associated with Christ, a 
destructive judgment awaits those who despise Him and His work (10:26-27, 29-31). 
Conversely, the eschatological judgment means salvation for believers (9:27-28). This 
final salvation is associated with Christ’s second coming appearance (9:28), assuming 
that the first appearance refers to His sacrificial offering (9:26, 28). If these two 
                                                
173 Cullmann, The Christology of the New Testament, 104. 
174 In the comparison of vv. 27-28, there is a parallel between anthropology (v. 27) and 
Christology (v. 28). While the sequence in anthropology is death and judgment, the sequence in 
Christology is sacrificial offering and final salvation for believers. In this parallel, the death of human 
beings is related to the sacrificial death of Christ and the eschatological judgment is related to the final 
salvation of believers. First, the comparison between the death of human beings and the death of Christ 
centers on the idea of “once” (ἅπαξ, see 9:26-28; see also ἐφάπαξ in 7:27; 9:12; 10:10): just as human 
beings die once, Christ was offered once. Second, eschatological judgment and final salvation stand 
together. 
175 The removal of sins by means of Christ’s sacrificial offering is portrayd in terms of bearing 
(verb ἀναφέρω) sins: “after Christ was offered once to bear the sins of many, to those who eagerly await 
him he will appear a second time, not to bear sin but to bring salvation” (9:28 NET). In 9:26, a similar 
passage that relates Christ’s once sacrifice with human sin, the language of removal of sins is explicit: “he 
has appeared once for all at the end of the ages to put away (verb ἀθέτησις) sin by the sacrifice of himself.” 




appearances describe the first and second coming of Christ to earth,177 they seem to be 
respectively followed and preceded by His appearing before God in heaven on behalf of 
human beings. Just as Christ’s sacrificial offering requires a movement from earth to 
heaven, as Christ goes into God’s presence to present His earthly sacrifice (9:24-25), the 
eschatological judgment and salvation imply a movement from heaven to earth, as Christ 
comes from God’s presence to make judgment and salvation a reality for human beings. 
Assuming that in these two movements the work of Christ is consistent with the will of 
the Father, in the first movement, what is done on earth (sacrifice) needs to be 
subsequently validated by God in heaven (in this sense there is a sacrificial offering in 
heaven, but not without its previous reality on earth). My suggestion regarding the second 
movement is that, presumably, what will be done on earth (judgment and salvation), 
needs to be previously validated by God in heaven (in this sense there is judgment and 
salvation in heaven, but not without their subsequent reality on earth). To be sure, the 
first movement is more detailed in Hebrews than the second, as the offering includes an 
appearance before God (9:24-25).178 However, the second movement seems to be not 
                                                
177 Elsewhere in the NT, the verb φανερόω is used for the appearances of Christ in His first (1 Tim 
3:16; 1 Pet 1:20; 1 John 1:2; 3:5, 8) and second (1 Pet 5:4; 1 John 2:28; 3:2) comings. In fact, the use of 
φανερόω in 1 John 3:5 and Heb 9:26 are similar, in the sense that this verb is related with the putting away 
of sin. In its turn, the verb ὁράω is used elsewhere in the NT for the appearances of Christ to people after 
His resurrection (Luke 24:34; Acts 9:17; 13:31; 26:16; 1 Cor 15:5-8). 
178 There are three references to Christ appearing in 9:24-28. He appeared in the presence of God 
in heaven (9:24, verb ἐµφανίζω, root φαινω), He appears on earth for His sacrifice on the cross (9:26, verb 
φανερόω, root φαινω) and, then, He will appear on earth a second time to bring salvation (9:28, verb ὁράω). 
Therefore, there is one reference to a heavenly appearance and two references to an earthly appearance. The 
heavenly appearance is related to and follows the first earthly appearance, since the heavenly appearance is 
a presentation before God of His earthly sacrificial appearance. As indicated previously, the offering in 
9:25 is described in terms of entering the sanctuary. This implies that Christ’s sacrificial offering was 
complete when He entered the heavenly sanctuary, in the presence of God (9:24). This point was elaborated 




only implied in Hebrews (9:27-28),179 but also canonically consistent with a 
messianic/Christological interpretation of “the Son of Man” (Jesus) coming to “the 
Ancient of Days” (God the Father) in heaven, in a context of divine judgment, to 
eschatologically receive the everlasting kingdom and bring it to believers on earth (Dan 
7:13-14, 18, 22, 27; cf. vv. 9-10, 26; Mark 14:62).180 It is noteworthy that the discussion 
of the eschatological judgment in Heb 10:25-31 even seems to include hints of 
investigative or legal procedure before the executive judgment, as the language of 
witnesses in the context of the Mosaic law (10:28) is used in comparison to the 
eschatological judgment (10:28-31).  
In short, the eschatological judgment and salvation refer to the conclusion of 
Christ’s soteriological priesthood, as far as the resolution of the sin problem. With this 
                                                
179 This point is highlighted by Cortez. In his remarks on 9:25-28, he argues that “the experience 
of human beings consisting in ‘death’ and ‘judgment’ represents two phases in the ministry of Jesus.” 
Indeed, “the first ‘appearance’ of Jesus Christ (9:26) is an event that included both a sacrifice on earth and 
Jesus’ appearance before God in heaven. The second phase is represented by ‘judgment.’ Hebrews 9:28 
argues that the ‘second’ appearance has the purpose of ‘saving’ those who are ‘eagerly waiting’ . . . for 
him. Almost all commentators see here a reference to the second coming. I think this is correct, but, just as 
the first appearance involved acts on earth (sacrifice) and in heaven (appearance before God), the second 
appearance should include an act in heaven as well as on earth.” Cortez, “‘The Anchor of the Soul That 
Enters Within the Veil’,” 396-397n1. 
180 Without entering into details (and potential disagreements) regarding the interpretation of Dan 
7, this basic notion is affirmed by Stephen R. Miller, Daniel, NAC (Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 
1994), 207-213. For helpful information about a messianic/Christological interpretation of Dan 7:13, see 
Michael B. Shepherd, “Daniel 7:13 and the New Testament Son of Man,” Westminster Theological Journal 
68, no. 1 (2006): 99-111. In my view, to avoid a confusion between Christ’s eschatological reception of the 
kingdom (Dan 7:13-14) and His heavenly enthronement at the ascension in the first century AD (as 
described, e.g., in Heb 1:5-13; 2:9; 10:12), it is important to acknowledge that the enemies of Christ’s 
kingdom were not fully subjugated at His enthronement. Rather, He is “waiting from that time until his 
enemies should be made a footstool for his feet” (Heb 10:13; cf. 1:13; Ps 110:1). Therefore, the divine 
judgment against enemies (cf. Heb 10:27) is crucial for the fullness of Christ’s kingdom. In a Christological 
reading of Dan 7:13-14, Christ’s eschatological reception of the kingdom takes place in the context of 
divine judgment against the little horn, a chief enemy of God and His people (cf. Dan 7:9, 21-22, 25-27). 
After this destructive judgment, “the saints of the Most High shall receive the kingdom and possess the 
kingdom forever, forever and ever” (Dan 7:17; cf. v. 27). Read along with Hebrews, this interpretation of 
Dan 7 sounds like Christ coming to earth to bring final salvation to believers in the context of 





resolution, Christ will bring complete salvation to believers in His second coming. 
Summary 
In summary, three types of Christ’s priestly action can be discerned in Hebrews: 
(1) the heavenly offering of His earthly sacrifice; (2) ongoing salvific mediation; and (3) 
eschatological judgment and salvation. The first type was officially performed before the 
Father once at His ascension, so that the Father can accept Christ’s earthly sacrifice on 
the cross. This acceptance established the basis for the other two types of priestly action 
and also meant the forgiveness of the sins of God’s covenantal-repented people 
committed throughout history before the beginning of Christ’s priesthood. The second 
type of Christ’s priestly action is His ongoing salvific mediation, which includes 
intercession for forgiveness and empowerment of believers. As far as the intercession for 
forgiveness, when a believer confesses his/her sins in prayer, Christ intercedes for 
him/her before the Father. As the legal authority to whom this case is presented, the 
Father forgives the believer on the basis of Christ’s past sacrifice and present 
intercession.181 With regard to the empowerment of believers, Christ helps them through 
the Holy Spirit to remain faithful to God, strengthening believers to endure temptation 
and enabling them to serve God in prayer, with praise, proclamation, and altruistic 
actions. Finally, the third type of Christ’s priestly action involves eschatological 
judgment and salvation, which portray the conclusion of His soteriological priesthood. 
                                                
his feet” (Heb 10:13; cf. 1:13; Ps 110:1). 
181 I do not share the view of a conceptual tension in Hebrews between Christ’s heavenly 
(continual) intercession and the completion (once for all) of His high-priestly work. David Hay seems to 
affirm this view when he indicates that the “idea of eternal intercession” in 7:25 “is something of a ‘foreign 





With the resolution of the sin problem, Christ will bring complete salvation to believers 
in His second coming. 
As it will become evident in the next section (The Goal of the Priesthood), these 
three types of priestly action resemble three crucial moments of the Aaronic priesthood, 
namely, the inauguration of the priesthood (and of the sanctuary), the daily intercession 
performed in the first apartment of the sanctuary, and the judgment implied in the 
purification of the sanctuary performed on the Day of Atonement. In fact, the next section 
will provide a teleological framework that enriches the understanding of the meaning of 
Christ’s priestly actions. 
The Goal of the Priesthood  
According to what has been described so far (The Need for Christ’s Priesthood, 
The Agent of the Priesthood, and The Actions of the Priest), the priesthood of Christ is 
needed to solve the sin problem. In this context, His priestly work is necessary to (1) 
restore the covenantal relationship between human beings and God by mediating divine 
forgiveness; (2) purify/eliminate the guilty conscience of human beings (who are aware 
of their broken covenantal relationship with God, resulted from the transgression of the 
divine law) and help them endure temptation; and (3) purify the heavenly sanctuary, 
which has been defiled by human sin and reveals that the sin problem impacts creation at 
a cosmic level.  
Christ was prepared/perfected for the priestly office through His incarnation and 
deadly suffering. In this process, He learned obedience to God and developed mercy in 
                                                




terms of His profound identification with human beings. Although His priestly 
appointment was divinely expressed/revealed long before His incarnation, it became 
officially effective at the ascension and was associated with His royal enthronement in 
heaven. In terms of priestly actions, at the ascension Christ officially presented to the 
Father His earthly sacrifice for the forgiveness of sins committed by repented believers 
who lived before the official beginning of Christ’s priesthood. This official presentation 
also established the basis of His other two priestly activities. In His ongoing intercession, 
Christ mediates forgiveness of sins before the Father on behalf of repented believers in 
prayer and empowers them, through the Holy Spirit, to remain faithful to God when they 
face temptation and to serve God in prayer, with praise, proclamation, and altruistic 
actions. Then, the eschatological judgment and salvation mark the conclusion of Christ’s 
soteriological priesthood. With the resolution of the sin problem, He will bring salvation 
to believers in His second coming. 
While many aspects of this overall picture of Christ’s priesthood point to specific 
goals to be achieved,182 my contention in this section is that the notion of covenant 
(mentioned in the need for Christ’s priesthood) constitutes a teleological framework that 
deepens the understanding of Christ’s priesthood and organize specific goals into a 
conceptual whole. 
Better/New Covenant and Goal 
Taking into account the most detailed reference to the new covenant (Heb 8, 
                                                
182 Particularly, the three types of need for Christ’s priesthood and the three types of His priestly 
action indicated above. There are also a couple of statements in the first chapters of Hebrews that seem to 
imply a goal to be achieved. For instance, the bringing of sons to glory (2:10) and their sanctification by 




quoting Jer 31:31-34), we find at least three features of this covenant that imply a goal: 
(1) this covenant is an eschatological promise to be fulfilled (“the days are coming,”183 
8:8); (2) the establishment of the new covenant (8:8) conveys the idea of teleological 
fulfillment, as the verb συντελέω comes from the root τελος;184 and (3) the promise of the 
new covenant makes the previous covenant old (8:13).185  
The basic notion that informs this eschatological fulfillment, that is, the transition 
from a first good/old covenant to a better/new covenant,186 is that the first covenant was a 
theoretical anticipation or a shadow that pointed to the reality of the better/new 
covenant.187 Hence, the first covenant is not replaced because it did not bring into effect 
                                                
183 The language of eschatological “days” also appears in 1:2; 8:10; and 10:16. 
184 This is not an argument simply based on etymological root. I mention the root here to reinforce 
the teleological meaning of the verb. According to BDAG, the verb συντελέω in v. 8 means “to carry out or 
bring into being someth. that has been promised or expected, carry out, fulfill, accomplish.” BDAG, 975. 
185 This is the only instance where the language old is used in reference to the first covenant. This 
covenant is made, declared, or treated as old (verb παλαιόω, see BDAG, 751) by the promise of the new 
covenant (8:13). Overall, the language is of a first covenant (8:7, 13; 9:1, 15, 18; 10:9). Regarding 10:9, in 
the other occurrence of πρῶτος and δεύτερος in Hebrews (8:7), these words seem to refer to a first and 
second covenant. For studies on the covenant in Hebrews, see Ekkehardt Müller, “Jesus and the Covenant 
in Hebrews,” in ‘For You Have Strengthened Me’: Biblical and Theological Studies in Honor of Gerhard 
Pfandl in Celebration of His Sixty-Fifth Birthday (St Peter am Hart, Austria: Seminar Schloss Bogenhofen, 
2007), 189-208; Scott W. Hahn, “A Broken Covenant and the Curse of Death: A Study of Hebrews 9:15-
22,” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 66, no. 3 (2004): 416-436; Scott R. Murray, “The Concept of Διαθήkη 
in the Letter to the Hebrews,” Concordia Theological Quarterly 66, no. 1 (2002): 41-60; John Dunnill, 
Covenant and Sacrifice in the Letter to the Hebrews, Society for New Testament Studies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992); Richard B. Hays, “‘Here We Have No Lasting City’: New 
Covenantalism in Hebrews,” in The Epistle to the Hebrews and Christian Theology, ed. Richard 
Bauckham, Daniel R. Driver, Trevor A. Hart, and Nathan MacDonald (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2009), 151-173; Peter Gräbe, “The New Covenant and Christian Identity in Hebrews,” in Cosmology and 
New Testament Theology, ed. Richard Bauckham, Daniel Driver, Trevor Hart, and Nathan MacDonald 
(London: T&T Clark, 2008), 118-127; Susanne Lehne, The New Covenant in Hebrews, Library of New 
Testament Studies (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997). 
186 The language of a better (κρείττων) covenant appears in 7:22; 8:6, and a new (καινός and νέος 
[12:24]) covenant is found in 8:8; 9:15; 12:24. This covenant is implicitly referred as new (καινός) in 8:13, 
and called second (δεύτερος) in 8:7. In 13:20, there is a reference to the eternal (αἰώνιος) covenant (cf. Isa 
55:3; 61:8; Jer 32:40; Ezek 37:26). 





what it was supposed to bring. Rather, the transition to a better covenant was originally 
intended by God in terms of a theoretical anticipation that gives room to its reality. To be 
more precise, the first covenant188 in Hebrews refers to three interrelated cultic elements: 
priesthood, sanctuary, and sacrifices. In the first covenant, the priesthood was composed 
by a large number of mortal and weak/sinful priests (7:23, 28); the sanctuary was not the 
real/true/perfect one (see 8:2, 5; 9:1, 11, 24); and the priestly service involved multiple 
ineffective sacrifices (7:27; 9:9-10, 25; 10:1-4, 11). Conversely, in the excellent reality of 
the new covenant, there is only one eternal and perfect/sinless high priest (7:16, 24-26), 
who offerered an effective sacrifice once for all (7:27; 9:24-28; 10:10-12, 14) and 
ministers in the real/true/perfect sanctuary (8:2, 5; 9:11, 24).189  
                                                
away because of the arrival of the new covenant, 8:13; 10:9). Indeed, the services (basically sacrifices, 
θυσίαι, 9:9; cf. 10:1) performed in the sanctuary of the first covenant (cf. 9:1) are in force only “until the 
time of the new order” (µέχρι καιροῦ διορθώσεως ἐπικείµενα) (9:10 NIV). The eschatological replacement is 
due to the fact that these services (sacrifices, θυσίαις, 10:1) refer to “a shadow (σκιά) of the good things to 
come (µελλόντων ἀγαθῶν) instead of constituting the true form of these realities (οὐκ αὐτὴν τὴν εἰκόνα τῶν 
πραγµάτων)” (10:1; cf. 8:4b-5a). Therefore, by its own nature, the first covenant could not bring into effect 
the results that belong to the reality to which the first covenant contains only “a sketch and shadow 
(ὑποδείγµατι καὶ σκιᾷ)” (8:5 NRSV, NET). This context explains especially why the first covenant was a 
theoretical anticipation or shadow that pointed to the reality of the better/new covenant. Furthermore, the 
principle of necessity, expressed by the word group ἀναγκαῖος (8:3) ἀνάγκη (9:23), explains why the first 
covenant was a theoretical anticipation or shadow that pointed to the reality of the better/new covenant. 
More specifically, there is a principle of necessity that implies a close relationship between the sketch (cf. 
ὑποδείγµατα in 9:23) and the reality, where the services of the first covenant follow a ritual pattern that 
must take place in the reality of the better/new covenant. 
188 In Hebrews, the language of law (ὁ νόµος) is used to refer to the regulations of the priesthood 
(the order of Aaronic priests, 7:11-12, 28) and its services (especially sacrifices) in the sanctuary setting in 
the context of the first covenant (8:3-4; 10:1). Heb 9:1 explicitly indicates that the first covenant had 
“regulations for worship” (δικαιώµατα λατρείας, the language of δικαιώµατα in 9:10 describes sacrifices 
and purification rites) and a sanctuary (τό τε ἅγιον κοσµικόν). With regard to the priests, the affirmation that 
Jesus is mediator of a better covenant in His priestly ministry (8:6) appears to imply that, comparatively, 
Aaronic priests were mediators of the first covenant (cf. 8:5-4). Therefore, the language of law and of first 
covenant seem to be used interchangeably.  
189 Indeed, the better covenant is characterized by (1) a better priest (7:21-28) who performs (2) a 
better priestly work in a better sanctuary (8:1-6). First, with His priestly appointment (7:21), Christ “has 
become (perfect tense of γίνοµαι) the guarantee (ἔγγυος) of a better covenant” (7:22 NASB). This better 





It is noteworthy that the author of Hebrews explains the transition from the 
priesthood, sanctuary, and sacrifice of the first covenant to those of the better/new 
covenant by using quotations from the LXX (priesthood—Ps 110:4 in Heb 7:17, 21; 
sanctuary—Exod 25:40 in Heb 8:5; sacrifice—Ps 40:6-8 in Heb 10:5-9).190 This OT 
foundation for the elaboration of the new elements in the better/new covenant show that 
the realities of this covenant were originally intended by God to solve the sin problem, as 
they would really take away sins from human beings (cf. Heb 10:4, 9:28). In other words, 
in consonance with the divine plan, the priesthood of Christ aims at being the 
eschatological agency that really removes sins from repented believers. 
The author of Hebrews speaks of this eschatological reality in terms of promises. 
In his words, the better covenant mediated by Christ’s priesthood “has been enacted on 
                                                
by death from continuing His office (7:23-24), and that He does not have the sinful weaknesses of other 
high priests (7:26-28). Second, the better covenant in 8:6 is described in terms of a superior priestly work. 
The idea that Christ is the mediator (µεσίτης) of a better covenant is associated with Christ’s more excellent 
(comparative form of διάφορος) priestly service (λειτουργία—the occurrences of the word group λειτουργός, 
λειτουργία, λειτουργέω in Heb 8:2, 6; 9:21; 10:11 refer to priesthood) in the heavenly sanctuary (8:1-5—in 
8:2, Christ is “a minister in the holy places (τῶν ἁγίων λειτουργὸς), in the true tent that the Lord set up”). 
190 First, the OT basis for the transition in terms of priesthood is Ps 110:4 (cf. Heb 7:17, 21), which 
appears particularly in the section on Christ’s priestly appointment (Heb 7). In Heb 7, Ps 110:4 provides the 
key to explain why Christ can be a high priest without being a levite: He is a priest according to the order 
of Melchizedek. Second, the OT support for the transition of sanctuaries is Exod 25:40 (cf. Heb 8:5). Heb 
8:4-5 stipulates that the services of the first covenant were performed in a sketch and shadow of the true 
heavenly sanctuary. The earthly sanctuary of the first covenant was constructed according to the type of the 
heavenly one. Therefore, the affirmation that Christ is the minister of the real sanctuary is grounded on the 
idea that this sanctuary actually precedes and is the paradigm for the sanctuary of the first covenant. Third, 
the OT basis for a transition from multiple sacrifices to only one sacrifice is Ps 40:6-8 LXX (cf. Heb 10:5-
9). In contrast to the sacrifices of the first covenant (cf. Heb 10:8), Christ offered His own body (cf. Heb 
10:5) to do the will of God (cf. Heb 10:7, 9). “By that will we have been sanctified through the offering of 
the body of Jesus Chris once for all” (Heb 10:10; italics mine). I am indebted to Richard Davidson’s 
remarks on the use of the OT in these elaborations of priesthood, sanctuary, and sacrifice (and even the new 
covenant itself, Jer 31:31-34 in Heb 8:8-12) in Hebrews. In each of these cases, “the author of Hebrews 
introduces a departure from the Levitical type, but he substantiates such a change from the OT itself.” 




better promises” (8:6, NASB).191 The content of these promises (8:8-12; cf. Jer 31:31-34; 
Heb 10:16-17) can be outlined as follows: (1) the divine laws will be internalized in the 
minds and hearts of God’s covenantal people (8:10), (2) there will be a covenantal 
relationship between God and His people (8:10), (3) everyone will know God (8:11), and 
(4) God will forgive human sins (8:12). This is not to say that these four aspects were not 
available to human beings before the beginning of the salvific priesthood of Christ. But 
they were available as an experience grounded in the promise of Christ’s salvific 
priesthood, and not in its reality yet. In terms of the reality of Christ’s priesthood, as He 
mediates this covenant, Christ brings people to a covenantal relationship with God 
(initiation of points 1 to 4) and helps them to stay and grow in this covenant (continuation 
of points 1 to 4). This idea of initiation and continuation seems to be implied in the stages 
of fulfillment of the covenant suggested in the three types of Christ’s priestly actions 
described in the section above (The Actions of the Priest). I infer these stages from the 
overall picture of the priesthood of Christ in Hebrews. I will outline these stages below. 
Stages in the Fulfillment of the Goal192 
Inauguration 
The first type of priestly activity described in The Actions of the Priest was 
Christ’s heavenly offering of His earthly sacrifice at His official inauguration as priest 
                                                
191 ἐπὶ κρείττοσιν ἐπαγγελίαις νενοµοθέτηται. Considering that the majority of the NT occurrences 
of ἐπαγγελία is found in Hebrews (4:1; 6:12, 15, 17; 8:6; 9:15; 10:36; 11:9, 13, 17, 33, 39), this seems to be 
a key word in this book. 
192 To be sure, each one of the stages described below could be considered a specific goal. 
Furthermore, I have indicated above several individual goals in Hebrews. However, I keep the language of 
goal (singular) because I see individual goals from the perspective of a conceptual whole that implies a 




and king of the heavenly sanctuary. In terms of covenant, the goal of this activity seems 
to be the inauguration of the new/better covenant, which is compared with the 
inauguration of the first covenant (9:15-21).193 As Richard Davidson indicates, the 
inauguration of the first covenant was a large “integrally bound-up complex of 
inauguration/consecration events connected with the commencement of the Hebrew 
cultus,”194 which included the presentation of commandments of the law, sacrificial 
blood, and the consecration of the tabernacle with this blood (9:19-21).195 It is 
noteworthy that the consecration/inauguration of the tabernacle involved the consecration 
                                                
193 According to Hahn, the term Διαθήkη in Heb 9:16-17 should not be rendered as testament or 
will, but be consistent with the other occurrences of the term in Hebrews, which convey the meaning of 
covenant. In his words, “In the new covenant, Christ indeed dies, but he is a mediator (Heb 9:15; 12:24), 
not a ‘testator.’ Moreover, he does not die in order to leave an inheritance to the Church, but rather to enter 
the inheritance himself (Heb 1:3–4; 2:9; 9:11–12; 10:12–13), which he then shares with his ‘brothers’ (Heb 
2:10–3:6). Clearly, then, the mode of the inheritance of salvation in Hebrews is based on a Jewish 
covenantal and not a Greco-Roman testamentary model.” Scott W. Hahn, “Covenant, Cult, and the Curse-
of-Death: ΔιαθήΚη in Heb 9:15–22,” in Hebrews: Contemporary Methods, New Insights, ed. Gabriella 
Gelardini (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005), 70. In his remarks on 9:17, Hahn calls the attention to the 
expression διαθήκη γὰρ ἐπὶ νεκροῖς βεβαία, which conveys the idea that a covenant is confirmed upon dead 
[bodies], which suggests the sacrifice of animals (see Gen 15:9-10; Jer 34:18-20). Ibid., 73, 75. As hinted in 
Heb 9:18-20, “the Sinai covenant is solemnized by the sprinkling of the people with the blood of the animal 
sacrifices after their solemn promise to obey the covenant stipulations (Exod 24:3-8), conveying the 
concept, ‘As was done to the animals, so may it be done to us if we fail to keep the covenant.’” Ibid., 79. 
According to this view, “the purpose of Heb 9:16-17 is to explain why a death was necessary, given the 
predicament of the broken first covenant” indicated in 9:15. The explanation is that “where there is a 
covenant, it is necessary for the death of the covenant-maker to be endured [when transgressions have taken 
place].” The author of Hebrews “leaves open the possibility that the death of the covenant-maker might be 
borne by a designated representative, e.g., the high-priest Jesus. He only stresses that, because of 
transgression (Heb 9:15), someone must bear the curse-of-death” (compare with Heb 9:28; Isa 53 LXX). 
Ibid., 81-83. Following this perspective, “a broken covenant demands the death of the covenant-maker 
(Heb 9:16), and it is not being enforced while the offending covenant-maker lives (Heb 9:17).” Indeed, “the 
first covenant entailed the curse-of-death for those who broke it (Heb 2:2; 10:28), which Christ takes upon 
himself as Israel’s corporate representative (Heb 2:9, 14; 9:28), thus freeing those under the first covenant 
from the curse-of-death (Heb 2:15; 10:14) and providing for them a new and better covenant (Heb 9:28; 
10:15-17; 12:22-24).” Ibid., 85. 
194 Richard M. Davidson, “Inauguration or Day of Atonement?: A Response to Norman Young’s 
‘Old Testament Background to Hebrews 6:19-20 Revisited’,” AUSS 40, no. 1 (2002): 72. 
195 Mary D’Angelo speaks of a conflation of the inauguration of the covenant, the consecration of 
the priests, and the inauguration of the sanctuary in Heb 9:16-21. See Mary Rose D’Angelo, Moses in the 





of Aaron and his sons to the priesthood (see Exod 40:9-15; Lev 8-9).196 Therefore, from a 
biblical typological perspective,197 the inauguration of the new/better covenant is a fitting 
framework for the understanding of the official initiation of Christ’s priesthood in 
Hebrews. In this context, the passages that describe His entrance into the heavenly 
sanctuary (6:19-20; 9:11-12, 24-25) in the ascension (4:14) are pointing to the official 
inauguration of His priesthood, and by implication, as a complex of events, the 
inauguration of the heavenly sanctuary for His salvific priesthood. These events were 
necessary to inaugurate the promised new/better covenant. 
This conception is obviously different from the traditional idea maintained in 
Hebrews scholarship that Christ’s entrance into the heavenly sanctuary referred to the OT 
Day of Atonement (Lev 16).198 While the traditional idea emphasizes Christ’s entrance 
                                                
1979), 243-249. 
196 In Leviticus, the emphasis is on the consecration of Aaron and his sons to the priesthood. The 
consecration of the tabernacle appears in 8:10-11. 
197 Davidson tentatively defines biblical typology as “the study of certain OT salvation-historical 
realities (persons, events, institutions) which God specifically designed to correspond to, and to be 
prospective/predictive prefigurations of, their ineluctable (devoir-être) and absolutely escalated 
eschatological fulfillment aspects (inaugurated/appropriated/consummated) within NT salvation history.” 
Richard M. Davidson, “Typological Structures in the Old and New Testaments,” (Th.D. dissertation, 
Andrews University, 1981), 3. For studies on typology in Hebrews, see Davidson, “Typology in the Book 
of Hebrews,” 121-186; Alberto R. Treiyer, “Antithetical or Correspondence Typology?,” in Issues in the 
Book of Hebrews, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, 1989), 187-198. 
198 For a helpful overview of the Day of Atonement as the primary background for the 
understanding of Christ’s ascension in Hebrews, see Cortez, “‘The Anchor of the Soul That Enters Within 
the Veil’,” 9-18. Cortez indicates that “a majority of expositors consider that Jesus’ ascension in Hebrews 
is structured in three stages that correspond to the Day of Atonement ritual: (1) the passion and death of 
Jesus correspond to the immolation of the victim (Heb 9:13, 14), (2) the ascension to heaven corresponds to 
the entrance of the high priest into the holy of holies (9:11-12), (3) and Jesus’ purification of believers 
corresponds to the purification of the heavenly sanctuary (9:23). Some add a fourth stage, Jesus’ second 
coming corresponds to the exit of the high priest from the holy of holies on the Day of Atonement (9:28).” 
For extensive bibliographical information of scholars who advance these stages (which includes Craig 
Koester, Donald Hagner, Richard Nelson, Kennet Schenck, Norman Young, Gareth Cockerill, David 
deSilva, George Guthrie, Paul Ellingworth, William Lane, John Scholer, F. F. Bruce, Harold Attridge, 
David Peterson, William Loader), see ibid., 13n1, 16n1. Furthermore, Cortez provides a summary of the 





into the Most Holy Place,199 following the type of the Day of Atonement,200 the position 
adopted in the present study has the whole sanctuary in view in its account of Christ’s 
entrance, as indicated in the OT type of inauguration.201 According to the OT 
                                                
Atonement and the ascension of Christ in Hebrews: (1) “absence of ‘affliction of the soul’ in relation to 
Jesus’ entrance into the heavenly sanctuary,” (2) “the Azazel ritual is omitted,” (3) “the sprinkling of Jesus’ 
blood in heaven does not refer to the Day of Atonement ritual,” (4) “the Day of Atonement provides only 
secondary imagery to Jesus’ sacrifice.” Ibid., 19-30. The third and the fourth points of the summary 
indicate the new covenant is the main reference for the sprinkling of Christ’s blood in heaven and the 
primary imagery for His sacrifice. As Cortez mentions, “The only explicit references to the Day of 
Atonement are found in Heb 8-10 . . . , but it is in these chapters where the institution of the new covenant 
dominates the argument.” Ibid., 30. 
199 See stage (2) in the previous footnote. 
200 It is important to highlight, however, that the Day of Atonement did not focus only on the most 
holy place. Rather, it was the entire tabernacle that was purified on that day (see Lev 16:14-20). Therefore, 
the Day of Atonement also had the whole sanctuary in view, and not only the most holy place. 
201 In Cortez’s helpful overview of suggestions in secondary literature regarding the primary OT 
background for the understanding of Christ’s ascension in Hebrews, the idea of inauguration that I 
subscribe here is the one labeled as “Moses Inauguration of the Sanctuary.” See Cortez, “‘The Anchor of 
the Soul That Enters Within the Veil’,” 31-36. Cortez indicates that some “scholars allow for a double 
analogy of Jesus’ ascension that would include the Day of Atonement and Moses’ inauguration of the 
sanctuary,” and Ellingworth is an example of that. Ibid., 31n1. It is noteworthy that Ellingworth maintains 
that in 9:11-14 the Day of Atonement is “the typological counterpart of the sacrifice and exaltation of 
Christ,” while in 9:23 purification is interpreted as consecration or inauguration of the sanctuary. 
Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 445, 477. Similarly, Davies, Hurst, and Spicq interpret 9:23 in 
terms of inauguration of the sanctuary. See John H. Davies, A Letter to Hebrews, Cambridge Bible 
Commentary: New English Bible (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 91; Lincoln D. Hurst, The 
Epistle to the Hebrews: Its Background of Thought, Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 38; Spicq, L’Épitre aux Hébreux, 2:267. More 
specific emphases on the idea of inauguration are offered by D’Angelo and Dahl. D’Angelo argues that 
ἐπιτελεῖν in Heb 8:5 means complete or consecrate, and not simply build. For her, the tabernacle was 
completed only when it was consecrated (Exod 40:33; Num 7:1). D’Angelo, Moses in the Letter to the 
Hebrews, 234. In his turn, Dahl stipulates that in Heb 10:19-25 the verb ἐγκαινίζω (v. 20; compare with 
9:18) is a cultic term that conveys the idea of consecration or inauguration. Hence, Christ opened or 
consecrated the entrance to the sanctuary. In his words, “the opening of the way through the curtain as a 
cultic act of consecration, identical with the ratification of the new covenant.” Dahl, “A New and Living 
Way,” 403-404. A detailed proposal of the idea of the inauguration of the heavenly sanctuary is delineated 
in Richard M. Davidson, “Christ’s Entry ‘within the Veil’ in Hebrews 6:19-20: The Old Testament 
Background,” AUSS 39, no. 2 (2001): 175-190. As Cortez indicates, Davidson’s proposal draws on 
Vanhoye’s and Shea’s literary analysis of the structure of Hebrews and assumes that “Heb 6:19-20; 9:11-
14, 24; and 10:19-22 are parallel passages that refer to the same event and sould explain one another.” 
Cortez, “‘The Anchor of the Soul That Enters Within the Veil’,” 32. Cortez provides a helpful 5-point 
summary of the arguments articulated by Davidson: (1) “Jesus is king and high priest. The fact that he is 
described in Hebrews as being a high priest ‘according to the order of Melchizedek’ makes clear that 
Hebrews does not wish to establish an Aaron-Jesus typology. Aaron is not king. Moses, instead, functions 
in Hebrews as a type of Jesus (3:1-6; 9:15-24). Moses functions as a king high priest, particularly in his role 





background, the Day of Atonement (cf. Lev 16:16, 18-20, 33) was not the only ritual that 
included an entrance into the most holy place.202 The other ritual that included this 
entrance was the ritual of inauguration or initial consecration of the sanctuary (cf. Exod 
40:1-9; Lev 8:10-12; Num 7:1; Heb 9:21), which obviously preceeded the various rituals 
during the year that culminated on the Day of Atonement ritual.203 
However, this does not mean that there are no points of contact between the Day 
of Atonement ritual and the inauguration of Christ’s priesthood (and, accordingly, the 
inauguration of the new/better covenant and the eschatological salvific inauguration of 
the heavenly sanctuary). In fact, there are two points of contact that can be highlighted, 
one in terms of reality and the other in terms of parable. First, in terms of reality, while 
this study assumes that the typological OT Day of Atonement ritual points to the 
                                                
room of the sanctuary as part of the inauguration rites (Exod 26:33; 40:1-9; Lev 8:10-12; and Num 7:1)”; 
(2) “Hebrews 10:19-22 refers to the ‘new and living way which He [Jesus] inaugurated [ἐνεκαίνισεν] for us 
through the veil’ (NASB). It is argued that the verb ἐγκαινίζω is used here in a cultic sense just as in Heb 
9:18 where it refers to the inauguration of the first covenant—which includes the inauguration of the 
Mosaic tabernacle (vv. 19-21). Therefore, the ‘new and living way’ denotes the heavenly sanctuary which 
is inaugurated by Christ”; (3) “Hebrews 9:12 refers to the sacrifices ‘of goats and calves’ (τράγων καὶ 
µόσχων). The word for goats (τράγων) does not appear in the sacrifices of the Day of Atonement in Lev 16 
(LXX) but appears only in Num 7 where the inauguration rites of the sanctuary are described. There, the 
sacrifices of calves (µόσχων) also appear. Thus Num 7-8 is the only place in the LXX where there is 
reference to the sacrifices of goats and calves (τράγων καὶ µόσχων). Hebrews 9:19 mentions both kinds of 
animals for the sacrifice of the inauguration of the covenant”; (4) “Hebrews 9:24 describes Jesus’ entrance 
into the heavenly sanctuary in the context of the inauguration of the new covenant and the tabernacle as 
described in 9:15-22. Richard M. Davidson concedes, however, that in this case the cleansing of the 
heavenly sanctuary remains ambiguous and refers to the inauguration of the sanctuary (9:15-22) as well as 
the Day of Atonement (9:25).” Ibid., 32-34. My view in this dissertation is aligned with Davidson’s 
position. For a criticism of this position and Davidson’s response to it, see Davidson, “Inauguration or Day 
of Atonement?,” 69-88; Norman H. Young, “The Day of Dedication or the Day of Atonement?: The Old 
Testament Background to Hebrews 6:19-20 Revisited,” AUSS 40, no. 1 (2002): 61-68. See also Roy Gane, 
“Re-Opening Katapetasma (‘Veil’) in Hebrews 6:19,” AUSS 38, no. 1 (2000): 5-8. 
202 For further details about the Day of Atonement, see Gane, Cult and Character, 275-276. 
203 As Davidson claims, “Besides the Day of Atonement, the only other occasion in which the 
Most Holy Place was entered was by Moses in his (priestly) work of anointing/inaugurating the sanctuary 
before Aaron the high priest was anointed (Exod 40:1-9; Lev 8:10-12; Num 7:1).” Davidson, “Christ’s 




eschatological Day of Atonement, that is, the final judgment (see subsection Final 
Purification below), this assumption does not imply that there will be sacrifices to be 
offered in the final judgment as in the OT Day of Atonement ritual. Rather, the sacrificial 
elements of the typological Day of Atonement were fulfilled in Christ’s once for all 
earthly sacrifice presented to the Father in heaven at the inauguration of the new/better 
covenant in His ascension (cf. Heb 9:24-26).204 In fact, the sacrificial elements of all 
rituals in the OT cultus (including the Day of Atonement) were fulfilled in the reality of 
Christ’s one sacrifice (cf. 7:27; 10:1, 4, 11-12).205 
Second, in terms of parable, the Day of Atonement ritual is a parable (cf. 9:9)206 
                                                
204 In his study of the the unambiguous allusions to the Day of Atonement in Hebrews (9:6-7, 24-
25; 10:1-4), Johnsson highlights that “all ritual sacrifices—whether daily or yearly, public or private—
pointed forward to the cross and met their sacrificial aspect in the death of Christ. However, other features 
of these could find their fulfillment only in connection with Christ’s priestly ministry subsequent to 
Calvary.” Following this perspective, he argues that “the Levitical Day of Atonement does have an initial 
fulfillment at the cross,” as far as the sacrificial aspect is concerned. According to Johnsson, the 
unambiguous allusions to the Day of Atonement are used in Hebrews in the context of the discussion of the 
“efficacy of sacrifice.” William G. Johnsson, “Day of Atonement Allusions,” in Issues in the Book of 
Hebrews, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, 1989), 106, 115, 119. 
Therefore, the Day of Atonement is referred in Hebrews essentially in its sacrificial aspect.  
205 According to Hebrews, the sacrifices of the OT cultus, offered either daily (7:27; 10:11) or 
yearly (10:1), were fulfilled (cf. 10:1) in Christ’s one sacrifice. See also the first quotation indicated in the 
previous footnote.  
206 The Day of Atonement in 9:7 is part of a parable (παραβολή, 9:9), in which the two apartments 
of the tabernacle (holy place and most holy place, cf. 9:1-5) and the correspondent daily (in the first 
apartment) and yearly (access to the second apartment, Day of Atonement) services represent two 
ages/covenants that correspond to two sanctuaries—the earthly/first tabernacle (πρώτης σκηνῆς—the 
heavenly sanctuary is referred in 9:11 as “the greater and more perfect tent [σκηνῆς] not made with hands.” 
The use of σκηνῆς in this verse seems to establish a contrast with the earthly/first tabernacle [πρώτης 
σκηνῆς]) and the heavenly sanctuary (τῶν ἁγίων—the other occurrences of τῶν ἁγίων in Hebrews [8:2; 
10:19] refer to the heavenly sanctuary) (see 9:6-10). Therefore, the two types of time (daily and yearly 
services) and space (first and second apartments) in the cultus of the earthly sanctuary serve as a parable for 
the transition from the Aaronic priesthood to Christ’s priesthood in terms of time (the age of the first 
covenant and the age of the new/better covenant) and space (the earthly sanctuary and the heavenly 
sanctuary). Considering that the second type of time (yearly) and space (second apartment) refers to the 
Day of Atonement and corresponds, in this parable, to the new covenant/heavenly sanctuary, one may ask 
what would be the parallel between the Day of Atonement and the new covenant/heavenly sanctuary in the 
parable. One possible answer would be that the heavenly sanctuary is the second apartment (the most holy 





of singularity in the new/better covenant, in contrast to the plurality in the first covenant 
exemplified by the daily service.207 On the Day of Atonement, only the high priest (µόνος 
ὁ ἀρχιερεύς) goes into the second apartment—in contrast to the plurality of priests (οἱ 
ἱερεῖς) going daily in the first apartment, and this is done only once (ἅπαξ) a year—in 
contrast to the plurality of times (διὰ παντὸς)208 the priests enter the first apartment in the 
daily service (9:6-7). Indeed, the root ἅπαξ (that includes the adverbs ἅπαξ and ἐφάπαξ) 
in Hebrews is used to describe the one sacrificial offering of Christ (7:27; 9:26, 28) and 
His one entrance into the heavenly sanctuary (9:12), in contrast to the plurality of 
sacrifices and entrances of the Aaronic priesthood in general. However, being part of the 
first covenant, even the OT Day of Atonement is characterized by plurality and 
repetition. In contrast to the work of Christ, the plurality/repetition of sacrifices and 
entrances into the sanctuary were performed every (κατά) year (9:25; 10:1, 3). 
In this parable, the Day of Atonement points to the fulfillment of the singularity 
of Christ as (high) priest and the singularity of His one offering in the inauguration of the 
                                                
However, this answer is inadequate. First, from a broader perspective of the priesthood of Christ in 
Hebrews, His work in the heavenly sanctuary includes a continuous intercessory activity (see 7:25) that is 
similar, in terms of temporal continuity, to the daily activities performed in the first apartment of the earthly 
sanctuary. Second, from the standpoint of the spatial logic of the parable in 9:6-10, if the heavenly 
sanctuary is the second apartment (the most holy place), then, from the logic of transition emphasized in the 
parable, the earthly sanctuary would be the holy place. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the earthly sanctuary 
had two apartments and not only one. Hence, the logical point of the parable is that the transition from one 
apartment to the other in the earthly sanctuary represents the transition from one entire (earthly) sanctuary 
to another entire (heavenly) sanctuary. 
207 The transition from plurality (first covenant) to singularity (new covenant) is discussed by 
Cortez as part of his argument that the Day of Atonement in Heb 9:6-10 functions as a metaphor of 
transition between the covenants. See Felix H. Cortez, “From the Holy to the Most Holy Place: The Period 
of Hebrews 9:6-10 and the Day of Atonement as a Metaphor of Transition,” Journal of Biblical Literature 
125, no. 3 (2006): 543-544. 
208 This expression means “always, continually, constantly.” BDAG, 224. A literal translation of 




covenant at Christ’s ascension. This inauguration provides the necessary framework for 
the daily mediation of the new/better covenant, which I will describe below. 
Daily mediation 
The second type of priestly activity described in The Actions of the Priest was 
Christ’s ongoing salvific mediation. In terms of covenant, this could be compared to the 
OT daily service (209(ָּתִמיד of the priesthood.210 The goal of this activity seems to be the 
provision of divine forgiveness and the internalization of the divine laws in God’s 
covenantal people (cf. 8:9, 12; 10:16-17),211 which are respectively related to Christ’s 
mediatorial actions of intercession for forgiveness and empowerment of believers. Taking 
into account that Christ’s once for all sacrifice is a distinctive feature of His priesthood 
(cf. 7:27; 10:11-12), His ongoing mediation is not accompanied by continuous sacrifices 
as in the daily service of the OT priesthood. Rather, His continuous mediation is based on 
the one sacrifice.  
According to Hebrews, the goal of bringing people to a new covenantal 
relationship with God achieved at the beginning of Christ’s heavenly priesthood does not 
                                                
209 In the typology of the first covenant, the connection between covenant and the priestly daily 
service is indicated in Hebrews: “The first covenant had regulations for worship (λατρείας) and an earthly 
place of holiness” (9:1). This worship in the earthly sanctuary of the first covenant is described in 9:6 in 
terms of daily service: “The priests go regularly into the first section, performing their ritual duties.” 
210 See Exod 25:30; 27:20; 28:29-30, 38; 29:38, 42; 30:8; Lev 6:6, 13; 24:2-4, 8; Num 4:7, 16; 
28:3, 6, 15, 23-24, 31; 29:6, 11, 16, 19, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34, 38. 
211 While the new covenant mentioned in 8:8-12 entails four promises (the internalization of the 
divine laws [8:10], a covenantal relationship between God and His people [8:10], universal knowledge of 
God [8:11], and divine forgiveness [8:12]), the reference to the new covenant in 10:16-17 mentions only 
the internalization of the divine laws (10:16) and divine forgiveness (10:17). In fact, these two promises 
seem to be the basis for the other promises in 8:10-12. The covenantal relationship between God and His 
people follows the internalization of the divine laws in 8:10. Likewise, divine forgiveness (8:12) is the 




mean that His priesthood has achieved its ultimate goal. This notion is expressed in 
10:14, where Christ has perfected212 believers for all time (τετελείωκεν εἰς τὸ διηνεκὲς), 
but they “are being sanctified” (present participle: τοὺς ἁγιαζοµένους).213 In fact, even the 
language of sanctification of believers is used in a complete and an incomplete sense in 
Hebrews. In a complete sense, this language is expressed in the perfect participle 
(ἡγιασµένοι ἐσµὲν, 10:10) and in the aorist (ἡγιάσθη, 10:29). In these two cases, 
sanctification is related to Christ’s sacrificial offering or blood, and seems to describe 
cultic purification (see 9:13; 13:12). In other cases, the present participle (οἱ ἁγιαζόµενοι, 
2:11) is employed, such as in 10:14, and the incomplete sense of sanctification is clearly 
highlighted in the exhortation that believers should pursue holiness/sanctification 
(ἁγιασµός, 12:14). Likewise, the language of incompleteness appears in the idea that 
believers are “receiving (present participle: παραλαµβάνοντες) a kingdom” (12:28), in the 
                                                
212 Several passages imply that Christ’s priesthood brings perfection (expressed by the noun 
τελείωσις and the verb τελειόω) to human beings (see 7:11, 19; 9:9; 10:1, 14) is closely related to a new and 
better covenant (7:22; 8:6; 9:15; 12:24). The affirmation that Christ has perfected believers (τελειόω, 10:14; 
implied in 7:11; 9:9) involves the perfecting (9:9) or the purification of their conscience (10:1-2, 22; 9:14). 
The verb τελειόω (to make perfect) comes from the root τελος suggests the idea of bringing to a teleological 
fulfillment. Just as Christ was made perfect in the sense of going through an experience that enabled Him to 
achieve the goal of being a merciful high priest, believers are made perfect by Christ’s priesthood in the 
sense that His work enabled them to achieve the goal of being in a new covenantal relationship with God. 
Indeed, 7:19 seems to conceive the perfection of believers in terms of their drawing near to God through 
hope (see also 6:19), and in 9:14 the purification of the conscience from sins has the purpose of enabling 
them to serve God. This language of service (λατρεύω) is also used in 12:28, where the author urges the 
audience to offer to God a grateful service. This service seems to be described in 13:1-17. See Cockerill, 
The Epistle to the Hebrews, 676. See also Koester, Hebrews, 554-556; Lane, Hebrews 9-13, 497-498.  
213 In his remarks on τοὺς ἁγιαζοµένους in 10:14, Ellingworth indicates that “the force of the 
present participle, in apparent contrast with the perfect ἡγιασµένοι in v. 10, is disputed . . . : is it timeless (so 
Riggenbach, Bruce), iterative (“those who from time to time receive sanctification”; unlikely in this 
context), or durative (“those who are in the process of sanctification”; so Michel)? The most likely 
explanations, not mutually exclusive, are (1) that the author felt that yet another perfect here would be 
redundant; and (2) that the present was used to balance the previous words and avoid the possible 
implication that Christians had already reached their goal.” Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 511. 




benediction prayer that God may equip or make believers complete (καταρτίσαι214) in 
everything good to do His will, working in them through Jesus Christ (13:21), and in the 
statement that Christ will appear a second time for salvation (9:28). 
Furthermore, the reality of sin was not completely eliminated, even among 
believers. The persistent reality of sin can be observed in three levels of information in 
Hebrews. First, believers depend on a merciful priestly expiation of their sins, as they 
constantly experience temptation (2:17-18) followed by sin (4:15).215 Fortunately, Christ 
the high priest sympathizes (4:15) and intercedes constantly for them (7:25). Second, 
there are pastoral admonitions exhorting believers to resist or fight against sin (12:4). 
They should lay aside sin (12:1) and avoid the danger of becoming defiled (µιανθῶσιν,216 
12:15). This reference to defilement provides the transition to a third level, characterized 
by strong warnings against defiant sins, which describe a rejection of the person and 
work that made the new covenant possible.217 Considering the persistent reality of sin, 
                                                
214 This verb, which is in the optative aorist form here, means to “put into proper condition,” 
“adjust, complete, make complete.” BDAG, 526. While the rendition equip is selected by ESV, NASB, 
NIV, the translation make complete is used by NRSV. In 1 Thess 3:10, καταρτίζω describes the action of 
supplying. See also 1 Pet 5:10.  
215 This situation of temptation and sin describes the weaknesses of human beings (4:15). 
216 While the verb µιαίνω refers to sexual immorality in this passage (see 12:16) it has cultic 
overtones in the LXX. In fact, the majority of the LXX occurrences of this verb are found in Leviticus (32 
times).  
217 In these warnings, believers should not neglect salvation (2:3) nor “be hardened by the 
deceitfulness of sin” (3:13; see also 3:8, 12, 15; 4:3), which is expressed in terms of rebellious disobedience 
(4:6-7). In fact, the apostasy of defiant sins is portrayed as intentionally causing a new crucifixion of Christ 
(6:4-6). The continuous practice of defiant deliberate sin leads to the breaking of their covenantal 
relationship with God, as “there no longer remains a sacrifice for sins” (10:26). This continuous practice is 
vividly portrayed as the trampling underfoot of Christ and the profanation of the blood of the covenant that 
had previously sanctified or purified the one who is now breaking the new covenant (see 10:29). The point 
of all these warnings against defiant sins is that they will lead to the condemnation of the divine judgment 




believers in the new covenant still have their weaknesses, they still need to fight against 
sin, and they still run the risk of willfully breaking the covenant with defiant sins. The 
implication of this reality is that as high priest Christ not only brings people to a new 
covenantal relationship with God by means of the intercession of divine forgiveness, but 
also empowers them to remain and grow in this covenant. This would be the systematic 
meaning of the affirmation that He is the mediator of a better/new covenant (8:6; 9:15; 
12:24). 
The ultimate effect of the daily mediation takes place with the final purification 
that fully establishes the new/better covenant. This last phase is spelled out below. 
Final purification 
The third type of priestly activity described in The Actions of the Priest was the 
eschatological judgment and salvation. In terms of covenant, the goal of this activity 
seems to be the final consummation of the new/better covenant, which typologically 
corresponds to the OT Day of Atonement. As indicated above on the discussion of 
Inauguration, while many scholars relate the Day of Atonement ritual with the ascension 
of Christ, I relate it with the eschatological judgment. To be sure, as highlighted in that 
discussion as well, the sacrificial aspect of this ritual was fulfilled with the Christ’s 
earthly sacrifice and His ascension, and the Day of Atonement is a parable about the 
singularity seen in Christ’s priesthood (one high priest, one entrance). However, the goal 
or logic of the Day of Atonement ritual as a whole, as a general judgment where God’s 
covenantal people is finally and corporately purified, delineates the typological 





Like the Christological daily mediation, the eschatological Day of Atonement 
does not involve the offering of sacrifices, given the uniqueness of Christ’s sacrifice. Just 
as His daily mediation is based on His past sacrifice, the final purification is also based 
on the same past sacrifice. Furthermore, the final eschatological purification does not take 
away the purification or forgiveness of sins performed by Christ in His ascension (cf. 1:3; 
9:15) or the expiation or forgiveness of sins performed by Him in His daily mediation (cf. 
2:17)219 but rather assumes them. Thus, in light of the typological OT sequence of daily 
service and Day of Atonement, the ultimate validity of the purification in Christ’s 
ascension and of His ongoing expiation of sins has in view the final purification, when 
the sin problem will be completely eradicated. 
In fact, both the purification of the inauguration and of an eschatological Day of 
Atonement can be potentially informed by the reference to the purification of the 
heavenly things or the heavenly sanctuary in 9:23.220 The former conveys the idea of 
                                                
218 In my view, the identification of the logic of the Day of Atonement with the ascension of Christ 
is problematic in the sense that the ascension of Christ does not fully eliminate the reality of the sin 
problem. I am assuming here that, from the vantage point of Hebrews, the repetition of the Day of 
Atonement every year is not part of the logic of the Day of Atonement. Rather, the repetition shows the 
weakness of a ritual that contains only a shadow of the reality of Christ’s priesthood, namely, the incapacity 
to remove sins. When compared with the reality of Christ, who has the power to take away sins, the logic of 
the Day of Atonement is of a final elimination of sin. 
219 I explore these concepts above in The Actions of the Priest (see The Heavenly Offering of His 
Earthly Sacrifice and Ongoing Salvific Mediation, Intercession for Forgiveness). 
220 The elaboration of this statement in this paragraph is consistent with Doukhan’s interpretation 
of Dan 8:14 and 9:24-27. Whereas the prophecy of 70 weeks in Dan 9:24-27 “foretells the coming of a 
Messiah by reference to the first ordination of the High Priest and his role in the continual offering,” “the 
prophecy of 2300 evenings and mornings” in Dan 8:14 “foretells the coming of Kippur by reference to the 
princely figure of the High Priest in the service on the Day of Atonement. The two events are set up in 
connection with each other, and are placed in the same perspective, pointing in the same direction—to 
salvation.” To support this view of Dan 9:24-27, Doukhan argues that “Daniel 9:24 and Ex. 29:36, 37 are 





initial consecration of the sanctuary, whereas the latter is related to a complete 
purification of the sins of the people accumulated in the sanctuary (a corporate 
judgment).221 If the latter is implied, the purification of the heavenly sanctuary in 9:23 
refers to the final judgment that leads to the consummation of the new/better covenant. 
Grammatically speaking, the infinitive form of the verb καθαρίζω does not provide an 
answer for the time (e.g., past, present, future) of purification. What is affirmed is the 
necessity of the heavenly things to be purified.222 Textually speaking, the statement in v. 
23 is immediately surrounded by the discussion of the inauguration of the covenant (vv. 
                                                
Most Holy.” “In context, Ex. 29:36, 37 deals with the ordination of the first High Priest in Israel and refers 
to the institution of the ‘continual burnt offering,’ a token of God’s presence among His people” (cf. Exod 
29:42-44). Hence, “by echoing the text of Exodus 29, the prophecy of Daniel 9 directly connects the event 
of the atoning death of the Messiah with the ordination of the High Priest and the institution of the sign of 
permanence presence of God among His people, namely the continual burning offering.” With regard to the 
view of Dan 8:14, Doukhan stipulates that “the prophecy of 2300 evenings and mornings implies the 
involvement of the High Priest as it relates to the Day of Atonement.” The following arguments are offered 
to support this interpretation: (1) the LXX “has preserved a translation of Daniel 8:14 which points to the 
cleansing of the sanctuary” (καθαρισθήσεται τὸ ἅγιον) “—that is, the Day of Atonement, thereby supporting 
an old tradition of interpretation which was later adopted by Rashi”; (2) “the parallelism between the 
sequence of the events reported by Daniel 7 and that of Daniel 8 makes the judgment and the Day of 
Atonement coincide. This correspondence is also confirmed outside Daniel, by the liturgical and rabbinical 
Jewish tradition which relates the Day of Atonement to the Day of Judgment”; (3) “the unexpected use of 
the association of ram-goat in Daniel 8 alludes to the Levitical ritual of Kippur”; (4) “the designation of” 
 prince) as the main personage involved there” (cf. Dan 8:11) “and His clothes of linen hint at the High)“ ַׂשר
Priest at work on the Day of Atonement.” The term ַׂשר “points to the High Priest in many texts of the Old 
Testament (1 Chron. 15:22; 24:5; Ezra 8:24). Within the book of Daniel,” this term “refers to Michael 
(10:5, 13, 21; 12:1), whose garments are reminiscent of the Day of Atonement, the only day the priest was 
thus dressed (Lev. 16:4)”—“cf. Sir 45:24 where the word prostates: prince designates the High Priest; cf. 
Fl. Josephus, Ant. XII, r, 2; cf. 1 Macc. 13:42.” Jacques Doukhan, Daniel: The Vision of the End (Berrien 
Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1987), 37-38, 128n73. 
221 Gane emphasizes the idea that the Day of Atonement is as a corporate judgment in Israel. In his 
words, “Fates of Israelites are affected or even decided throughout the year according to the ways in which 
they relate to Yhwh. But separation between truly loyal and disloyal people is completed on the Day of 
Atonement. By the end of this day there are only two classes of Israelites: (1) a remnant who are morally 
‘pure,’ that is, having no impediments to their relationship with Yhwh (Lev 16:30), and (2) those who have 
no future with Yhwh and his people (23:29–30). So we find that, within the Israelite cultic year, the Day of 
Atonement completes the determination of destinies on the national level and in this sense can be regarded 
as Israel’s judgment day.” Gane, Cult and Character, 306. 




18-21) and the ascension of Christ (v. 24). But it also has in view the Day of Atonement 
(9:25) and the eschatological judgment and salvation (vv. 27-28) that point to the 
consummation of the covenant.223 
While the eschatological judgment is against those who decided to drift away 
from their covenantal relationship with Him (defiant sinners who broke the new/better 
covenant, cf. 10:26-31; 12:25-27), Christ will appear a second time for the salvation of 
those who are faithfully living in this covenantal relationship. This salvation seems to be 
connected with the teleological notions of bringing sons to glory (2:10), entering into 
divine rest (4:11), and the final inheritance of promises (6:12; see also 9:15; 10:36; 11:13; 
39). To use a covenantal language in its fullest sense, the God of Abraham will be the 
God of the saved, and they will be His people (8:10). They shall all know Him (8:11).224  
Overall, this section indicated that the goal of Christ’s priesthood is not limited to 
removing sins from human beings, but is more fully understood as establishing the reality 
of a covenantal relationship between God and human beings. 
                                                
223 In both cases, the sacrificial blood of Christ is the basis of purification (9:23), either for the 
initiation of the new covenantal relationship with God or the judgment that will fully consummate this 
relationship. More importantly, these two possible explanations are related to the initial and final goal of 
Christ’s priesthood, the inauguration and consummation of the new covenantal relationship of believers 
with God. It is possible, therefore, that the language of purification of the heavenly sanctuary refers both to 
the inauguration of the covenant and the eschatological judgment that leads to the consummation of the 
covenant. According to Davidson, “while Heb 9:23 harks back to the inauguration, and the implications of 
this are drawn in v. 24, at the same time the nontemporal statement of v. 23 (‘necessity . . . to be cleansed’) 
appears to be intentionally ambiguous, and the same language could also have reference to the Day of 
Atonement. Such a double meaning seems likely, inasmuch as the author, building upon this verse, shifts to 
unmistakable language of the Day of Atonement in vv. 25-28.” Ibid., 187. 
224 Among the occurrences of the language of knowing (expressed by the verb ידע) God in 
Jeremiah, from where Hebrews quotes the promise of a new covenant, two types of passages are identified. 
Negatively, unfaithful people are referred and accused by God as not knowing Him (2:8; 4:22; 9:2 MT [9:3 
ESV], 5 MT [9:3 ESV]; 10:25). Conversely, from a positive perspective, to know God is to turn to Him 





In summary, the goal of Christ’s priesthood is explained by the framework of the 
better/new covenant. The teleological nature of this covenant is revealed especially by the 
first covenant, which was a theoretical anticipation of the coming realities of Christ’s 
sacrifice and His priesthood in the heavenly sanctuary. In fact, the reality of Christ’s 
priesthood mediates or fulfills the covenant between God and human beings in three 
stages: (1) inauguration, (2) daily mediation, and (3) final purification.  
First, the inauguration of the new/better covenant took place at the ascension of 
Christ and the official initiation of His priesthood in the heavenly sanctuary on the basis 
of His one sacrifice. This inauguration established the necessary framework for the daily 
mediation of the new/better covenant.  
Second, the daily mediation aims at providing divine forgiveness and the spiritual 
internalization of the divine laws in God’s covenantal people, on the basis of Christ’s one 
sacrifice. In this phase, Christ constantly brings people to a new covenantal relationship 
with God by means of the intercession of divine forgiveness and also empowers them to 
remain and grow in this covenant. The ultimate effect of the daily mediation takes place 
with the final purification that fully establishes forever the new/better covenant. 
Third, the final purification performed in the context of eschatological judgment 
and salvation represents the consummation of the new/better covenant, also based on 
Christ’s one sacrifice. While the eschatological judgment is against those who decided to 
defiantly drift away from their covenantal relationship with Him (defiant sinners who 
continue to break the new/better covenant and refuse to repent, cf. 6:4-6; 10:26-31; 





Having provided this description and elaboration of the priesthood (need, agent, 
actions, goal) of Christ in Hebrews, I move now to a second step, namely, the study of 
macro-hermeneutical principles of reality that ontologically support and inform the 
description and elaboration of the historical model of Christ’s priesthood that has been 
delineated so far. As I mentioned before, this second step refers to the priesthood of 
Christ, which particularly refers to the ontological and cosmological notions expressed or 
implied in Hebrews about His divinity and humanity. 
The Priesthood of Christ:                                                                             
Hermeneutical Principles of Reality 
Arguably, an important contribution of the historical model is the interpretation of 
the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality on the basis of Hebrews. Given the 
influential role of the discussion regarding the intellectual background of the epistle for 
the study of ontology in Hebrews, I acknowledge that scholars who subscribe to Middle 
Platonism as the (or a) background of Hebrews find ontological support for a non-
sequential view of Christ’s priesthood, as they interpret God and heaven in Hebrews as 
timeless/spaceless realities. While I am aware of the debate about the intellectual 
background of Hebrews, I will not enter into this discussion for two reasons. First, this 
would make this study too lengthy, and there is already considerable scholarly discussion 
on this regard.225 This discussion shows that there are arguments for not adopting Middle 
                                                
225 For a helpful description of the main theories and issues involved in these debates, see Hurst, 
The Epistle to the Hebrews. Overall, there are four major proposals of the conceptual background of 
Hebrews: (1) Gnosticism, (2) Middle Platonism (e.g., Philo), (3) Palestianian Judaism (e.g., Qumran and 
other apocalyptic groups), (4) Graeco-Roman culture. Currenly, while the first proposal (Gnosticism) has 
been largely abandoned, the fourth one (Graeco-Roman culture) is a more recent project. This means that 
the focus of the debate is on Middle Platonism and Palestinian Judaism. Eric F. Mason and Kevin B. 





Platonism as the conceptual background for Hebrews, even though its language may be 
considered similar.226 Second, the methodological procedure employed in this section 
moves from the text of Hebrews to ontology, instead of assuming an ontology first (from 
a specific intellectual background) and then moving to the reading of the text. This 
                                                
Literature, 2011), 4. Representatives of these four proposals include, Gnosticism: Käsemann, The 
Wandering People of God; Middle Platonism: James W. Thompson, “What Has Middle Platonism to Do 
with Hebrews,” in Reading the Epistle to the Hebrews: A Resource for Students, ed. Eric F. Mason and 
Kevin B. McCruden (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 31-52; Palestinian Judaism: Eric F. 
Mason, “Cosmology, Messianism, and Melchizedek: Apocalyptic Jewish Traditions and Hebrews,” in 
Reading the Epistle to the Hebrews: A Resource for Students, ed. Eric F. Mason and Kevin B. McCruden 
(Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 53-76; Graeco-Roman culture: Patrick Gray, “Hebrews 
among Greek and Romans,” in Reading the Epistle to the Hebrews: A Resource for Students, ed. Eric F. 
Mason and Kevin B. McCruden (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 13-30.  
226 The view that the conceptual background of Hebrews derives from Philo (Middle Platonism) 
reached its climax with Spicq in 1952. Subsequent scholarship (especially Williamson) challenged this 
view. Barrett was very influential in affirming eschatology, and not Platonic ontology, as the intellectual 
framework of Hebrews, even though he ackwnoledges that its language is similar to Middle Platonism. 
Geoffrey E. Sterling, “Ontology Versus Eschatology: Tensions between Author and Community in 
Hebrews,” The Studia Philonica Annual 13 (2001): 191-192. See Spicq, L’Épitre aux Hébreux; Ronald 
Williamson, Philo and the Epistle to the Hebrews (Leiden: Brill, 1970); Charles K. Barrett, “The 
Eschatology of the Epistle to the Hebrews,” in The Background of the New Testament and Its Eschatology: 
C. H. Dodd Festschrift, ed. W. D. Davies and D. Daube (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), 
363-393. After that period, there are still scholars who affirm the priority of Middle Platonism. Influential 
works of this view are Lala K. K. Dey, The Intermediary World and Patterns of Perfection in Philo and 
Hebrews (Cambridge, MA: Society of Biblical Literature, 1975); Thompson, The Beginnings of Christian 
Philosophy. Others have reassessed the relatationship of Hebrews with Jewish eschatology and Platonic 
ontology. Schenck and Sterling affirm that both Hebrews and Philo draw from a common Platonizing 
tradition, instead of stipulating some type of dependence of Hebrews on Philo. Kenneth L. Schenck, “Philo 
and the Epistle to the Hebrews: Ronald Williamson’s Study after Thirdy Years,” in The Studia Philonica 
Annual: Studies in Hellenistic Judaism, ed. D. T. Runia and G. E. Stirling (Atlanta: Scholars, 2002), 134-
135; Sterling, “Ontology versus Eschatology,” 210-211. Another aspect of this reassessement is the 
suggestion of combinations of Middle Platonism and apocalyptic eschatology in Hebrews: (1) its temporal 
aspect is eschatological while the spatial/cosmological aspect is Platonic (Schenck), (2) the author has a 
Platonic perspective while the audience holds an eschatological view (MacRae), or (3) the author holds an 
eschatological position whereas the audience has a Platonic standpoint (Sterling). See Schenck, Cosmology 
and Eschatology in Hebrews, 23; Sterling, “Ontology versus Eschatology,” 210; G. W. MacRae, “Heavenly 
Temple and Eschatology in the Letter to the Hebrews,” Semeia 12 (1978): 196. Finally, there are those who 
agree with Barrett (and Williamson) that Hebrews is similar to Middle Platonism only at the level of 
language, but not in terms of thinking. See Barrett, “The Eschatology of the Epistle to the Hebrews,” 393; 
Williamson, Philo and the Epistle to the Hebrews, 557; Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 31; Peterson, 
Hebrews and Perfection, 131; Adams, “The Cosmology of Hebrews,” 138; S. Nomoto, “Herkunft Und 
Struktur Der Hohenpriestervorstellung Im Hebräerbrief,” Novum Testamentum 10 (1968): 18-19. I agree 
with authors who do not see a similarity of thinking between Hebrews and Neo Platonism. Given the 
engagement of Hebrews with OT texts, I concur with scholars whoc view the OT as the intellectual 
background of Hebrews. See King L. She, The Use of Exodus in Hebrews (New York: Peter Lang, 2011), 




hermeneutical methodology is similar to Vanhoozer’s “theodramatic metaphysics,” 
which “begins with the speech and acts of God, inquiring what God must be to have said 
and done that.”227 In other words, the study seeks to uncover the ontology implicit in 
statements about what God says and does, and the same principle applies to the study of 
an implicit ontology of humanity and cosmology in Hebrews. With regard to cosmology 
in Hebrews, for instance, Ellingworth has this same methodological attitude. Instead of 
exploring “the influences which may have contributed to the cosmology of Hebrews,” he 
focuses on the examination of “the relevant texts themselves, in order to discover how 
they relate to one another.”228 As I will show in the subsections below, by using this 
methodology, I find a dynamic interpretation of the macro-hermeneutical principles of 
reality in Hebrews that support a sequential (temporal) view of Christ’s priesthood. 
Divinity: Christ and the Concept of Divine Nature  
In this discussion of Divinity as the first hermeneutical principle of reality of the 
present section, I will deal with the reality of God. First, I will focus on divine reality in 
general in Hebrews and then on the reality of Christ’s divinity in the epistle. 
The Reality of God 
References to God are found throughout Hebrews.229 He is initially portrayed as 
                                                
227 Kevin Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and Authorship 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79.  
228 Paul Ellingworth, “Jesus and the Universe in Hebrews,” Evangelical Quarterly 58, no. 4 
(1986): 338. This approach affirms the priority of moving “from text to background” and not “from 
background to text,” which may imply an imposition of a possible background on the text. Schenck, 
Cosmology and Eschatology in Hebrews, 3. 
229 The noun θεὸς occurs 68 times in Hebrews. For a study on God in Hebrews, see Harold W. 





speaking to human beings, in the past and more recently,230 through intermediaries 
(prophets, the Son, 1:1-2).231 I will use this idea of God speaking to start a reflection 
about divine reality in Hebrews. Then, I will draw inferences about divine reality from 
the ideas of divine rest and God’s reactions to human actions.  
God speaks  
Through the instrumentality of the prophets, God spoke literally “in various 
parts”232 and “in many ways” (1:1).233 The content of what He says are OT quotations 
(1:5-13; 3:7, 15; 4:3, 5, 7; 5:5-6; 7:20; 8:8; 10:15-16).234 In some instances, God speaks 
to the Son (1:5, 8-13; 5:5-6; 7:17, 21). In others, He speaks to the audience of the epistle 
                                                
Bauckham, Daniel R. Driver, Trevor A. Hart, and Nathan MacDonald (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2009), 95-110. 
230 In the past (πάλαι) and more recently (ἐπ’ ἐσχάτου τῶν ἡµερῶν τούτων).  
231 According to Cockerill, “God ‘speaks’ to his people . . . both by the words that he spoke to his 
people of old (Heb 3:7–4:11; 10:36-39) and by his conversations with his Son concering the Son’s 
incarnation and exaltation (1:1-14; 2:11-13; 7:1-28; 10:5-10).” Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 45. 
232 This is the literal translation of πολυµερῶς. BDAG, 847.  
233 The Greek expression is Πολυµερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως. 
234 While in 1:1-2; 5:5-6 the verb λαλέω is used, the verb λέγω is employed in 1:5-7, 13; 3:7, 15; 
4:3, 5, 7; 7:20; 8:8; 10:15-16. There is an overlap between God and the Holy Spirit speaking (cf. 3:7, 11 
with 4:4-5, and 8:8 with 10:15-16). Christ speaks in 2:12-13; 10:5-7, and believers are invited to speak in 
13:6. In all cases, they speak through OT quotations. As Cortez indicates, “there is something unique to 
Hebrews’ use of Scripture: the oral nature of the word of God and its immediacy.” Cortez, “‘The Anchor of 
the Soul That Enters Within the Veil’,” 435. His emphasis agrees with Pamela Eisenbaum’s point that 
almost all Hebrews’ quotations from the OT are “quotations of direct speech.” Pamela Michelle 
Eisenbaum, The Jewish Heroes of Christian History: Hebrews 11 in Literary Context (Atlanta, GA: 
Scholars Press, 1997), 92. Therefore, it could be said that, in Hebrews, the word of God is not written (“the 
author of Hebrews does not use the common formula ‘as it is written’”), but spoken. Cortez, “‘The Anchor 
of the Soul That Enters Within the Veil’,” 438. See also, Kenneth L. Schenck, “God Has Spoken: Hebrews’ 
Theology of the Scriptures,” in The Epistle to the Hebrews and Christian Theology, ed. Richard Bauckham, 
Daniel R. Driver, Trevor A. Hart, and Nathan MacDonald (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 321-336; 




(3:7, 15; 4:7).235 Indeed, the divine voice speaking today (3:7, 15; 4:7) denotes a temporal 
immediacy236 of what God says to the audience.237 This immediacy entails that believers 
should not refuse the warning of the divine voice that speaks from heaven, since that is 
the same voice that spoke powerfully at Mount Sinai in the past (12:19; cf. vv. 25-26).238  
The reference to God speaking at Mount Sinai239 is helpful for understanding the 
reality of God, as this reference implies that the divine ability to speak in various parts 
and ways (1:1) and the temporal immediacy of a message recorded in the past should not 
be limited to the work of intermediary secondary causes, in this case, human prophets and 
the biblical text.240 Without disregarding the intermediary role of prophets and sacred 
                                                
235 For a description of “God’s dialogue with the Son and His siblings” in Hebrews, see Attridge, 
“God in Hebrews,” 103-108.  
236 Cockerill speaks of “the immediacy of God’s word.” Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 44. 
237 According to this view, the word σήµερον in Ps 2:7, which is a passage quoted by the author of 
Hebrews (1:5; 5:5) and qualified as something that God spoke to the Son, could denote a sense of temporal 
immediacy between the audience of Hebrews and God addressing the Son. See Johnson’s emphasis on the 
use of the word today as indicative of the immediacy of God’s word in Johnson, “The Scriptural World of 
Hebrews,” 241. 
238 Regarding the connection between 12:19 and 25-26, Koester emphasizes that in 12:26 God is 
identified as the voice of 12:19. Koester, Hebrews, 543. See also Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 379. 
Cockerill suggests a Christological interpretation of the one speaking in 12:25, in the sense that God 
“speaks in the present from heaven through the exalted Son.” Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 663. 
On the other hand, Ellingworth seems to avoid a Christological interpretation of this passage. He writes, 
“The strongest argument in favour of identifying Christ, not God, as ‘the one who speaks,’ is the mention 
of Christ, or more precisely his blood, as ‘speaking’ in v. 24. However, the author makes a similar 
unspecified change of subject in 8:5; and the theme changes here between the atonement, in v. 25, and the 
eschatological cataclysm, from v. 26. Since God is explicitly mentioned in vv. 28f., it is therefore on 
balance best to consider him as referred to implicitly, as often in Hebrews, from v. 25 onwards.” 
Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 684. 
239 See especially Exod 19-20; Deut 4-5.   
240 The relationship betwee prophets and Scripture is highlighted by Johnson in the following way: 
“By constantly citing the LXX and by introducing such citations with verbs of speaking, Hebrews in effect 
treats texts as words from ‘the prophets’ through whom God spoke in the past. And because many of the 
verbs of introduction are in the present tense, the reader learns that God’s speech through these prophetic 




texts, the multiplicity and immediacy of the divine speech should be attributed to the 
reality of God Himself. To put it more sharply, the use of intermediaries is not 
philosophically justified on the basis of an ontological or metaphysical gap between God 
and human beings in terms of space-time, which would require the intermediary role of 
spatio-temporal intermediaries (prophets, texts) to codify or transcribe an original divine 
non-discursive (non-sequential, timeless/spaceless) divine message into the spatio-
temporal pattern of discursive speech. Rather, at Mount Sinai, the idea of distance 
between God and human beings was related to the consuming glory of His presence, and 
did not imply a divine inability to speak words discursively (spatio-temporal 
sequence).241 God’s speech, then, necessarily assumes a temporal interpretation of God’s 
                                                
241 According to Exod 19-20 and Deut 4-5, it was not only Moses who could hear and understand 
God’s voice, but the people of Israel as well. These passages highlight the mediation of Moses regarding 
the words spoken by God in the context of the people’s fear of His glorious presence. In Exod 19:9 (italics 
mine), “the Lord said to Moses, ‘Behold, I am coming to you in a thick cloud, that the people may hear 
when I speak with you ( ִרי ִעָּמְךַּבֲעבּור ִיְׁשַמע ָהָעם ְּבַדּבְ  ), and may also believe you forever.’” Then, Exod 20:1 
(italics mine) introduces the description of the 10 commandments in the following way, “And God spoke 
all these words, saying” (ַוְיַדֵּבר ֱאֹלִהים ֵאת ָּכל־ַהְּדָבִרים ָהֵאֶּלה ֵלאֹמר). Immediately after the description of the 
commandments spoken by God, vv. 18-19 reveal that “when all the people saw the thunder and the flashes 
of lightning and the sound of the trumpet and the mountain smoking, the people were afraid and trembled, 
and they stood far off and said to Moses, ‘You speak to us, and we will listen; but do not let God speak to 
us, lest we die’” (see also Deut 5:5). In Deut 4:12, Moses reminds the people about that event: “the Lord 
spoke to you (ַוְיַדֵּבר יהוה ֲאֵליֶכם) out of the midst of the fire. You heard the sound of words ( קֹול ְּדָבִרים ַאֶּתם
 but saw no form; there was only a voice” (see also Deut 5:4). In Deut 5:23-27 (italics mine), Moses ,(ׁשְֹמִעים
adds, “as soon as you heard the voice (ְּכָׁשְמֲעֶכם ֶאת־ַהּקֹול) out of the midst of the darkness, while the 
mountain was burning with fire, you came near to me, all the heads of your tribes, and your elders. And 
you said, ‘Behold, the Lord our God has shown us his glory and greatness, and we have heard his voice 
ָרִאינּו ִּכי־ְיַדֵּבר ) out of the midst of the fire. This day we have seen God speak with man (ְוֶאת־קֹלֹו ָׁשַמְענּו)
 .and man still live. Now therefore why should we die? For this great fire will consume us ,(ֱאֹלִהים ֶאת־ָהָאָדם
If we hear the voice of the Lord (ֲאַנְחנּו ִלְׁשֹמַע ֶאת־קֹול יהוה) our God any more, we shall die. For who is there 
of all flesh, that has heard the voice of the living God speaking out of the midst of fire as we have, and has 
still lived? Go near and hear all that the Lord our God will say, and speak to us all that the Lord our God 
will speak to you, and we will hear and do it.’” In his notes on Exod 19:9a, Jeffrey H. Tigay comments, 
“the people personally overhear God and Moses conversing.” However, they “decline to hear Him directly 
following the Decalogue (20:16).” The Jewish Study Bible, 2nd ed., Jewish Publication Society (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 137. In his remarks on Deut 5:19-30, Bernard M. Levinson argues that 
“while the Decalogue was given directly to the people (v. 4; 4.10-13), the rest of the laws were mediated by 
Moses, at their plea (vv. 22-24, 4.14).” Ibid., 359. For the purposes of the present dissertation, my point is 





reality (being). God exists and acts in space and time. 
God reacts to human actions 
Another significant idea about the divine reality that can be derived from God 
speaking is that He reacts to human actions (see 3:9-11; 4:3, 7). Heb 3:7-11 describes a 
situation according to the following sequence: (1) God speaks/His voice is heard (v. 7), 
(2) human beings rebelliously harden to His voice (v. 8, see v. 16),242 (3) God is 
provoked243 by that (v. 10), and (4) He pronounces a judgment against them (v. 11). It is 
significant that point 2 is temporally qualified: He was “provoked for forty years” (v. 17). 
Thus, point 4 does not represent a capricious divine reaction to one event characterized 
by human rebellion, but it is God’s final response to a continual practice of putting Him 
to test. Ontologically speaking, God not only reacts to human actions but He can be also 
the recipient or object of human action (be provoked) for a certain extension of time.  
The idea of God being the recipient of actions is also implied in sacrifices offered 
to Him:244 Christ “offered Himself without blemish to God” (9:14), Abel “offered to 
God” an acceptable sacrifice (11:4), and believers are to “continually offer up a sacrifice 
of praise to God” (13:15-16). In these cases, God is not a passive recipient of the 
sacrificial actions directed to Him. Rather, God approved245 Abel’s sacrificial gifts (11:4), 
                                                
presence, these passages describe Him as being able to speak discursively, using sequential and human 
intelligible words, with human beings. 
242 In v. 9, this point 2 is portrayed as putting God to test (verb πειράζω), and this human action is 
interpreted in terms of unbelief in vv. 12, 19. 
243 Verb προσοχθίζω, which conveys the idea of being angry, offended, provoked. BDAG, 884. 
244 In the passages quoted (9:14; 11:4; 13:15-16), I have italicized the expression to God (τῷ θεῷ). 





and He is pleased with the sacrifices offered by believers (13:16246).  
The language of divine acceptance is associated with God’s pleasure, inasmuch as 
something is pleasing to Him (see 11:5-6; 12:28; 13:16, 21).247 As a requirement for 
someone to please God, faith is described as believing that He “is a rewarder of those 
who seek him” (11:6, NASB). Hence, God reacts not only in terms of being pleased but 
also by rewarding. The same principle applies in cases when He is not pleased.248 For 
instance, the fathers of Israel did not remain in God’s covenant, and because of their 
unfaithfulness He neglected or had no concern for them (8:9). In a more forceful 
language, the divine judgment249 is described in terms of vengeance250 and repayment251 
(10:30), which underline the idea of divine reaction against deliberate continual human 
sinful actions (see 10:26-29).252  
                                                
µαρτυρέω in BDAG, 618) is described by a participle absolute construction. 
246 The sacrifices mentioned in 13:16 are “doing good and sharing” (εὐποιΐας καὶ κοινωνίας). 
247 The verb εὐαρεστέω (to please, be pleased) appears in 11:5-6; 13:13, 16, whereas the adjective 
εὐάρεστος (pleasing, acceptable) and the adverb εὐαρέστως (in an acceptable manner) are found in 13:21 
and 12:28 respectively. For information regarding the lexical meaning of these terms, see BDAG, 403. 
248 See references to God not being pleased (verb εὐδοκέω) in 10:6, 8, 38. For further information 
about εὐδοκέω conveying the meaning of being pleased, taking delight, see BDAG, 404. 
249 In Hebrews, there are references to judgment (κρίµα, 6:2; κρίσις 9:27; 10:27), God judging 
(verb κρίνω, 10:30; 13:4), and God as judge (κριτής, 12:23). For information regarding the lexical meaning 
of these terms, see BDAG, 567, 569-570. 
250 This noun ἐκδίκησις conveys the meaning of (1) “meting out of justice, giving of justice”; (2) 
“retaliation for harm done, vengeance”; and (3) “penalty inflicted on wrongdoers, abs. punishment.” 
BDAG, 301. 
251 Expressed by the verb ἀνταποδίδωµι. See BDAG, 87. 
252 From an ontological standpoint, a less personalistic interpretation of God’s reaction (positively: 
reward; negatively: vengeance) could argue that this is a result of divine predestination (see the functional 
model in chaps. 2-3) or of the teleological structure of creation (see the sacramental model in chaps. 2-3). 
In the first case, God predetermined these two outcomes and also the two groups of people who would 





God reacts to Christ’s sacrifice 
In the case of Christ’s sacrifice, the acceptance of the Father seems to take place 
at Christ’s appearance before the Father in the heavenly sanctuary (9:24).253 From an 
ontological standpoint, the acceptance of the sacrifice implies not only that He is a 
recipient of someone else’s action, but also assumes a before and after in God’s 
temporality. In other words, He accepts and is pleased with the sacrifice as and/or after it 
is offered to Him, and not before that.254 Thus, the pleasing acceptance is a divine 
reaction (change), which implies a temporal sequence of before and after: there was a 
time for the Father when Christ was not in His presence in the heavenly sanctuary, and 
there is a time for the Father when Christ is in His presence in the heavenly sanctuary. 
Furthermore, this language has also spatial implications for the understanding of 
God. While His omnipresence is assumed in the acceptance of the sacrifice offered by 
Abel and in His pleasure with the sacrifices offered by believers,255 as these sacrificial 
                                                
teleology of creation naturally rewards at some point people whose actions are consistent with the laws 
ingrained in the structure of the world (the divine design), and naturally punishes at some point people 
whose actions go against the structure of creation. In both cases, God is not personally reacting in a 
temporal way (after) to a human action. Whereas these two types of interpretation of the language of divine 
reaction are able to explain ontologically how human beings are rewarded or punished by God, without 
assuming that He is personally reacting in a temporal way, these atemporal interpretations are unable to 
provide an ontological account of the biblical notion of divine pleasure, which is part of the picture of 
divine reaction in Hebrews. The language of divine pleasure in Hebrews implies that God is in some way 
the recipient or object of an external action. On the other hand, according to a timeless view of God, the 
biblical language of Him being pleased or displeased by a certain human action is ontologically impossible. 
This language becomes a meaningless metaphor without an ontological referent, as either God 
predetermined Himself to be eternally pleased or displeased toward different groups of human beings, with 
the implication that the eternal divine pleasure or displeasure is not influenced by human action; or human 
actions conform to or go against the teleological structure of creation, which could hardly be conceived in 
terms of the personal idea of pleasure or displeasure. 
253 As I have mentioned earlier, this reading is based on the idea that in 9:24-25 the offering 
(expressed by the verb προσφέρω) is understood with a focus on the priestly entrance into the sanctuary. 
254 Even though He could be willing to accept and be pleased before the sacrifice is offered. 





actions were/are performed on earth, the idea of Christ appearing before the Father in the 
heavenly sanctuary seems to emphasize the importance of Christ meeting God in His 
heavenly place. This heavenly place is not merely equated with everywhere. Otherwise, 
God could simply observe and approve Christ’s earthly sacrifice at the cross on the basis 
of His omnipresence, without any need for a further appearance of Christ before God in 
His heavenly place for us (9:24).256 Therefore, God’s acceptance of Christ’s sacrifice 
seems to take into account the importance of Christ appearing before God in His 
heavenly place. 
God rests 
The idea of divine rest in Hebrews is consistent with the temporality observed in 
the notions that God speaks and reacts. Heb 4:4-10 elaborates on the idea that “God 
rested on the seventh-day from all his works” (4:4)257 by using God’s protological rest in 
the seventh-day as a paradigm for the eschatological Sabbath rest of His people, in which 
they can rest from their “works as God did from his”258 (4:10). The concept of divine rest, 
                                                
thoughts and intentions of the human heart and the statement that “no creature is hidden from his sight, but 
all are naked and exposed to the eyes of him to whom we must give account” (Heb 4:12-13). 
256 In fact, the spatio-temporal sequentiality of sacrifice was already prefigured in the Aaronic 
priesthood. After (temporal language) the death of the sacrificial victim, there was a sacrificial movement 
mediated by the priest toward the divine place (spatial language), and this movement could be vertically 
toward heaven (fire, burnt offerings) or horizontally toward the most holy place (blood/purification 
offering). Hence, the notion of divine omnipresence did not invalidate the significance of the spatial idea of 
God in His most holy place. See my discussion on this point in the subsection above on The Heavenly 
Offering of His Earthly Sacrifice under The Actions of the Priest (The Priesthood of Christ in Hebrews). 
257 This is an allusion to Gen 2:2. UBS5, 864. 
258 ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ὁ θεός. Obviously, this is not the first time that the rest of God from His 
works in creation is used as a paradigm for the rest of human beings from their works. The fourth 
commandment in Exod 20:8-11 uses God’s rest in creation as a paradigm for the weekly rest of human 




by itself, can be attractive for a timeless view of God. However, since this rest is 
qualified as being from works (that is, after works), and in the seventh-day (that is, after 
six days), the rest is described in a temporal way.  
Having articulated an understanding of divine reality implied in references to God 
throughout Hebrews. I will focus on the reality of Christ as divine in Hebrews.259  
The Reality of Christ’s Divinity 
In this section about the reality of Christ’s divinity in Hebrews, I will explore 
concepts of divine sameness and divine becoming. 
Divine temporal sameness 
Christ is addressed as God260 in the use of OT quotations in 1:8-12.261 The divine 
                                                
259 For a study on the divinity of Christ in Hebrews, see Richard Bauckham, “The Divinity of 
Jesus Christ in the Epistle to the Hebrews,” in The Epistle to the Hebrews and Christian Theology, ed. 
Richard Bauckham, Daniel R. Driver, Trevor A. Hart, and Nathan MacDonald (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2009), 15-36. 
260 See also 1:3. 
261 In fact, God is the one who calls the Son God. Even though Hebrews does not mention that 
God is the one speaking through the OT quotations employed in 1:5-13, it is evident from vv. 5-6 that He is 
the speaker. The use of Ps 45:6-7 [44:7-8 LXX] in Heb 1:8-9 indicates that the Son is God (vocative ὁ 
θεὸς), His throne is forever and ever (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος), and God has anointed (verb χρίω) Him. 
Thus, 1:8-9 implies a relationship between two persons referred as God, namely, one anointing and the 
other being anointed in a royal context. It could be argued that Hebrews has a Trinitarian view of God. 
Besides the two persons referred as God in 1:8-9, the Spirit speaks as God (cf. 3:7, 11 with 4:4-5, and 8:8 
with 10:15-16). Regarding ὁ θεὸς in 1:8-9, the expression is taken as a vocative in the reading graded as “B” 
(σου) in UBS5, which is the same reading found in the LXX.: Ὁ θρόνος σου ὁ θεὸς εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος. 
As Bruce Metzger explains, if the alternative reading (Ὁ θρόνος αὐτοῦ ὁ θεὸς) is adopted, ὁ θεὸς would be 
“the subject (or predicate nominative),” which would be translated as “God is thy throne (or, Thy throne is 
God),” a “highly improbable” interpretation. Metzger adds that, besides this “internal difficulty of 
construing αὐτοῦ,” the Committee was impressed “by the weight and variety of the external evidence 
supporting σου.” Bruce M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament, 2nd ed., A 
Companion Volume to the United Bible Societies’ Greek New Testament (4th rev. ed.) (London; New 




Son is referred as the Creator262 of earth and heavens in the beginning.263 There is, 
however, an ontological contrast between the Creator and the earth and heavens (1:11-
12). The contrast centers on the notion that they will perish or pass away, but He will 
remain or live on (σὺ δὲ διαµένεις264). In fact, “the permanence of God is contrasted with 
the most permanent objects in the world, heaven and earth.”265 In this contrast, heavens 
and earth are compared to a garment (1:11-12266) or robe/mantle (1:12) that will become 
old/wear out267 (1:11), will be rolled up (1:12)268 and changed (ἀλλαγήσονται, 1:12). In 
contrast to this reality, the divine Creator is the same (σὺ δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς εἶ, 1:12), and His 
sameness is described in temporal language: “your years will have no end”269 (1:12). 
Hence, the temporal description of God’s sameness is contrasted to a change of 
becoming old and coming to an end, which are characteristics associated with the 
                                                
262 See also 1:2. 
263 This appears in the quotation from Ps 102:25-27 [101:26-28 LXX] found in 1:10-12. The Son 
is addressed as Lord (vocative κύριε). 
264 See BDAG, 233. The verb µένω is employed in Heb 7:24 to emphasize that Christ has a 
permanent priesthood “because He continues forever.” 
265 I am using here the words of Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler in their notes on Ps 102:27-29 
of the Hebrew Bible. The Jewish Study Bible, 1381. In this point, Heb 1:10-12 quotes Ps 102:25-27 
[101:26-28 LXX]. The idea that heaven and earth are the most permanent objects in the world is found in 
Eccl 1:4, where the earth remains or stands forever whereas a generation goes and another comes. 
266 I am following the reading graded as “B” in UBS5 that includes ἱµάτιον (garment) in 1:12. 
267 The passive form of παλαιωθήσονται means to become old, conveying the idea of becoming 
useless. BDAG, 751. 
268 I am following the reading graded as “A” in UBS5 that includes ἑλίξεις (or εἱλίξεις) in 1:12. In 
the other NT occurrence of the verb ἑλίσσω, the heaven vanishes “like a scroll that is being rolled up (verb 
ἑλίσσω), and every mountain and island was removed from its place” (Rev 6:14). The verb ἑλίσσω does not 
appear in Ps 101:26-28 LXX, as the verb ἀλλάσσω is employed. 
269 The verb ἐκλείπω has three basic meanings: (1) “to be no longer in existence, fail give out, be 




temporality of creatures or created things in the current state of the world (that is, as a 
consequence of sin in the world).270 Hence, a temporal (not temporary) conception of 
divine sameness along the lines of 1:12 is not conceptually problematic as philosophical 
accounts of a timeless God may assume. In fact, the temporal sameness (ὁ αὐτὸς) of 
Christ is reaffirmed in 13:8 with a more emphatic and detailed language,271 where the 
manifoldness/diversity (ποικίλαις) of strange teachings (13:9) seems to be contrasted with 
the sameness (ὁ αὐτὸς) of Christ (13:8).272 While manifoldness/diversity (13:9) denotes 
ambiguity and deceit,273 Christ’s sameness entails consistency and trustworthiness, which 
is based on the reality that His sameness is temporally described as existing in the past 
(ἐχθὲς), present (σήµερον), and future (εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας).274 
                                                
270 Hebrews 1:11-12 seems to point to an eschatological destruction of the earth and heavens (as 
we know them) by the action of the Lord, and not simply because of a natural process of getting old. This 
eschatological divine action seems to be indicated by the use of the verb ἑλίσσω with reference to the world 
in Heb 1:12 and Rev 6:14, the only two occurrences of the verb in the NT. 
271 For a connection between 13:8 and 1:12, see Johnson, Hebrews, 346; Attridge, The Epistle to 
the Hebrews, 392; Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 705. 
272 After the exhortation to remember the leaders of the church who teach the word of God—
which is associated to the consideration of their conduct and the imitation of their faith (13:7), and before 
the warning against “diverse and strange teachings” (διδαχαῖς ποικίλαις καὶ ξέναις, 13:9), the author of 
Hebrews underlines that “Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today and forever” (Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐχθὲς 
καὶ σήµερον ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, 13:8). 
273 ποικίλαις has two basic meanings: (1) “existence in various kinds or modes, diversified, 
manifold,” and (2) “existence in various aspects.” The second meaning may describe (a) things (many-
colored, variegated) and (b) persons with “devious ways of thinking,” which is a figurative extension of 
(a), in the sense of being “ambiguous, craft, sly, deceitful.” Ibid. Therefore, ποικίλαις in Heb 13:9 seems to 
convey the meaning 2b. 
274 According to Attridge, this tripartite formula (ἐχθὲς, σήµερον, and εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας) “bears some 
superficial resemblance to divine self-predications of the Old Testament,” but “it is not a cryptic way of 
identifying Jesus and Yahweh. Some commentators have been tempted to correlate the three temporal 
elements with moments in the history of Jesus in his humanity and exalted state, where he functions as 
intercessor. The formula would then parallel the traditional christological perspective of the catena in chap. 
1. Since the patristic period, other commentators have read the formula as a summary of a three-stage 
christology, like that explicit in the exordium and implied elsewhere in Hebrews. Nothing in the immediate 





Divine temporal becoming 
It must be pointed out, however, that the temporal description of the divine 
sameness is not a spatio-temporal language that anthropomorphically depicts a timeless-
spaceless reality. Rather, the verb γίνοµαι is often used in reference to Christ in Hebrews 
(see 1:4; 2:17; 5:5, 9; 6:20; 7:16, 26), conveying the idea that He became something, 
which implies temporal sequence.275 More precisely, He became “much superior to 
angels” (1:4) and “exalted above the heavens” (7:26); He became a high priest (2:17; 5:5; 
6:20; 7:16) and “the source of eternal salvation” (5:9). To be sure, this becoming of 
exaltation and salvific priesthood presupposes His previous earthly experience of 
suffering and death as a human being (see 2:9-10, 14, 17-18; 5:7-10). But Hebrews does 
not ascribe the becoming to a human nature of Christ that functions as a spatio-temporal 
instrument of His timeless-spaceless divine nature. It is not merely the human Christ who 
becomes exalted and becomes a high priest for salvation, instrumentally making the 
divine Christ also exalted and high priest. As a matter of fact, if the Jesus of 2:9 is the 
Son of 1:2-3 and 10, namely, the creator and sustainer God, then the idea of Jesus being 
                                                
although it is not a systematic affirmation but a foundation for exhortation that is here offered. The 
emphasis is clearly on the eternal ‘sameness’ of Christ. Because Jesus Christ is an integral part of the 
eternal divine realm that is unchanging, he is now, for the Christian addressees, a sure foundation for their 
communal life (v. 7) and doctrine (v. 9).” Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 393. 
275 I agree with Kibbe that while the verb γίνοµαι can have a stative or a progressive sense, these 
passages seem to imply some kind of progression. Taking the the whole argument of Hebrews into account, 
Kibbe points out that “in order for us to fix our eyes on the one who walked the path ahead of us as the 
model of faith and perseverance and obedience, his own ‘becoming’ must bear some correspondence to 
ours.” Kibbe, “Is it Finished?” 48n99. Kibbe’s position is clearly different from Webster’s idea that 
becoming in this context is “not to be taken to mean the realization or acquisition of some wholly new, 
additional reality,” but “a perfect movement in the being of God. This movement is not a coming-to-be.” 
Rather, it is “the repetition in time of his eternal being.” John Webster, “The One Who Is Son: Theological 
Reflections on the Exordium to the Epistle to the Hebrews ” in The Epistle to the Hebrews and Christian 
Theology, ed. Richard Bauckham, Daniel R. Driver, Trevor A. Hart, and Nathan MacDonald (Grand 




made lower (ἠλαττωµένον) than angels in 2:9 entails that the divine Christ became lower 
in His incarnation,276 a temporal sequence in the divinity of Christ’s being of being 
higher (before the incarnation) and then lower (after the incarnation). 
Likewise, 5:8 depicts the earthly suffering of the incarnate Christ with a 
significant remark: “though being a Son” (YLT),277 “he learned obedience through what 
he suffered.” This learned obedience qualified Him to become the source of salvation 
(5:9) and high priest (5:10). The Son here is not yet the exalted Son (king, see 1:3-6, 8-9) 
and the ascended high priest (see 4:14; 8:1-2; 9:11-12, 24-25). Rather, this is the 
suffering Son who is becoming qualified for His salvific priesthood. If the note “though 
being a Son” suggests an attitude of surprise in face of this process of qualification 
involving the Son, the surprise is not based on the fact that the Son who was learning 
obedience was the king of 1:3-6, 8-9, since these passages point to a future278 
enthronement after the purification of sins (1:3) performed when He ascended to 
heaven.279 Rather, in light of the description of the Son before the incarnation as the 
                                                
276 In the quotation of Ps 8:5 (8:6 LXX) in Heb 2:7, to be made a lower than the angels (ἠλάττωσας 
αὐτὸν βραχύ τι παρ’ ἀγγέλους) seems to refer to the divine creation of human beings. According to this 
perspective, the language of Jesus being made lower (τὸν δὲ βραχύ τι παρ’ ἀγγέλους ἠλαττωµένον βλέποµεν 
Ἰησοῦν) in Heb 2:9 points to the divine Christ becoming a human being. Interpretation that identifie the 
suffering and death of the incarnate Christ as the point when he was made lower, perhaps in terms of 
humiliation, disregards that in 2:9 Jesus is made lower than angels so that (ὅπως) He might taste (γεύσηται) 
death. See Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 76. In other words, it is because Christ is made lower 
(incarnation) that He is able to taste death (see 2:14), and not that He was made lower precisely when He 
tasted death. On the other hand, this is not merely a reference to the incarnation by itself, but an incarnation 
that has mortality in view. See Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 49. In this sense, Christ’s suffering and death are part of 
the picture of being made lower than angels. For interpretations that focus on suffering/death, see 
Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 154; Johnson, Hebrews, 91; Koester, Hebrews, 217. For a 
position that emphasizes the incarnation, see Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 132-133. 
277 I use the YLT for this expression because it better captures the participle ὢν in καίπερ ὢν υἱός. 
278 Taking the moment when the Son learned obedience on earth as a reference. 





creator and sustainer God (1:2-3, 10), the surprise is that it was the same divine person 
who underwent a process of becoming qualified for His salvific priesthood. In short, 
Christ did that as incarnate God. Obviously, to do this as incarnate God is different from 
merely doing it through a human nature, since the former implies a divine temporality 
that, by definition, is able to really experience sequential events. 
Summary 
In summary, God is really able to experience sequential events, and in this sense 
divinity is temporal. A number of examples can be enumerated:  
                                                
1:3-4, 8-9, 13) that follows the purification of sins in 1:3, the language of begetting (γεννάω), Father and 
Son, and firstborn (πρωτότοκος) in 1:5-6 constitutes a royal terminology applied to the enthronement of the 
ascended Christ. Notice the royal context of Ps 2:7 (see vv. 6-8) and 2 Sam 7:14 (see vv. 12-16), which are 
the quotations used in Heb 1:5. Likewise, the language of firstborn (πρωτότοκος) is used in Ps 88:28 LXX 
(89:27 ESV) in reference to the Davidic king (see also 89:3-4, 20-29, 35-36 ESV). It is interesting to note 
that in the OT both Levites (Num 3:45; 8:18) and the Davidic king (Ps 88:28 LXX) are God’s firstborn. In 
Hebrews, Christ, God’s firstborn, is both king and priest. It is significant that Acts 13:13 quotes Ps 2:7 in 
light of Christ’s resurrection. In regards to πρωτότοκος in the NT, Col 1:18 uses the language to emphasize 
Christ’s preeminence (ἀρχή, πρωτεύων), with particular reference to His resurrection (πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν 
νεκρῶν). Likewise, Rev 1:5 employs πρωτότοκος with reference to Christ’s resurrection (ὁ πρωτότοκος τῶν 
νεκρῶν) and in association with the idea that He is “the ruler (ὁ ἄρχων) of kings on earth.” According to this 
perspective, in Hebrews, Christ is the firstborn of God as the resurrected and ascended Son who is 
enthroned in heaven. To be sure, a potential objection to this view is the interpretation that in Heb 1:6 God 
“brings the firstborn into the world (οἰκουµένην).” It is important to indicate, however, that the other 
occurrence of οἰκουµένη in Hebrews is found in 2:5 and it refers to the “world to come” (τὴν οἰκουµένην τὴν 
µέλλουσαν), and not to this present world. Furthermore, when the author of Hebrews mentions Christ 
coming to this world in the context of the incarnation, he does not use the term οἰκουµένη but κόσµος (10:5). 
Associated with these terminological considerations, the context of Heb 1:3-13 seems to indicate that 
οἰκουµένη in 1:6 describes the heavenly world. See Moffitt, Atonement and the Logic of Resurrection in the 
Epistle to the Hebrews, 53-68; Ardel B. Caneday, “The Eschatological World Already Subjected to the 
Son: The Oikoumevn of Hebrews 1.6 and the Son’s Enthronement,” in A Cloud of Witnesses: The Theology 
of Hebrews in Its Ancient Contexts, ed. Richard Bauckham, Daniel Driver, Trevor Hart, and Nathan 
MacDonald (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 28-39; Cortez, “‘The Anchor of the Soul that Enters Within the 
Veil’,” 213-224. Hence, the language of begetting in Heb 1:5 is not an ontological explanation of Christ’s 
divine nature. In other words, this passage is not related to an idea of eternal (timeless) generation of the 
Son. See Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 53-57; Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 103-105; 
Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 111-114, 118; Johnson, Hebrews, 77-79; Koester, Hebrews, 191-
193, 197-199; Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 24-27. For references to other interpretations that understand the 
begetting of the Son in 1:5 as Christ’s eternal generation, incarnation, baptism, or second coming, see 
Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 103; Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 112; Koester, 





(1) God speaks discursively and in multiple ways, meaning that His speech may 
be mediated or immediate. Divine speech necessarily implies temporal sequence and, 
therefore, divine temporality.  
(2) God reacts (positively or negatively) to human actions. For instance, He can 
be provoked by them for a certain period of time, and then judge or condemn those who 
performed those actions. In a positive way, He can be pleased by human actions. The 
spatio-temporal dynamics of the sacrificial offering is a fitting framework for the 
understanding of the notion of divine pleasure. Temporally, the offering of the sacrifice 
implies a sequence of death of the victim and a movement toward God, which takes place 
spatially as the smoke goes up to heaven (burnt offerings) or the blood is carried into the 
sanctuary (purification offerings). This spatio-temporal movement is seen as Christ 
appears before God in the heavenly sanctuary (God’s place). Thus, these direct historical 
relationships of God with human beings and Christ necessarily implies divine spatio-
temporality. 
(3) For God the Father, there was a time (temporality) when Christ was not in His 
presence in the heavenly sanctuary (spatiality). In addition, the notion of divine 
omnipresence does not invalidate the significance of the spatial idea of God being met in 
His most holy place. He can rest at a specific time after a sequence of activities. God’s 
Trinitarian relationships necessarily imply divine temporality.  
(4) The divinity of Christ has a temporal sameness (in the past, present, and 
future), meaning that He does not become old and His years have no end. Divine 
                                                




temporality is identical but infinite and analogical to the temporality of creation.  
(5) At the same time, the divine Christ experiences becoming. The incarnation 
implied a sequence where the creator and sustainer God was made lower than the angels. 
As a human being, the divine Christ underwent a process of becoming qualified to be a 
salvific high priest that involved suffering and learned obedience. Then, at His ascension, 
the resurrected Christ became the exalted king and the salvific high priest. In light of 
these examples, divinity is spatio-temporal, as it is able to really experience sequential 
events in specific places. Christ’s divinity is necessarily temporal in an inifinite 
analogical sense. 
Having discussed divinity in Hebrews as the first principle of reality, I move to 
the description of humanity in this epistle. 
Humanity: Christ and the Concept of Human Nature  
There are a few passages in Hebrews that reveal assumptions about the reality of 
human beings in general, and several passages that offer hints about the human nature of 
Christ. I will start this section with the discussion of the conception of human beings in 
general. The main idea of this general anthropology is that human nature is necessarily 
grounded in the body and its functions. Associated with this idea, the discussion on the 
human incarnation of Christ’s divine being will emphasize that His humanity is not 
necessary to provide a spatio-temporal instrument for His divinity. I will start this 
discussion with the anthropology of Hebrews and then move to Christological 
anthropology.280 
                                                





General Anthropology: Human Nature  
Grounded in the Body 
The author of Hebrews clearly emphasizes that God has access to the deepest 
parts of a human person, which includes “soul/life281 and spirit” and “both joints and 
marrow”282 (4:12). The point of this language is that He is able to discern or judge 
(κριτικὸς) “the thoughts and intentions of the heart.” In this passage, the inner human 
nature consists of physical (joints and marrow) and abstract aspects (soul/life and 
spirit),283 which implies that the deepest internal part of human beings is not described as 
an immaterial soul that constitutes the essence of a person, being secondarily and 
externally accompanied by a body.284 Rather, physical language is included in the 
                                                
in the previous chapter) may question the methodological approach of studying human beings in general 
and then connecting general anthropology to the humanity of Christ, instead of going the other way around. 
While I appreciate the idea of using Christ’s humanity as the starting point for a general anthropology, I do 
not think that the methodological move that I make here is unsound. First, the Barthian position may fear 
that the move from general anthropology to Christ’s humanity implies some kind of natural theology 
(epistemologically staring with humanity and moving to God/Christ). This charge, however, is unfair. My 
study about human beings does not use data from scientific anthropological studies. Rather, the source of 
information for my general anthropological conclusions is the same that Barthian theologians would use to 
construe their accounts of a Christological anthropology, namely, the biblical material. Second, the notion 
of incarnation in Hebrews stipulates that Christ “had to be made like his brothers in every respect” (2:17), 
except for sin (4:15). Therefore, in some sense, what we study about human beings in general does apply to 
Christ’s humanity.  
281 These are the two basic related meanings of ψυχή. See BDAG, 1098. Cockerill seems to prefer 
the term life in Heb 4:12. See Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 216. ψυχή and πνεῦµα appear together 
also in 1 Thess 5:23 in the NT. 
282 ψυχῆς καὶ πνεύµατος, ἁρµῶν τε καὶ µυελῶν 
283 My argument here is similar to the notion that these psychological/abstract and physical aspects 
summarize the whole of human nature or existence, as advanced by Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 
134; Koester, Hebrews, 274; Peter T. O’Brien, The Letter to the Hebrews, PNTC (Grand Rapids, MI; 
Nottingham, England: Eerdmans; Apollos, 2010), 176-177. However, my argument has a significant 
nuance: in Heb 4:12, these aspects summarize the inner human nature or existence. 
284 There are unconvincing attempts to interpret Heb 4:12 according to an anthropological 
framework of Greek (following a platonic orientation) ontology. As Attridge indicates, “P. Proulx and L. 
Alonso-Schökel (“Hebr. IV, 12–13: componentes y estructura,” Bib 54 [1973] 331–39) attempt to fit all the 
elements of this verse into a Platonic framework provided by Tim. 43–45, 69–74, 81, 85, 90, but such a 





reference to inner human nature, and the last part of 4:12 confirms this understanding, as 
thoughts and intentions (psychological language) are directly associated with the heart 
(bodily language) in the deepest internal part of a human person. Elaborating on this 
anthropological perspective, one cannot talk about the essence of human beings without 
reference to the body. The discussion on to what extent anthropological language of 4:12 
should be taken as literal or figurative285 does not impact the point that I emphasize here. 
                                                
Furthermore, Spicq sees in Heb 4:12 a Philonic dichotomy between ψυχή (animal soul, life) and πνεῦµα 
(νοῦς, the rational nature, the connection with the divine, the real essence of human beings), namely, a 
dichotomy between the natural and spiritual natures of human beings. Spicq, L’Épitre aux Hébreux, 1:52-
53. Attridge explains that “the theoretical distinction between ψυχή and νοῦς is made by Aristotle An. 2.2 
(413b 24–27); 3.4 (429a 10—429b 9); 3.5 (430a 18–25). It becomes commonplace in later Greek 
philosophy and religion, where πνεῦµα and νοῦς are often equated. . . . Philo’s psychology is complex and 
his language fluid, reflecting the various philosophical theories on which he has drawn. See Dillon, Middle 
Platonists, 174–78. At times he simply distinguishes between soul or pneuma and body (Op. mund. 135; 
Leg. all. 3.161). Within the soul (ψυχή) he can isolate the rational element (νοῦς) as the superior part (Op. 
mund. 69; Leg. all. 1.37–40), a distinction parallel to that of irrational and rational components of the soul 
(Rer. div. her. 232). The spirit can be seen as the essence of the soul (Rer. div. her. 55–57; Det. pot. ins. 
80–86; Quaest. in Gen. 259), which is infused into the soul by God (Leg. all. 3.37). The distinction of 
matter, soul, and spirit will be more fully developed in Gnostic sources.” Attridge, The Epistle to the 
Hebrews, 135n39. More recently, Johnson stipulated that Heb 4:12 reflects “the tripartite psychology 
familiar in Platonism (see Timaeus 43A-45E, 69A-90E).” Johnson, Hebrews, 134. However, a Philonic 
distinction of soul and spirit, and a Platonic tripartite psychology are not convincing conceptual 
backgrounds for the understanding of Heb 4:12. First, as Attridge has indicated, a Philonic distinction of 
soul and spirit presupposes that the human spirit is the superior to the soul (ψυχή). Nevertheless, there is no 
hierarchy between human ψυχῆς the πνεύµατος in Hebrews. Koester correctly indicates that “there is little 
difference in meaning, of the salvation of one’s ‘soul’ (10:39) and the completion of one’s ‘spirit’ in the 
heavenly city of God (12:23).” Koester, Hebrews, 274. See Herbert Braun, An Die Hebräer (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1984), 119; O’Brien, The Letter to the Hebrews, 177n137. Moreover, Smillie properly 
observes that ψυχή in Hebrews is used “for the spiritual nature of the human . . . person” (see Heb 6:19; 
10:39; 12:3; 13:17). Gene R. Smillie, “‘Ο Λογος Του Θεου’ in Hebrews 4:12-13,” Novum Testamentum 46, 
no. 4 (2004): 343. Second, a tripartite (Platonic) proposal does not make justice to the fact that Heb 4:12 
use two pairs, ψυχῆς καὶ πνεύµατος and ἁρµῶν τε καὶ µυελῶν. From a logical standpoint, it is difficult to see 
how two pairs form a tripartite divison. Such attempt seems to impose an alien framework into the text. 
285 Some scholars interpret joints and marrow in Heb 4:12 as metaphorical equivalents of soul and 
spirit (see Spicq, L’Épitre aux Hébreux, 2:89; Smillie, “‘Ο λογος του θεου’ in Hebrews 4:12-13,” 342-343), 
based on Euripides’ (c. 480-406 BC) metaphorical use µυελὸς in the expression ἄκρος µυελὸς ψυχῆς (“the 
deepest marrow of the soul”) in Hippolytus, 255. However, Attridge argues that “the metaphysical use of 
µυελὸς in that passage hardly implies it is regularly used in such a metaphorical way,” and suggests that “it 
is probably better to understand the phrase” in Heb 4:12 “as a complex summary of the whole of human 
nature.” Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 135. While conceding that it is uncertain whether joints and 
marrow in Heb 4:12 “are to be understood literally or figuratively,” Ellingworth points out that “literal and 





As Ellingworth correctly indicates in his remarks on this passage, “literal and figurative 
associations of parts of the body are not separated in biblical anthropology, which does 
not sharply distinguish between physical and psychological functions.”286 To put it more 
pointedly, a literal and figurative association regarding parts of the body in biblical 
language is possible because there is in the biblical anthropological mindset an 
ontological holistic combination of physical and psychological aspects and functions.287 
According to this anthropological view that the inner nature of human beings 
includes bodily parts, 10:22 mentions a complete purification of the human person. 
Externally, the body is washed with pure water. Internally, the heart is sprinkled from an 
evil conscience. Therefore, the inner human nature is portrayed with a psychological 
                                                
sharply distinguish between physical and psychological functions.” Ellingworth, The Epistle to the 
Hebrews, 263. 
286 Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 263. 
287 The distinction aspective/partitive employed by James Dunn (drawn from D. H. Whiteley, 
Theology of St. Paul [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966], 36) is helpful on this point. While the partitive 
conception regards “the human being as made up of distinct parts,” the aspective view sees the human 
being “as a whole person existing on different dimensions” or aspects. Whereas Dunn acknowledges the 
value of this distinction when used in broad terms, he warns against the simple application of this 
distinction to Hebrew and Greek forms of thought, in which the former is considered aspective and the 
latter partitive. He argues that “the complexity and diversity of the evolving debate within Greek 
philosophy on physics can hardly be adequately grasped by such distinctions. And the influence of 
Hellenistic thought particularly on diaspora Judaism diminishes the distinction anyway—as Philo always 
demonstrate.” James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 
54. While aware of this complexity, I find the aspective/partitive distinction conceptually helpful for the 
realization that biblical anthropology (and not necessarily all Hebrew forms of thought) has an aspective, 
and not partitive, view of human beings. A recent example of a holistic (monistic) interpretation of biblical 
anthropology, which implies an aspective view of human beings, is Joel B. Green, Body, Soul, and Human 
Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible, Studies in Theological Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2008). Green is aware of the danger of simplistic differentiations between generalized accounts 
of Hebrew and Greek thinking (see ibid., 51-54), but he argues that the Bible does not hold a partitive or 
dualist notion of the human being. Green offers a survey of biblical anthropology in NT and OT studies in 
the twentieth and twentieth-first century, with an emphasis on a holistic (monistic) interpretation. See ibid., 
pp. 4-16. At the end of his study, he denies the idea of an intermediate state between death and resurrection, 
and defends the absolute need of resurrection for life after death. He writes, “There is no part of us, no 
aspect of our personhood, that survives death.” In the NT, “life-after-death requires . . . re-embodiment” 




(conscience) and bodily language (heart). In this way, psychological terms such as ψυχή 
(4:12; 6:19; 10:39; 12:3; 13:17) and πνεῦµα (4:12; 12:23),288 used in an anthropological 
sense, should not be interpreted as referring to an immaterial entity or noncorporeal being 
that constitutes the real essence of human beings.289 In fact, the occurrences of ψυχή in 
6:19; 10:39; 12:3 and 13:17 do not point to this interpretation.290 Likewise, the reference 
to “the spirits of the righteous made perfect” in the heavenly Jerusalem (12:23) does not 
                                                
288 Attridge speculates that, perhaps, the use of πνεῦµα in 9:14 and 12:9 is also anthropological. 
Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 376n81. In my judgment, these passages do not indicate a specific 
anthropological use of πνεῦµα. 
289 To use the categories mentioned by Green, I am basically suggesting that the anthropology of 
Hebrews implies a form of monism, meaning that human beings have “no second, metaphysical entity, such 
as a soul or spirit,” as defended by forms of radical dualism (“the soul [or mind] is separable from the 
body, having no necessary relation to the body”) and wholistic dualism (the human person is “composed of 
discrete elements” that constitute “a functional unity”). Green indicates that the monism he has in mind 
assumes that what “we label ‘soul’” is “neither reducible to brain activity” (against reductive materialism) 
“nor evidence of a substantial, ontological entity such as a ‘soul’” (against radical dualism and wholistic 
dualism), “but rather represent essential aspects or capacities of the self.” Green, Body, Soul, and Human 
Life, 31. 
290 In 6:19, ψυχή is related to the hope (ἐλπίδος, v. 18) of the believer. In 10:39, those who have 
faith will preserve (περιποίησιν) ψυχή (in other words, these persons will be preserved), but those who 
shrink back (ὑποστολῆς) will be destroyed (ἀπώλειαν). This passage seems to portray a situation of 
judgment, when there will be either salvation or damnation (which implies the destruction of the ψυχή) of 
the person. In 12:3, ψυχή (κάµητε ταῖς ψυχαῖς, which describes a person being fatigued) is associated with 
the situation when a person gives up (ἐκλυόµενοι). As Eduard Schweizer indicates, ψυχή is related to the 
positive idea of “life-force, courage, or readiness for sacrifice.” Schweizer, “ψυχή, ψυχικός, ἀνάψυξις, 
ἀναψύχω, δίψυχος, ὀλιγόψυχος,” TDNT, 9:650. In 13:17, the author depicts the leaders of the church caring 
for (ἀγρυπνοῦσιν) the ψυχή of believers. As Elligworth points out, “No separation of soul and body is 
implied, but the author’s concern is clearly the spiritual good of the community.” Ellingworth, The Epistle 
to the Hebrews, 723. Schweizer even wonders if the meaning of ψυχή in 13:17 emphasizes the human 
being “as a whole or on his life before God,” as it does in 10:39. Schweizer, “ψυχή, ψυχικός, ἀνάψυξις, 
ἀναψύχω, δίψυχος, ὀλιγόψυχος,” TDNT, 9:650. My impression is that, both in 10:39 and 13:17, ψυχή refers 
to the human being as a whole (or as a person, see this definition in BDAG, 1099), with a particular 
emphasis on his/her life before God. Therefore, having all these passages in view, ψυχή is not 
anthropologically conceptualized in Hebrews as an immaterial entity (soul) or noncorporeal being that 
constitutes the real essence of human beings. Rather, it is related to human desire/hope (6:19) and 
vitality/courage (12:3), and refers to the human being as a whole with an emphasis on his/her life before 




indicate that the human spirit is an immaterial entity or noncorporeal being.291 
                                                
291 My suggestion in this footnote is that the reference to Zion in 12:22-24 is not an ontological or 
temporal description, but a mental possibility for living believers (pointing to the final salvation), just as 
Sinai in this context is a possibility for them in terms of judgment. If this congregation or group of 
righteous people (spirits) includes deceased believers, the inclusion is rhetorical or proleptical, as this is not 
a present ontological description. With this summary and keeping in mind what I explain in this footnote, 
the reading that interprets the spirits in 12:23 in terms of a noncorporeal presence of deceased believers in 
heaven assumes that what constitutes the essence of a person is an immaterial entity that is secondarily 
accompanied by a body. Furthermore, this interpretation presupposes that it is precisely this immaterial 
entity that is made perfect in human beings. However, it is important to note that the audience (living 
believers) hearing the words of 12:22-23 is described as having “come to Mount Zion and to the city 
(πόλει) of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem.” Obviously, these believers do not come literally or 
ontologically to God’s heavenly city, because they still seek (ἐπιζητοῦµεν) this city (πόλιν) that is to come 
(13:14). The reference to the hope (ἐλπίδος) of believers entering in the heavenly presence of God (inside 
the curtain where Christ has gone on our behalf) in 6:18-20 may be helpful for the understanding of a non-
literal entrance of believers in the heavenly city of God in 12:22-23. But how about deceased believers? 
Have they come literally or ontologically to God’s heavenly city, as perfected disembodied spirits? This 
does not seem to be the picture of deceased believers in chap. 11. They all died in faith, “not having 
received the things promised, but having seen them and greeted them from afar” (11:13). Similar to the 
audience of Heb 13:14, the believers who died in faith are described as those who seek (ἐπιζητοῦσιν, 11:14) 
a heavenly country, the city (πόλιν, 11:16) that God has prepared for them (11:14-16). When the hope of 
life after death is mentioned, there is a reference to the eschatological resurrection (ἀναστάσεως, 11:35). At 
the end of the chapter, the author reiterates that they did not receive the promise (11:39) and emphasizes 
that “God had provided something better for us, that apart from us they should not be made perfect” 
(11:40). If the essence of the human being is an immaterial entity (soul or spirit), these ideas about 
deceased believers in chapter 11 could receive the following interpretation: (1) the better provision that 
God has for “us” (living believers) is the work of Christ, which makes us perfect in the sense that it allows 
us to have access to God (this understanding of perfection was explored above in the discussion of the Goal 
of the Priesthood. See also Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 597-599; Johnson, Hebrews, 309-310; 
Koester, Hebrews, 520) (2) the believers of chapter 11 died without receiving the promise and without 
being made perfect because their death preceded the salvific work of Christ (see Cockerill, The Epistle to 
the Hebrews, 598), which the audience of Hebrews can benefiting from; and (3) the believers of chapter 11 
did not benefit from Christ’s work when they died, but when Christ started His salvific work, as 
disembodied spirits after death they started benefiting from His work just as living believers did (See ibid., 
599, 656, 657n71). It is in this way that, apart from living believers (the audience of Hebrews), deceased 
believers should not be made perfect (11:40) (ibid., 599). It is also in this sense that they are spirits made 
perfect in the heavenly Jerusalem (12:22-23) (ibid., 656, 657n71). Whereas points 1 and 2 are consistent 
with the message of Hebrews, point 3 stretches the ideas of the epistle to accommodate the anthropological 
presupposition that the essence of the human being is an immaterial entity secondarily accompanied by a 
body. In his remarks on 12:23, Ellingworth argues that it is “misleading to suggest that the righteous are 
thought of here as having been made perfect in spirit, but not yet in body: this dichotomy does not appear 
significant in Hebrews.” Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 681. For Koester, “Hebrews provides no 
clarity about a person’s state between death and final judgment.” Koester, Hebrews, 546. Even Cockerill 
acknowledges that the author of Hebrews “makes no statement about what the faithful of old experienced 
after their deaths.” Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 598. In my estimation, point 3 stretches the 
anthropology of Hebrews in two ways. First, it extrapolates the natural reading of chapter 11, which 
expresses the possibility of going beyond death in a bodily way, either by being taken by God without 
seeing death (Enoch, 11:5) or by living again in terms of resurrection (11:19; 35). Second, in contrast to 
11:40, deceased believers would precede the audience of Hebrews in terms of perfection and fulfillment of 
the promise. More specifically, they would have access to God in the promised city “apart from” the 





Keeping in mind this conception that human nature is grounded in the body and 
                                                
This argument is opposed to Cockerill’s point that deceased believers “have been ‘made perfect’ in the 
same way that contemporary believers ‘have been made perfect.’” Ibid., 657. Chronologically, the deceased 
believers of chapter 11 would have benefited from the work of Christ and would have access to God at least 
since His ascension. Presumably, they would have been experiencing this benefit before many believers 
among the audience of Hebrews who may have become Christian years after the ascension of Christ. 
Qualitatively, their access to God would be distinct from the one of living believers. Different from their 
situation in 11:13-16, and assuming that the immaterial soul or spirit would be the essence of their 
humanity, these deceased believers would be ontologically present in the promised heavenly city and have 
literal access to God there, while living believers would still long to be ontologically there (13:14), having 
only a mental access probably through hope and prayer (see 4:16; 6:19-20; 9:19; 12:22-24). This argument 
is different from Scholer’s artificial distinction between deceased believers being made perfect now, and 
receiving only at the end the eschatological promise of rest with living believers. See Scholer, Proleptic 
Priests, 200-201. In his remarks on 12:22-24, Cortez suggests that, “by referring to and using Scripture as 
God’s own speech in his exposition, the author of Hebrews has constructed a world in which the audience 
stands at Mount Zion where they hear God speak and, hence, witness the enthronement of the Son, his 
appointment as high priest, and the inauguration of the new covenant.” Cortez, “‘The Anchor of the Soul 
That Enters Within the Veil’,” 444. If this suggestion is sound, my point here is that believers have mental 
(through hope and prayer) access to this world. Therefore, taking into account these implications of point 3, 
I suggest this point misreads the anthropological picture of Hebrews. According to these implications, I 
suspect that if the author and the audience of Hebrews shared the presupposition that an immaterial entity 
(soul or spirit) is the essence of the human being, the author would have framed chapter 11 (especially 
11:13-16, 35, 39-40) in a different way. In my view, a more natural reading of Hebrews suggests the 
following elaboration of point 3: The believers of chap. 11 did not benefit from Christ’s work as living 
believers do and they did not receive the promises (11:13-16; 39-40). Deceased believers are not 
disembodied spirits after death, but wait for a future resurrection (11:35, Koester seems to interpret 11:39-
40 in terms of resurrection. See Koester, Hebrews, 520-521) to live again and have access to God (attain 
perfection) in the promised heavenly city along with living believers, who already experience on earth this 
access non-ontologically on the basis of Christ’s ascension. Accordingly, the spirits made perfect in 12:22-
24 are probably another description of the church or congregation (ἐκκλησίᾳ) of “the firstborn who are 
enrolled in heaven” (12:23). These parallel descriptions refer to believers (as persons) in general, who 
benefit from the work of Christ. However, the expression “you have come” (προσεληλύθατε, 12:22) depicts 
a non-ontological access and presence of believers in the heavenly city. This point is compatible with 
Cockerill’s idea that the contrast between Sinai (12:18-21) and Zion (12:22-24) in 12:18-24 is not “a simple 
contrast between the old and the new religious orders, or between the times before and after Christ.” 
Rather, the contrast is between “belief and unbelief, with apostasy and faithfulness, with judgment and 
blessing.” Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 643. Following this interpretation, my suggestion is that 
Zion in 12:22-24 is not an ontological or temporal description, but a mental possibility for living believers 
(pointing to the final salvation), just as Sinai (in the way it is described in this context) is also a possibility 
for them in the sense of judgment. Does this congregation or group of righteous people (spirits) include 
deceased believers? As far as this is not an ontological description in the present, it is rhetorically, and 
perhaps proleptically, possible. In terms of rhetoric, notice how the author of Hebrews, as he deals with 
past and present realities, employs figurative language for situations somehow related to death in chapters 
11-12: (1) although dead, Abel still speaks through the faith expressed by the sacrifice he offered (11:4) 
(see ibid., 527n35, 37); (2) the blood of Christ speaks something better than Abel (12:24) (see ibid., 659); 
(3) Isaac was resurrected figuratively or as a parable (παραβολῇ) when Abraham offered up him (11:19); 
(4) the believers of chap. 11 are portrayed as a great cloud of witnesses that surround the audience of 
Hebrews, as this audience runs the race of the Christian life (12:1). In terms of proleptic language, the 
rhetorical portrayal of a present reality can use images of a future reality. Lane seems to interpret the 




its functions,292 I will move to the discussion of Christological anthropology in 
Hebrews.293 
Christological Anthropology 
The notion that human nature is grounded in the body and its functions indicates 
that Christ’s human nature should not be conceptualized in terms of His body being 
instrumental to an alleged immaterial being (soul or spirit). Likewise, the presupposition 
that God is not a timeless-spaceless being implies that the humanity of Christ was not 
needed as a spatio-temporal instrument of His divinity. In this way, Christ did/does not 
experience spatio-temporal events through His human nature, but as a divine-human 
being. Therefore, the concept that human nature is grounded in the body and its functions 
implies that Christ’s human nature is essential (not instrumental) to (1) His incarnate life 
and death and to (2) His incarnate life and the heavenly priesthood. My next step is to 
articulate this implication from the Christological anthropology of Hebrews. 
Incarnate life and death 
As a matter of fact, in its more explicit Christological anthropology, Hebrews 
emphasizes Christ’s mortal humanity294 (2:9295), more precisely, a humanity for 
                                                
292 This reflection is clearly different from Schenk’s view that Hebrews assumes a dichotomous 
understanding of the human person, where the body (transitory hindrance) is innately inferior to the spirit 
(potentially eternal). See Schenck, Cosmology and Eschatology in Hebrews, 133-139, 143. 
293 For a recent study on the humanity of Christ in Hebrews, which focuses on His resurrected 
humanity, see Moffitt, Atonement and the Logic of Resurrection in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Moffitt is 
particularly critical of a dualistic (body, spirit) interpretation of the ontology of Christ’s glorified humanity. 
See ibid., 178-179, 302. 
294 Assuming a simple (not composite) ontological singularity of Christ as a divine-human being, 
the incarnate God experienced death at the cross. Christ’s divinity did not die, as it did not cease to exist 
(cf. Heb 1:10-12; John 10:17-18). In a mysterious way, His divinity experienced death, but not in the sense 




                                                
295 The Christological anthropology of Heb 2 seems to indicate that Christ’s incarnation made Him 
lower than angels (2:9). This passage elaborates on the quotation of Ps 8:5-7 LXX (8:4-6 ESV) in vv. 6-8. 
According to 2:7, man (ἄνθρωπος, 2:6) was made a little lower or for a little while lower than the angels 
(ἠλάττωσας αὐτὸν βραχύ τι παρ’ ἀγγέλους). The temporal and qualitative ambiguity of “being brief in 
duration” (little while) or “being low in quality” (little) expressed by the adjective βραχύ (see BDAG, 183) 
seems to play a role in the Christological reading of 2:9, which points out that Jesus was made a little lower 
or for a little while lower than the angels (τὸν δὲ βραχύ τι παρ’ ἀγγέλους ἠλαττωµένον βλέποµεν Ἰησοῦν). 
While NIV prefers the rendition “a little lower,” other translations opt for “a little while lower” (NASB, 
NRSV, NET, ESV). Overall, the language of being lower does not seem to allude to an ontological 
hierarchy of being, where the human being is in itself ontologically lower than the angelic being. The point 
is not primarily ontology, but honor. This idea is incompatible with Cockerill’s position, who implicitly 
maintains an ontological distinction for the language of lower and higher. Cockerill, The Epistle to the 
Hebrews, 132-133. In contrast to Cockerill, Ellingworth and Johnson interpret the lowering of 2:9 in terms 
of mortality rather than incarnation. See Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 154; Johnson, Hebrews, 
91. As it will become evident below, my point about honor is consistent with lowering in terms of 
mortality, assuming that the death and suffering of Christ describe His humiliation. As a matter of fact, the 
incarnate Christ was for a little while lower than angels changed because He was “crowned with glory and 
honor” after His death (2:9). This coronation made Christ “much better than the angels” (1:4 NASB). 
Assuming that the coronation implies His resurrection, it was Christ as a human being that became lower 
than angels, and it was also Christ as a (resurrected) human being that became higher than angels. Being 
God, Christ was always superior to the angels from an ontological standpoint. “He is the radiance of the 
glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature, and he upholds the universe by the word of his power” 
(1:3). He is the creator (1:10, 2) and eternal (1:11-12) God. However, as a human being, Christ was lower 
(incarnation) and then higher (ascension) to the angels, not from an ontological standpoint, but from the 
perspective of a position of honor. Thus, it is not the possession of human nature by itself that determines 
whether someone is lower or higher than angels. Rather, Christ became superior because of a higher kingly 
position of honor. Conversely, He was previosuly made lower than the angels in the incarnation 
presumably because, in God’s creation, human beings occupy a lower position of honor in comparison with 
the angels (2:7). I am reading 2:7 anthropologically and then Christologically (in light of 2:9). If 2:7 is read 
only Christologically, then perhaps it could be said that Christ was made lower than angels in terms of His 
mortal humanity (see the comments on 2:14 below). In an anthropological reading, it would make no sense 
to interpret that God made human beings lower than angels in terms of their mortal humanity, since God 
did not create human beings for mortality (see Gen 1-2). In any case, if 2:7 is read anthropologically and 
Christologically or read only Christologically, the reason for making Christ higher than angels (in light of 
chap. 1) is not related to a glorified state of His body, but to His crowning with glory and honor because of 
His death (2:9). Again, the point here is the position of honor, and not an ontological status of the human 
body. While the changes of becoming lower and higher take place in the realm of honor rather than of 
ontology, theses changes do result from ontological events, namely, lowering incarnation, suffering death, 
and exalted ascension. In fact, His suffering death could be seen as the center of these ontological events, as 
Christ became incarnate in order to “taste death” and became higher than angels in the coronation “because 
of the suffering of death” (2:9). In context, the passage reads, “But we see him who for a little while was 
made lower than the angels, namely Jesus, crowned with glory and honor because of the suffering of death 
(διὰ τὸ πάθηµα τοῦ θανάτου δόξῃ καὶ τιµῇ ἐστεφανωµένον), so that by the grace of God he might taste death 
for everyone” (ὅπως χάριτι θεοῦ ὑπὲρ παντὸς γεύσηται θανάτου) (2:9, italics mine). The position of the term 
ὅπως, which associated with the subjunctive verb γεύσηται (to taste or come to know, BDAG, 195) indicates 
purpose (in order that, BDAG, 718), seems to qualify the immediate previous word ἐστεφανωµένον (having 
being crowned) or complement the previous prepositional phrase διὰ τὸ πάθηµα τοῦ θανάτου (because of the 
suffering of death). See Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 76. See also Cockerill, The Epistle to the 
Hebrews, 134n46; Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 155. Considering these possibilities, Attridge 
suggests that the clause initiated by ὅπως “relates to the whole of what precedes and indicates the basic 
purpose of the savior’s mission that culminates in his death and exaltation.” Attridge, The Epistle to the 





(sacrificial) death (2:14296; 10:5-9297).298 In His humanity for death, test/temptation and 
                                                
the incarnation, as the incarnation was the ontological ground for His suffering death. 
296 The concept of suffering of death (τὸ πάθηµα τοῦ θανάτου) mentioned in 2:9 is explored in 
2:10, 14. In 2:14, human beings share (κεκοινώνηκεν) in blood and flesh and because of that Christ 
“likewise partook (µετέσχεν) of the same things.” The difference between human beings in general and 
Christ in this passage does not seem to lie in the verbs κοινωνέω and µετέχω, which are used synonymously, 
but in their tenses (perfect and aorist, respectively). As Attridge emphasizes, the verbs κοινωνέω and 
µετέχω, which respectively describe human beings sharing in flesh and blood and Christ partaking in flesh 
and blood, are used synonymously. See the parallel use of these Greek terms in Prov 1:11, 18 (LXX); 1 Cor 
10:17-21; 2 Cor 6:14. Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 91. Furthermore, the adverb παραπλησίως 
(meaning likewise) that immediately precedes µετέσχεν “itself does not show clearly just how far the 
similarity goes. But it is used in contexts where no differentiation is intended, in the sense in just the same 
way.” BDAG, 770. Cockerill classifies the aorist µετέσχεν as ingressive (began to partake), minimizing its 
distinction of the perfect κεκοινώνηκεν, as both Christ and human beings in general would be in a 
continuous state of partaking/sharing of blood and flesh. Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 147n105. 
The argumentation that follows indicates that I do not subscribe to Cockerill’s position. Rather, my 
suggestion is that the expressions “blood and flesh” (2:14) and “in the days of his flesh” (5:7) do not merely 
describe the incarnation. Rather, they emphasize His passion, as they are used in direct relationship to His 
death. In 2:14, Christ participated in flesh and blood “so that through death (ἵνα διὰ τοῦ θανάτου) he might 
destroy him having the power of death” (NRSV, italics mine). In 5:7, “the days of His flesh” refer 
particularly to when His “prayers and supplications, with loud cries and tears,” addressed the “one who was 
able to save him from death” (italics mine). In other words, these passages do not simply highlight His 
humanity, but His mortal humanity. As Attridge indicates regarding 5:7, “the ‘days of his flesh’ or ‘his 
fleshly (i.e., mortal) days.’” Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 149; italics mine. From a canonical 
perspective, this interpretation is similar to the idea of perishable body that is contrasted to a resurrected 
imperishable body in 1 Cor 15:50-54 (see footnotes below). The language of partaking of blood and flesh 
(Heb 2:14) and of the “days of His flesh” (Heb 5:7) seem to point to Christ’s mortal or perishable humanity 
(focus on His death). Therefore, from this perspective, the use of the aorist (partook of blood and flesh) in 
2:14 and the temporal qualification (in the days of His flesh) in 5:7 is better understood in the context of 
Christ’s mortal or perishable humanity. 
297 This passage qualifies Christ’s human nature as a humanity for sacrificial death by quoting Ps 
40:6-8 (39:6-8 LXX). The most important difference between the psalm and Hebrews is that the latter uses 
body (σῶµα, Heb 10:5) instead of ears (ָאְזַנִים, Ps 40:7 MT; ὠτία, Ps 39:7 LXX). For a helpful discussion of 
the difference with the LXX, see Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 435-436. Cockerill stipulates that 
“‘ears you prepared for me’ fits the context well. However, it is probable that another [LXX] translator took 
‘ears’ as a metaphor in which the part stood for the whole, ‘ears’ for the entire ‘body,’ which God ‘prepared 
as a vehicle of obedience.” The author of Hebrews “could have built his case on the more literal translation 
which would have been in full agreement with the obedience of the Son. However, ‘body’ allowed him to 
tie this obedience more readily to the incarnation and final offering of Christ’s ‘body’ on the cross.” Ibid., 
436. In Heb 10:5, Christ spoke the words of the psalm “when He came into the world (κόσµον).” According 
to Cockerill, “‘as he was coming into the world,’ or, perhaps, ‘as he was about to come into the world,’ 
pinpoints the eve of the incarnation as the occasion when Christ spoke these words.” This expression 
echoes the “Behold, I have come” from v. 7 of the psalm quoted in 10:5.” Ibid., 434. Likewise, Lane 
stipulates that the expression “‘when he comes into the world,’ is distinctly ‘incarnational’ language.” 
Lane, Hebrews 9-13, 262. This Christological speech contrasts the body prepared for Him and the 
sacrifices and offerings (10:5-6, 8) of the Aaronic priesthood (implied in 10:1-4). In this contrast, Christ 
came to do God’s will (10:7, 9). Cockerill emphasizes that “the obedience of Christ described in Ps 40:6-





                                                
the new system of heart obedience is established (Heb 10:9). Thus this psalm is the turning point that 
enables the pastor to move from his initial explanation of Jer 31:31-34 in 8:7-13 to his final reiteration of 
this prophecy in 10:15-18.” Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 441. Indeed, the incarnation is an act for 
obedience, as Christ came to the world to do God’s will, and the offering of Christ’s body (His sacrificial 
death) defines His obedience (10:10). In 13:11-12, the body of Christ is implied in His bloody suffering 
outside the gate (the word σώµατα appears in 13:11). Similar to 10:10, the language of sanctification 
through this sacrifice (ἁγιάσῃ διὰ) is used. The linkage between these two passages is important because 
they are the two instances where σῶµα is used for Christ in Hebrews, explicitly (10:5, 10) and implicitly 
(13:11-12). Heb 10:10 reads, “by that will (ἐν ᾧ θελήµατι) we have been sanctified (ἡγιασµένοι) through the 
offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all (διὰ τῆς προσφορᾶς τοῦ σώµατος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐφάπαξ).” 
As Cockerill maintains, this offering gives specificity to the will of God in this verse. Ibid., 443. All these 
remarks point to the idea that Christ’s obedience and humanity/body are conceptualized in the context of 
His sacrificial death. This also seems to be the case of “his flesh” (σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ) in 10:20. My point here is 
that His flesh is seen in the context of His sacrificial death. For a helpful discussion of the possibilities 
related to the interpretation of the explanatory phrase τοῦτ’ ἔστιν τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ in 10:20, see Cortez, 
“‘The Anchor of the Soul That Enters Within the Veil’,” 415-419. In short, he firstly indicates that the 
antecedent qualified by this explanatory phrase is probably “the veil” (τοῦ καταπετάσµατος), and not the 
“way” (ὁδὸν). Second, the implied preposition διὰ (that appears in διὰ τοῦ καταπετάσµατος) in the 
explanatory phrase is both locative (“through the veil, that is, through His flesh”) and instrumental 
(“through the veil, that is, by means of His flesh”). In his words, “The locative sense of διὰ, identifies the 
‘veil’ as the point of access to the presence of God; a meaning that is, in fact, because of the image, 
analogous to the instrumental. The veil as a point of access (locative) is in an analogous sense a means of 
access as well (instrumental). Admittedly, there is a progression in the meaning of the preposition, but this 
is something that we should expect from the use of metaphorical images. Thus, we should understand this 
expression in the following way: “by the new and living way that he opened for us through the curtain, that 
is, [by means] of his flesh.” Ibid., 419. In agreement with my discussion of the macro-hermeneutical 
principles of reality regarding the notion of Christ’s flesh and blood, the instrumentality of the blood of 
Christ in 10:19 paralells the instrumentality of the flesh in 10:20, and the instrumentality of His flesh and 
blood refer to His sacrificial death as the means by which believers enter the heavenly sanctuary. 
298 Compare the footnote above on 2:14 with the contrast between perishable and imperishable 
body in 1 Cor 15:50-54. The contrast indicated here assumes a synonymous parallelism in the passage. 
More specifically, “Paul is not using synthetic parallelism that introduces a further thought (‘flesh and 
blood’ = the living; ‘corruptible’ = the dead), but synonymous parallelism (‘flesh and blood’ = 
‘corruptible’) to refer to the condition of physical human existence. The first assertion, that flesh and blood 
cannot inherit the kingdom of God, is explained by the second in ways that any Greek reader could 
understand. ‘Flesh and blood’ represents what is corruptible, and what is corruptible cannot stake a claim 
on what is incorruptible.” David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians, Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New 
Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 741. Garland indicates (see ibid., 741n1) that this 
synonymous parallelism is affirmed by R. Morissette, “‘La chair et le sang ne peuvent hériter du Règne de 
Dieu’ (1 Cor. xv,50),” Science et esprit 26 (1974): 46-48 (article pages 39–67); H. Conzelmann, 1 
Corinthians, translated by J. W. Leitch, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 290n10; G. D. Fee, The 
First Epistle to the Corinthians, New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans. 1987), 798; B. Witherington III, Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical 
Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 310; C. Wolff, Der erste Brief des 
Paulus an die Korinther, Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament 7 (Berlin: Evangelische 
Verlagsanstalt. 1996), 414; R. F. Collins, First Corinthians, Sacra Pagina 7 (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical 
Press, 1999), 579; J. R. Asher, Polarity and Change in 1 Corinthians 15: A Study of Metaphysics, Rhetoric, 
and Resurrection, Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie 42 (Tübingen: Mohr, 2000), 153-54; W. 
Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther (1 Kor 15, 1–16, 24), Evangelisch-katholischer Kommentar zum 
Neuen Testament 7/4 (Zurich: Benziger/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2001), 366. On the other 





suffering were part of His life, but these experiences reached their climax in His death.299 
In the context of test/temptation and suffering,300 the incarnate Christ developed 
                                                
the Corinthian, vol. 2: Chapters 9–16, translated by A. Cusin (Edinburgh: Clark, 1887), 434; J. Jeremias, 
“Flesh and Blood Cannot Inherit the Kingdom of God,” New Testament Studies 2 (1995-1956), 152. With 
regard to the ideas of perishable and imperishable body in 1 Cor 15:50-54, Paul introduces his argument in 
1 Cor 15 by emphasizing Christ’s death, burial, and resurrection (vv. 3-4). Then, he explains how the 
resurrection of Christ is related to the future resurrection of deceased believers (vv. 12-23). Before he 
moves to the discussion of the resurrected body, Paul’s remarks about the reign of Christ and His campaign 
against enemies, especially against death as the last enemy (vv. 24-28), are similar to the ideas presented in 
Hebrews about Christ as king subjugating enemies (Heb 1:13, 2:8; 10:12-13) and defeating the power of 
death (Heb 2:14-15). Regarding the resurrected body of deceased believers (vv. 35-49), Paul contrasts the 
present human body (before or at death—Paul employs here the language of sowing [verb σπείρω]. While 
this language emphasizes the dead [see 15:35-36], the concluding statements of this discussion indicate that 
the bodies of living believers are also included [see 15:52-53]) and the resurrected body by employing the 
following terms in vv. 42-44: perishable (φθορᾷ) x imperishable (ἀφθαρσίᾳ), dishonor (ἀτιµίᾳ) x glory 
(δόξῃ), weakness (ἀσθενείᾳ) x power (δυνάµει), unspiritual body (σῶµα ψυχικόν—while most translations 
render ψυχικόν as natural [ESV, NASB, NIV, YLT, NET], the term in 1 Cor 14:44 conveys more precisely 
the idea of unspiritual [BDAG, 1100]. See the use of ψυχικός in 1 Cor 2:14 [reference to someone who 
“does not accept the things of the Spirit of God”], James 3:15 [described as something that does not come 
from above and associated with the idea of earthly and demoniac], and Jude 19 [describes someone “devoid 
of the Spirit”]) x spiritual body (σῶµα πνευµατικόν). Toward the conclusion of this discussion, Paul points 
out that “flesh and blood (σὰρξ καὶ αἷµα) cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable 
(φθορὰ) inherit the imperishable (ἀφθαρσίαν).” Interpreting this statement as a synonymous parallelism, the 
language of flesh and blood is used in the sense of a perishable body, that is, it relates to death. This idea is 
confirmed by the eschatological event when “the dead will be raised imperishable” and living believers 
“shall be changed” (15:52). For both living and deceased believers, the perishable will put on the 
imperishable, meaning that the mortal will put on immortality (15:53-54). Therefore, the language of flesh 
and body in 1 Cor 15:50 conveys the idea of a perishable or mortal body, as it relates to death. It is also 
plausible, in light of 1 Cor 11:23-26, that the language of eating Christ’s flesh and blood in John 6:51-56 
refers not merely to His humanity, but to His mortal humanity, with special reference to His death (in the 
Greek NT, flesh [σὰρξ] and blood [αἷµα] appear together also in Matt 16:17; John 1:13; Gal 1:16; and Eph 
6:12). Hence, in these contexts, blood and flesh are not merely elements of the human body, but they 
portray a body that faces death. 
299 It is possible to discern in Hebrews both a more focused and a broader perspective of Christ’s 
experience of temptation. Since the notion of His suffering (πάσχω) in Hebrews is related to His death (see 
2:9-10; 5:7-8; 9:26; 13:12), His suffering death is the event of His test/temptation. On the other hand, 4:15 
provides a broader perspective in which Christ has been tested/tempted “in all things as we are, yet without 
sin” (NASB). πεπειρασµένον δὲ κατὰ πάντα καθ’ ὁµοιότητα χωρὶς ἁµαρτίας. It is noteworthy how the 
language of a broader perspective of His humanity in 2:17 is similar to the language of a broader 
perspective of His test/temptation in 4:15. The expression κατὰ πάντα appears in both passages, and same 
language of likeness is used in them, namely, the verb ὁµοιόω (2:17) and the noun ὁµοιότης (4:15). In both 
perspectives, the test/temptation of Christ enabled Him to be merciful (2:17) or sympathetic (4:15) toward 
human beings. 
300 In 2:18, His test/temptation is qualified in terms of suffering. “For because he himself has 
suffered when tempted (ἐν ᾧ γὰρ πέπονθεν αὐτὸς πειρασθείς), he is able to help those who are being 




something new both in relation to human beings, namely, mercy (2:17) and sympathy 
(4:15),301 and in relation to God the Father, in terms of learned obedience (5:8).302 This is 
not to say that Christ could not have been already merciful and sympathetic toward 
human beings before the incarnation. The point here is that the incarnate Christ 
developed these attitudes on a new level because He experienced test/temptation and 
suffering now as a divine-human being (not through a human nature). 
One of the main ideas highlighted by the Christological concept of humanity for 
(sacrificial) death in Hebrews is the identity of the incarnate Christ with human beings, 
particularly in His death. Because of the incarnation, Christ was able to “taste death for 
everyone” (2:9). Due to His anthropological participation in mortal humanity (2:14), He 
is a brother of believers (2:11-12, 17). Therefore, Christ’s humanity was essential for His 
sacrifice on the cross, in the sense that this was a real human303 sacrifice on behalf of the 
human family. In other words, His humanity is crucial for the identification of His 
sacrifice with human beings. 
The next point to be described is Christ’s incarnate life and His heavenly 
priesthood. 
                                                
301 The test/temptation of Christ enabled Him to be merciful (2:17) or sympathetic (4:15) toward 
human beings. In 2:18, He is able (δύναται) to help human beings “because He himself suffered when 
tempted.” In 4:15, He is not unable (µὴ δυνάµενον) to sympathize with human beings, as He has been 
tempted in all things. 
302 The concepts of temptation and learned obedience are two related notions in the Christological 
anthropology of Hebrews. Similar to the idea of becoming enabled in temptation and suffering, the notion 
of learned obedience from what He suffered indicates that Christ developed something new (learned 
obedience) in relation to God Father. Although the language of test/temptation is not employed in 5:7-8, the 
notion of suffering (5:8) and death (5:7) is present there. In Christ’s incarnate experience, He had to show 
faithfulness (πιστὸς, 2:17) and godly fear (εὐλαβείας, 5:7) as a divine-human being in order to fulfill God’s 
will. This was a new experience for Him, in comparison with His divine life before the incarnation. 





Incarnate life and heavenly priesthood 
Just as the humanity of Christ was an essential ontological ground for His earthly 
life, especially characterized by temptation, suffering, and death; His resurrected 
humanity304  is also a crucial ontological ground for His heavenly life and priesthood. 
The language of “the power of an indestructible life” (7:16) appears to point to His 
resurrection305 (cf. 13:20) in a glorified or imperishable human body.306 This resurrected 
                                                
the sacrifice was truly human.  
304 Although I affirm the glorification of Christ’s resurrected humanity (as it will become evident 
below), I do not subscribe to Vanhoye’s idea of Christ’s teleoisis (His priestly consecration/perfection) as 
the transformation of His humanity in His sacrifice and manifested in His resurrection. In Vanhoye’s 
perspective, the idea of perfection in Hebrews is described as the recreation of a human being according to 
the plan of God. According to Vanhoye’s explanation of Christ’s teleoisis, there was “a real transformation 
of his flesh and blood nature. . . . a sacrifice which took over his whole being so as to open it up to the re-
creative action of God, and which introduced his renewed humanity into eternal intimacy with God.” 
Vanhoye, Old Testament Priests and the New Priest, 166-167. This conception is consistent with 
Vanhoye’s notion of sacrifice as transformation, more specifically a transformation of the creature “by 
imparting to it the divine holiness.” Ibid., 198. According to this understanding, the primary idea conveyed 
by the concept of sacrifice is not an action that offers something to God (God as the recipient of the action, 
perhaps in terms of the propitiation of His wrath), but rather an action performed by God (God as the 
subject of the action, His transformation of the human being). For further explanation about Vanhoye’s 
understanding of the transformation of Christ’s humanity as the key point of His sacrifice and priestly 
consecration (teleiosis), see ibid., 83, 157, 194, 197, 167-168, 180, 187, 197-198, 205, 219.  
305 This idea is different from Cockerill’s interpretation of Christ’s indestructible life as a reference 
to His eternal divinity, and not as pointing to His resurrection. Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 323-
324. Other scholars, however, interpret this language of imperishable life in the context of Christ’s 
resurrection, as the emphasis of Hebrews is on His exaltion. See Koester, Hebrews, 355; Lane, Hebrews 1-
8, 184; Moffitt, Atonement and the Logic of Resurrection in the Epistle to the Hebrews, 42, 148; Vanhoye, 
Old Testament Priests and the New Priest, 162. In his survery of Christ’s resurrection in Hebrews in the 
secondary literature, Moffitt outlines the following views: (1) the resurrection is not central for the author, 
who focuses on the death and exaltation (e.g., F.F. Bruce, P. Ellingworth, B. Westcott, W. Lane, A. 
Vanhoye); (2) the resurrection as spiritual ascension (Christ ascended immediately to heaven after His 
death) (e.g., H. Windisch, O. Hofius, J. Jeremias); (3) the relationship between resurrection and exaltation 
is unclear (e.g., W. Loader, C. Koester, H. Weiss); (4) the resurrection is completely conflated with the 
exaltation (e.g., E. Grässer, D. Hay, U. Kellermann, R. Nelson, K. Schenck, J. Thompson); (5) there is no 
resurrection in Hebrews (e.g., H. Attridge, G. Bertram, H. Braun, E. Käsemann). See Moffitt, Atonement 
and the Logic of Resurrection in the Epistle to the Hebrews, 4-41. Moffitt considers that these views are 
insufficient treatments of Christ’s resurrection in Hebrews, and suggests that they all wrongly assume that 
the cross is “the act of sacrifice,” implying that the heavenly exaltation is only a clarification of “the 
spiritual significance of the cross.” Ibid., 41. 
306 Curiously, in 7:16 there is a contrast marked by ἀλλὰ between the expressions κατὰ δύναµιν 





and everlasting life constitutes the ground for Christ’s ongoing heavenly intercession on 
behalf of believers (7:24-25). 
Once again, the notion of identification with human beings is central to the 
humanity of Christ. The earhly life of the incarnate Christ was essential for His heavenly 
priestly mercy and sympathy toward human beings (2:17; 4:15; cf. 5:1-2), as He 
intercedes for them before the Father in heaven (2:17; 7:25; 9:24). In fact, His 
identification with human beings is not only significant for His attitude toward them, but 
also for His mediation before the Father. To be more specific, He presented in heaven His 
sacrificial offering before the Father and continuously intercedes for human beings as the 
representative of the human family. As the human representative of His brothers (cf. 
2:17), the incarnate Christ is worthy (cf. 3:3) to be heard by the Father, since He is 
described as faithful to the Father (2:17; 3:2). This faithfulness was probably developed 
in His learned obedience in the context of suffering (5:7-8; cf. 10:7, 9). Hence, this 
conception of human representation seems to be essential for the Father’s acceptance of 
Christ’s heavenly offering and intercession on behalf of human beings. 
Summary 
In summary, the general anthropology of Hebrews assumes that the inner human 
nature is not defined by an immaterial entity (soul/spirit) secondarily accompanied by a 
body. Rather, the essence of human nature is necessarily grounded in the body and its 
                                                
to the law of the fleshly ordinance). As I have emphasized the words in italics, the adjectives ἀκαταλύτου 
(indestructible) and σαρκίνης (fleshly) form a contrastive parallel in this sentence. See Cockerill, The 
Epistle to the Hebrews, 323. In the context of Heb 7:11-28, in contrast to the sequential Aaronic priests 
who were prevented from continuing their office because of their mortality (7:23), that is, their perishable 




functions. By implication, Christ’s human nature is not conceived as an immaterial being 
with a spatial instrumental body. Likewise, because the divine nature is not timeless-
spaceless, Christ’s humanity is not a spatio-temporal instrument of His divinity. 
Accordingly, He does/did not experience spatio-temporal events through His human 
nature, but as a divine-human being.  
Instead of being defined in terms of spatio-temporal instrumentality for Christ’s 
divinity, His humanity is essential for the sacrifice on the cross and for Christ’s heavenly 
priesthood. This essentiality focuses on the identification of the incarnate Christ with the 
human family. In other words, His mediation on behalf of human beings is real because 
He is able sympathize with them as one of them. Furthermore, His sacrifice is truly a 
human sacrifice and, therefore, it is really on behalf of human beings. Likewise, the 
heavenly presentation of His sacrifice before the Father and His oingoing intercession is 
truly performed in favor of human beings, as the incarnate Christ is one of them in terms 
of His humanity. 
The remarks above reveal that Christ’s humanity is crucial for the interpretation 
of His priesthood, as His earthly sacrifice and heavenly priesthood revolve around and 
assume the incarnation. The idea of human nature as essential, not instrumental, to 
Christ’s priesthood is consistent with a spatio-temporal sequence of the priestly work that 
involves earth and heaven, as described by the historical model. My next step is to 
describe the cosmology of Hebrews, which is the last principle of reality to be depicted in 
the present research. 
Cosmology: Christ, Heaven, and Earth  




temporal sequence that involves earth and heaven. In this section on cosmology, I will 
focus on the ontological reality of earth and heaven from the perspective of spatio-
temporality. 
Hebrews assumes a dynamic relationship of Christ with heaven307 and earth:308 
(1) He is their creator (1:10);309 (2) He came to this earthly world310 in His incarnation 
(10:5); (3) after His resurrection (13:20; 7:16), He ascended to heaven (1:6311; 4:14; 
9:24); (4) while He is in heaven (8:1-2), He has influence on believers on earth (see, e.g., 
13:21), and because of Him they have a spiritual non-ontological access to God in heaven 
(4:16; 6:19-20; 10:19-21; 12:22); and (5) He will come from heaven to appear a second 
time on earth to save believers (9:28).312 
                                                
307 The terminology for heaven in Hebrews includes the singular (9:24; 11:12; 12:26) and plural 
(1:10; 4:14; 7:26; 8:1; 9:23; 12:25) forms of the noun οὐρανός, and is related to the adjective ἐπουράνιος 
(heavenly) (3:1; 6:4; 8:5; 9:23; 11:16; 12:22). Among its lexical meanings, the noun οὐρανός conveys the 
idea of sky or transcendent heaven. BDAG, 738. For the lexical meanings of ἐπουράνιος, see BDAG, 388. 
308 Not all of the eleven occurrences of the noun γῆ (earth) in Hebrews have a cosmological 
connotation. Some of its occurrences describe land (land that receives rain, 6:7; the land of Egypt, 8:9; the 
land of promise, 11:9; dry land, 11:29). But when this noun appears along with the terms οὐρανός (heaven) 
(1:10; 8:1, 4; 12:25-26), ἐπουράνιος (heavenly) (11:13, 16), or κόσµος (world) (11:38), then it has a 
cosmological connotation and is properly translated as earth. For the possible lexical meanings of γῆ, see 
BDAG, 196. 
309 See also τὰ πάντα in 1:2. 
310 The word in 10:5 is κόσµος. Besides κόσµος (4:3; 9:1, 26; 10:5; 11:7, 38), the other terms used 
to refer to world in Hebrews are οἰκουµένη (1:6; 2:5); αἰών (1:2; 11:3), and τὰ πάντα (1:3; 2:10). For further 
information about their lexical meanings, see BDAG, 32, 561, 699, 782. 
311 For the interpretation of this passage as a reference to Christ’s ascension, see the last part of 
footnote 274 above. 
312 For studies on the cosmology of Hebrews, see Schenck, Cosmology and Eschatology in 
Hebrews; Edward Adams, “The Cosmology of Hebrews ” in The Epistle to the Hebrews and Christian 
Theology, ed. Richard Bauckham, Daniel R. Driver, Trevor A. Hart, and Nathan MacDonald (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 122-139; Jon C. Laansma, “The Cosmology of Hebrews,” in Cosmology and 
New Testament Theology, ed. Sean M. McDonough and Jonathan T. Pennington (London: T&T Clark, 
2008), 125-143; Jon C. Laansma, “Hidden Stories in Hebrews: Cosmology and Theology,” in Cosmology 





In the present account of cosmology in Hebrews, this dynamic relationship of 
Christ with heaven and earth will be informed by three concepts: (1) the framework of 
eschatology, (2) the notion of heaven, and (3) the conception of heavenly sanctuary. I 
will start with the framework of eschatology. 
Framework: A Cosmological Eschatology 
As I have indicated in the discussion on Divinity above, 1:10-12 seems to point to 
an eschatological destruction of the earth and heavens (as we know them) by the action of 
the Lord.313 According to 1:11-12, “they will perish,” and the Lord “will roll them up.”314 
The author mentions the Lord’s eschatological shaking of heaven and earth (12:26), and 
explains that created things are shaken or removed315 “in order that (ἵνα) the things that 
cannot be shaken may remain (µείνῃ)” (12:27), namely, the divine kingdom that believers 
are receiving (12:28).316 Therefore, the distinction between created things being removed 
and the kingdom remaining is eschatological, as the context emphasizes the future divine 
judgment that has cosmological proportions (12:25-29). In other words, this distinction is 
                                                
(London: T&T Clark, 2008), 9-18; Ellingworth, “Jesus and the Universe in Hebrews,” 337-350. See also 
Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 24-34; Koester, Hebrews, 97-104. 
313 Cockerill and Adams interpret the reference to earth and heavens in this passage as 
encompassing the whole created order. Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 112; Adams, “The 
Cosmology of Hebrews,” 130. 
314 Elsewhere in the NT, the verb ἑλίσσω (to roll up) is used in Rev 6:14 to describe an 
cosmological destruction in the context of the eschatological day of the divine wrath (see Rev 6:16). 
315 “The removal of things that are shaken—that is, things that have been made” ([τὴν] τῶν 
σαλευοµένων µετάθεσιν ὡς πεποιηµένων, 12:27). 
316 The author quotes Hag 2:6 in 12:26. Then, he indicates that believers are “receiving a kingdom 





not ontologically static but historically dynamic.317 In this eschatological or historical 
dynamics, what remains is what it is to come.318 In the context of God’s future judgment, 
the present creation will give place to the enduring divine kingdom (12:26-28). 
Elsewhere, Hebrews refers to “the world (οἰκουµένην) to come” (2:5, italics mine) and 
“the age (αἰῶνος) to come” (6:5, italics mine). While the epistle does not use the language 
of new creation to refer to the replacement of the present creation by the enduring divine 
kingdom,319 God is the one who prepared320 the city (11:16) expected by the believers in 
Heb 11.321 In this sense, God makes a new creation to replace the old creation.322 
                                                
317 This dynamism is evident in the telic sequence implied by the use of the conjunction ἵνα in 
12:27: the created things being shaken are removed so that (ἵνα) what is not shaken may remain. 
318 The verb µένω (remain) appears elsewhere in Hebrews in a similar context in 13:14. In that 
passage, the author highlights that “here we have no lasting (µένουσαν) city, but we seek the city that is to 
come (µέλλουσαν).” According to the logic of this statement, there is a parallel between the verbs µένω and 
µέλλω. 
319 Some scholars believe that Hebrews stipulates a permanent removal of material creation. See 
Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 381; Marie E. Isaacs, Sacred Space: An Approach to the Theology of 
the Epistle to the Hebrews (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 65, 67, 82, 86; Schenck, 
Cosmology and Eschatology in Hebrews, 126-144. Others reject the interpretation of annihilation of 
creation and emphasize the idea of its judgment (Koester), cleansing (Laansma), and re-creation (Adams). 
See Koester, Hebrews, 103; Adams, “The Cosmology of Hebrews,” 137-138; Laansma, “Hidden Stories in 
Hebrews,” 13-14. Laansma sees Christ’s bodily resurrection as a theological decisive indication that the 
created world will not be annihilated. Laansma, “The Cosmology of Hebrews,” 129. Adams enumerates the 
following indirect evidence for a re-creation of the world in Hebrews: The Son is the heir of (1) all things 
(1:2), which means that there will be a cosmos in the eschaton to be inherited; Christ has/will have a future 
(2) universal reign (2:6-8); and the references to (3) the coming world (2:5) and (4) the city that is to come 
(13:14; 11:10), which he relates to the New Jerusalem descending on the new earth in Rev 21:9–22:5. 
Adams, “The Cosmology of Hebrews,” 138. 
320 God is designer (τεχνίτης) and builder (δηµιουργὸς) of the city (11:10). 
321 The believers of Heb 11 “were strangers and foreigners on the earth” (11:13, NET). Noah even 
“condemned the world” (τὸν κόσµον) by his reverent fear (11:7). The enduring divine kingdom seems to be 
alluded in the affirmation that these believers were seeking a heavenly country (11:14, 16), the city 
prepared by God (11:16). 
322 It is possible to see a parallel between Hebrews and Rev 21:1-2, as the former has the concept 
of heaven and earth passing away (cf. with Rev 21:1) and the coming of a heavenly city (cf. with Rev 21:2) 
in the eschatological context of divine judgment (cf., e.g., with Rev 20:11-15). Rev 21:1 indicates that the 





For the purposes of the present research, the most significant aspect of the 
cosmological eschatology of Hebrews is that the relationship between Christ and heaven 
and earth does not entail a vertical movement only, as the eschatological framework 
implies also a historical dynamics or a horizontal movement.323 The idea of a historical 
dynamics of the world is compatible with a historical sequence in Christology, since there 
was on earth a Christological historical dynamics of incarnation, life, death, resurrection, 
and ascension.324  
In order to support a historical dynamics of events in heaven (especially after the 
ascension), I will explore below the concept of heaven in Hebrews, as this exploration 
prepares the ground for the ontological understanding of Christ in the heavenly sanctuary. 
Heaven in Hebrews 
A distinction seems to emerge when the occurrences of the terminology for 
heaven are examined in Hebrews. As mentioned above, for example, the removal of 
                                                
καὶ ἡ πρώτη γῆ), which are replaced by “a new heaven and a new earth” (οὐρανὸν καινὸν καὶ γῆν καινήν). 
Moreover, Rev 21:2 adds that the holy city (New Jerusalem) comes down out of heaven presumably to the 
new created world (the new heaven and the new earth). From a canonical reading, Rev 21:1-2 seem to 
complete the sketchy eschatological picture provided by Hebrews. In my estimation, the cosmological 
eschatology of Hebrews is compatible with the eschatology of Revelation. 
323 It is noteworthy that biblical typology is characterized by horizontal and vertical structures. See 
Davidson, “Typological Structures in the Old and New Testaments,” 191-408. 
324 Hebrews does not elaborate on the time elapsed between death, resurrection, and ascension. A 
more precise elaboration would require a canonical reading of the NT. I have mentioned in the beginning of 
this section on Cosmology that Christ ascended to heaven after His resurrection. Considering that Hebrews 
does not emphasize much on the resurrection, some scholars have maintained that Christ ascended to 
heaven at His death (see footnotes 85 and 330 above). However, this position is problematic. First, 
Hebrews does affirm Christ’s resurrection. The explicit passage about this event is 13:20, which indicates 
that God brought up Christ from the death (ὁ ἀναγαγὼν ἐκ νεκρῶν). A less explicit passage emphasizes His 
“indestructible life” in 7:16 that contrasts with Christ’s mortal humanity before the resurrection. To be sure, 
these two passages do not use the explicit language of bodily resurrection. But to assume some kind of 
immaterial resurrection means that the essence of human nature is not grounded in the body, a position I 
have rejected in my reading of the anthropology of Hebrews in Humanity above. Therefore, I suggest that 




heaven and earth (the present creation) in the context of God’s eschatological judgment 
(12:26). While this heaven is shaken/removed, the hope is on the heavenly country or city 
(11:16), the kingdom that cannot be shaken. Thus, the same terminology (heaven) is used 
for the reality that will pass away and the reality of the new order coming from God.  
Considering the singular and plural forms of οὐρανός (heaven) and the adjective 
ἐπουράνιος (heavenly) in Hebrews,325 the distinction could be described as follows: (1) the 
heaven(s) or sky in the realm of human beings (1:10; 11:12; 12:25-26) and (2) as the 
heaven(s) of God’s realm (8:5; 9:23; 11:16; 12:22).326 In effect, this would establish a 
basic difference between a reality that can be shaken/removed (e.g., our earth and heaven, 
that is, our world) and a reality that cannot be shaken/that endures (e.g., God’s heavenly 
city). 
Nevertheless, I have not mentioned yet four occurrences related to Christ’s 
ascension: He passed through (διεληλυθότα327) the heavens (4:14); He was exalted above 
the heavens (ὑψηλότερος τῶν οὐρανῶν, 7:26); He entered into heaven, in the presence of 
God (9:24); and He “is seated at the right hand of the throne of the majesty in the 
heavens” (8:1, NASB; italics mine). In the first two occurrences, Christ is beyond the 
heavens. In the other two, He is in (the) heaven(s). Perhaps, following the basic 
                                                
325 The occurrences of these terms in Hebrews refer to the following realities: the stars of heaven 
(11:12), the heaven that is shaken/removed along with the earth (singular: 12:26; plural: 1:10; 12:25), 
things in the heavens as types for copies on earth (9:23), heavenly things having shadows on earth (8:5), 
heavenly things purified (9:23), heavenly country (11:16); heavenly Jerusalem (12:22), heavenly calling 
(3:1), and heavenly gift (6:4). 
326 See Adams, “The Cosmology of Hebrews,” 132; Schenck, Cosmology and Eschatology in 
Hebrews, 145. 




distinction of the human and the divine realms, Christ is beyond the heaven(s) of the 
human realm, but is in the heaven(s) of the divine realm.328 In distinguishing human 
realm and divine realm, I simply mean the atmospheric heavens (human realm) and the 
created universe beyond the atmosphere where God rules the world (divine realm). 
Taking into account that the ascension of Christ is the ascension of the (bodily) 
resurrected Christ, the heaven(s) of the divine realm seems to be spatial.329 Furthermore, 
as indicated in my discussion on Divinity above, the idea of ascension and the notion of 
the resurrected Christ appearing in the presence of God imply a temporal sequence of 
past, present, and future (that is, a sequentiality of before and after) in heaven.  
Therefore, the heavenly divine realm where Christ ministers as high priest is 
ontologically consistent with a spatio-temporal (historical) dynamics initiated with His 
ascension. His continual intercession (7:25), then, should be understood as part of this 
historical dynamics, as it relates to human beings in the spatio-temporal (historical) 
reality of their earthly lives, especially considering that, when they sin on earth, the 
intercession of Christ is effective in heaven, particularly as they pray. In this sense, there 
is a synchronic correspondence between the spatio-temporal (historical) realities of the 
divine heavenly realm and the realities of the human earthly realm.  
An important aspect of the divine heavenly realm that seems to entail its spatio-
                                                
328 I agree with Ellingworht that Hebrews “does not develop a cosmology including several 
heavens.” Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 127. See also Koester, Hebrews, 99; MacRae, 
“Heavenly Temple and Eschatology in the Letter to the Hebrews,” 187. My distinction here is a minimal 
distinction of God’s realm and human realm. 
329 For Adams, “The heavenly abode of God is not necessarily, for the author, a ‘spiritual,’ in the 
sense of non-substantial, dimension, especially if he assumes that the risen and ascending Christ entered 
into it bodily. The author seems to conceive of it as a ‘place’ and describes it, albeit analogously, in 




temporal (historical) reality is the notion of the sanctuary in heaven.330  
The Heavenly Sanctuary 
In Hebrews, the noun σκηνή331 and the expression τά ἅγια (and its variants) 
convey the meaning of sanctuary.332 σκηνή describes the sanctuary/tabernacle where 
Christ ministers in 8:2 and 9:11. With regard to τά ἅγια and its variant forms, 10 
occurrences are found in Hebrews: 8:2; 9:1 (singular form), 2 (anarthrous form), 3 
(anarthrous and compound form—Ἅγια Ἁγίων), 8, 12, 24 (anarthrous form), 25; 10:19; 
13:11. Among these occurrences, three of them (8:2; 9:12, 24) describe this sanctuary 
                                                
330 The heavenly sanctuary in Hebrews is the main topic of the debate over the conceptual 
background of the epistle. Schenck, Cosmology and Eschatology in Hebrews, 8; Laansma, “The 
Cosmology of Hebrews,” 140. According to Schenck, there are three basic ontological interpretations of the 
heavenly sanctuary in Hebrews: (1) Platonic, (2) Apocalyptic, and (3) Cosmological. The Platonic position 
focuses on 8:5, interpreting ὑποδείγµατι and σκιᾷ in a Platonic fashion, and stipulates that the heavenly 
sanctuary is a platonic model. The Apocalyptic view interprets the heavenly sanctuary as a free standing 
structure in heaven. Finally, the cosmological interpretation views the sanctuary as a representation of the 
universe, where the earth is the outer court (Holy Place) and heaven is the inner court (Most Holy Place). 
This cosmological understanding derives from readings of Philo and Josephus. See Schenck, Cosmology 
and Eschatology in Hebrews, 8, 151-154. For further information regarding the Platonic interpretation, see 
ibid., 117-122. Schenck seems to adopt the cosmological interpretation, at least metaphorically, as he views 
God’s heaven metaphorically as the Most Holy Place. See ibid., 145, 168. This line of interpretation seems 
to be also adopted by McKelvey, Pioneer and Priest, 72-87, 169; Laansma, “Hidden Stories in Hebrews,” 
14, 16-17. As it will be evident from my arguments in this section, I follow the interpretation of a free 
standing structure in heaven. 
331 Out of the 31 occurrences of σκηνή in the NT, 10 are found in Hebrews (8:2, 5; 9:2-3, 6, 8, 11, 
21; 11:9; 13:10). Considering that its basic meaning is tent, σκηνή is used to refer to the tabernacle or the 
cultic tent (the tent of the testimony). See BDAG, 928. 
332 I do not follow Vanhoye’s idea that “Hebrews distinguishes σκηνή (tent) and τά ἅγια 
(sanctuary).” Vanhoye stipulates a metaphorical interpretation where the “true sanctuary” is actually 
“God’s own holiness.” In this way, the language of a sanctuary in heaven is merely the attempt to describe 
in limited human words the transcendent divine holiness. On the other hand, his reading of Heb 9:11 seems 
to indicates that σκηνή refers to Christ’s glorified humanity, which as a house reunites into Himself “all 
persons who are faithful to Him.” Vanhoye, Old Testament Priests and the New Priest, 194, 197. In my 
estimation, this interpretation and distinction is quite speculative. Furthermore, I do not subscribe to 
Schenck’s notion that in Hebrews σκηνή refers to the sanctuary as a whole (with the exception of 9:1-10) 
while τά ἅγια refers to the Most Holy Place, which substantiates his idea that the heavenly sanctuary does 
not have an outer court (Holy Place) but only an inner court (Most Holy Place). See Schenck, Cosmology 





explicitly as the place where Christ is the high priest (see also 10:19-21 in comparison 
with 6:19-20333). It is noteworthy that only in 9:2-3 there is a clear distinction between 
the holy place and the most holy place. All other occurrences of τά ἅγια (and its variants) 
in Hebrews appear to refer to the sanctuary as a whole,334 and this conclusion seems to be 
supported by its use in the LXX.335  
With these terminologies and occurrences in view, I will concentrate on passages 
that relate to Christ and the heavenly sanctuary (6:19-20; 8:2; 9:11-12, 24; 10:19-20), 
with a particular focus on how the reality of this sanctuary is portrayed in its connection 
                                                
the interpretation of τά ἅγια as referring to the whole sanctuary, and not only to the Most Holy Place. 
333 For a proposal of chiastic correspondence between 6:19-20 and 10:19-20 and an elaboration of 
its implications for the priesthood of Christ, see Davidson, “Christ’s Entry ‘within the Veil’ in Hebrews 
6:19-20,” 178. 
334 A. P. Salom, “Ta Hagia in the Epistle to the Hebrews,” AUSS 5, no. 1 (1967): 65. See also O. 
Kuss, Der Brief an Die Hebräer Und Die Katholischen Briefe, 2 ed. (Regensburg: Pustet, 1966), 125; O. 
Michel, Der Brief an Die Hebräer, 14 ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984), 323; E. 
Riggenbach, Der Brief an Die Hebräer (Leipzig: Deichert, 1922), 284; H-F. Weiss, Der Brief an Die 
Hebräer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 486n46; Rissi, Die Theologie des Hebräerbriefs, 
38. In English versions, ESV seems to be one of the most consistent translations, as it renders the plural 
form as holy places (8:2; 9:8, 12, 24, 25; 10:19; 13:11), and the singular form as place of holiness (9:1). 
Other versions have more variation. Among the versions compared below, NIV opts for “most holy place” 
in several instances, whereas ESV, NASB, and NRSV never employ this rendition in these passages.  
Hebrews Passage ESV NASB NRSV NET NIV KJV 
8:2 holy places sanctuary sanctuary sanctuary sanctuary sanctuary 
9:1 (singular) place of holiness sanctuary sanctuary sanctuary sanctuary sanctuary 
9:8 holy places holy place sanctuary holy place most holy place the holiest of all 
9:12 holy places holy place holy place most holy place most holy place holy place 
9:24 (anarthrous) holy places holy place sanctuary sanctuary sanctuary holy places 
9:25 holy places holy place holy place sanctuary most holy place holy place 
10:19 holy places holy place sanctuary sanctuary most holy place the holiest 
13:11 holy places holy place sanctuary sanctuary most holy place sanctuary 
 
335 According to Carl Coesart, from the 109 occurrences of τά ἅγια in the LXX that refer to the 
sanctuary, in 106 times the term refers to the whole sanctuary. In three verses it describes the Holy Place (1 
Kgs 8:8; 2 Chr 5:9, 11). There is no reference to the Most Holy Place alone. See Carl Coesart, “A Study of 
Ta Hagia in the LXX, Pseudepigrapha, Philo, and Josephus, and Its Implications in Hebrews,” (MA Thesis, 
Nazarene Theological Seminary, 2000). For a summary of Coesart’s study on extra-biblical literature, see 
Carl Coesart, “The Use of Hagios for the Sanctuary in the Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, Philo, and 




with Christ. Most of these passages emphasize that Christ entered the heavenly sanctuary 
(6:20; 9:12, 24). However, where exactly did He enter? According to 6:19, He entered 
behind or within the veil/curtain. In 9:12, He entered “into the holy places” (εἰς τὰ ἅγια), 
that is, the sanctuary. Finally, in 9:24, He entered “into heaven itself” (εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν 
οὐρανόν). The reading of these three passages in conjunction, raises the following 
question: Does heaven contain a sanctuary or heaven is itself a sanctuary, as apparently 
suggested by 9:24 (see also 4:14336)?337 In short, the answer provided below indicates 
                                                
336 The idea that heaven is itself a sanctuary seems to be assumed not only in 9:24, but also in 
4:14, where Christ passes through the heavens as a high priest. This passage evokes the image of the high 
priest Christ entering the heavenly sanctuary in His ascension, as if the heavens of the human realm were a 
curtain through which He enters the heaven of the divine realm, that is, the heavenly sanctuary. This idea is 
highlighted in commentaries about 4:14. For example, see Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 224; 
Koester, Hebrews, 282. The difference is that Cockerill and Koester highlight Christ’s entrance into heaven 
as the Most Holy Place, while I emphasize His entrance into heaven as the sanctuary as a whole (according 
to the understanding of τά ἅγια as I have indicated above). 
337 Taking into consideration the relationship between sanctuary and heaven, Schenck outlines 
“three major suggestions for the nature of the heavenly tent in Heb. 8–10,” namely, (1) “a literal structure 
in heaven,” (2) “a reference to multilayered heavens,” and (3) “a metaphor for the highest heaven itself.” 
Schenck, Cosmology and Eschatology in Hebrews, 145. Overall, he observes these suggestions in different 
interpretations of the heavenly sanctuary in 9:24: (1) “the interpretation which believes there to be a literal 
structure within heaven” understands 9:24 as “a synecdoche,” where “the whole (heaven) is substituted for 
its part (the tabernacle in heaven)”; (2) “the view which identifies the parts of the tent with a multilayered 
heaven” interprets the “holy of holies” as “the highest heaven”—this is “a more literal cosmological 
reading” of 9:24; (3) the position that conceives heaven as a “metaphor for whole tent” identifies the “holy 
of holies with heaven as a whole”—this is a “metaphorical-cosmological reading” of 9:24. Ibid., 165. For 
bibliographic information regarding these positions, see ibid., 165n69. Schenck argues that while it is 
difficult to classify those who read 9:24 platonically, he tends to place them in the interpretation of (a 
modified) synecdoche. Ibid., 165n69. The view of synecdoche (literal sanctuary) aligns with my idea of 
heaven containing a sanctuary, whereas the cosmological views of a multilayered heaven (literal 
cosmological reading) and of heaven as a whole (metaphorical cosmological reading) align with heaven 
being a sanctuary. While Schenck considers all these interpretations as “theoretically possible,” he 
dismisses the idea of a literal sanctuary in heaven and a synecdoche in 9:24 on the basis of the following 
arguments: (1) the emphatic use of αὐτὸν is against the synecdoche view. In his words, “to consider this 
phrase only a figurative equivalent to ‘the sanctuary in the heavens’ arguably loses some of the meaning: 
Christ did not enter the sanctuary symbolizing the realities of heaven; he entered heaven itself”; (2) a literal 
reading of the cleansing of the heavenly sanctuary in 9:23 is “an absurd image for a literal structure in the 
purest heaven.” Ibid., 165, 174, 181. In my estimation, the second argument is unconvincing. Shenck’s 
assumption that a heavenly sanctuary does not need purification is not derived from his reading of 
Hebrews, but it is essentially his own presupposition. The second argument is textual and well articulated, 
but not strong enough. To my understanding, the emphatic form is not necessarily against the synecdoche 





that, in a more specific view, heaven contains a sanctuary. In a more general way, 
however, heaven is a sanctuary. This answer can be unpacked in two points. First, the 
reading of 9:24 does not deny that heaven contains a sanctuary. This argument is 
supported by two lines of argument: (a) 9:24 assumes a typological relationship between 
the heavenly and the earthly sanctuaries, and (b) 9:24 is consistent with parallel 
references to heaven that seem to assume a sanctuary in heaven. Second, heaven is a 
sanctuary as a synecdoche, where the whole (the heavenly realm) is used for the part (the 
heavenly sanctuary). 
First, the reading of 9:24 does not deny that heaven contains a sanctuary, as this 
passage assumes a typological relationship between the heavenly and the earthly 
sanctuaries. The idea of Christ entering heaven is contrasted with a priestly entrance into 
the earthly sanctuary in 9:24.338 This comparison implies a contrast between two 
sanctuaries on the basis of a connection between them: The earthly sanctuary was an 
antitype of the true (ἀντίτυπα τῶν ἀληθινῶν) heavenly sanctuary. A typological language 
also appears in 8:5, where the heavenly sanctuary is the type (τύπον)339 of the earthly 
                                                
on earth. The emphasis is on a heavenly reality. The synecdoche view still emphasizes a heavenly reality, 
even though Schenck expects a more emphatic interpretation that views heaven itself as the heavenly 
sanctuary. In the text below I explain why I find the synecdoche view a viable interpretation. For a defense 
of synecdoche, see Hurst, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 28.  
338 The earthly sanctuary is referred as the sanctuary made by (human) hands (χειροποίητα ἅγια). 
Temples “made by hands” (χειροποίητα), that is, earthly sanctuaries are mentioned in Acts 7:48 and 17:24. 
The Aaronic earthly sanctuary is implied by the term χειροποίητος in Heb 9:11. 
339 The term τύπος that Heb 8:5 quotes from Exod 25:40 (LXX) corresponds to ַּתְבנִית in Exod 25:9, 
40 (MT). In his study of this Hebrew expression in relationship with the typology of Hebrews, Davidson 
argues that ַּתְבנִית may signify a “solid construction or an architect’s blueprint.” The context of Exod 25:9, 
40 suggests that Moses had not “been shown merely architect’s plans,” but “was provided in vision with a 
view of something constructed, relating in vivid reality to how the sanctuary was going to look.” In this 
way, there are four possibilities for the interpretation of ַּתְבנִית as something constructed in Exod 25:9, 40: 





sanctuary (implicitly referred as sketch and shadow).340 The typological connection 
between the earthly and heavenly sanctuaries assumes an analogy between antitype and 
type. Whereas the qualification of the antitype as sketch and shadow indicates that the 
type (heavenly sanctuary) cannot be described with precision on the basis of an 
observation of the antitype (earthly sanctuary), they must be similar enough for the type 
to serve as the pattern for the construction of the antitype (see 8:5).341 This idea of 
                                                
sanctuary for the building of the earhly (that is, both a copy of and a model/pattern for), or (3) “the 
heavenly sanctuary itself (that is, the original),” (4) Moses first saw “the heavenly sanctuary itself and then 
a three-dimensional model of the heavenly, according to which he was to pattern the construction of the 
earthly.” Davidson stipulates that “the teophanic context of Exodus 24 implies that Moses saw the heavenly 
sanctuary.” Nevertheless, “if the heavenly sanctuary itself (unmediated by some miniature model 
presentation) were solely in view, this would not seem to coincide with other OT portrayals of the heavenly 
sanctuary,” which “is described as a vast, majestic temple, accommodating countless angels” (see, e.g., Isa 
6:1; Ps 11:4; Dan 7:9-14—these passages are suggested by de Souza referenced below). “If Moses had 
been able to take in such a display of majesty (unmediated by some kind of miniature model), it would not 
be necessary for God to tell him repeatedly to build it according to what he was shown (Exod 25:9, 40; 
26:30; 27:8; Num 8:4). The emphasis of these latter passages rule out the view that Moses saw only the 
heavenly reality and then was left to translate it into earthly proportions.” Therefore, Davidson concludes, 
“It seems more probable that Moses was first given a vision of the heavenly sanctuary and then was 
provided with a miniature model of it by which to construct the earthly.” Davidson, “Typology in the Book 
of Hebrews,” 162-163, 167. David Freedman has a more limited view of ַּתְבנִית in Exod 25 that focuses only 
on the heavenly sanctuary itself, and does not include the miniature model as Davidson’s more elaborated 
interpretation suggests. See David N. Freedman, Pottery, Poetry, and Prophecy: Studies in Early Hebrew 
Poetry (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1980), 138n20; David N. Freedman, “Temple without Hands,” in 
Temples and High Places in Biblical Times (Jerusalem: The Nelson Glueck School of Biblical Archaeology 
of Hebrew Union College, 1977), 28. For a more recent treatment of ַּתְבנִית in Exod 25 that follows 
Davidson’s perspective, see de Souza, “The Heavenly Sanctuary/Temple Motif in the Hebrew Bible,” 164-
173. As I agree with Davidson’s suggestion, for the purposes of the present study, my remarks on the 
typological relationship of the heavenly and earthly sanctuaries implicitly include the idea of a miniature 
model that mediated the construction of the earthly sanctuary. At the same time, the inclusion of a 
miniature model does not deny the fact that the heavenly sanctuary is ultimately the type of the earthly 
sanctuary.  
340 ὑποδείγµατι καὶ σκιᾷ. ὑποδείγµατι conveys the meaning of “outline, sketch, symbol.” BDAG, 
1037. NET and NRSV render it as sketch in 9:23. This term also occurs in 4:11 and 8:5, while σκιά 
(shadow) also appears in 10:1. The language of ὑπόδειγµα, σκιά, τύπος, ἀντίτυπος, and ἀληθινός (and also 
εἰκών and πρᾶγµα in 10:1) has been often read as Platonic. For a treatment and rejection of the Platonic 
reading, see Hurst, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 13-21.  
341 Several scholars believe that Hebrews assumes a real sanctuary in heaven. See Weiss, Der Brief 
an die Hebräer, 486; David M. Allen, Deuteronomy and Exhortation in Hebrews: A Study in Narrative Re- 
Presentation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 219; Hurst, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 28; R. McL. 
Wilson, Hebrews (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987), 166; Barrett, “The Eschatology of the Epistle to 





similarity is appropriate not only for the understanding of the reality of the sanctuaries 
but also for their service.342 The use of Ἀνάγκη (necessity)343 in 9:23 emphasizes that just 
as the sketches (antitype: the earthly sanctuary) of the heavenly things344 needed to be 
purified (καθαρίζεσθαι) with their correspondent sacrifices, it was necessary by 
implication that the heavenly things themselves345 (type: the heavenly sanctuary) should 
be purified with “better sacrifices.” Hence, the notion of correspondence in terms of 
necessity highlights the resemblance between type and antitype, while acknowledging 
that the type has superior characteristics, not being merely identical to the antitype.346 
According to this perspective, heaven contains a sanctuary. Taking into account the 
Aaronic earthly sanctuary (see, e.g., 9:1-5), the features of this antitype follow the pattern 
provided by the heavenly type (8:5). The type is certainly superior and not precisely the 
same as the antitype, but its features resemble, although not precisely, the earthly 
                                                
and Most Holy Place) in heaven. See Michaelis, “σκηνή, σκῆνος, σκήνωµα, σκηνόω, ἐπισκηνόω, 
κατασκηνόω, σκηνοπηγία, σκηνοποιός,” TDNT, 7:377-378; She, The use of Exodus in Hebrews, 128. 
While Michaelis seems to suggest this view, She clearly indicates that the heavenly sanctuary is a spatio-
temporal reality. Conversely, while Schenck acknowledges that 8:5 constitutes a strong argument for a real 
sanctuary in heaven, he argues that “the author does not mean to say that all the parts of the earthly 
tabernacle correspond to ‘parts’ of the heavenly tabernacle. The author would be saying somewhat loosely 
that everything in the earthly tabernacle corresponded in general to the τύπος Moses saw on the mountain.” 
Schenck, Cosmology and Eschatology in Hebrews, 172. In my judgment, even though the idea of a general 
correspondence could be acceptable, the expression “somewhat loosely” is unclear, especially considering 
that Schenck does not interpret the heavenly sanctuary in Hebrews as a real sanctuary. It is not clear to me 
how it is possible to establish a general correspondence if there is no correspondence in reality, but only in 
meaning. As I argue in this section, it seems to me that 8:5 and 9:24 point to a correspondence of reality. 
342 As Davidson indicates in his remarks on 9:24, “the antitupos ‘corresponds’ to the preceding 
tupos but also points forward to the eschatological inauguration of its services.” Davidson, “Typology in 
the Book of Hebrews,” 153. 
343 See BDAG, 60. 
344 τὰ µὲν ὑποδείγµατα τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς 
345 αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ ἐπουράνια 




sanctuary. Yet, just as the earthly sanctuary was a spatio-temporal reality, the heavenly 
sanctuary is also a spatio-temporal reality.347 In other words, this sanctuary exists in 
another part of the universe that is heaven. 
Moreover, 9:24 is consistent with parallel references to heaven that seem to 
assume a sanctuary in heaven. Gathering the references to the heavenly sanctuary in 9:23-
24,348 the following expressions can be grouped: “the things in the heavens” (τῶν ἐν τοῖς 
οὐρανοῖς), “heavenly things themselves” (αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ ἐπουράνια), “true things” (τῶν 
ἀληθινῶν), and “the heaven itself” (αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανόν). On the basis of these expressions, 
the plural forms349 with the implied word things seem to support the interpretation that 
                                                
347 See Johnsson, “The Heavenly Sanctuary: Figurative or Real?” 35-51. 
348 The affirmation that Christ entered into heaven (τὸν οὐρανόν), and not into the earthly antitype 
(9:24), should be read from the perspective of how the sanctuaries are mentioned in their comparison in 
9:23. In 9:23a, the earthly and the heavenly sanctuary are referred to as τὰ µὲν ὑποδείγµατα (earthly 
sanctuary) τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς (heavenly sanctuary). Notice that they are referred to in an articular plural 
form, meaning that the word things is implied in the reference to the heavenly sanctuary. Literally, the 
sketches (τὰ µὲν ὑποδείγµατα) of the things in the heavens (τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς). This literal translation is 
adopted by NASB (see also YLT). Other versions opt for “heavenly things” (see ESV, NIV, NRSV). In 
9:23b, the heavenly sanctuary is referred to as αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ ἐπουράνια. In their reference to the heavenly 
sanctuary, the parallel between this expression and τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς is clear. Obviously, the adjective 
ἐπουράνια (heavenly) is part of the same word group of the noun οὐρανοῖς (heavens), and both appear in 
articular plural form, indicating that the word things is implied in αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ ἐπουράνια (the heavenly things 
themselves). Turning to 9:24, there is a continuation of the comparison between earthly and heavenly 
sanctuaries. In 9:23 they are similar because both need to be purified, but they are different in the sense that 
they are purified with different types of sacrifice. In 9:24, the similarity is that both sanctuaries are entered 
by a priest (see also 9:25), but the basic ontological difference is that the earthly sanctuary is described 
literally as antitypes (ἀντίτυπα τῶν ἀληθινῶν) and holy places made by hands (χειροποίητα ἅγια), whereas 
the heavenly sanctuary is referred to as the true things (τῶν ἀληθινῶν) and as the heaven itself (αὐτὸν τὸν 
οὐρανόν). The literal rendition “holy places” and “true things” is adopted by ESV. 
349 In the reading of 9:23-24 there is an important continuation in the language employed to refer 
to the earthly and heavenly sanctuaries. First, the plural forms dominate 9:23 and are also found in 9:24, 
leading to the inclusion of places and things in a literal translation. ἀληθινῶν is articular (τῶν ἀληθινῶν) and 
ἅγια is defined by χειροποίητα. See Salom, “Ta Hagia in the Epistle to the Hebrews,” 64. The only 
exception of the plural form is that in 9:24 heaven is singular (αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανόν). Therefore, in 9:23-24, 
the earthly sanctuary is always referred to in the plural form and the heavenly sanctuary is referred to in the 




there is a real sanctuary in heaven, that is, heaven contains a sanctuary.350  
Second, I suggest that heaven is a sanctuary as a synecdoche, where the whole 
(the heavenly realm) is used for the part (the heavenly sanctuary). This suggestion derives 
from the comparison between the realities of the earthly and heavenly sanctuaries pointed 
out in 9:24. The earthly sanctuary is described literally as holy places made by hands 
(χειροποίητα ἅγια) and the heavenly sanctuary is referred to as heaven itself (αὐτὸν τὸν 
οὐρανόν). Assuming that the use of χειροποίητα indicates that the earthly sanctuary 
belongs to the realm of this creation,351 then the emphasis on heaven itself probably 
underlines that the heavenly sanctuary does not belong to the realm of this creation, but to 
the heavenly realm of God’s presence (as indicated in the continuation of the verse). In 
this sense, Christ’s entrance into the heavenly realm is not different from His entrance in 
the reality of heavenly sanctuary there. In fact, His entrance in the heavenly realm seems 
to be a general way of describing His entrance into the sanctuary in heaven.  
The interpretation of the idea of heaven itself literally being a sanctuary would 
exclude the notion of Christ entering into a real sanctuary in heaven, especially if this 
                                                
350 The difference in meaning between singular and plural forms of οὐρανός and ἅγιος (for 
sanctuary) should not be exaggerated. To mention two examples, in 8:1 Christ is in the heavens (plural 
form τοῖς οὐρανοῖς), “seated at the right hand of the throne of the Majesty.” In 9:24, Christ entered into 
heaven (singular form τὸν οὐρανόν) “to appear in the presence of God.” Comparing 8:1 and 9:24, the use of 
the singular or the plural form does not seem to make a difference in terms of meaning. In a second 
example, the earthly sanctuary is referred to by singular τό ἅγιον in 9:1, while this sanctuary is referred to 
by the plural τὰ ἅγια in 9:25. Again, the use of the singular or the plural form does not seem to make a 
difference in terms of meaning. Indeed, “the heaven itself” (αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανόν) in 9:24 is clearly related 
with the previous expressions “the things in the heavens” (τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς) and “heavenly things 
themselves” (αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ ἐπουράνια) in 9:23. With regard to the first expression, the same noun οὐρανός is 
used. In the case of the second expression, the same emphatic αὐτός is employed. 
351 The other occurrence of χειροποίητος in Hebews spells out what the author means by the use of 
this term. In 9:11, χειροποίητος conveys the idea of something belonging to the realm of this creation—




interpretation assumes that God’s heaven is a timeless-spaceless environment. According 
to this assumption, the sanctuary in heaven cannot be a reality, but it is only a 
metaphorical language that portrays a timeless-spaceless environment by means of a non-
ontological spatio-temporal image.352 Nevertheless, since this timeless-spaceless 
assumption does not find support in Hebrews,353 instead of perceiving an incongruity 
between the idea of a real sanctuary in heaven and the reference to the heavenly 
sanctuary as heaven itself (9:24), this reference could be taken as a synecdoche, where 
the whole (the heavenly realm) is used for the part (the heavenly sanctuary).354 
To conclude, I will briefly comment on the idea of God’s presence in the 
heavenly sanctuary. As a matter of fact, the ontological entrance of Christ in the heavenly 
sanctuary is used in Hebrews to ground exhortations encouraging a spiritual non-
ontological entrance of believers (presumably through hope355 and prayer) into this 
sanctuary (6:19-20; 10:19-20).356 Both these ontological and non-ontological entrances 
convey the idea of going into the presence of God.357 The logical implication would be 
                                                
352 For a discussion regarding the idea of temporality or timelessness in relationship with the the 
heavenly sanctuary, see Fernando Luis Canale, “Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary,” 
AUSS 36, no. 2 (1998): 183-206. 
353 See, for example, my remarks on eschatological (historical) or spatio-temporal dynamics and 
the ontological typological relationship between earthly and heavenly sanctuaries above. 
354 See footnote 333 above. 
355 See 6:19. 
356 In 6:20, the high priest Jesus is called a forerunner (πρόδροµος). 
357 In 9:24, Christ’s ontological entered the heavenly sanctuary to appear in the presence of God. 
In 10:19, the exhortation to a non-ontological entrance of believers into the heavenly sanctuary parallels the 
encouragement to “draw near” (verb προσέρχοµαι) in 10:22. Out of seven occurrences (4:16; 7:25; 10:1, 22; 
11:6; 12:18, 22) of the verb προσέρχοµαι in Hebrews, two instances use this verb to refer to those who 
“draw near to God” (7:25; 11:6). In this context, it seems plausible to assume that the non-ontological 




that God the Father is present in the heavenly sanctuary. While Hebrews does not explore 
further this idea of God being present in the heavenly sanctuary, when the term 
χειροποίητος in Hebrews (9:11, 24) is compared with its use in Acts (7:48; 17:24), a 
significant question may be raised regarding God’s presence in a real sanctuary in 
heaven. The emphasis of Acts 7:48 and 17:24 is that God does not dwell in temples made 
by (human) hands. In light of this statement, can God dwell in a heavenly sanctuary? This 
question echoes Solomon’s prayer at the inauguration ceremony of the temple in 1 Kgs 8 
(see also 2 Chr 6).358 According to this prayer, God does not dwell on earth or in an 
earthly temple. In fact, nor even heaven359 can contain Him (ְיַכְלְּכ֔לּוָך MT) or be enough 
(ἀρκέσουσίν LXX) for Him (1 Kgs 8:27; see also 2 Chr 6:18). Nevertheless, the fact that 
heaven cannot contain or be enough for God should not be simply equated with the idea 
that He cannot be really there. In other words, His real presence in the heavenly sanctuary 
does not mean that this sanctuary contains His transcendent being. Indeed, despite the 
fact that heaven does not contain God, He is not unable to dwell in heaven (heaven is His 
dwelling place—1 Kgs 8:30; see also 2 Chr 6:21).360 Moreover, even though God’s 
dwelling place is in heaven, He was able to dwell in the earthly temple in some sense.361 
                                                
358 In fact, the statement of Acts 7:48, while supported by a quotation from Isa 66:1-2 in Acts 
7:49-50, is preceded by a reference to the fact that Solomon built a house for God (7:47).  
359 The verse indicates that the highest form of heaven is in view: literally, “the heavens and the 
heavens of the heavens” (ַהָּׁשַמִים ּוְׁשֵמי ַהָּׁשַמִים).  
360 In the prayer, when the people of Israel would offer supplications toward the earthly temple, 
God would hear from His dwelling place in heaven (ֶאל־ְמקֹום ִׁשְבְּתָך ֶאל־ַהָּׁשַמִים). The verse indicates that 
God dwells in heaven, not on earth. 
361 The glory of the Lord filled the temple, and Solomon declared that it was built as place for the 
Lord to dwell forever (1 Kgs 8:10-13; see also 2 Chr 5:14-6:2). Literally, “a place for you to dwell in 
forever” ( ָך עֹוָלִמיםָמכֹון ְלִׁשְבּתְ   , 1 Kgs 8:13). Also, God’s name would be in that temple, and His eyes and 




Using a typological relationship of sanctuaries in Hebrews, and considering Solomon’s 
temple an antitype, the dwelling of God in the true sanctuary in heaven must be even 
more remarkable than His dwelling in the earthly sanctuary. In light of these comments, 
can God dwell in a heavenly sanctuary? Yes, as long as this dwelling does not imply the 
the notion of containing Him. This point implies, then, that God relates to creatures, not 
only on earth (earthly sanctuary) but also in heaven (heavenly sanctuary), through His 
immanence and not through His transcendence. To put it more sharply, even in the 
heavenly sanctuary, God relates to creatures in heaven (humans and angels) in divine 
immanence, and not in divine transcendence. 
Summary 
In summary, the relationship between Christ and earth/heaven takes place in the 
context of a cosmological eschatology, which entails a historical dynamics of horizontal 
(sequence of events) and vertical (from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven) 
movements that involve time and space on earth and in heaven. More specifically, the 
incarnation, a vertical movement of the divine Christ from heaven to earth, marks the 
beginning of the horizontal movement or the history of the earthly divine-human Christ. 
The earthly horizontal movement is characterized by His life, death, resurrection, and 
ascension, which is a vertical movement from earth to heaven. Because of this vertical 
movement, Christ is beyond the heaven(s) of the human realm (the atmospheric heaven), 
but is in the heaven(s) of the divine realm (the created universe beyond the atmosphere 
where God rules the world). 
Moreover, the vertical movement of the ascension initiates the horizontal 




movement that synchronically relates to the horizontal movement of the history of earthly 
human beings (for instance, Christ enables them to enter non-ontologically the heavenly 
sanctuary presumably through their hope and prayer). This horizontal movement 
continues until His second coming, a vertical movement from heaven to earth.  
Regarding the spatio-temporal reality of the divine (created) heaven implied in 
this historical dynamics, the ascension of the (bodily) resurrected Christ indicates that 
heaven is spatial, and His appearing in the presence of God the Father entails temporality 
(a sequentiality of before and after). According to this perspective, then, the ascended 
Christ performs His priesthood in a real spatio-temporal sanctuary in heaven, which 
typologically resembles the real spatio-temporal earthly sanctuary. Although the spatio-
temporal heavenly sanctuary is characterized by the presence of God, this does not mean 
that it contains the divine reality, just as the earthly sanctuary did not. 
Implications for Christ’s Priesthood 
Taking into account the principles of reality described above, it is necessary to 
draw their main implications for the understanding of Christ’s priesthood. To accomplish 
this task, I will review the key ideas indicated above in the discussion of the principles of 
reality and, then, draw implications for each component of the priesthood of Christ in the 
historical model.  
First, I have pointed out that God is really able to experience sequential events, as 
Hebrews assumes that He is temporal and not timeless. This presupposition about God’s 
reality is necessary to understand the spatio-temporal dynamics of Christ’s priesthood, 
inasmuch as the spatio-temporal nature of God’s and Christ’s reality ontologically 




sanctuary. For the Father, there was a time (temporality) when Christ was not in His 
presence in the heavenly sanctuary (spatiality). Moreover, the everlasting temporal 
sameness and eternity of the divine Christ is compatible with His experience of becoming 
(the incarnation, the process of qualification to the official priesthood through suffering 
and learned obedience, the ascension, the exaltation as a royal high priest).  
Second, regarding the humanity of Christ, human nature is grounded in the body, 
that is, this nature is spatio-temporal. Since the divine nature is not timeless-spaceless, 
Christ’s humanity is not a spatio-temporal instrument of His divinity. In His earthly 
mortal humanity, Christ developed something new in relation to human beings (mercy, 
sympathy) and toward the Father (obedience), as He developed these attitudes on a new 
level, in the context of test/temptation and suffering as a divine-human being. Instead of 
an instrument of divinity, Christ’s humanity is crucial for His identification and 
mediatorial representation as a real human being on behalf of the human family. 
Third, in the context of cosmology, the ascension of Christ entails a historical 
dynamics of horizontal (sequence of events) and vertical (earth-heaven) movements that 
involve time and space on earth and in heaven. The ascension initiates the horizontal 
movement of the work of the incarnate Christ as high priest officially in the heavenly 
sanctuary, a movement that synchronically relates to the horizontal movement of the 
history of earthly human beings. The spatio-temporal reality of the divine realm of 
(created) heaven implied in this historical dynamics is supported by the ascension of the 
spatial (bodily) resurrected Christ and His appearing in the presence of God (a temporal 
sequentiality of before and after). Christ performs His priesthood in a spatio-temporal 




sanctuary, as this created heavenly environment is related to divine immance, not to His 
transcendence. 
The spatio-temporal or historical interpretation of the principles of reality 
(divinity, humanity, and cosmology) assumed in Hebrews has direct implications for the 
understanding of each component (need, agent, actions, and goal) of the historical model 
of Christ’s priesthood outlined in the first part of this chapter. I will start with the first 
component, namely, the need of Christ’s priesthood. 
Need  
In the historical model, Christ’s priesthood is needed to solve the sin problem, 
which means that His priestly work is necessary to restore the covenantal relationship 
between human beings and God by mediating divine forgiveness, to purify/eliminate the 
guilty conscience of human beings and help them endure temptation, and purify the 
heavenly sanctuary, which has been defiled by human sin and reveals that the sin 
problem impacts creation at a cosmic level. 
Even though Hebrews does not elaborate on the origin of sin, the historical 
dynamics of the principles of reality seem to indicate that the sin problem began at some 
point in the past history of God and human beings. Hence, the sin problem was not 
eternally constituted in God’s being or by His will that later became actualized in the 
history of human beings. Another implication of this historical interpretation of the 
principles of reality is that the sinful weakness of human beings is not the human 
ontological condition that initiated sin. Presumably, it was the initial historical attitude of 
rebellion against God (cf. Gen 3) that led to this ontological condition of weakeness, that 




From the vantage point of the notion of covenant, the sin problem implies a 
breaking of the covenantal relationship between God and human beings, which is 
regulated by divine laws. In this context, sin is narrowly the historical breaking of the 
law, and broadly the historical breaking of a covenantal relationship with God. From this 
covenantal perspective, the sin problem describes the emergence of a spiritual distance 
that separates God and human beings. But this distance is not only characterized by the 
fact that human beings sinfully depart from God, but also by the fact that in His 
temporality God reacts to this sinful departure. The more conspicuous reaction is the 
negative attitude of judgment. In this context, the priesthood of Christ is necessary for the 
redemption of the transgressions by which human beings broke their covenantal 
relationship with God, thereby restoring the original created unity between God and 
human beings. However, the fact that He is the one who appointed Christ as high priest 
indicates that God also reacts positively to the sinful departure of human beings, in the 
sense that He provides a way to reestablish His covenantal relationship with them. 
Agent  
Regarding the agent of the priesthood in the historical model, Christ was 
prepared/perfected for the official priestly office through His incarnation and deadly 
suffering, to learn obedience to God and be merciful toward human beings. Thus, His 
official priesthood was initiated at His exalted ascension. 
According to the historical framework of the principles of reality, Christ’s 
preparation/perfection as the priestly agent through His incarnation and deadly suffering, 
learning obedience to God and being merciful toward human beings, was a real historical 




(spatio-temporal) humanity of Christ. Similarly, the official initiation of His priesthood at 
the ascension is a historical (temporal) event that took place in a specific place (spatial 
divine real sanctuary in heaven). 
Actions 
The priestly actions of Christ in the historical model officially initiated with His 
presentation before the Father of His earthly sacrifice. On the basis of the Father’s 
acceptance of that sacrifice, Christ performs an ongoing salvific mediation that includes 
intercession for forgiveness before the Father and empowerment of believers through the 
Holy Spirit. This ongoing mediation is finished by the eschatological judgment and 
salvation, as Christ will bring complete salvation to believers in His second coming. 
Considering the spatio-temporal interpretation of the principles of reality, the 
presentation of Christ’s sacrifice to the Father at the ascension was a historical (spatio-
temporal) event that was subsequently followed by His ongoing mediation before the 
Father in heaven and by the Spirit on earth. The spatio-temporal continual action in 
heaven synchronically relates to the history of human beings on earth, particularly 
considering their actions and prayers. This means that God’s forgiveness is a real divine 
action that historically responds to the priestly activity of Christ. Likewise, the 
purification of the heavenly things is somehow a spatio-temporal activity in the heavenly 
sanctuary in terms of forgiveness and judgment. Moreover, Christ’s empowerment of 
believers through the Spirit really happens historically. This is not an eternally 
constituted reality in the being or will of God that is actualized in spatio-temporal 





The goal of Christ’s priesthood in the historical model is to establish a covenantal 
relationship between God and human beings, and this takes place in three phases: (1) the 
inauguration of the new/better covenant at the ascension of Christ and the official 
initiation of His priesthood in the heavenly sanctuary, (2) the daily mediation that 
provides divine forgiveness and the internalization of the divine laws in God’s covenantal 
people, and (3) the final purification in the context of eschatological judgment and 
salvation leading to the consummation of the new/better covenant. 
Taking into account the historical interpretation of the principles of reality, the 
goal of Christ’s priesthood is not fulfilled as an earthly actualization of a reality already 
constituted in God’s heaven. Rather, there is a divine work done in heaven to achieve 
human salvation in the official inauguration, daily mediation, and final purification. 
Christ’s daily mediation in the heavenly sanctuary synchronically relates to the history of 
human beings on earth, implying that God’s forgiveness temporally follows their prayers 
and Christ’s intercession. Thus, there is a temporal synchronism between heaven and 
earth, as Christ empowers believers to remain and grow in the new covenantal 
relationship with God, in the context of their struggle against sin, until the judgment and 
salvation leading to the historical (spatio-temporal) achievement of the redemptive goal 
of the covenant. 
Potential Challenges to These Implications 
This spatio-temporal interpretation of the principles of reality behind Christ’s 
priesthood in Hebrews, suggested in this research, could be challenged in two main ways. 
One challenge could be the charge of literalism in the interpretation of Hebrews. This 




exhortation (13:22). The first problem I see in this criticism is that literalism is not an 
accurate description of the interpretation of Hebrews suggested in the present study, as I 
have proposed that God’s spatio-temporality is not exactly the same as human spatio-
temporality and the heavenly sanctuary is not precisely identical to the earthly sanctuary, 
but a reality is assumed. The second problem with this challenge is that while the primary 
purpose of Hebrews is not to provide a theological ontology, the theological exhortation 
does not exclude ontological notions but rather assumes them.362 In other words, the 
exhortation to believers assumes that Christ is really a high priest in heaven on their 
behalf. Another important point relates to Hebrews’ use of Psalms. The author of 
Hebrews could be charged of literalism as He uses the poetical language of Psalms in 
order to scripturally ground the events of Christ’s kingship and priesthood.363 However, 
the Christological use of Psalms in Hebrews seems to indicate that their poetry is not 
merely metaphorical language with no reference to reality, but it points to the fulfilment 
of historical realities in a poetic way. In short, the problem of not allowing the biblical 
text to have a say about the reality it assumes or implies is that we leave the door open to 
explicitly or implicitly speculate about the meaning of the reality assumed by the text 
outside Scripture. When the theologian brings this alien speculation to guide and shape 
scriptural interpretation, he or she acts as if there was an absconditus God behind the God 
                                                
362 Adams makes a similar point in his discussion of the cosmology of Hebrews. In his words, 
“Hebrews is not a treatise on cosmology,” but the author does “make serious statements that relate to” 
cosmological “questions.” Hence, “cosmological assertions are intertwined with his Christological claims, 
so that one could not jettison his cosmology without doing serious damage to his Christology.” Adams, 
“The Cosmology of Hebrews,” 122, 138. See also Laansma, “The Cosmology of Hebrews,” 125. Following 
the logic of Adams’ argument, the implied ontology of Hebrews is foundational for its theology and 
exhortation.  
363 See, e.g., Heb 1:5 and 5:5 (Ps 2:7); 1:6 (Ps 97:7); 1:8-9 (Ps 45:6-7); 1:10-12 (102:25-27); 1:13 




of Scripture, or an absconditus Christ behind the Christ of Scripture, or an absconditus 
divine heaven behind the heaven of Scripture.364 Their realities are obviously more 
complex than their portrayal in Scripture, but not contrary to or necessarily less than this 
portrayal. 
The second type of charge would not necessarily challenge my ontological 
reading of Hebrews, but question whether the ontological assumptions of Hebrews should 
be taken into account in modern theology. According to this type of challenge, the 
assumptions of Hebrews would be part of a first century (pre-scientific) view of reality.365 
Without entering into the discussion of biblical inspiration,366 it is importance to notice 
that Hebrews was not merely following ancient cosmological views.367 In principle, the 
interpretation suggested in this study does not seem to be incompatible with the scientific 
data used in modern cosmology research.368 Furthermore, the holistic account of human 
                                                
364 This is an extension of Barth’s criticism to the notion of God absconditus that I have described 
in the previous chapter (see Ontological Model, Divinity). 
365 This challenge follows Bultmann’s notion that the cosmology of the NT is mythical and 
obsolete. See Rudolf Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate, trans. Hans Werner Bartsch 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1961), 1-8. 
366 This is an important topic to be addressed in this type of debate. One aspect to be discussed, for 
example, is that God, the supreme creator, would not communicate to the inspired author a mistaken 
cosmology. According to this view, if there is an outdated cosmology, this would be related with the human 
prophet (who lived in a pre-scientific age), and not with God. However, I would suggest that while the 
biblical inspired material is not a treatise on cosmology, it remains to be shown that the Bible contains 
cosmological statements or assumptions that go against modern scientific research, even though this has 
been the view promoted by many theologians. An example of this situation is the myth of a solid heavenly 
dome the correction offered by Randall W. Younker and Richard M. Davidson, “The Myth of the Solid 
Heavenly Dome: Another Look at the Hebrew Rāqîaʻ,” AUSS 49, no. 1 (2011): 125-147. 
367 While a research on ancient cosmologies was beyond the scope of the present study, I have 
indicated in the section on cosmology that Hebrews does not assume, for example, an outdated Platonic 
cosmology or an outdated cosmological view of several heavens. 
368 My study suggests that there is an atmospheric heaven or sky and a part of the created universe 
(the heaven where God governs the world) that is beyond our scientific knowledge of the universe. The 





nature, for example, is consistent with theological anthropological modern views.369 With 
regard to a spatio-temporal God and His spatio-temporal heaven, they go beyond the 
scope of scientific enquiry, as these are realities existing beyond our world, even though 
these topics may raise interesting questions for philosophical theology. Therefore, this 
second challenge is not a problem for the results suggested in this research.  
My answers to these potential challenges, however, do not preclude the need of 
further research on the way biblical materials present assumptions about realities and also 
how modern science can dialogue with the ontological theology found implicitly or 
explicitly in Scripture. 
Having discussed the implications of the principles of reality assumed in Hebrews 
for the understanding of Christ’s priesthood, I will outline in the next chapter a brief 
comparison of my findings about the priesthood of Christ in Hebrews and its principles of 
reality in this chapter (the historical model) with the models described and compared in 
the previous chapters. 
                                                
scientific cosmology. Since modern science does not offer us an exhaustive knowledge of the universe, the 
notion of a divine heaven is not incompatible with the scientific data used in modern cosmology. 
369 See, e.g., Nancey C. Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); John C. Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science (New 










A BRIEF COMPARISON OF THE MODELS 
 
Introduction 
In this short chapter, I will compare the priesthood of Christ and its principles of 
reality in the historical model (depicted in chapter 4), with the sacramental, functional, 
and ontological models (described in chapters 2 and 3). The comparisons at the end of 
chapters 2 and 3 will serve as a basis for this last comparison. Thus, I will follow the 
same structure/style and I do not need to repeat here all the explanations outlined earlier. 
The Priesthood of Christ 
The Need for Christ’s Priesthood 
The comparison of the models regarding the need for CP in chapter 2 was 
organized according to two basic questions: (1) What is the problem of sin? (2) Why is 
CP necessary? The answers to the first question (see Table 9) in the three first models 
were initially two: an ontological disorder that hinders the teleological movement from 
human beings to God (sacramental model), and a moral rebellion of human beings 
against God (functional and ontological models). Both answers assume that original 
creation is incomplete and in need of fulfillment. In this way, sin either describes (theistic 
evolution: ontological and sacramental [O’Collins] models) or deepens (historical fall: 
sacramental [Aquinas] and functional models) this incompleteness. In this context, how 




provided by the other models? First of all, the book of Hebrews does not offer the details 
that the models provide. More specifically, it is not possible to determine categorically in 
the context of Hebrews that the sin problem is primarily human rebellion. Likewise, the 
affirmation of a complete original creation is not explicitly stated in Hebrews.  
 
Table 9. The need for CP 
SACRAMENTAL MODEL FUNCTIONAL MODEL ONTOLOGICAL MODEL HISTORICAL MODEL 
• The Problem of Sin 
o ontological disorder  
o background: original 




• Why CP is necessary 
o human healing 
o improvement of 
original creation: 
qualified by a 
historical fall 
(Aquinas) or theistic 
evolution (O’Collins) 
• The Problem of Sin 
o moral rebellion  
o background: original 




• Why CP is necessary 
o divine propitiation 
o improvement of 
original creation: 
qualified by a 
historical fall 
• The Problem of Sin 
o moral rebellion 
o background: original 




• Why CP is necessary 
o divine propitiation  
o improvement of 
original creation: 
qualified by theistic 
evolution 
• The Problem of Sin 
o moral rebellion 
(transgression of the 
divine law) 
o background: original 
creation complete 
 
• Why CP is necessary 
o divine forgiveness 
o restoration of original 
creation (qualified by 
a historical fall) 
o Forgiveness and 
empowerment of 
human beings  
o Resolution of the sin 




However, we should not read Hebrews in isolation from other canonical books. 
While a canonical study of the priesthood of Christ lies beyond the scope of this study, I 
suggest that Hebrews seems to assume the picture of creation delineated in Genesis (Heb 
4:4 quotes Gen 2:2): The good/complete creation (Gen 1-2) is marred by human sin, 
which was initiated as a rebellion/disobedience against God (Gen 3).1  
Furthermore, the scope of the sin problem in Hebrews is not limited to human 
                                                
1 Arguably, this was not only the case at the beginning of human sin. Rather, rebellion seems to be 
the main definition of the sin problem in every age, as this is the reason for the strongest warnings of 




beings, but comprises a defilement of heaven and the action of the devil leading to death.2 
This larger scope appears to imply that these elements, not emphasized in the three 
models, were not part of a supposedly original incomplete creation (Why would heaven 
be defiled in original creation? Why would the devil lead people to death in original 
creation?), but they have been added after the disruption of a complete original creation. 
Regarding the second question (Why is CP necessary?), two answers were 
provided by the three models: CP is needed primordially to heal human beings from the 
imperfection of their creation (sacramental model) or it is necessary chiefly for the 
propitiation of God (functional and ontological models). From the broader perspective of 
the incompleteness of original creation, CP is ultimately needed to improve original 
creation, either directly (theistic evolution) through the activities of ontological healing 
(O’Collins) and divine propitiation (ontological model), or indirectly (historical fall, the 
incompleteness of original creation is now addressed under the new conditions of sin) 
through these same activities (Aquinas and Calvin respectively). Because the historical 
model defines the sin problem primordially in terms of rebellion, it agrees with the 
functional and ontological models that the principal need for CP is divine forgiveness. 
This is exemplified by the fact that CP in Hebrews begins with the ascension of Christ, 
who goes before the presence of God the Father. Only after that the empowerment of 
human beings is possible. Furthermore, since the historical model views original creation 
as complete, CP is needed for restoration of original creation, and not its improvement or 
                                                
2 The action of the devil producing death in Hebrews (2:14) could be understood as another 
pointer that Hebrews assumes the Genesis account of the Fall, as the serpent leads human beings to sin and 
death in chapter 3 (see Rev 12:9). In this view, the action of the devil in Heb 2:14 would be a continuation 




fulfillment. The notions that CP is not effective when it is rejected by human beings and 
that CP does not eliminate the need of personal endurance emphasize the idea of human 
responsibility, and not a fulfillment of original creation. Rather, the idea of fulfillment is 
related to the redemptive plans of God outlined in the Aaronic priesthood. 
The Agent of Priesthood 
The following questions guided the comparison of the three models regarding the 
agent of CP: (1) How is Christ’s divinity involved in His priesthood? (2) How is Christ’s 
humanity involved in His priesthood? Taking into account the first question, in the 
sacramental model the divine agent focuses His priestly activity upon human beings (see 
Table 10), while in the functional and ontological models this agent focuses on God. 
Second, while the functional model seems to see the agency of the divine Son (second 
person) working to propitiate God the Father (first person), the ontological model tends to 
draw a more general picture of God acting upon Himself. In this way, the divinity of 
Christ seems to be the main agent of the priesthood in the ontological model. In 
comparison with these views, the historical model seems to focus on God the Father as 
the object of the priestly action in terms of forgiveness. Like in the functional and 
ontological models, this statement derives from the notion that rebellion is the main 
feature of the sin problem. While the historical model would agree with the ontological 
model that Christ’s priesthood could be interpreted as God acting upon Himself 
(subject/object), the historical model would describe this conception along the lines of the 
functional model, where the God the Son (incarnate) works for the forgiveness3 of God 
                                                





the Father (provided this work was already planned by the Father).  
 
Table 10. The agent of CP 
SACRAMENTAL MODEL FUNCTIONAL MODEL ONTOLOGICAL MODEL HISTORICAL MODEL 
• Agency: Christ’s divinity 
o Main agent 







• Agency: Christ’s 
humanity 
o His human life as 
the scope of the 
priesthood 
o Human nature as the 
instrument of the 
divine agency (point 
of contact with the 
physical world) 
• Agency: Christ’s divinity 
o Guarantees: eternity 
and power of the 
priesthood 
o Focus: God (second 
person propitiates 
the first person)  
 
 
• Agency: Christ’s 
humanity 
o Main agent 





• Agency: Christ’s divinity 
o Main agent 
o Subject/object of the 
priesthood (acts upon 
Himself) 




• Agency: Christ’s 
humanity 
o Earthly form of 
God’s self-
humiliation  
o Recipient of the 
benefits of the 
priesthood  
• Agency: Christ’s Divinity 
o Main agent: divine-
human 
o Learned obedience 
o Focus: God the Son 
intercedes for the 
forgiveness of God 
the Father 
 
• Agency: Christ's 
Humanity 
o Main agent: divine-
human 
o Enabled divinity to 
experience suffering, 
test/temptation, death 
(pre-requisite) in a 
divine-human level 
o Priest-king, God’s 
appointment 




Regarding the agency, the historical model conceptualizes Christ as agent of the 
priesthood acting as divine-human being, and not through a human nature.4 While the 
sacramental and ontological models consider the divinity of Christ as the main agent of 
His priesthood, and the functional model attempts to focus on His humanity as the main 
agent, the historical model seeks to highlight the unity of a divine-human agency.  
The main emphasis of the historical model regarding Christ’s humanity is that the 
human nature enabled His divinity to experience suffering, test/temptation, and death as a 
                                                
forgiveness. 
4 As already indicated, the divine Christ was able to perform mediation before His incarnation in 
terms of creation. Furthermore, the divine Christ in the incarnate state was able to learn obedience and to 




human being. However, a key difference between the historical model and the other 
models is that this experience5 is not a constitutive part of His priesthood, but a pre-
requisite. The priestly agency officially starts at His ascension into heaven. This official 
beginning is not sufficiently emphasized in the other models, which affirm in different 
ways the priestly agency in the incarnate earthly life with its climax on the cross. 
The Actions of the Priest 
The comparison of the priestly actions of Christ was organized according to the 
following questions: (1) How are His actions seen as a whole? (2) What are the priestly 
actions of the earthly Christ? (3) What are the priestly actions of the ascended Christ?  
Priestly action as a whole: Regarding the first question, the sacramental and 
ontological models tend to view Christ’s priestly action as one (see Table 11). The 
unifying principle in the sacramental model is the notion of Christ’s invisible sacrifice 
(with different forms of material expression and effective communication to human 
beings—sacraments). Whereas in the ontological model the unifying principle in this 
model is the one person of Christ, who is the object of His own priestly actions. On the 
other hand, the functional model emphasizes distinct and subsequent actions in Christ’s 
priesthood (teaching, sacrifice on the cross, and heavenly intercession). In comparison 
with these models, the historical model is similar to the functional model in the emphasis 
of distinct and subsequent actions, although the sequence of actions is different. This 
difference leads to the next question. 
 
                                                





Table 11. The actions of CP 
SACRAMENTAL MODEL FUNCTIONAL MODEL ONTOLOGICAL MODEL HISTORICAL MODEL 
• Action: one (invisible 







• Earthly Christ 
o Entire life (devotion 
to God – invisible 
sacrifice)  
o Material expression 
(cross) 
§ Powerful influence 
on material human 
beings 
 
• Ascended Christ 




l form of the 
sacrifice): heals 
human beings on 
earth (application of 
salvation) 








• Earthly Christ 




§ Christ punished in 




• Ascended Christ  
o Intercession in 
heaven: subsequent 






believers on earth 
(Lord’s Supper) 
• Action: one (Christ’s one 
person and action – 
















• Ascended Christ 
o Reveals the reality 
of complete 
reconciliation to 
human beings on 
earth 
(contemporaneous 
to all times, taste of 
the new reality in 
the eucharist) 








• Earthly Christ 
o Life/death as 
preparatory and 
even proleptic or 






• Ascended Christ 
o Presentation of His 
sacrifice to the Father 
at the ascension 







judgment and final 




Priestly actions of the earthly Christ: In the three models, the main emphasis 
regarding the priestly actions of the earthly Christ lies on the interpretations of His 
sacrifice. According to the principle of invisible sacrifice in the sacramental model, His 
entire earthly life of devotion to God is a sacrifice that assumes a particular 
visibile/material expression on the cross. Since CP is needed for the healing of human 
beings and the divine Christ is the main agent of the priesthood that acts through the 
instrumentality of His humanity, the material expression of Christ’s sacrifice on the cross 
                                                




is a powerful influence on material human beings.6  
For the functional model, Christ’s earthly teachings are priestly activities, but the 
main emphasis centers on His penal substitutionary sacrifice on the cross. Because CP is 
needed for divine propitiation and His humanity is its main agent, the sacrifice of the 
cross describes the human Christ receiving the wrath of God in the place of elected 
human beings (propitiation by punishing Christ in the place of sinful human beings).  
In the ontological model, while Christ’s life (especially when in prayer) and death 
are intercessory, the focus is on His substitutionary sacrifice on the cross, which means 
the destruction of sin/evil. In contrast to these models, the historical model interprets 
Christ’s life and particularly His sacrifice as pre-requisites (that may involve proleptic 
priestly language) for the fulfillment of the priestly role officially initiated at the 
ascension. This point leads us to the next question. 
Priestly actions of the ascended Christ: As far as the priestly actions of the 
ascended Christ, the sacramental model emphasizes the sacraments of the church 
(particularly the eucharist), which are ultimately ministered by the ascended Christ. 
Following the principle of invisible sacrifice, the eucharist is a material/sacramental form 
of Christ’s sacrifice that effectively heals human beings. For the functional model, the 
emphasis is on Christ’s ongoing heavenly intercession, which is a subsequent salvific 
activity that propitiates God the Father on the basis of the earthly sacrifice on the cross. 
This model also assumes that the priestly teaching of Christ continues after His ascension 
in the form of word and sacrament, which effectively applies (especially through the 
                                                




Lord’s Supper) salvific grace to human beings. In the ontological model, the ascended 
Christ reveals the reality of complete reconciliation in His contemporaneity to all times, 
offering a taste of this new reality in the eucharist. In contrast to the sacramental and 
functional models, the ontological model attempts to avoid the notion of subjective 
salvific application of the priestly actions in Christ (the reality of salvation) to concrete 
human beings.  
However, only the functional model focuses on a concrete salvific activity in 
heaven. In the sacramental and ontological models, the emphasis is on the activity of the 
ascended Christ on earth, either sacramentally healing human beings (sacramental model) 
or revealing to them the complete reality of human reconciliation already effected by God 
in Christ (ontological model). In comparison with these models, the historical model 
intensifies the focus of the functional model on Christ’s priestly activity in heaven, as it 
emphasizes the official priestly actions of His ascended state. The historical model 
stipulates a sequence of official priestly activities performed by the ascended Christ in 
heaven. At the ascension, He presented the sacrifice on the cross to the Father, entering 
into the heavenly sanctuary, for the forgiveness of human sins. In his ongoing salvific 
mediation, He intercedes for forgiveness before the Father and empower believers 
through the Holy Spirit (see Heb 6:4; 10:29).7 In contrast to the other models, the 
historical model does not regard the Lord’s Supper/Eucharist part of Christ’s priestly 
action, even though from a canonical perspective this crucial earthly celebration can be 
                                                
7 Even though the focus of these passages is not on the elaboration of the role of the Holy Spirit in 
this process, 6:4 seems to describe the earthly experience of salvation as sharing in the Holy Spirit, which is 
also depicted as tasting the heavenly gift, the word of God, and the powers of the coming age. In 10:29, the 





understood as a remembrance and proclamation of the new convenant (see 1 Cor 11:25-
268; Matt 26:28; Mark 14:24; Luke 22:20) mediated by Christ’s priesthood. Finally, 
Christ’s priestly activity is associated with the eschatological judgment and then the 
second coming that will bring complete salvation to believers. 
The Goal of the Priesthood 
Considering that all models propose that the goal of CP is the reconciliation of 
human beings with God, the following questions guided their comparison: (1) What is the 
nature of the reconciliatory goal? (2) How does CP achieve this goal?  
Regarding the first question, the sacramental model emphasizes an ontological 
reconciliation, described in terms of a teleological union, a participation of human beings 
in God, which is ultimately the goal of original creation (see Table 12). The emphasis of 
the functional model is on a moral reconciliation characterized by the grace of God’s 
forgiveness, who justifies and then sanctifies human beings. The ontological model 
pushes the functional model a little further by assuming that creation is in need of moral 
reconciliation since the beginning, and emphasizes that the locus of the reality of 
reconciliation is Christ. In His divine-human person, God and humanity are reconciled, 
which means that the goal of CP is already an ontological reality. In comparison with 
these models, the historical model conceptualizes the goal of covenantal/moral 
reconciliation according to the framework of the better/new covenant. The first covenant 
(Aaronic priesthood) was a pointer to the reality of Christ’s priesthood. Only this reality 
                                                
8 I have taken the language of remembrance (ἀνάµνησις) and proclamation (related to the verb 




could achieve the goal of the removal of sin, bringing about a close relationship between 
God and human beings. 
 
Table 12. The goal of CP 
SACRAMENTAL MODEL FUNCTIONAL MODEL ONTOLOGICAL MODEL HISTORICAL MODEL 








• How CP achieves this 
goal 
o divine agent uses 
material instruments 
o ontological healing 
of human beings 




• The Reconciliatory Goal 







• How CP achieves this 
goal 
o sacrifice on the 
cross and heavenly 
intercession: 
propitiate the Father 






• The Reconciliatory Goal 
o moral reconciliation 
(in Christ) 
o Goal achieved 
ontologically 
o Remaining aspect: 
revelation  
 
• How CP achieves this 
goal 





o Revelation (new 
reality): Christ 
contemporary to all 
times, use of 
material instruments 
• The Reconciliatory Goal 




















§ Final purification 
 
 
In this context, how does CP lead to the reconciliatory goal? In the sacramental 
model, the ontological reconciliation is reached through the healing of human beings. By 
means of material instruments (Christ’s humanity, sacraments), the divine agent in CP 
produces this healing, leading human beings in their teleological movement towards God. 
For the functional model, the moral reconciliation is reached primordially through the 
propitiation of the Father. The transformation of human beings, also mediated by material 
instruments (word/sacrament), is dependent and subsequent to His forgiveness. In this 
case, CP leads to the reconciliatory goal by primordially propitiating the Father (in His 




forgiveness and transformation to human beings through material instruments. In the 
ontological model, the reconciliatory goal is already a complete reality in (in Christ), but 
it still needs to be revealed to human beings. Christ is revealing the new reality of 
reconciliation by means of His contemporaneity to all times, using material instruments 
to provide a taste of this new reality. In comparison with these models, the historical 
model stipulates that the goal of moral reconciliation is achieved on the basis of the 
establishment of the better/new covenant that took place at the official inauguration of 
Christ’s priesthood at His ascension. With this, He initiated a daily mediation that 
provides forgiveness of sins and the internalization of divine laws by which human 
beings achieve spiritual union with God. Christ helps believers remain and grow in the 
covenantal relationship with God, as they struggle against sin, until the judgment and 
salvation leading to the consummation of the covenant. 
Having provided this brief comparison of the models of Christ’s priesthood, I will 
compare the interpretation of the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality assumed by 
the historical model with the interpretations assumed by the other three models. 
The Priesthood of Christ 
Divinity: Christ and the Concept of Divine Nature 
The sacramental, functional, and ontological models seem to affirm or are 
logically close to the idea that God, in His perfection, is timeless/spaceless in His being 
(for instance, immutable, simple, impassible, non-discursive knowledge), and 
consequently His eternal (timeless/spaceless) action is described by His will 
(predestination). This notion is nuanced in different ways (see Table 13). According to 




earthly spatio-temporal instruments that repeat the simultaneous divine action into the 
sequentiality of earthly time. What is already a timeless or simultaneous reality in God is 
actualized or repeated into sequential time. 
 
Table 13. Divinity 
SACRAMENTAL MODEL FUNCTIONAL MODEL ONTOLOGICAL MODEL HISTORICAL MODEL 



















• The object of God’s 
salvific action: spatio-
temporal human beings 
• God’s nature: timeless/ 











• God’s historical action: 
historical/chronologica





• The object of God’s 
salvific action: spatio-
temporal human beings 
• God’s nature: simultaneous 
temporality (logically close to 
timelessness) and 
incomprehensible spatiality 
(logically close to 
spacelessness) 
 









(secondary causes implied) 
 
 
• The object of God’s salvific 
action: He Himself (spatio-
temporal human beings are 
benefited in Him/Christ) 
• God’s nature: spatio-


















• The object of God’s 
salvific action: spatio-
temporal human beings 




In contrast to these models, the historical model holds that God is spatio-temporal, 
meaning that He is able to really experience sequential events in specific places. This 
position implies that there is no divine eternal/timeless action (predestination) and, 
therefore, there is no need to conceptualize an actualization of eternal action in spatio-
temporal reality. In other words, God’s actions really take place in history (in the sense of 
a sequence of events) instead of being merely duplicated in the temporality of our world. 
In this context, there is no distinction between eternal and historical action, since all 




instead of a real eternal “action.” Furthermore, if there is a need some kind of 
instrumentality for the fulfillment of the salvific divine plan, this need is not caused by a 
discontinuity between God as timeless-spaceless reality and spatio-temporal human 
beings, but motivated by other factors. 
Humanity: Christ and the Concept of Human Nature 
The sacramental, functional, and ontological models agree that Christ’s humanity 
is spatio-temporal (see Table 14), while they stipulate different levels of relationships 
between Christ’s humanity and divinity, from the perspective of space-time. Essentially,  
Christ’s humanity is a spatio-temporal instrument of His non-spatial/timeless divinity. 
The historical model concurs with the idea that Christ’s humanity is spatio-temporal, but 
it disagrees with the other models regarding the understanding of the instrumentality of 
His humanity.  
In short, in the historical model, Christ’s humanity is not a spatio-temporal 
instrument of His non-spatial/timeless divinity, since divinity is spatio-temporal in an 
analogical infinite sense. Christ’s humanity is a pre-requisite that enables Him as God to 
be a human being by ontological accommodation. In this sense, Christ experiences reality 
on a new level, namely, on the divine-human level. This new experience qualifies Him to 
be more symphatetic toward human beings and obedient toward God. Christ’s humanity 








Table 14. Humanity 
SACRAMENTAL MODEL FUNCTIONAL MODEL ONTOLOGICAL MODEL HISTORICAL MODEL 
• Christ’s human nature: 
spatio-temporal  
 
• Instrumentality: secondary 









• Central instrumental role: 
passibility (impassible 
divinity) 













• Central instrumental 
role: passibility 
(impassible divinity) 
• Christ’s human nature: 
spatio-temporal 
 
• Instrumentality: secondary 
cause (spatio-temporal) of 
divine simultaneity 
(logically close to 
timelessness/spacelessness) 
 




• Central instrumental role: 
historical revelation of 
simultaneous (logically 
timeless) passibility 
• Christ’s human nature: 
spatio-temporal 
 
• God becomes a human 
being ontologically 









• Central ontological 
role: death (God 
experiences death) 
 
Cosmology: Christ, Heaven, and Earth 
The sacramental, functional, and ontological models seem to assume that God’s 
heaven is a timeless/spaceless environment while the earth is obviously spatio-temporal 
(see Table 15). The bridge from heaven to earth, which are two different ontological 
types of environment, consists on spatio-temporal instruments, particularly the 
sacraments. In the sacramental and functional models, the role of these instruments is the 
actualization of the heavenly reality on earth, whereas in the ontological model its role is 
the revelation of the heavenly reality on earth. In contrast to these models, there is no 
ontological gap between God’s heaven and earth, in the sense that both are spatio-
temporal environments. Hence, the historical events in heaven synchronically relate to 
historical events on earth. Furthermore, in contrast to the other models that basically 
restrict the actions of the earthly Christ to the earthly realm (because of the obvious 
reason that heaven is a timeless-spaceless environment), the historical model stipulates 
that Christ acts historically in heaven. In principle, if the ascended Christ needs to act on 




motivated by a distinction of timeless-spaceless and spatio-temporal realities. However, 
the historical model does not emphasize the use of secondary causes in its understanding 
of CP. 
 
Table 15. Cosmology 
SACRAMENTAL MODEL FUNCTIONAL MODEL ONTOLOGICAL MODEL HISTORICAL MODEL 






• Earth: spatio-temporal 
 
• The ascended Christ acts 






• Goal of His action on 
earth: partially actualize 
the reality of new 
creation on earth 
 
• Christ: effects new 
timeless creation in the 
cosmos 






• Earth: spatio-temporal 
 
• The ascended Christ 






• Goal of His action on 
earth: partially 
actualize the reality of 
new creation on earth 
 
• Christ: effects new 
timeless creation in the 
cosmos 






• Earth: spatio-temporal 
 
• The ascended Christ acts on 
earth through spatio-temporal 
instruments/secondary causes 




• Goal of His action on earth: 
partially reveal the reality of 
new creation on earth 
 
 
• Christ: is the locus of non-
sequential (logically timeless) 
new creation (micro/macro-
cosmos) 






• Earth: spatio-temporal 
 
• The ascended Christ 
acts in heaven 
historically, which 
synchronically relates 
to earthly history 
 
 
• Goal of His action in 
heaven: historically 
fulfill the reality of the 
new covenant 
 
• Christ: historically 
effects the new 
covenant (new creation 
in the cosmos implied) 
 
Implications for Christ’s Priesthood 
Need 
With regard to the need for the priesthood, the sacramental, functional, and 
ontological models assume that original creation is incomplete (see Table 16). The 
presupposition that God is timeless/spaceless, shared by the three models, implies that 
this incompleteness is intended by the timeless will of God. The ontological model, for 
example, seems to indicate that the original incompleteness is ontologically characterized 




creation is incomplete nor is sequential time a problem to be overcome.  
 
Table 16. Implications for CP 







• Incomplete creation 
intended by the timeless 




• Main object of CP (main 
need): human beings 
(their ontological healing 
through spatio-temporal 
instruments [humanity of 
Christ, sacraments]) 
• Incomplete creation 
intended by the timeless 




• Main object of CP (main 
need): God (the 
propitiation of His 
timeless wrath, but being 
timeless this cannot be 
propitiated) 
• Incomplete creation 
intended by the timeless 
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cross: spatio-
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Taking into account in what sense Christ’s priesthood is necessary, the idea of 
ontological healing in human beings advanced by the sacramental model is qualified by 
the instrumentality of spatio-temporal agencies that includes Christ’s humanity and the 
sacraments. On the other hand, the emphasis on divine wrath that requires Christ’s 
priestly propitiation in the functional model seems ontologically problematic when one 
considers the presupposition of divine timelessness. The wrath of a timeless God is 
eternally constituted, and not caused by something external to Himself in chronological 
history. By claiming that God is eternally the agent and the subject of propitiation, the 
ontological model appears to be more coherent with the presupposition of a timeless God, 
because His wrath and propitiation are found in His simultaneous being, and not in 
chronological history. But that would seem to imply that the conflict between good and 
evil observed in history is ontologically found and grounded in the essential being of 
God. Conversely, the historical model avoids the conclusion that the conflict between 
good and evil exists ontologically in God’s eternal being by stipulating that the ultimate 




in the history between God and human beings. Moreover, the historical model is more 
ontologically consistent than the functional model with regard to the notion of divine 
forgiveness. Different from a timeless God, whose wrath is eternally constituted, a 
temporal God reacts to human actions that take place in history. 
Agent 
As far as the agent of the priesthood is concerned, a timeless/spaceless 
presupposition of God’s being and action favors the idea that He is the subject of the 
priesthood, as He cannot be the object of a chronological action performed outside of 
Himself. In this sense, the sacramental model is consistent with this ontological 
presupposition, as the model sees the movement of Christ’s priestly activity moving from 
God to human beings for their healing through the spatio-temporal instrumentality of His 
humanity. On the other hand, it is difficult for the functional model to ontologically 
sustain the view that the actions of Christ are directed toward the Father, as a timeless 
God cannot be the object of the historical actions of the incarnate Christ (nor a divine 
Christ can be the subject of a historical propitiation, unless instrumentally through a 
human nature). The ontological model seems to solve this Protestant dilemma by making 
the timeless God the eternal subject and object of His action. He is eternally self-
propitiated, and the benefits of this propitiation are enjoyed by a transformed humanity in 
the eternal Christ. An ontological consequence of this decision is that Christ is the 
timeless locus of new creation (and transformed human beings), while the sacramental 
and functional models have Christ historically and partially actualizing new creation in 
human beings. In contrast to these models, the historical model holds that a spatio-




humanity of Christ does need to be interpreted as a spatio-temporal instrument of the 
divinity, through which He interacts with the spatio-temporal world. Rather, through the 
ontological incarnation of his divine being, His humanity allows Him to interact with 
human beings directly and experience death. Furthermore, Christ effects a new covenant 
historically, which also implies a new creation, in the sense that He is not replicating an 
eternal (timeless-spaceless) reality in our spatio-temporal world, but this new reality is 
really new as it takes place in history. 
Actions 
In the context of the actions of the priest, the emphasis of the sacramental (one 
invisible sacrifice) and ontological (one person as eternally subject/object) models on one 
action is compatible with the presupposition of a timeless divine action. On the other 
hand, the notion of the functional model that the actions are multiple and sequential is 
incompatible with this presupposition, which means that these actions would be 
performed by Christ in His humanity (as a spatio-temporal instrument), and not in His 
divinity. This interpretation would partially9 fit the earthly actions of Christ, but it seems  
ontologically problematic for a heavenly propitiatory intercession before a 
timeless/spaceless Father in a timeless/spaceless heaven. On the other hand, by assuming 
a spatio-temporal interpretation of divine spatio-temporal action, the historical model is 
able to stipulate a multiple and sequential view of the official actions of the ascended 
Christ (heavenly offering of the earthly sacrifice, ongoing salvific mediation, and 
eschatological judgment and final salvation) and postulate that God can really respond 
                                                





(historically) to the priestly activity, as He forgives human beings as a response to 
Christ’s priestly work. In fact, this spatio-temporal ongoing action in heaven parallels the 
history of human beings on earth, their actions and prayers. Hence, Christ’s action to 
empower human beings really happens historically. This is not an eternally constituted 
reality in the being or will of God that is actualized in the spatio-temporal realities of 
earth. Likewise, the purification of the heavenly things is somehow a spatio-temporal 
activity in the heavenly sanctuary in terms of forgiveness and judgment. 
Goal  
Regarding the goal of the priesthood, the sacramental model is ontologically 
consistent with the presuppositions about Divinity, Humanity, and Cosmology. In order to 
achieve the goal of ontological reconciliation, the divine Christ priesthood uses spatio-
temporal instruments to ontologically heal human beings and guide their teleological 
movement toward God. The functional model, on the other hand, seems to lack 
ontological coherence between the idea of moral reconciliation, characterized by the 
divine forgiveness that is based on the propitiatory work of Christ (earthly sacrifice and 
heavenly intercession), and the presupposition of a timeless God. This God cannot 
forgive human beings historically (as an action that responds to another action). The 
ontological model seems to solve the ontological inconsistency related to the divine 
forgiveness of a timeless God by ultimately locating this forgiveness in 
(timeless/simultaneous) eternity, and not by understanding it historically. The ontological 
model is also compatible with its own interpretation of the macro-hermeneutical 
                                                




principles of reality when it assumes that the goal of Christ’s priesthood is already 
ontologically achieved, if this is seen eternally and not historically (not through the work 
of the earthly Christ), and that the spatio-temporal instruments mediate a revelation of 
this timeless reality. 
Conversely, in the historical model the goal of Christ’s priesthood is not fulfilled 
as an earthly actualization of a reality already constituted in God. Rather, there is a divine 
engagement for human salvation in human history. Christ’s daily mediation in the 
heavenly sanctuary synchronically relates to the history of human beings on earth, which 
implies that God’s forgiveness temporally follows their prayers and Christ’s intercession. 
Thus, there is a temporal synchronism between heaven and earth, as Christ empowers 
believers to remain and grow in a covenantal relationship with God, in the context of 
their struggle against sin, until the eschatological judgment and salvation leading to the 
historical (spatio-temporal) consummation of the covenant. 
Conclusion 
In my concluding remarks of chapter 4, I indicated that the sacramental and the 
ontological models of Christ’s priesthood tend to be more ontologically consistent with 
their respective interpretations of the principles of reality. From a historical perspective 
of Catholic and Protestant theologies, it is possible that the functional model (classical 
Protestantism) formulated an account of Christ’s priesthood that represents an alternative 
to the sacramental model (in the Thomistic form), without paying special attention to the 
interpretation of the principles of reality. This would explain the reason why the 
sacramental and functional models have different accounts of Christ’s priesthood, while 




of ontological coherence regarding the idea of propitiation describes both the 
sacramental model (Thomistic form) and the functional model, as this idea is 
ontologically incompatible with a non-spatial/timeless interpretation of the principles of 
reality. In modern theology, for the sake of ontological consistency, either the notion of 
propitiation has been dropped (sacramental model: O’Collins’ form) or reinterpreted (the 
ontological model). The principles of reality of the sacramental model seem to be built 
for a notion of God as the subject of Christ’s priesthood, but not its object. As a result, 
the idea of divine propitiation is unnecessary. Human beings are the object and, thus, the 
earth is the main realm of this priesthood, not heaven.  
The situation is different for the functional model, as the notion of divine 
propitiation is perhaps the chief idea for the understanding of Christ’s priesthood. To 
affirm that God is the primary object of this priesthood requires a different ontological 
interpretation of God, the role of Christ’s humanity, and a focus on God’s heaven. The 
ideas that the divine Christ became able to experience passibility in His earthly life 
(Luther) and that the human Christ is physically/spatially present in heaven (Calvin) call 
for a more active role of Christ’s humanity and have ontological implications that should 
be further elaborated toward an alternative (spatio-temporal) interpretation of the 
principles of reality. But this was not the route adopted by the ontological model, which 
reinterpreted divine propitiation as an eternal (simultaneous) reality, presumably giving 
no room for a real historical propitiatory intercession of the ascended Christ in heaven. 
As I conclude the present chapter, my suggestion is that the historical model 
provides an alternative that makes the interests of the functional model more viable than 




reject the general idea of human (ontological) transformation advanced by the 
sacramental model. However, the historical model does not believe that this is the first 
role of Christ’s priesthood. Rather, God’s forgiveness is the first target. At the same time, 
the view of a capricious God that needs to be appeased by the suffering of an innocent 
man is avoided on the grounds that He is the one who appoints Christ for the priesthood 
(an idea advanced by the functional model) and that Christ is also God (in this sense God 
is also the subject of the priestly action—an insight advanced by the ontological model). 
Furthermore, the most fundamental difference between the historical model and the 
sacramental model is that the former operates with a spatio-temporal view of divine 
reality while the latter assumes a timeless-spaceless view, which also implies differences 
regarding the nature and process of human transformation suggested by each model. As 
far as these two views of divine reality are concerned, these two models are ontologically 
consistent. Nevertheless, my study of Hebrews leads to the spatio-temporal reading of the 
historical model, which produces a distinct picture of Christ’s priesthood. With regard to 
the functional and ontological models, I have noticed in this study that the functional 
model has interesting insights about Christ’s priesthood that push toward a 
reinterpretation of the principles of reality (in my view, a spatio-temporal 
reinterpretation) that would sustain these insights. Likewise, I have noted that the 
ontological model contains important remarks about the principles of reality (in the 
direction of a spatio-temporal understanding) that would push toward a reinterpretation of 
the priesthood of Christ. In this sense, the functional and ontological models are close to 
the historical model, as the historical model could be seen as an expansion of Christ’s 




problematized by the ontological model. A basic difference, however, between the 
historical model and these other models is the strong emphasis on a heavenly priesthood 














The purpose of the present study has been to deconstruct hermeneutically 
conflicting models of the doctrine of CP in order to articulate a constructive proposal of 
an alternative model as a suggestion for the resolution of the conflict of interpretations 
regarding this doctrine. To contextualize this purpose, chapter 1 introduced different 
interpretations of the doctrine of Christ’s priesthood (background of the problem) in 
systematic theology and highlighted that there is disagreement betweem them on this 
regard (the problem). Then, the chapter briefly indicated the goal, the value, and the 
parameters of the research to be pursued (purpose, justification, scope, conceptual 
framework, and methodology).  
In chapter 2 (The Priesthood of Christ), I described the three models of 
interpretation of the doctrine of Christ’s priesthood that have been selected in this study, 
namely, the sacramental, the functional, and the ontological models. This description 
provided a general overview of the discussion from a systematic perspective, and also 
prepared the ground for the study of the macro-hermeneutical presuppositions that 
undergird each model. Considering that the description of the models was organized 
according to the topics need, agent, actions, and goal, this chapter outlined each model as 




Table 17. The priesthood of Christ 
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historical fall 
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humanity 
o His human life as 
the scope of the 
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o Human nature as the 
instrument of the 
divine agency (point 
of contact with the 
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• Agency: Christ’s divinity 
o Guarantees: eternity 
and power of the 
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o Focus: God (second 
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humanity 
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benefits of the 
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• Agency: Christ’s 
Divinity 
o Main agent: 
divine-human 
o Learned obedience 
o Focus: God the 
Son intercedes for 
the forgiveness of 
God the Father 
 
• Agency: Christ's 
Humanity 
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After this general depiction, chapter 3 (The Priesthood of Christ) initiated the 
hermeneutical analysis of each model, focusing on macro-hermeneutical principles of 
reality, namely, the interpretations of each model regarding divinity, humanity, and 
cosmology as far as the reality of Christ is concerned. The chapter showed how 
ontological assumptions about Christ inform the interpretation of His priesthood in the 
sacramental, functional, and ontological models. In short, I delineated the interpretations 
of the macro-hermeneutical principles as outlined in the first three content columns of 
Table 18. 
 
Table 18. The priesthood of Christ 
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• The ascended Christ 
acts in heaven 
historically, and this 
action 
synchronically 
relates to the history 
that takes place on 
earth 
 
• Goal of His action in 
heaven: historically 
fulfill the reality of 
the new covenant 
 
• Christ: historically 
effects the new 
covenant (new 




From the perspective of this interpretation of the macro-hermeneutical principles, 
I concluded the chapter with a reflection on the implications of such principles for the 




Table 16.  
In chapter 4, I took the last step in this hermeneutical analysis, in which I 
attempted to read systematically the general picture of Christ’s priesthood (need, agent, 
actions, and goal) and its macro-hermeneutical principles of reality (divinity, humanity, 
and cosmology) in Hebrews—the main source for a theological understanding of Christ’s 
priesthood. This study is a constructive proposal that seeks to offer a viable alternative to 
the conflicting interpretations of the priesthood of Christ in the sacramental, functional, 
and ontological models. In fact, I label this alternative as historical model. But this is not 
a full blown model yet. What I propose in this research are the initial contours of this 
alternative model, which are the result of my study of Hebrews. 
The basic contours of the historical model become more evident when compared 
with the other models discussed in this dissertation. A short comparison was provided in 
chapter 5, which began with the the priesthood of Christ, as Table 17 indicates. 
Furthermore, Table 18 outlines the priesthood of Christ sketched by the historical model 
in comparison with the other models. As indicated in chapter 3, the interpretation of 
macro-hermeneutical principles of reality has crucial implications for the understanding 
of Christ’s priesthood. Comparatively, the implications of the interpretation of these 
principles in the historical model are highlighted on Table 16. 
Concisely, the basic difference between the historical and the other models is the 
strong emphasis on an official heavenly priesthood and the intentional interpretation of it 
as spatio-temporal. In this sense, the model is historical because it assumes a sequence of 
events in the heaven. In short, each one of the models could be depicted as follows:  




Christological picture that is soteriologically concrete in spatio-temporal instruments that 
convey and actualize the timeless-spaceless reality of the new creation in human beings.  
In the functional model, the priesthood of Christ is essentially described in a 
Christological language that involves sequentiality of functions (earthly cross and 
heavenly intercession), but it is soteriologically concrete in spatio-temporal instruments 
that convey/actualize the timeless-spaceless reality of the new creation in human beings. 
The priesthood of Christ in the ontological model mainly portrays a Christology 
that reveals, by means of spatio-temporal instruments, in our spatio-temporal world the 
soteriological reality of new creation that is already concrete in God.  
Finally, in the historical model, the priesthood of Christ emphasizes a real spatio-
temporal official activity in heaven in which God is involved in the soteriological process 
of forgiving and transforming human beings (new creation). 
Conclusion 
The main contention of the present study is that the historical model constitutes a 
viable alternative that points to a way out of the conflicting systematic interpretations of 
the doctrine of Christ’s priesthood. This conclusion is unpacked in the following 
arguments. 
First, from the perspective of the historical model, the basic problem of the 
sacramental model lies on the interpretation of the macro-hermeneutical principles of 
reality, as it conceptualizes the divine reality and realm in terms of timelessness-
spacelessness. At the same time, the principal virtue of the sacramental model is the 
overall logical coherence between the understanding of Christ’s priesthood and the 




Therefore, while the historical model reads from the overall picture of Christ’s priesthood 
in the Epistle to the Hebrews that the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality are 
spatio-temporal, this model also learns from the sacramental model the importance of 
keeping a logical consistency between the interpretation of Christ’s priesthood and the 
understanding of principles of reality. Accordingly, by assuming a spatio-temporal view 
of divine reality, the historical model will necessarily (in terms of internal consistency) 
outline a different conception of the priesthood of Christ in comparison with the 
sacramental model.  
Second, in contrast to the sacramental model, the chief weakness of the functional 
model (when evaluated from the perspective of the historical model) is the lack of 
consistency between its notion of the priesthood of Christ and its interpretation or 
assumptions regarding the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality. While the picture of 
Christ’s priesthood in this model seems to imply a spatio-temporal view of reality, its 
interpretation of the principles of reality is more aligned with a timeless-spaceless 
perspective of divine reality. In its reading of Christ’s priesthood in Hebrews, the 
historical model recognizes that the functional model provides a more adequate picture of 
Christ’s priesthood than the sacramental and ontological models, and this is its significant 
virtue. However, the important idea of sequential actions and events in the functional 
model is obscured by a timeless-spaceless understanding of divine reality. In this sense, 
the historical model learns by observing the functional model that a consistent 
understanding of Christ’s priesthood characterized by sequential actions and events 
requires an interpretation of the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality that 




Third, the major problem of the ontological model (when evaluated from the 
perspective of the historical model) is that it did not modify in a substantial way the 
timeless-spaceless view of reality assumed by the sacramental and functional models. To 
be sure, the historical model learns from the ontological model the criticism of several 
inadequacies of the classical paradigm of a divine timeless-spaceless reality. Also, the 
historical model acknowledges that the notion of Christ’s priesthood and the 
interpretation of the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality are more systematically 
coherent in the ontological model than in the functional model. These two points describe 
the most important virtues of the ontological model. However, the more systematically 
coherent interpretation of the ontological model means that the priesthood of Christ in the 
model does not seem consistent with the picture of this priesthood in Hebrews, as read by 
the historical model. While the sacramental model interprets Christ’s priesthood in terms 
of a spatio-temporal (instrumental) application of a timeless-spaceless reality to spatio-
temporal human beings, the ontological model speaks of Christ’s priesthood in the sense 
of a non-sequential (logically timeless-spaceless) reality that is revealed to spatio-
temporal human beings (that is, they experience sequentiality). 
Fourth, the consistency of the historical model is basically described by a focus on 
an official heavenly priesthood described in Hebrews that implies, for instance, a real 
appearance before God the Father and a real activity of salvific mediation in the heavenly 
sanctuary that is supported by a spatio-temporal view of God and heaven. These activities 
allow an actual interaction between what takes place on earth (e.g., human prayer) and 





Recommendations for Further Research 
The consistency of the historical model delineated in this dissertation and the 
proposal that the model is a viable alternative to the disagreements between the 
sacramental, functional, and ontological models does not mean that the historical model 
does not have limitations. First of all, it needs to be emphasized that the historical model 
is a working hypothesis, and not a full blown model. In my view, the consolidation of the 
model depends on further examination of its arguments and the systematic expansion of 
its ideas. 
First, by suggesting a further examination of the arguments of the historical 
model, I acknowledge that the present study was a systematic description and analysis of 
the basic ideas that produce a general understanding of Christ’s priesthood. For instance, 
this study explored the sacramental, functional, and ontological models as heuristic tools 
for a systematic and conceptual comprehension of the priesthood of Christ, and not with 
the primary interest of deepening the understanding of what Aquinas, O’Collins, Calvin, 
Luther, Barth, and Torrance think about this issue, which probably would be the interest 
of a research in the field of historical theology. However, studies with this interest could 
be helpful to correct, adjust, or refine what the present research affirms about these 
models and theologians. Furthermore, this dissertation outlined the historical model by 
spending only one chapter on a systematic interpretation of Christ’s priesthood in 
Hebrews. Nevertheless, entire dissertations could be written on this topic, deepening the 
exegetical discussion of key passages and covering other aspects of the exegetical work 
in Hebrews, such as the historical and conceptual background of the epistle. In this way, 
biblical studies would be useful to correct, adjust, or refine what the present research 




Second, a systematic expansion of the ideas of the historical model suggested in 
this dissertation implies further research on biblical, doctrinal, historical, and 
philosophical theology. In my view, a systematic expansion in biblical theology is the 
most urgent need. In the present research, the historical model derives its ideas from the 
epistle to the Hebrews. Even though I argue that Hebrews is the normative starting point 
for a study on Christ’s priesthood in systematic theology,1 as this is the only place in 
Scripture where Christ is called (high) priest, I recognize that the historical model cannot 
be restricted to a reading of Hebrews. Rather, the model must be informed by a canonical 
reading that observes how the picture of Christ’s priesthood is enriched by the study of 
the canon as a whole (tota Scriptura). Such enrichment may include correction, 
adjustment, or refinement of the historical model presented in this dissertation.  
For instance, in his study of Prov 8, Richard Davidson suggests that the meaning 
of the verb נסך in Prov 8:23 is illuminated by the occurrence of this term in Ps 2:6, which 
describes the installment of a king in using the language of birth in Ps 2:7.2 Davidson 
stipulates that in the context of Prov 8:22-31 this royal installment “refers to the time of 
Christ’s installment into a new office at the commencement of creation and the particular 
                                                
1 The idea of a normative starting point does not mean that any study of Christ’s priesthood must 
start with Hebrews. The present dissertation, for example, begins with theological models and then moves 
to the study of Hebrews. However, the study of Hebrews in this dissertation assumes that this epistle is the 
normative starting point for the study of Christ’s priesthood. In other words, the theological models 
described in chapters 2 and 3 could be properly evaluated only after a study of Christ’s priesthood in 
Hebrews. Thus, Hebrews is the normative source for an evaluation of theological interpretations of Christ’s 
priesthood.  
2 Richard M. Davidson, “Proverbs 8 and the Place of Christ in the Trinity,” Journal of the 
Adventist Theological Society 17, no. 1 (2006): 49. For the meaning of נסך III as installment, see F. Brown, 
S. R. Driver, and C. A. Briggs, A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament (Oxford: Oxford, 
1907), 651. Davidson indicates that the birth language is associated with royal installment in Prov 8:22-24 
and Ps 2. In this way, ‘birth’ is a “technical language to describe the formal installation of royalty into a 




role to which He is installed as the ‘Mediator’ between an infinite [transcendent3] God 
and His finite creatures.”4 Taking this interpretation of Prov 8 into account, it is possible 
that a mediatorial priesthood of Christ also associated with His enthronement as king 
took place in the context of creation. In this case, Prov 8:22-31 could be related to Ps 2:6-
7 in terms of a mediation of creation, while Hebrews (see 1:5; 5:5) would relate to this 
psalm refering to a mediation of redemption in the context of the ascension and 
enthronement of the resurrected Christ. This scenario seems to suggest that the royal 
priestly mediation of Hebrews constitutes not only the salvation of human beings but also 
the recovery of Christ’s royal mediation at the beginning of creation. If this canonical 
reading is correct, the scope of Christ’s mediation would include actions in a world 
without sin, before and after the existence of the sin problem.5 In fact, the notion of 
mediation and even priesthood seems to be present in the Bible in a world before and 
after sin.6 However, in order to substantiate and unfold this idea, future studies would 
                                                
3 Davidson, “Proverbs 8 and the Place of Christ in the Trinity,” 53. 
4 Ibid., 52. Davidson suggests that “perhaps in a council between the members of the Godhead 
before creation, it was decided that the One we now call the Second Person of the Godhead would at the 
commencement of creation condescend to partially empty himself (cf. the kenosis of Phil 2), to step down 
(perhaps taking the form of an angel?) to become the Mediator between the infinite God and finite 
creatures? And that Prov 8 is referring to this installation—this ‘begetting’ of the Son of God—into the 
office of Mediator between the transcendent God and finite created beings? And that Prov 8 describes the 
mediatorial role of Wisdom—the pre-incarnate Christ?” Ibid., 53. 
5 The difference between this idea of mediation in creation and the notion of mediation in creation 
before sin implied or elaborated in the sacramental, functional, and ontological models is that in these 
models “original” creation was incomplete. On the other hand, the canonical expansion of the historical 
model on this point would mean that the conditions of complete original creation are recovered at the end. 
While those models conceptualize that Christ’s mediation is needed because of the incompleteness of 
creation, the historical model would stipulate that this mediation is part of the reality of complete creation 
and, therefore, eschatologically recovered with the events initiated at Christ’s ascension. 
6 Regarding the world before sin, Davidson argues that “the Garden of Eden was the first 
sanctuary on earth” and that the man was a priest in the garden. The arguments that support these 
statements include the idea that there are numerous parallels “between the accounts of creation as a whole 





need to show (1) whether the language of mediation and priesthood could be used 
interchangeably and, if so, (2) what would be the need, actions, and goal of a priesthood 
without reference to sin. In fact, this is only one example of the possibilities of the study 
of the canon as a whole (tota Scriptura) for a potential enrichment of the historical model 
presented in this dissertation. Another example could be a typological reading of the 
sanctuary in the Hebrew Bible that would draw connections with the priesthood of Christ. 
After a canonical (tota Scriptura) systematic expansion, doctrinal and 
philosophical studies could be undertaken for a further systematic expansion of the 
historical model. Doctrinal studies could explore how the priesthood of Christ, as 
explained by the historical model (now as a canonical model, and not merely a model 
derived from Hebrews), are systematically related to Christology in general, soteriology, 
ecclesiology, the doctrine of God, pneumatology, hamartiology, anthropology, and 
eschatology. The connections and implications provided by this exploration may lead 
also to correction, adjustment, or refinement of the historical model presented in this 
dissertation. Moreover, philosophical studies could deepen the discussion on time and 
space, relating or comparing this discussion with traditions in philosophical theology that 
deal with this issue (e.g., classical theism, process theology, etc.). Likewise, historical 
studies could relate or compare the historical model with significant theologians who 
                                                
the garden in Gen 2:15 (“till” [עבד] and “keep” [ׁשמר]) is “used to describe the work of the Levites and 
priests in the Sanctuary (Num 3:7-8; 18:3-7).” Richard M. Davidson, “Back to the Beginning: Genesis 1-3 
and the Theological Center of Scripture,” in Christ, Salvation, and the Eschaton: Essays in Honor of Hans 
K. LaRondelle, ed. Jiri Moskala (Berrien Springs, MI: Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, 2009), 
16-17. See also Richard M. Davidson, “Earth’s First Sanctuary: Genesis 1-3 and Parallel Creation 
Accounts,” AUSS 53, no. 1 (2015): 65-89. In terms of the world after sin, Rev 20:6 (see also 1:6; 5:10) 
indicates that the saved (those who share in the first resurrection) “will be priests of God and of Christ.” 
According to this perspective, the language of priesthood goes beyond the sin problem and salvation, which 




were not included in the sacramental, functional, and ontological models. For instance, 
some features of the historical model could be shown to be at least partially compatible 
with the soteriology of Jacobus Arminius,7 who attempted to overcome the traditional 
idea of predestination described in chapter 3 of this dissertation.8 However, it is not clear 
to me that his theology would support the ideas highlighted in the historical model, as the 
doctrine of God in Arminius is similar to classical theism (Aquinas).9 Nevertheless, this 
is a topic for another study. My point here is that, by way of comparison with other 
philosophical and theological traditions, studies on philosophical and historical theology 
could offer heuristic tools that may lead to correction and adjustment of the language 
used in the historical model, and/or to the refinement and sophistication of the concepts 
and language employed in the model. 
                                                
7 For Arminius’ understanding of Christ’s priesthood, see, e.g., Orations of Arminius 1. 
8 As Keith Stanglin indicates, for Arminius, “predestination is conditional on a person’s free 
acceptance or rejection of God’s saving grace.” Keith D. Stanglin, Arminius on the Assurance of Salvation: 
The Context, Roots, and Shape of the Leiden Debate, 1603-1609, Brill’s Series in Church History (Leiden; 
Boston: Brill, 2007), 84. According to Arminius, in his act of predestination God primarily establishes the 
condition for salvation, namely, human repentance and faith. See Arminius A Declaration of the Sentiments 
of Arminius. Translation taken from James Arminius, The Works of James Arminius, 3 vols., The Master 
Christian Library Ver. 5.0 [CD Rom] (Albany, OR: AGES Software, 1997), 1:222-223. For helpful 
information on Arminius’ conception of divine predestination, see William den Boer, God’s Twofold Love: 
The Theology of Jacob Arminius (1559-1609), Reformed Historical Theology (Göttingen; Oakville, CT: 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2010), 178-179; William den Boer, “Jacobus Arminius: Theologian of God’s 
Twofold Love,” in Arminius, Arminianism, and Europe Jacobus Arminius (1559/60-1609), ed. Theodoor 
Leeuwen (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009), 47-48. 
9 Arminius argues that God does not know realities in the world as they appear or develop in 
history, since “the understanding of God is derived from no external cause, not even from an object.” 
Public Disputations 4.37. Translation taken from Arminius,  1:413. Rather, “the act of understanding in 
God is his own being and essence.” It means that God knows all things “as they are in Himself and in his 
understanding.” Public Disputations 4.32. Translation taken from ibid., 1:410-411. Hence, “by a single and 
undivided act . . . He knows all things.” Public Disputations 4.33. Translation taken from ibid., 1:411. “The 
mode by which God understands, is not that which is successive . . . but it is simple.” Ibid. Following this 
perspective, the decree of Predestination is a timeless/eternal act “because God does nothing in time, which 
He has not decreed to do from all eternity.” And this is based on God’s immutability, since “if it were 
otherwise, God might be charged with mutability.” Arminius Public Disputations 15.6. Translation taken 





In short, the present dissertation provides a working hypothesis of a priestly 
Christology outlined in the historical model. This hypothesis invites further research in 
the fields of biblical theology and exegesis, doctrinal studies, historical theology, and 
philosophical theology.
                                                









APPENDIX A  
 
References and Allusions to Christ’s Priesthood                                                                
in the Context of the Structure of Hebrews  
Introduction  
For a proper reflection about the components of Christ’s priesthood (need, agent, 
actions, goal) based on Hebrews, it is necessary to provide some preliminary remarks 
regarding references and allusions to His priesthood, especially in the context of the 
terminology for the priesthood and of the structure of the epistle.1 
The Terminology for the Priesthood 
The terminology2 adopted by the author of Hebrews to refer explicitly to the idea 
                                                
1 While I comment on the literary structure of Hebrews, I do not deal with introductory matters of 
the study of the epistle, such as authorship, immediate audience, place of origin, date of composition, and 
historical background. Even though I recognize that a discussion of these topics sheds light on the 
understanding of Hebrews, there is no sufficient space in this study to explore these matters. In a recent 
introduction to Hebrews, Mason indicates that “most contemporary scholars . . . concede that we cannot 
know the author’s personal identity but that we can discern several things about him from the text.” 
Regarding the immediate audience, “modern interprets” increasingly “argue that nothing in Hebrews 
demands a reading so dependent on Jewish ethnicity,” but “scholarly reconstructions of the precise setting 
continue to vary. Regardless, almost all interpreters now agree,” with reference to 13:24, “that the text was 
sent to friends still in Rome.” Mason and McCruden, Reading the Epistle to the Hebrews, 3. For a detailed 
discussion of the introductory matters of Hebrews, see Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 1-32; 
Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 1-78; David A. DeSilva, Perseverance in Gratitude: A Socio-
Rhetorical Commentary on the Epistle “to the Hebrews” (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 1-82; 
Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 1-85; Johnson, Hebrews, 1-62; Koester, Hebrews, 19-132; 
O’Brien, The Letter to the Hebrews, 1-43; Lane, Hebrews 1-8, xlvii-clv. 
2 A short introduction to priestly terminology in the NT is found in Vanhoye, Old Testament 




of priesthood includes the vocables ἀρχιερεὺς3 (high priest), ἱερεὺς4 (priest), ἱερωσύνης5 
(priesthood, priestly office), and ἱερατεία6 (priesthood, priestly office). Overall, the 
vocables appear 35 times in the epistle, and 19 of them refer to Christ (ἀρχιερεὺς—2:17; 
3:1; 4:14, 15; 5:5, 10; 6:20; 7:26; 8:1; 9:11; ἱερεὺς—5:6; 7:11, 15, 17, 21; 8:4; 10:21; 
ἱερωσύνης—7:24).7 Arguably, the prominent terms ἀρχιερεὺς and ἱερεὺς are used 
interchangeably with reference to the (high) priesthood of Christ, as they do not seem to 
carry a particular distinction or emphasis.8 Initially, Jesus (2:9; 3:1; 4:14) Christ (5:5), the 
Son of God (4:14), is called ἀρχιερεὺς (2:17; 3:1; 4:14, 15; 5:5). At first, ἱερεὺς appears in 
the first (5:6) of three quotations of Ps 110:4 (LXX 109:4) in the epistle—the other two 
are 7:17 and 219—which identify Christ as a priest according to the order of 
Melchizedek. It is noteworthy that the author comments on this connection with 
Melchizedek in different passages, qualifying Jesus both as ἀρχιερεὺς (5:10; 6:20) and 
                                                
3 This vocable appears 17 times in Hebrews (2:17; 3:1; 4:14, 15; 5:1, 5, 10; 6:20; 7:26, 27, 28; 8:1, 
3; 9:7, 11, 25; 13:11). For the lexical meaning of ἀρχιερεὺς, see BDAG, 139; L&N §53.89.  
4 This vocable appears 14 times in Hebrews (5:6; 7:1, 3, 11, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, 23; 8:4; 9:6; 10:11, 
21). For the lexical meaning of ἱερεὺς, see BDAG, 469; L&N §53.87. Even though there is a textual variant 
in 10:11 that reads ἀρχιερεὺς instead of ἱερεὺς, the reading with ἱερεὺς is given an “A” grading in UBS5. 
5 This vocable appears 3 times in Hebrews (7:11, 12, 24). For the lexical meaning of ἱερωσύνης, 
see BDAG, 471; L&N §53.86. 
6 This vocable appears only once in Hebrews (7:5). For the lexical meaning of ἱερατεία, see 
BDAG, 469; L&N §53.86. 
7 The Greek NT text used in this study is the UBS5.  
8 Gottlob Schrenk, “ἀρχιερεὺς,” TDNT, 3:277n54; A. Sand, “ἱερεὺς,” EDNT, 2:174. 
9 The quotation in 7:21 has a textual variant. The longer reading includes the latter part of Ps 109:4 
LXX (κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Μελχισεδεκ), likewise the other two quotations in 5:6 and 7:17. However, the “A” 
grading in UBS5 is given to the shorter reading, which does not contain that part. Even though the shorter 
reading does not mention Melchizedek, his name seems to be implied in this quotation on the basis of two 





ἱερεὺς (7:11, 15). After chapter 7, the (high) priest Christ is identified as ἀρχιερεὺς (8:1; 
9:11). In the two instances where He is called ἱερεὺς (8:4; 10:21), a parallel with ἀρχιερεὺς 
is noticed. In the first instance, the context of 8:4 compares Christ as ἀρχιερεὺς in heaven 
(8:1) with high priests in general (πᾶς ἀρχιερεὺς) on earth (8:3). Since their office is 
exercised on earth,10 the author argues in 8:4 that Christ could not be ἱερεὺς on earth at 
all. This use of ἱερεὺς does not seem to establish a distinction from ἀρχιερεὺς. Christ is a 
heavenly ἀρχιερεὺς, in contrast with earthly high-priests. In the second instance, the 
accusative form ἱερέα µέγαν in 10:21 appears to reflect the Greek version (LXX) of 
references to high-priest in the Hebrew Bible. The LXX does not employ the term 
ἀρχιερεὺς, but the expression ὁ ἱερεὺς ὁ µέγας, which corresponds to the Hebrew 
construction ַהּכֵֹה֩ן ַהָּג֨דֹול in the MT.11 Therefore, the use of ἱερεὺς in Heb 10:21, and even 
in the entire epistle, does not seem to establish a distinction from ἀρχιερεὺς.12 
Besides the use of specific terms to refer explicitly to the idea of priesthood, the 
author of Hebrews seems to allude to Christ’s priesthood with the cultic/ritual language 
                                                
(2) this is the third quotation of that psalm in Hebrews, and the first two do mention Melchizedek. 
10 The repetition of the verb προσφέρω and the noun δῶρον in 8:4 suggests that the participial 
construction ὄντων τῶν προσφερόντων κατὰ νόµον τὰ δῶρα refers to earthly high-priests of 8:3. 
11 Compare the following passages in the MT and the LXX, Lev 21:10; Num 35:25, 28; 2 Kgs 
12:11; 22:4, 8; 23:4; 2 Chr 34:9; Neh 3:1, 20; 13:38; Hag 1:1, 12, 14; 2:2, 4; Zech 3:1, 8; 6:11. The LXX 
does use the term ἀρχιερεὺς (see, e.g., Lev 4:3; Josh 22:13; 24:33), but not in correspondence with the 
Hebrew construction ַהּכֵֹה֩ן ַהָּג֨דֹול . In Lev 4:3 and Josh 22:13, ἀρχιερεὺς (LXX) corresponds to ן  MT). For) ּכֵֹהֽ
further information about the high-priest in the LXX, see Schrenk, “ἀρχιερεὺς,” TDNT, 3:277n54. 
12 For Schrenk, ἱερεὺς in Hebrews is “a generic word; the exposition always has ἀρχιερεὺς in 




of purification (1:3; 9:14, 22-23),13 blood (9:12, 14; 10:19, 29; 12:24; 13:12, 20),14 
sacrifice (5:1; 7:27; 8:3; 9:23, 26; 10:12, 10, 14, 26),15 ministry/service (8:2, 6),16 
sanctuary (8:2; 9:11, 12, 24),17 and mediation (7:25; 8:6; 9:15; 12:24; 13:15, 21).18 When 
                                                
13 The language of purification is explicitly expressed in Hebrews through the nouns καθαρισµός 
(1:3) and καθαρότης (9:13), the adjective καθαρός (10:22), and the verb καθαρίζω (9:14, 22-23; 10:2). 
Overall, these terms respectively mean purification, purity, pure or clean, and to purify or cleanse. Such 
meanings may have ritual/cultic and moral connotations. See BDAG, 488-490; L&N §53.28-29. In 
Hebrews, the language of purification is associated with sin (1:3; 10:2), blood (9:13-14, 22), sacrifice (9:23; 
10:2), and evil conscience (10:22). In the LXX, there is a concentration of the occurrences of these Greek 
terms in Leviticus, which highlights their cultic/ritual connotation. In the context of the priestly 
consecration of Aaron and his sons, the altar is purified with sacrificial blood (Lev 8:15; see also Exod 
29:36-37), and this purification is also a priestly practice in other contexts (Lev 16:19; Exod 30:10; Ezek 
43:26). The Day of Atonement, for instance, includes not only the purification of the altar (Lev 16:19), but 
also the atonement (ἐξιλάσκοµαι) of the sanctuary as a whole and the cleansing (καθαρίζω) of the priests (v. 
20—the priests are mentioned only in the LXX, not in the MT; see also v. 24 LXX. The MT includes 
atonement for the priests in v. 33). In Lev 16:30, atonement (ἐξιλάσκοµαι) is defined in terms of cleansing 
(καθαρίζω) from sin, and the chapter indicates that this atoning purification is a priestly activity. 
14 The majority of the NT occurrences of the noun αἷµα are in Hebrews (2:14; 9:7, 12-14, 18-22, 
25; 10:4, 19, 29; 11:28; 12:4, 24; 13:11-12, 20). This noun occurs 97 times in the NT, and 21 are in 
Hebrews. In fact, αἷµα appears 11 times in Heb 9, which is the NT chapter with more references to this 
noun. From the 21 occurrences, 7 seem to refer cultically/ritually to Jesus’ blood, as this is a sacrificial 
blood (9:14; 12:24; 13:12) of the covenant (10:29; 13:20), the blood that gives access to the heavenly 
sanctuary or the holy places (9:12; 10:19). 
15 Most of the NT occurrences of the noun θυσία are in Hebrews (5:1; 7:27; 8:3; 9:9, 23, 26; 10:1, 
5, 8, 11-12, 26; 11:4; 13:15-16). It occurs 28 times in the NT, and 15 are found in Hebrews. Indeed, θυσία 
appears 10 times in Heb 10, which is the NT chapter with more references to this noun. From the 15 
occurrences, 7 seem to refer to Christ’s sacrifice, 2 explicitly (9:26; 10:12) and 3 implicitly (5:1; 7:27; 8:3; 
9:23; 10:26). The occurrences of θυσία in Heb 10:5, 8 indicate a parallel meaning of sacrifice and offering 
(προσφορά). The noun προσφορά also appears in Heb 10:10, 14, 18 (see also Acts 21:26; 24:17; Rom 15:16; 
Eph 5:2). In vv. 10 and 14, it depicts Christ’s sacrificial offering. 
16 The nouns λειτουργός (minister) and λειτουργία (service/ministry) in Heb 8:2 and 6 respectively 
refer to Christ as priest in the heavenly sanctuary (see vv. 1-6). In 9:21, λειτουργία describes the 
service/ministry of the earthly tabernacle, and in 10:11 the participial form of the verb λειτουργέω depicts 
the service of earthly priests. Elsewhere in the NT, λειτουργία is used to refer to priestly service (Luke 1:23; 
see also Phil 2:17, which applies this service to the faith of believers) and λειτουργός is employed to convey 
the idea of a priestly minister of the gospel (Rom 15:16). This terminology, especially in the verbal form, is 
profusely used in the LXX to describe the priestly service (see, e.g., Exod 28:35, 43; 29:30; 30:20; 31:10; 
35:19; 36:33 [39:26 MT]; 37:19 [38:21 MT]; 38:27 [40:30 MT]; 39:11-12 [39:32 MT]).  
17 In Hebrews, the noun σκηνή and the expression τά ἅγια (and its variants) convey the meaning of 
sanctuary. Most of the 31 occurrences of σκηνή in the NT are found in Hebrews (8:2, 5; 9:2-3, 6, 8, 11, 21; 
11:9; 13:10). Considering that its basic meaning is tent, σκηνή is used to refer to the tabernacle or the cultic 
tent (the tent of the testimony). See BDAG, 928. This noun describes the sanctuary/tabernacle where Christ 





the explicit references to Christ’s priesthood indicated in the previous paragraph are taken 
together with the allusions mentioned in the present paragraph, the main passages related 
to Christ’s priesthood in Hebrews are: 1:3; 2:17; 3:1; 4:14-15; 5:1, 5-6, 10; 6:20; 7:11, 
15, 17, 21, 24, 25-27; 8:1-4, 6; 9:11-12, 14-15, 22-24, 26; 10:10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 26, 29; 
12:24; 13:12, 15, 20-21.  
After these preliminary remarks on the terminology of the priesthood I will briefly 
describe the priesthood of Christ in the context of the structure of Hebrews.  
The Priesthood and the Sctructure of Hebrews 
Using George Guthrie’s proposal as a frame of reference of the structure of 
Hebrews,19 in which there is a complex interplay between the genres of exposition and 
                                                
occurrences are found in Hebrews (8:2; 9:1 [singular form], 2 [anarthrous form], 3 [anarthrous and 
compound form—Ἅγια Ἁγίων], 8, 12, 24 [anarthrous form], 25; 10:19; 13:11), and 3 of them (8:2; 9:12, 
24) point to the sanctuary where Christ is the high priest. It is noteworthy that, with the exception of the 
contrast between the holy place and the most holy place in Heb 9:2-3, all other occurrences of τά ἅγια (and 
its variants) in Hebrews appear to refer to the sanctuary as a whole. See Salom, “Ta Hagia in the Epistle to 
the Hebrews,” 59-70. This point will be further elaborated in the section below on Cosmology. 
18 The idea of Christ’s priestly mediation in Hebrews seems to be highlighted by the noun µεσίτης 
(8:6; 9:15; 12:24—elsewhere in the NT Christ is called µεσίτης in 1 Tim 2:5), the verb ἐντυγχάνω (7:25—
elsewhere in the NT Christ is the subject of ἐντυγχάνω in Rom 8:34), and the preposition διά (7:25; 13:15, 
21). With the meaning of mediator (see BDAG, 634; L&N §31.22), µεσίτης depicts Christ as the mediator 
of a better (8:6) and new (9:15; 12:24) covenant. This mediation is associated with Christ’s priestly 
ministry (λειτουργία—in 8:1-2, Christ the high priest is the λειτουργός of the sanctuary) in 8:6, and with His 
sacrificial death and blood in 9:15 and 12:24 respectively. Describing the action of intercession or appeal 
(see BDAG, 341; L&N §33.347), the verb ἐντυγχάνω in 7:25 describes Christ interceding for those who 
come to God, and this intercession appears in the context of His permanent priesthood (v. 24) as a High 
Priest (v. 26). The preposition διά in the genitive form (through) coveys the idea of agency or means, 
among other senses (see Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of 
the New Testament [Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996], 368-369). In 7:25, a passage that I have already 
indicated its priestly context, believers come to God through Christ. In 13:15, using a priestly language, 
believers are exhorted to offer a sacrifice of praise to God through Christ. In 13:21, the author of Hebrews 
prays that God may work in believers through Christ. This mediatorial activity seems to be associated with 
His sacrifical blood in 13:20. 
19 See George H. Guthrie, The Structure of Hebrews: A Text-Linguistic Analysis (Leiden; New 
York: Brill, 1994), 144; George H. Guthrie, Hebrews, The NIV Application Commentary (Grand Rapids, 





exhortation20—the exposition serving the overall purpose of exhortation in the book,21 the 
main passages about Christ’s priesthood are found in different sections and genres of the 
epistle, as it can be observed in the general structure of Hebrews outlined below.22 
Introduction (1:1-4)* 
Exposition I: The Son as Our Messenger (1:5–2:18)* 
  Exhortation (2:1-4) 
 Exhortation (3:1–4:13) 
  Transition from exposition to exhortation (3:1-6)* 
Exposition II: The Son as Our High Priest (4:14–10:25)* 
 Transition/overlap: exhortation, exposition (4:14-16)* 
                                                
Hebrews, which includes minor adjustments to his two previous publications, found in Guthrie, “The 
Structure of Hebrews Revisited,” https://hebrews.unibas.ch/documents/2006GuthrieH.pdf (accessed 28 
December, 2016), 2 (Figure 2: the Structure of the Book of Hebrews). He adopts the method of text-
linguistics analysis or discourse analysis, which attempts to track cohesion shifts in the discourse. See 
Guthrie, The Structure of Hebrews, 36-37, 45-58. To some extent, his analysis builds on the literary 
analysis of Albert Vanhoye, La Structure Littéraire De L’Épitre Aux Hébreux (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 
1962). See Guthrie, The Structure of Hebrews, 45; Cynthia Long Westfall, A Discourse Analysis of the 
Letter to the Hebrews: The Relationship between Form and Meaning, Library of New Testament Studies 
(London; New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 19. Supporters of Guthrie’s proposal include, Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 
xc-xcviii; O’Brien, The Letter to the Hebrews, 31-34; Barry C. Joslin, “Can Hebrews Be Structured? An 
Assessment of Eight Approaches,” Currents in Biblical Research 6, no. 1 (2007): 115-122. The main critic 
of Guthrie is probably Westfall, who considers “his proposal of two independent but interrelated backbones 
[exposition and exhortation] that run side by side but eventually converge” as incoherent and confusing. 
Westfall, A Discourse Analysis of the Letter to the Hebrews, 20. For a defense of Guthrie’s proposal in face 
of Westfall’s criticism, see Joslin, “Can Hebrews be Structured?,” 99-129; O’Brien, The Letter to the 
Hebrews, 33-34. 
20 Guthrie affirms “a brilliant interplay between expositional spans and more overtly hortatory 
spans in the book, and that these subgenres, while dynamically interweaving both rhetorically and 
semantically, have distinct features and functions, which must be taken into account in structural 
assessments of the book. These subgenres neither should be held apart, as if they were two parallel but 
separate rivers flowing side-by-side, nor should they be mingled to the point that their distinctiveness and 
unique contributions to the discourse become obscured.” Guthrie, “The Structure of Hebrews Revisited,” 
https://hebrews.unibas.ch/documents/2006Guthrie.pdf (accessed 28 December, 2016), 6; Guthrie, The 
Structure of Hebrews, 50, 115. 
21 In agreement with the idea that Hebrews is a “word of exhortation [παράκλησις]” (Heb 13:22), 
Guthrie argues that “the expositional material serves the hortatory purpose of the whole work,” assuming 
that “the purpose of the book of Hebrews is to exhort the hearers to endure in their pursuit of the promised 
reward.” He explains, “In the expositional units the discourse deals with information about the Son. In the 
hortatory units the author turns to his hearers and exhorts them to take action.” The Christological 
exposition “offers a powerful motivation for an active obedience and endurance” of believers. Guthrie, The 
Structure of Hebrews, 143, 145. 
22 Adapted from Guthrie, “The Structure of Hebrews Revisited,” 
https://hebrews.unibas.ch/documents/2006GuthrieH.pdf (accessed 28 December, 2016), 2 (Figure 2: the 
Structure of the Book of Hebrews). The symbol (*) indicates that the section contains at least one main 




 Exhortation (5:11-6:20) 
  Transition from exhortation to exposition (6:13-20)* 




 Generally speaking, besides the introduction (1:1-4) and benediction/conclusion 
(13:20-25),23 Hebrews has two sections of exposition, namely, the Son as our messenger 
(1:5–2:18) and the Son as our high priest (4:14–10:25),24 and ends with exhortation 
(10:26–13:19).25 The first expositional section includes hortatory material or exhortation 
(2:1-4), and the first and second sections are connected by exhortation (3:1–4:13), which 
has a transition26 (3:1-6) between the first section of exposition and the hortatory material 
and moves to an overlap of exposition and exhortation (4:14-16) in the transition from the 
hortatory material and the second section of exposition. Besides this overlap, the second 
section includes exhortation (5:11–6:20), which has a transition (6:13-20) that brings the 
discourse back to exposition. In the transition (10:19-25) from the second section to the 
final hortatory material there is again an overlap of exposition and exhortation.    
Almost all explicit references to Christ as (high) priest appear in exposition II 
                                                
23 For Guthrie, the benediction includes vv. 20-21 and the conclusion comprises vv. 22-25. 
Guthrie, “The Structure of Hebrews Revisited,” https://hebrews.unibas.ch/documents/2006GuthrieH.pdf 
(accessed 28 December, 2016), 2 (Figure 2: the Structure of the Book of Hebrews). 
24 These are short titles of the sections. According to Guthrie, the first section is entitled “The 
Position of the Son, Our Messenger, in Relation to the Angels” and the second section is labeled “The 
Position of the Son, Our High Priest, in Relation to the Earthly Sacrificial System.” Ibid. 
25 Guthrie speaks of “three general movements in the discourse,” the two Christological 
expositions in their logical development, and the final hortatory material that draws “force from the 
expositional material and by reiteration of key themes and forms found in other blocks of exhortation, . . . 
using especially encouragement, warnings, promises, and positive and negative examples.” Ibid., 
https://hebrews.unibas.ch/documents/2006Guthrie.pdf (accessed 28 December, 2016), 5, 8-9. 
26 For a helpful treatment of transition devices and techniques in Hebrews, see Guthrie, The 




(4:14-15; 5:5, 6, 10; 7:11, 15, 17, 21, 24, 26; 8:1, 4; 9:11; 10:21). Occurrences of these 
references are found in exposition I (2:17), and in transitions from expositon to 
exhortation (3:1; 10:21) and vice-versa (4:14-15; 6:20).27 Therefore, explicit references to 
Christ’s priesthood tend to be found in hortatory material only when there is a transition 
from or to exposition. On the other hand, allusions to Christ’s priesthood, while largely 
present in exposition II (5:1; 7:25, 27; 8:2-3, 6; 9:11, 12, 14-15, 22-24, 26; 10:12, 10, 14, 
19), occur in the final hortatory material (10:26, 29; 12:24; 13:12, 15), and also in the 
introduction (1:3) and the benediction (13:20-21).  
Not surprisingly, most references and allusions to Christ’s priesthood appear in 
exposition II, which is a section that deals specifically with this priesthood. I briefly 
outline this section on Christ’s priesthood below.28 
The Position of the Son, Our High Priest, in Relation to the Earthly Sacrificial System (4:14–10:25) 
Opening: Having a Great High Priest–Hold Fast and Draw Near (4:14-16) 
A. The Apointment of the Son as a Superior High Priest (5:1-10; 7:1-28) 
1. Introduction: The Son Taken from Among Humans and Appointed According to the Order 
                                                
27 In his treatment of transition devices in Hebrews, Guthrie suggests the existence of “hook 
words” that are used for lexical stitching. To put it differently, “two parts of the discourse are stitched 
together in the book’s structural development” through the use of “common words.” In this sense, “the end 
of one unit and the beginning of the next” are “stitched together by the use of a repeated term or terms.” 
Taking into account the shift between genres (exposition and exhortation) in Hebrews, hook words are used 
not only to build continuity between “adjacent units,” such as the immediate shift from exposition to 
exhortation, but also to effect a long “stitching of the expository unit to the next expository unit.” An 
example of this transition device is the use of the hook word ἀρχιερεὺς in 2:17 (at the end of exposition I); 
3:1 (shift to exhortation); 4:14 (the beginning of exposition II). The use of this word in 2:17 constitutes the 
first reference to Christ’s priesthood in the book. “As the author shifts to exhortation at 3:1 the high priest 
theme is reiterated and then deactivated until 4:14,” which is the beginning of the next exposition section. 
Ibid., 13-16. Therefore, there is an immediate transition from exposition to exhortation in 2:17 and 3:1, but 
also a “dynamic transition” from exposition I and exposition II in 2:17 and 4:14, as “the author resumes his 
Christological exposition at 4:14 and following.” Ibid., 
https://hebrews.unibas.ch/documents/2006Guthrie.pdf (accessed 28 December, 2016), 18. It must be noted 
that other terms are identified by Guthrie as hook words along with ἀρχιερεὺς in the transition from 
exposition to exhortation in 2:17-18 and 3:1-2, and in the transition from exposition I to exposition II in 
2:17-18 and 4:14-5:3. See ibid., 16-18. 
28 Adapted from ibid., https://hebrews.unibas.ch/documents/2006GuthrieH.pdf (accessed 28 




of Melchizedek (5:1-10) 
Exhortation (5:11–6:20) 
The Difficulty in Giving Advanced Teaching on the Subject: Their Immaturity (5:11–6:3) 
Warning: The Danger of Falling Away From Christian Faith (6:4-8) 
The Author’s Confidence in and Desire for the Hearers (6:9-12) 
Transition to Exposition: God’s Oath–Our Basis for Hope (6:13-20) 
2. The Superiority of Melchizedek (5:1-10) 
 ab (transition). We Have Such a High Priest Who is a Minister in Heaven (8:1-2)  
 B. The Superior Offering of the Appointed High Priest (8:3–10:18) 
1. Introduction: The More Excellent Ministry of the Heavenly High Priest (8:3-6) 
2. The Superiority of the New Covenant (8:7-13) 
3. The Superior New Covenant Offering (9:1–10:18) 
a. The Place and Practice of Old Covenant Offering (9:1-10) 
b. The New Covenant Offering Superior as to Blood, Place, and Eternality (9:11–10:18) 
Closing: Since We Have a Great Priest–Draw Near, Hold Fast, Consider (10:19-25) 
 
According to Guthrie, exposition II forms a great inclusio in the book, evidenced 
by at least nine lexical parallels between the opening at 4:14-16 and the closing at 10:19-
25.29 This inclusio is constituted by two primary themes regarding Christ’s priesthood—
(a) His superior appointment (5:1-10; 7:1-28) and (b) His superior offering (8:3–
10:18)30—and the transition between them (8:1-2) is arguably the center of the inclusio.31 
This preliminary overview of the terminology related to Christ’s priesthood in the 
context of the literary structure of Hebrews provided the initial background information 
for my conceptual articulation of the components of Christ’s priesthood in chapter 4. 
                                                
29 See ibid., https://hebrews.unibas.ch/documents/2006Guthrie.pdf (accessed 28 December, 2016), 
20-21. 
30 In his treatment of transition devices in Hebrews, Guthrie suggests the existence of two 
significant parallel introductions in the book. The first one is the parallel between the beginning of 
expositions I (1:5–2:18) and II (4:14–10:25). Both expositions are introduced by the quotation of Ps 2:7 
(see 1:5 and 5:5). Guthrie argues that “this parallel introduction facilitates a fluid transition from the first 
major expositional span of material, to the second.” Ibid., 23. While this first parallel relates to the 
transition between expositions I and II, the second parallel concerns the transition between the two main 
parts of exposition II. In fact, the themes of (a) Christ’s superior appointment (5:1-10; 7:1-28) and (b) 
Christ’s superior offering (8:3–10:18) present a similar introduction (see 5:1 and 8:3), one with the focus on 
the idea of appointment (5:1) and the other focusing on the offering (8:3). Ibid., 24-25. 
31 According to Guthrie, “The intermediary transition at Heb. 8:1-2 could be considered the center 
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